Some probabilistic models of best, worst, and best-worst choices

Over the past decade or so, a choice design in which a person is asked to select both the best and the worst option in an available set of options has been gaining favor over more traditional designs, such as where the person is asked, for instance, to: select the best option; select the worst option; rank the options; or rate the options. In this paper, we develop theoretical results for three overlapping classes of probabilistic models for best, worst, and best-worst choices, with the models in each class proposing specific ways in which such choices might be related. The models in these three classes are called random ranking and random utility, joint and sequential, and ratio scale. We include some models that belong to more than one class, with the best known being the maximum-difference (maxdiff) model, summarize estimation issues related to the models, and formulate a number of open theoretical problems.     

Tag, you're it: Tagging as an alternative to yes/no recognition in item method directed forgetting

The current study contrasted a standard yes/no recognition task with a tagging recognition task in the context of an item-method directed forgetting paradigm. During the study phase, a series of words was presented one at a time, each followed by an instruction to remember (R) or forget (F). The retention of R and F study words was tested using either a typical yes/no recognition task or a tagging recognition task in which participants labeled each word as “R”, “F” or “New”. The directed forgetting effect observed in each task was equivalent in magnitude. However, the tagging recognition task afforded an additional analysis of the errors of misattribution that was not possible with the more typical yes/no recognition task. Interestingly, when falsely recognizing a Foil word, participants were more likely to assign an “F” tag than an “R” tag. These errors of misattribution are consistent with existing accounts of directed forgetting that suggest R words are better encoded than F words. We argue for the utility of the tagging procedure, given it does not alter the directed forgetting effect normally seen with yes/no recognition but provides additional information about errors of misattribution.     

Driving without awareness: The effects of practice and automaticity on attention and driving

This research examined the development of proceduralised “driving without awareness” in a driving simulator by paying participants to drive a simulated road regularly over 12 weeks of testing. This longitudinal research paradigm is a significant departure from previous studies which have examined drivers in a conscious attentional mode using short experimental sessions or cross-sectional designs comparing expert and novice performance. During each session, participants took two “trips” on the simulated road; sometimes travelling on a “to and from” journey on one half of the road, sometimes traversing the entire road in one direction. A range of measures, including driving performance, vehicle detection, perceptual speed regulation, and hazard reactions were collected. The results showed the development of driving patterns and changes in object detection performance indicative of proceduralised driving. Speed and lane position variability quickly decreased with practice, as did participants’ subjective experiences of driving difficulty. Performance on an embedded detection task appeared to become a proceduralised part of the driving task, becoming highly efficient in later stages of the experiment. The changes in attentional focus and driving performance over time provide new light on previous research findings and allow us to critically re-examine several established models of driver behaviour.     

The influence of depression symptoms on exploratory decision-making

People with symptoms of depression show impairments in decision-making. One explanation is that they have difficulty maintaining rich representations of the task environment. We test this hypothesis in the context of exploratory choice. We analyze depressive and non-depressive participants’ exploration strategies by comparing their choices to two computational models: (1) an “Ideal Actor” model that reflectively updates beliefs and plans ahead, employing a rich representation of the environment and (2) a “Naïve Reinforcement Learning” (RL) model that updates beliefs reflexively utilizing a minimal task representation. Relative to non-depressive participants, we find that depressive participants’ choices are better described by the simple RL model. Further, depressive participants were more exploratory than non-depressives in their decision-making. Depressive symptoms appear to influence basic mechanisms supporting choice behavior by reducing use of rich task representations and hindering performance during exploratory decision-making.     

The smart gut: Tracking affective associative learning with measures of “liking”, facial electromyography, and preferential looking

We demonstrate here that initially neutral items can acquire specific value based on their associated outcomes, and that responses of physiological systems to such previously meaningless stimuli can rapidly reflect this associative history. Each participant participated in an associative learning task in which four neutral abstract pictures were each repeatedly paired with one of four foods that varied in valence and magnitude. Over the course of learning, participants’ “liking” ratings of and preferences for each picture came to reflect the value of the food with which it was paired. The abstract pictures also elicited physiological responses characteristic of the foods with which they were paired, including changes in facial electromyography (EMG) and preferential looking. A logistic modeling procedure showed that learning parameters, such as the rate at which participants learned the values associated with the pictures, were similar across food outcomes of different value.     

Making decisions about now and later: Development of future-oriented self-control

This study explored factors underlying preschoolers’ ability to make future-oriented choices. In a delay-of-gratification choice task, quantity and visibility of the reward was systematically varied. Participants included 90 typically developing children aged 2–4 years. Children made more choices to delay gratification as the quantity of the reward increased from 1 to 4 stickers, but covering the reward did not have an effect. The study extends previous findings on delay of gratification choice tasks in suggesting a developmental pattern beginning with an early appearing “hot” motivational system. Having children think about the present self versus the future self presumably activates a second “cool” representational system. Age differences in the development of this system and its integration with the motivational system may be at the heart of the “U” shaped function observed in the present work, one in which simpler abilities underlying self-control develop in parallel and integrate to produce more complex behaviour. The study thus contributes to our understanding of the development of future-oriented self-control, a milestone central to socialization and the definition of the self.     

Comparison of active and purely visual performance in a multiple-string means-end task in infants

The aim of the present study was to understand what factors influence infants’ problem-solving behaviours on the multiple-string task. The main question focused on why infants usually solve the single string-pulling task at 12 months at the latest, whereas most 16-month-old infants still cannot solve the task when several strings are presented, only one of which is attached to the desired object. We investigated whether this difficulty is related to infants’ ability to inhibit their spontaneous immediate actions by comparing active and purely visual performance in this task. During the first part of the experiment, we assessed the ability of infants aged 16–20 months to solve the multiple-string task. The infants were then divided into three groups based on performance (a “failure” group, an “intermediate” group, and a “success” group). The results of this action task suggest that there were differences in infants’ performance according to their level of inhibitory control of their preferred hand. In the second part of the experiment, the three groups’ predictive looking strategies were compared when seeing an adult performing the task. We found that only infants who successfully performed the action task also visually anticipated which string the adult had to pull in the visual task. Our results suggests that inhibitory control was not the only factor influencing infants’ performance on the task. Furthermore, the data support the direct matching hypothesis (Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 2005), according to which infants need to be able to perform actions themselves before being able to anticipate similar actions performed by others.     

On the limits of infants' quantification of small object arrays

Recent work suggests that infants rely on mechanisms of object-based attention and short-term memory to represent small numbers of objects. Such work shows that infants discriminate arrays containing 1, 2, or 3 objects, but fail with arrays greater than 3 [Feigenson, L., & Carey, S. (2003). Tracking individuals via object-files: Evidence from infants' manual search. Developmental Science, 6, 568-584; Feigenson, L., Carey, S., & Hauser, M. (2002). The representations underlying infants' choice of more: Object files versus analog magnitudes. Psychological Science, 13(2), 150-156]. However, little is known about how infants represent arrays exceeding the 3-item limit of parallel representation. We explored possible formats by which infants might represent a 4-object array. Experiment 1 used a manual search paradigm to show that infants successfully discriminated between arrays of 1 vs. 2, 2 vs. 3, and 1 vs. 3 objects. However, infants failed to discriminate 1 vs. 4 despite the highly discriminable ratio, providing the strongest evidence to date for object-file representations underlying performance in this task. Experiment 2 replicated this dramatic failure to discriminate 1 from 4 in a second paradigm, a cracker choice task. We then showed that infants in the choice task succeeded at choosing the larger quantity with 0 vs. 4 crackers and with 1 small vs. 4 large crackers. These results suggest that while infants failed to represent 4 as “exactly 4”, “approximately 4”, “3”, or as even as “a plurality”, they did represent information about the array, including the existence of a cracker or cracker-material and the size of the individual objects in the array.     

A model for repeat trial product tests

A non-forced choice model is developed that describes subject behavior on repeat trial discrimination tests of the pick 1 ofk form. The model is developed from the Dirichlet distribution, and it allows for the derivation of individual true scores and of sampling properties for various constructs of interest. These results permit the analysis and comparison of test designs. The model is applied to issues such as forced vs. non-forced choice formats, the best number of alternatives at a choice point, and the selection of expert panels.     

Electrophysiological difference between the representations of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory

Causally related concepts like “virus” and “epidemic” and general associatively related concepts like “ring” and “emerald” are represented and accessed separately. The Evoked Response Potential (ERP) procedure was used to examine the representations of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory. Participants were required to remember a task cue (causal or associative) presented at the beginning of each trial, and assess whether the relationship between subsequently presented words matched the initial task cue. The ERP data showed that an N400 effect (250–450 ms) was more negative for unrelated words than for all related words. Furthermore, the N400 effect elicited by causal relations was more positive than for associative relations in causal cue condition, whereas no significant difference was found in the associative cue condition. The centrally distributed late ERP component (650–750 ms) elicited by the causal cue condition was more positive than for the associative cue condition. These results suggested that the processing of causal judgment and associative judgment in semantic memory recruited different degrees of attentional and executive resources.     

Failure to exploit learned spatial value information during visual search

ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been rapid proliferation of studies demonstrating how reward learning guides visual search. However, most of these studies have focused on feature-based reward, and there has been scant evidence supporting the learning of space-based reward. We raise the possibility that the visual search apparatus is impenetrable to spatial value contingencies, even when such contingencies are learned and represented online in a separate knowledge domain. In three experiments, we interleaved a visual choice task with a visual search task in which one display quadrant produced greater monetary rewards than the remaining quadrants. We found that participants consistently exploited this spatial value contingency during the choice task but not during the search task – even when these tasks were interleaved within the same trials and when rewards were contingent on response speed. These results suggest that the expression of spatial value information is task specific and that the visual search apparatus could be impenetrable to spatial reward information. Such findings are consistent with an evolutionary framework in which the search apparatus has little to gain from spatial value information in most real world situations.     

Ginzberg's theory of occupational choice: A reanalysis of increasing realism

A causal model of indicators was derived from Ginzberg, Ginsburg, Axelrad, and Herma's developmental framework of occupational choice. This theoretical perspective suggests that high school age adolescents' “fantasy” choices are diverted into more “realistic” anticipations mainly through awareness of the work world and work roles and perceived “reality factors” (perceived goal-blocks) which function to inhibit the maintenance of such “fantasy” desires. Panel data from a three-state sample of nonmetropolitan Southern males interviewed while in the tenth-grade in 1966 and reinterviewed in 1968 were examined using path analytic models. Findings suggest that “realistic” choices (expectations) demonstrate an increasing dissociation from earlier “fantasy” choices (aspirations) primarily through the formation of perceived “reality factors.” An alternative model which incorporates race as a predetermined variable seems to indicate that racial differences in occupational knowledge affect the formation of perceived “reality factors” which are significant mediators of social origin for high school seniors' occupational expectations. While race affects occupational knowledge directly, most of the causal effects of race on 1968 expectations are actually due to the association of race with SES. Areas of other research are specified.     

确定、不确定及风险状态下选择反转:“齐当别”选择方式的解释

应用广义“弱优势”（weak dominance）模型检验确定、不确定及风险状态下的选择反转现象。该模型将人们的二择一选择行为描述为一种搜寻一备择方案在主观上优越于另一备择方案的过程。即：在甲方案在某一维度上优越于乙方案,而乙方案在另一维度上优越于甲方案的情况下,为了利用“弱优势”（weak dominance）原则达成决策,人们必须在一维度上将两者间较小的差异人为地“齐同”掉,而在另一维度上将“辨别”两者间较大的差异作为最终选择的依据。因此,在每次选择时,如果不认为最大的差异都是来自同一维度,就会导致选择反转。此项研究设计了一“匹配”任务,并借此检验,在不同的决策状态下,判断两备择方案在各维度上的差异是否能预测人们的重复选择变异。总的测试-再测试结果支持“齐当别”选择方式的解释。其发现表明：重复选择之所以可能是一致的,并不是因为每次都认定被选中的备择方案具有最大值,而是因为每次选择都认定最大的差异来自一固定的维度。     

The response dynamics of preferential choice

The ubiquity of psychological process models requires an increased degree of sophistication in the methods and metrics that we use to evaluate them. We contribute to this venture by capitalizing on recent work in cognitive science analyzing response dynamics, which shows that the bearing information processing dynamics have on intended action is also revealed in the motor system. This decidedly “embodied” view suggests that researchers are missing out on potential dependent variables with which to evaluate their models—those associated with the motor response that produces a choice. The current work develops a method for collecting and analyzing such data in the domain of decision making. We first validate this method using widely normed stimuli from the International Affective Picture System (Experiment 1), and demonstrate that curvature in response trajectories provides a metric of the competition between choice options. We next extend the method to risky decision making (Experiment 2) and develop predictions for three popular classes of process model. The data provided by response dynamics demonstrate that choices contrary to the maxim of risk seeking in losses and risk aversion in gains may be the product of at least one “online” preference reversal, and can thus begin to discriminate amongst the candidate models. Finally, we incorporate attentional data collected via eye-tracking (Experiment 3) to develop a formal computational model of joint information sampling and preference accumulation. In sum, we validate response dynamics for use in preferential choice tasks and demonstrate the unique conclusions afforded by response dynamics over and above traditional methods.     

Managerial Work, Job Analysis, and Holland's RIASEC Vocational Environment Dimensions

We examined relations between the environmental dimensions underlying Holland's theory of vocational choice and skill requirements, context characteristics, and task frequency ratings for managerial jobs. The Holland environmental constructs were measured by the recently developedPosition Classification Inventory(PCI). The task, skill requirement, and context variables were measured using traditional job analysis surveys. Ten judges provided estimates of the expected correlations between the job analysis variables and the Holland constructs. The profile of observed correlations was generally consistent with the judges’ expectations based on Holland's theory, providing support for both that framework and the construct validity of the PCI. The one Holland dimension for which the data were least consistent with predictions was “Realistic.” Results provide a detailed picture of the work content, skills, and context variables within managerial work that are likely to be associated with the RIASEC dimensions. Implications for management development are discussed.     

The Relation of ERP Components to Complex Memory Processing

The relation between various ERP components generated during encoding of a word and its subsequent recall were investigated using a “rote” serial-order and an “elaborative” category memory task. Words (flashed separately) were time-locked to EEG recordings from 21 cortical sites. ERP components from the five subjects having the highest recall scores were compared to the five lowest scoring subjects. Results based on the P200 peak amplitude data as well as the N400 and late positive component peak amplitude and latency data suggest that anterior and posterior distributional differences are elicited during encoding of words for rote and elaborative memory tasks. Furthermore, strong individual differences in these patterns were found as a function of task. A tentative argument was made that the obtained anterior and posterior differences may index different word feature selection and encoding processes, which are differentially utilized by high and low recallers.     

Is guilt ‘likely’ or ‘not certain’?: Contrast with previous probabilities determines choice of verbal terms

This research focuses on what determines speakers' choice of positive and negative probability phrases (e.g., “a chance” vs. “not certain”) in a legal context. We argue that choice of phrase to describe an event's probability of occurrence can be determined by the contrast between its current p value and an earlier p value, and not by that current value alone. Three experiments were conducted describing scenarios where profilers communicated a suspect's probability of guilt to the police. In the first study, a probability estimate is revised upwards or downwards. In the second one, the probability estimate of a speaker is higher or lower than that given by a previous speaker. In both cases, participants expected upward trends to lead to positive phrases, whereas downward trends were associated with negative phrases. In a third study, participants had to select probability phrases to characterize two different suspects. No contrast effects were found. We conclude that verbal probability directionality has primarily an argumentative function, where positive phrases are selected when probabilities are contrasted with smaller p values, and negative when contrasted with higher p values.     

Is the go/no-go lexical decision task preferable to the yes/no task with developing readers?

The lexical decision task is probably the most common laboratory visual word identification task together with the naming task. In the usual setup, participants need to press the “yes” button when the stimulus is a word and the “no” button when the stimulus is not a word. A number of studies have employed this task with developing readers; however, error rates and/or response times tend to be quite high. One way to make the task easier for young readers is by employing a go/no-go procedure: “If word, press ‘yes’; if not, refrain from responding.” Here we conducted a lexical decision experiment that systematically compared the yes/no and go/no-go variants of the lexical decision task with developing readers (second- and fourth-grade children). Results showed that (a) error rates for words and nonwords were much lower in the go/no-go task than in the yes/no task, (b) lexical decision times were substantially faster in the go/no-go task, and (c) there was less variability in the latency data of the go/no-go task for high-frequency words. Thus, the go/no-go lexical decision task is preferable to the “standard” yes/no task when conducting experiments with developing readers.     

What is the nature of the mind's pattern-recognition process?

If we look at the human mind as a pattern-recognition device, what is the nature of its pattern-recognizing? And how does it differ from the majority of pattern-recognition methods we have collectively devised over the decades? These broad philosophical questions emerge from the studies of chess thought, and we propose that a major task of the mind is to engage in “experience recognition” (Linhares & Freitas, 2010). One of the basic tenets of that proposal is that pattern recognition, in cognitive science and related disciplines, does not accurately reflect human psychology. As an example, the well-known article by Chase and Simon, “perception in chess”, and the benchmark cognitive computational models of chess, by Gobet et al. were criticized. Lane and Gobet (2011) provide serious skepticism concerning some of those arguments, and here we take the opportunity to respond and expand the theoretical constructs of “experience recognition”. We postulate that the mind's pattern-recognizing process holds the following properties: it is a highly path-dependent process; it prioritizes internal encodings; it is a self-organizing process in constant change; and it constructs its future information-processing pathways by continuously recognizing the possibilities that lie within the adjacent possible.