Proneness to shame, proneness to guilt, and psychopathology.

The links between shame and guilt and psychopathology were examined. In 2 studies, 245 and 234 undergraduates completed the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory, the Symptom Checklist 90, the Beck Depression Inventory, the State-Trait Anxiety Scale, and the Attributional Style Questionnaire. Results failed to support Lewis's (1971) notion that shame and guilt are differentially related to unique symptom clusters. Shame-proneness was strongly related to psychological maladjustment in general. Guilt-proneness was only moderately related to psychopathology; correlations were ascribable entirely to the shared variance between shame and guilt. Although clearly related to a depressogenic attributional style, shame accounted for substantial variance in depression, above and beyond attributional style.     

Reply to Ellis and to Handfield on essentialism,laws, and counterfactuals

Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of superlongevity: developing technology to double (or more) the average human lifespan. I argue against Singer's view on two fronts. First, empirical research on happiness indicates that the later years of life are (on average) the happiest, and there is no reason to suppose that this trend would not continue if superlongevity were realized. Second, it is argued that there are good reasons to suppose that there will be a certain amount of self-selection: the happiest are more likely to adopt superlongevity technology. This means that the adoption of superlongevity technology will have the effect of raising the level of aggregate utility.     

Reply to Meyers,Cahoone, Colapietro,and Pratt

This paper responds to four commentators (Diana Tietjens Meyers, Lawrence Cahoone, Vincent Colapietro, and Scott L. Pratt) on my book The Network Self: Relation, Process, and Personal Identity (2019). Aspects of the book focused on and about which I respond include reflexive communication (Meyers); identity and integrity (Cahoone); embodiment, self-deception, and autonomy (Colapietro); and social location and power (Pratt). I also clarify my strategy in the book, namely, to shift the ontological framework away from the dualistic mind/body or psychological/animalist distinction and embrace the idea that as relational processes selves are particular kinds of natural complexes (to use a term from Justus Buchler). In doing so, I aim to avoid metaphysically narrow views of human selves or persons, and to provide a framework for conceptualizing selves in both abstract and practical terms.     

Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.     

Commitment,ego-involvement,and resistance to attack

Subjects with initially extreme or moderate positions (based on a median split) recorded a consonant speech under public, private, or no commitment and later received a strong, mild, or no attack on their position. Extremes were more ego-involved in terms of wider latitudes of rejection, narrower latitudes of non-commitment, and greater resistance to attack, relative to moderates. Commitment had no effect for extremes, suggesting a ceiling effect on changes in the latitudes and resistance to attack for initially high levels of ego-involvement. For moderates, commitment resulted in narrower latitudes of noncommitment, wider latitudes of rejection (greater rejection of discrepant positions), and greater resistance to attack, suggesting that commitment may elevate ego-involvement with the issue. Commitment and ego-involvement may increase the salience of one's attitude position in later situations, thereby increasing the probability of attitudeconsistent behavior.     

Response to Alcoff,Ferguson, and Bergoffen

This paper responds to comments, queries, and criticisms offered by Alcoff, Bergoffen, and Ferguson at a scholar's session on my work held at the annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in October 2001. Responding to Alcoff, I highlight my understanding of liberation in the context of a Nietzschean and a Latin American feminism and the politics of conceptualizing “resistance” in postcolonial theory. Responding to Ferguson, I address, among other issues, the often misunderstood distinction between postcolonialism and postmodernism, as well as related implications regarding some postcolonial feminists' qualified appeals to universals and women's rights. Responding to Bergoffen, I advocate on behalf of cultural formations supportive of the feminist affirmation of life and of radical subjectivities that challenge gender orthodoxies.     

Neuroticism, extroversion, and response to stress

The study evaluated the role of dispositional determinants in the mediation of response to stress. Thirty-five undergraduate females were assigned to one of four groups according to scores on the neuroticism and extroversion scales of the Eysenck Personality Inventory. The Induced Affect research paradigm was adapted as a stress analog procedure and, following a baseline phase, subjects were run in alternating relaxation and arousal phases. Both univariate and multivariate analyses were completed. Neurotic introverts tended to label IA generated arousal as fear whereas neurotic extroverts tended to label arousal as anger.     

Replies to Wallace,Queloz, and Kirwin

In this article, I reply to the comments offered by R. Jay Wallace, Matthieu Queloz, and Claire Kirwin on my book, The Will to Nothingness. An Essay on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (OUP, 2021). These comments and my replies cover central features of the book, including my analysis of ressentiment as an expression of the will to power; the concept of self-undermining functionality I introduce to make sense of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal; and my reasons for omitting to examine the “unconditional will to truth,” which he presents as the latest embodiment of this ideal.     

Rejoinder to Ekman,O'Sullivan,and Matsumoto

Each of the issues raised by Ekman, O'Sullivan, and Matsumoto is discussed. The relativity thesis, and the evidence on which it is based, emphasizes the issue of ecological validity. In the study of judgments of emotion from facial expression, the question of what occurs spontaneously in natural settings, rather than the question of the accuracy of those judgments, will lead to studies capable of resolving current debates.This study was funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am grateful to the editor and the journal for the opportunity given to me and to Ekman, O'Sullivan, and Matsumoto to exchange views. I thank Darrin Lehman for his advice.     

Absorption, openness to experience, and hypnotizability

Absorption, a correlate of hypnotizability, is conceptually related to openness to experience. Study 1 found no evidence that gender moderated the correlation between absorption and hypnotizability, or of nonlinear trends. Study 2 showed that openness was factorially complex, and that absorption was related to imaginative involvement, but not to social-political liberalism. Study 3 found small quadratic trends in the relations between these variables and hypnotizability; hypnotizability was related to imaginative involvement, but not liberalism. Study 4 confirmed differential correlations between absorption subscales and hypnotizability but failed to confirm the nonlinear trends. Implications for future studies of the correlates of hypnotizability, and for the nature of the "fifth factor" in personality structure, are discussed.     

Self-blame, self-efficacy, and adjustment to abortion

The causal impact of attributions and coping self-efficacy on adjustment to abortion was examined. Two hundred and eighty-three women were randomly assigned prior to their abortion to 1 of 3 counseling interventions: 1 designed to alter attributions for unwanted pregnancy (ATT-INT), 1 designed to raise coping expectations (EXP-INT), or a control (standard counseling) group. Depression, mood, anticipated consequences, and physical complaints were assessed postabortion. Women in the ATT-INT or EXP-INT group were better adjusted immediately postabortion than women in the control group. The EXP-INT group was also less depressed than the ATT-INT group. Three individual difference factors were also related to better adjustment: high coping self-efficacy, low self-character blame, and low other-blame. Self-efficacy also predicted adjustment 3 weeks postabortion. Implications for theories of adjustment to major life events, therapeutic interventions to assist coping with such events, and public policy on abortion are discussed.     

Response to Phillips,Hopkins, and Berman

Adam Phillips asks why we need to engage in professional policing. He exceeds my own professional comfort zone when he suggests that a great thing about psychoanalysis is that “it does not necessarily make people better.” I make a plea for a measure of professional idealism that takes account of the analyst's power. In her discussion, Linda Hopkins provides fascinating anecdotes that support my ideas about Masud Khan's analysis. Hopkins also argues for the value of idealization in therapeutic process, noting that I excessively emphasize its problematics. I agree with Hopkins's perspective and muse about why my paper reads otherwise. Emanuel Berman distinguishes institutional from individual idealizations and argues for the value of the latter while underscoring the difference between de-idealization and devaluation. I query the inevitably problematic nature of institutional idealizations.     

Responses to Allen,Appiah, and Lawson

In my Responses, I take up the various definitional and justificatory challenges that Anita Allen, Anthony Appiah and Bill Lawson raise to my defense of affirmative action and I try to build bridges and remove the apparent disagreements between our views. In the process, I have found a way to replace race-based affirmative action with a non-race-based program which retains all the benefits that a race-based program can provide and secures additional benefits as well.     

Reply to Downing,Jacobs, and Schneider

We thank our reviewers for their discussions and we appreciate the opportunity to dialogue about our work with Sandra. Some responses express our shared point of view, others our individual reflections. For clarity, we indicate the point of view at the beginning of each section.     

Replies to Kane,McCormick, and Vargas

This is a reply to discussions by Robert Kane, Kelly McCormick, and Manuel Vargas of Shaun Nichols, Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility.     

Induction, contrast, and resistance to extinction

The resistance of responding to extinction after variable-interval reinforcement in one of two components of a multiple schedule of reinforcement was (1) greater, when responding in the second component was reinforced on a variable-interval schedule than when responding there was extinguished, (2) not reduced, by a more rapid decrease in the rate of responding than occurs in ordinary extinction in the second component, and, (3) increased, by the occurrence of positive behavioral contrast before the beginning of extinction.     

Sensitivity to disgust, stigma, and adjustment to life with a colostomy

We examined whether trait disgust sensitivity predicts well-being in colostomy patients, and whether disgust predicts stigmatizing attitudes about colostomy in non-patients. 195 patients with a colostomy returned a mailed survey including measures of disgust sensitivity, life satisfaction, mood, and feelings of being stigmatized. We also conducted an internet-survey of a non-patient sample (n = 523). In the patient sample, we observed negative correlations between a bowel-specific measure of disgust sensitivity and life satisfaction (r = -.34, p<.01), and colostomy adjustment ( r = -.42, p<.01), and a positive correlation with feeling stigmatized because of the colostomy (r = .54, p<.01). Correlations between a general trait disgust measure and these outcomes were more modest. A structural equation model indicated that colostomy patients who had high disgust sensitivity felt more stigmatized, and this was in turn strongly related to lower life satisfaction. Concordantly, in the non-patient sample we observed that disgust sensitivity was a significant, positive predictor of wanting less contact with colostomy patients (r = .22, p < .01).     

Children's,adolescents', and adults' reference to goals to explain interpersonal actions

This study investigated children's, adolescents', and adults' references to an actor's goals when explaining interpersonal actions. Participants were presented with eight brief stories containing a variety of social events and were asked to explain why the actor in each story performed the central action. Children, adolescents, and adults mentioned goals for most of the stories. Adults and adolescents mentioned psychological goals much more often than did children. Older children, adolescents, and adults mentioned complex psychological goals more often than did younger children. Younger children often mentioned instrumental or social goals. When making goal attributions, children, adolescents, and adults considered both the nature of the action and the social context in which it occurred. Participants mentioned psychological goals more often when explaining an antisocial action and social goals when explaining a prosocial action. Participants were also more likely to mention psychological goals when interpersonal events immediately preceding the central action were described. Thus, goals were offered as explanations for interpersonal actions by all age groups, but the type of goals mentioned varied by the age of the participant, the social context, and the valence of the action. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.