Where am I? Distal cues use requires sensitivity to start location change in the rat

Place learning is impaired when a single plus maze is moved between adjacent locations 33-120 cm apart. This maze translation creates distinct start locations but maintains a single goal location with respect to distal cues. Hippocampal cell recording data suggest the majority of place fields are tied to apparatus boundaries, not to distal cues, when an apparatus is moved these distances to the left or right. Thus, rats may fail to appreciate the existence of multiple start locations with respect to distal cues when the maze is moved in this way and their start location on the surface is constant. Performance on the single plus maze problem was improved when texture cues were correlated with different start locations. Place learning was supported when multiple start locations were provided on a single large surface (double plus maze), even though rats did not explore the entire surface. Place learning was also supported when random extensions were added to a double plus maze such that start locations, relative to surface boundaries, were not informative as to goal location. This outcome suggests sensitivity to multiple start locations is required for distal cue use in translational place problems.     

Where Does I Stand? Reflections on Home and Identity Ensnared in a Cultural Narrative

In this paper the author explores a cultural narrative that she suggests rests on the concepts of the Feminine and Masculine as such, employing both as though they contain an agreed set of universal givens. These givens are extrapolated from an androcentric perspective on female and male bodies, in particular their biological functions regarding reproduction. The metaphors of the baby-in-womb, mother’s preoccupation with child and heteronormative sexual relations are the primary cyphers for the narrative. She suggests that remaining unconscious of this narrative, such that it is taken as a universal given, can hamper a person’s relation to themselves, the world and others. The author names two concepts, Home and Identity: Home being an hospitable and accommodating space with Identity denoting the one who inhabits the space. In the narrative these two are unhelpfully categorized as belonging to the Feminine and the Masculine respectively. For ease of understanding the author uses a capital letter to designate an abstract idea, and lower case when referring to the concrete or particular. Clinical examples are given throughout the paper to illustrate how acknowledgement and awareness of this narrative might free the analyst or therapist to think more broadly around issues pertaining to space and identity.     

Where exactly am I? Self-location judgements distribute between head and torso

I am clearly located where my body is located. But is there one particular place inside my body where I am? Recent results have provided apparently contradictory findings about this question. Here, we addressed this issue using a more direct approach than has been used in previous studies. Using a simple pointing task, we asked participants to point directly at themselves, either by manual manipulation of the pointer whilst blindfolded or by visually discerning when the pointer was in the correct position. Self-location judgements in haptic and visual modalities were highly similar, and were clearly modulated by the starting location of the pointer. Participants most frequently chose to point to one of two likely regions, the upper face or the upper torso, according to which they reached first. These results suggest that while the experienced self is not spread out homogeneously across the entire body, nor is it localised in any single point. Rather, two distinct regions, the upper face and upper torso, appear to be judged as where “I” am.     

I know you're me, but who am I? Perspective taking and seeing the other in the self

Research examining the consequences of perspective-taking on cognition suggests that through perceiver–target overlap, perspective-taking can lead to greater valuing of targets, greater helping of targets, and a reduction in stereotyping of targets and the groups to which they belong. Research has also begun to focus more closely on the ways perceivers come to think and act like targets. This research, however evocative, is not conclusive. The current studies set out to provide firmer support. Reported here, two studies found that perspective-taking influences perceiver–target overlap, which mediates changes in self-concept (ratings of the self on researcher-related attributes and beliefs after taking the perspective of a researcher in Study 1 and attitudes toward African Americans after taking the perspective of a racist in Study 2). In the same studies, overlap simultaneously mediated valuing of the targets (target ratings on positive attributes in Study 1 and liking for the target in Study 2).     

Where am I and how will I get there from here? A role for posterior parietal cortex in the integration of spatial information and route planning

The ability of an organism to accurately navigate from one place to another requires integration of multiple spatial constructs, including the determination of one's position and direction in space relative to allocentric landmarks, movement velocity, and the perceived location of the goal of the movement. In this review, we propose that while limbic areas are important for the sense of spatial orientation, the posterior parietal cortex is responsible for relating this sense with the location of a navigational goal and in formulating a plan to attain it. Hence, the posterior parietal cortex is important for the computation of the correct trajectory or route to be followed while navigating. Prefrontal and motor areas are subsequently responsible for executing the planned movement. Using this theory, we are able to bridge the gap between the rodent and primate literatures by suggesting that the allocentric role of the rodent PPC is largely analogous to the egocentric role typically emphasized in primates, that is, the integration of spatial orientation with potential goals in the planning of goal-directed movements.     

Where am I looking? The accuracy of video-mediated gaze awareness

Participants worked in pairs, with one person gazing at a flat horizontal stimulus between them. The other participant estimated where the gazer was looking. Experiment 1 used linear scales as gaze targets. The mean root mean square error of estimation equates to 3.8 degrees of head-and-eye pan and 2.6 degrees of tilt. This small error of estimation was essentially the same in a video-mediated condition and in one in which a procedure that did not allow the estimator to see the head-and-eye movement to the target position was used. Experiment 2 obtained comparable gaze estimation performance in face-to-face and video-mediated conditions, using a combined pan-and-tilt grid. It is concluded that people are very good at estimating what someone else is looking at and that such estimations should be practical during video-mediated conversation.     

Does the Worm Live in the Ground? Reflections on Native American Spirituality

Native American spirituality is described through the 4 basic cultural elements of Medicine, Harmony, Relation, and Vision. Based on these 4 cultural elements, practical implications for counseling are offered concerning greeting, hospitality, silence, space, eye contact, intention, and collaboration.     

Reflections on ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’

Abstract

This paper replies to the responses in this special issue to my essay, ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’     

Where is the forgetting with list-method directed forgetting in recognition?

Despite the fact that list-method directed forgetting instruction leads to decreases in memory performance on tests of free recall, there are to date no published reports of comparable effects in recognition testing. In the present article, we evaluated whether conditions that promote the importance of context in recognition, either via stimulus selection (Experiments 1 and 2) or by test choice (Experiment 3), elicit directed forgetting impairment. In all three experiments, we obtained reliable recognition deficits, suggesting that the typical conditions of recognition, rather than recognition itself, underlie the discrepancy between the tests of recognition and free recall in list-method directed forgetting.     

Who am I?: The influence of affect on the working self-concept

Two experiments investigated the impact of affect on the working self-concept. Following an affect induction, participants completed the Twenty Statements Test (TST) to assess their working self-concepts. Participants in predominantly happy and angry states used more abstract statements to describe themselves than did participants in predominantly sad and fearful states. Evaluations of the statements that participants generated (Experiment 2) demonstrate that these effects are not the result of (1) participants describing positively and negatively valenced information at different levels of abstraction, or (2) valence-based affective priming. Further, half of the participants in Experiment 2 were led to attribute their affect to the manipulation prior to completing the TST. This manipulation eliminated the influence of affect on the working self-concept. Taken together, these results are consistent with theory and research on the informative functions of affect.     

On the other hand am I rational? Hemispheric activation and the framing effect

In recent decades the investigation of framing effects has become the foremost studied phenomenon of rational/irrational decision making. Two experiments were conducted to determine whether the functional specializations of the left and the right hemispheres would produce different responses to a traditional framing task. In Experiment 1, a behavioral task of finger tapping was used to induce asymmetrical activation of the respective hemispheres. In Experiment 2, a monaural listening procedure was used. In both experiments, the predicted results were found. Framing effects were found when the right hemisphere was selectively activated whereas they were not observed when the left hemisphere was selectively activated. The results are interpreted in light of a dual-processing approach of decision-making.     

Where in the brain is the self?

Localizing the self in the brain has been the goal of consciousness research for centuries. Recently, there has been an increase in attention to the localization of the self. Here we present data from patients suffering from a loss of self in an attempt to understand the neural correlates of consciousness. Focusing on delusional misidentification syndrome (DMS), we find that frontal regions, as well as the right hemisphere appear to play a significant role in DMS and DMS related disorders. These data are placed in the context of neuroimaging findings.     

Who is the Hero in the Life of the Traumatized Patient? Reflections on Bodansky’s Work with Mrs. E

The vexed question of how to explain analytic success with traumatized patients like Bodansky’s Mrs. E is considered from a perspective on psychoanalytic history and the specific theory-buttressed assumptions and practices of earlier generations of analysts that led them to conclude that traumatized patients couldn’t be helped via psychoanalytic work. I then consider Mrs. E’s life with an organizing question, Who is its hero?, applying perspectives from Charles Dickens and from Fraiberg and colleagues’ work, and use these perspectives to question the theory-based assumption that Mrs. E must have somewhere had a good object experience to have a life. These perspectives allow contemplation of a saving forceful agency at Mrs. E’s core (perhaps one experienced by her as “animal”) that seems essential to understanding her successes in living. The success of her treatment in assisting her with building a life suggests that her analyst’s helping her with mirroring and, even more important, with mentalizing, contribute importantly to her life improvement. Some potential limitations of his approach to her are also implied in his account; in particular, his limited work with her intimate desires and feelings, both libidinal and aggressive.     

A secular age? Reflections on Taylor and Panikkar

During the last few years two major volumes have been published, both greatly revised versions of earlier Gifford Lectures: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and Raimon Panikkar’s The Rhythm of Being (2010). The two volumes are similar in some respects and very dissimilar in others. Both thinkers complain about the glaring blemishes of the modern, especially the contemporary age; both deplore above all a certain deficit of religiosity. The two authors differ, however, both in the details of their diagnosis and in their proposed remedies. Taylor views the modern age—styled as “secular age”—as marked by a slide into secular agnosticism, into “exclusive humanism”, and above all into an “immanent frame” excluding theistic “transcendence”. Although sharing the concern about “loss of meaning”, Panikkar does not find its source in the abandonment of (mono)theistic transcendence; on the contrary, both radical transcendence and agnostic immanence are responsible for the deficit of genuine faith. For him, recovery of faith requires an acknowledgment of our being in the world, as part of the “rhythm of being” happening in a holistic or “cosmotheandric” mode. In classical Indian terminology, while Taylor’s emphasis on the transcendence-immanence tension reflects ultimately a dualistic perspective (dvaita), Panikkar’s holistic notion of the rhythm of being captures the core of Advaita Vendanta.     

Should We Take Up the Slack?: Reflections on Non-ideal Theory in Ethics

Philosophia - This article asks whether (and how) our moral duties are created by others’ non-compliance and whether we should fulfill them or not. For example, do we need to donate more of...     

I think,therefore I am? Examining conceptions of the self,soul, and mind

In order to delineate among conceptions of the self, soul, and mind, participants reported where they believe these entities are located in the body and provided definitions of each entity. Results indicated that most people consider the self, soul, and mind localized in specific regions in the body. In contrast to previous research, however, some participants reported that the self is not centralized in one location. Participants tended to locate the self and mind in the head and the soul in the chest. The self and mind were commonly defined in mental terms and the soul as one’s essence. These results suggest that people tend to distinguish the soul from the mind, both in how they define each entity and where they locate them in the body. Although some people locate the soul in the same region as the self, most people more closely align the mind with the self.     

If I am only my genes, what am I? Genetic essentialism and a Jewish response

With the advent of the Genetic Age comes a unique new set of problems and ethical decisions. There is a tendency to take the scientific developments presented by modern genetics at face value, as if the science itself were value-neutral and not influenced by cultural and religious images. One example of the fallout of the Genetic Age is the development of a "genetic self," the idea that our essential selfhood lies in our genes. It is important to understand the assumptions of the Genetic Age, the development of genetic selfhood, and the broader cultural trends and assumptions that underlie modern genetic thinking. It is equally important, however, to shape a reaction to the concept of a genetic self. Judaism has long carried on a unique discussion about the nature of selfhood in different times and places and about the relation of the corporeal self to the essential self. Insights from Judaism therefore may help to craft a reaction to the modern genetic self that incorporates the best of modern genetics as well as the integrity of a more transcendent selfhood.