What is educational theory and how to make it?

An analysis is provided detailing the conditions for the appropriate theoretical study of the object of educational science: pedagogy.     

Defending victims: What does it take to intervene in bullying and how is it rewarded by peers?

Defending is considered important in reducing bullying and victimization in schools. Yet, the prevalence of defending is quite low and there is little insight into aspects that explain why students intervene in bullying situations. The current study used a longitudinal design to simultaneously examine the antecedents and status outcomes of defending behavior. It was expected that affective and social-cognitive factors explain involvement in defending. Moreover, it was proposed that defending would be rewarded with popularity among peers, but only for defenders who were not victimized themselves. Unconflated multilevel path models were used and data came from students in grades 4–6 of Finnish elementary schools (N = 4209 students from 210 classrooms and 38 schools; M_age 11.25; 50% boys). Affective empathy and students' self-efficacy beliefs were predictive of defending behavior over time, whereas cognitive empathy was not. Additionally, defenders increased their popularity among their peers. No substantial differences between victims and non-victims were found. This pattern of results suggests that, irrespective of victim status, specific children are more likely to defend in bullying situations and are rewarded with increased popularity.     

Gender and values: What is the impact on decision making?

In this study we investigated C. Gilligan's [(1982), In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press] suggestion that women and men, due to socialization, develop differently in terms of moral development [L. Kohlberg (1969), “Stage and Consequence: The Cognitive Development Approach to Socialization,” In D. G. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization: Theory and research, Chicago: Rand McNally]. We also considered whether men and women differ in terms of a related construct, values of equity and equality [K. A. Rasinski (1987), “What's Fair Is Fair or Is It? Value Differences Underlying Public Views About Social Justice,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 53, pp. 201–211]. It is our expectation that gender influences overall orientation in terms of the two sets of values, and that differences in values lead decision makers to weigh decision issues and to make final decisions differently. Results suggest that there are some gender-related differences in value systems, weights of decision issues, and final decisions.     

Knowledge about the distribution of information and group decision making: When and why does it work?

Research has shown that decision-making groups with distributed information perform better when group members know which member is knowledgeable about what. Thus far research has been unable to identify the process responsible for this effect. In the present study, we propose that group members’ task representations mediate the effect of knowledge about the distribution of information on decision performance. Building on this proposition, we also propose that reflection about the task moderates the effect of knowledge about distributed information through its effect on task representations. These hypotheses were put to the test in an experimental study of decision-making groups (N = 125). As predicted, knowledge of distributed information interacted with reflection to affect decision quality. Findings confirmed the proposed mediating role of task representations and information elaboration.     

What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?

This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifically characterise human choice, we have to work with a probabilistic or chaos-derived model. This has a number of implications for philosophy of mind. Firstly, it is in theory possible to describe human behaviour with some form of law-like equation; it is just a matter of figuring out what equation best captures the states of our central nervous system. Secondly, it means that our choices are not random but are chaotic: deterministic, but just hard to predict due to internal complexity. According to the current research, our actions are most likely caused by ‘precipitated avalanches’ of neural activity, which are difficult to predict due to chaos.     

Teaching a rational approach to career decision making: Who benefits most?

Who benefits most from rational decision-making training? Rational, intuitive, fatalistic, and dependent decision makers were compared on how much they learned from a rational decision-making training intervention. A Decision-Making Questionnaire was administered to 255 community college students to determine which style each used predominantly in three past career-related decisions. Subjects were randomly assigned to instruction in rational decision making or to a placebo intervention and later completed the Career Decision-Making Skills Assessment Exercise, a paper and pencil test on the application of rational decision-making principles. Individuals who had been highly impulsive, dependent, or fatalistic in prior course selections and those who exhibited dependency in prior job choices appeared to learn most from the rational training curriculum. Implications for when rational decision-making training should be prescribed are discussed.     

What is free association and what does it measure?

This paper reports the results of a study of free association in which participants were asked to produce the first two words to come to mind. The findings were used to estimate the reliability of indices of strength and set size for different types of items and to model free association as a retrieval task. When confined to first responses, reliability was generally high for both indices, particularly for words with smaller sets of associates and stronger primaries. When second responses were included, reliability declined. A second response added new but weak items to the set, and, when the primary associate was not produced on the first opportunity, it tended not to be produced on the second. Relative to when multiple responses are requested, first-response free association provides more reliable indices of the relative strength and set size for a word's strongest associates. A model of free association assuming that a strength distribution underlies each response provided a good fit to the data.     

What counts as a decision? Predictors of perceived decision making

We examined lay perceptions of what counts as a decision. Eighty-six subjects read 10 scenarios that described clear decisions (e.g., choosing a graduate school), clear “nondecisions” (e.g., an accidental wrong turn), or ambiguous actions (e.g., eating a donut when on a diet or allowing someone else to make the decision). The subjects rated each scenario as to whether the actor had made a decision and also rated six other attributes. The scenarios were rated as clearly illustrating a decision if the actor engaged in a lot of thought and did not act reflexively. Consideration of consequences and having alternatives were moderately related to decision ratings, whereas having self-control problems and the influence of physiological drives showed little relationship with decision ratings. Thus, lay concepts of decision making differ from decision theory in that thoughtful, intentional behavior is more important in defining a decision than are decision theoretic components, such as alternatives and consequences.     

Perceptions of wisdom: What is it and who has it?

One hundred fifty-five men and 233 women, aged 20 to 79 years, were asked to name both the most wise and the most interpersonally wise persons they knew personally and to give the age and sex of each. Participants were also asked for the areas in which their nominees were particularly wise. Overall, men and women responded similarly. The subjects tended to nominate individuals who were older than they were; the difference between their own age and their nominees' age decreased with increasing age. Subjects nominated males more often than females as wise and this tendency increased with the subjects' age. With the exception of older women, participants nominated females more often than males as interpersonally wise. When asked to report the areas in which their wise nominees were particularly wise, subjects tended to mention specific skill areas (e.g., business or science) for male nominees and interpersonal skill areas for female nominees.Please note that Nancy W. Denney is deceased.     

Discourse about discourse: what is it and how does it progress in Alzheimer's disease?

Discourse about discourse or a subject's comments about his/her performance during a discourse task can be defined as modalizing discourse (discours modalisateur; [Nespoulous, 1980]; [Nespoulous et al., 1998]). Since it does not convey the expected content of the discourse task (referential discourse), modalizing discourse has often been considered non-informative, and as such, has received little interest. The present study investigated the modalizing aspect of discourse production and its evolution in Alzheimer's disease (AD). Five AD patients produced a picture-induced narrative across five consecutive assessments. Two measures were derived: the modalizing/referential ratio (M/R ratio) and the percentage of repeated ideas. Results revealed that, compared to a group of 27 normal controls matched for age and education, AD patients: (1) obtained higher M/R ratios that tended to diminish as the number of assessments increased, and (2) produced higher percentages of repeated ideas throughout all assessments. These results suggest that modalizing discourse makes up a large proportion of AD patients' discourse and should be included in further studies to accurately describe their discourse behavior. The implications of modalizing discourse on preserved pragmatic abilities and its inclusion in comprehensive management programs of AD patients are discussed.     

What is episodic memory and how do we use it?

What are the neural and computational principles that give rise to episodic memory? Although memory is probably the most studied topic in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, most research has focused on learning at the micro-level. I outline the limitations of this approach and propose a ‘molar’ approach to tackle episodic memory at the scale of life.     

Drug treatment of epilepsy: when does it fail and how to optimize its use?

Although modern community-based studies have shown that a majority of people with newly diagnosed epilepsy will enter long-term remission, seizures remain refractory to treatment in a substantial proportion of this population--perhaps as much as 40%. A consensus is being reached that, for operational purposes, pharmacoresistance can be suspected when two appropriately chosen, well-tolerated, first-line antiepileptic drugs (AEDs) or one monotherapy and one combination regimen have failed due to lack of efficacy. Poor prognostic factors include lack of response to the first AED, specific syndromes, symptomatic etiology, family history of epilepsy, psychiatric comorbidity, and high frequency of seizures. These observations suggest that prognosis can often be determined early in the course of the disorder. We propose a management paradigm that aims to maximize the chance of successful AED therapy, including the early use of "rational polytherapy" for patients not responding to monotherapy, and to identify efficiently patients suitable for "curative" resective surgery, in particular those with mesial temporal lobe epilepsy. An orderly approach to each epilepsy syndrome will optimize the chance of perfect seizure control and help more patients achieve a fulfilling life.     

When does duration matter in judgment and decision making?

Research on sequences of outcomes shows that people care about features of an experience, such as improvement or deterioration over time, and peak and end levels, which the discounted utility model (DU) assumes they do not care about. In contrast to the finding that some attributes are weighted more than DU predicts, Kahneman and coauthors have proposed that there is one feature of sequences that DU predicts people should care about but that people in fact ignore or underweight: duration. In this article, the authors extend this line of research by investigating the role of conversational norms (H. P. Grice, 1975), and scale-norming (D. Kahneman & T. D. Miller, 1986). The impact of these 2 factors are examined in 4 parallel studies that manipulate these factors orthogonally. The major finding is that response modes that reduce reliance on conversational norms or standard of comparison also increase the attention that participants pay to duration.     

Who do you trust? The impact of facial emotion and behaviour on decision making

During social interactions, we use available information to guide our decisions, including behaviour and emotional displays. In some situations, behaviour and emotional displays may be incongruent, complicating decision making. This study had two main aims: first, to investigate the independent contributions of behaviour and facial displays of emotion on decisions to trust, and, second, to examine what happens when the information being signalled by a facial display is incongruent with behaviour. Participants played a modified version of the Trust Game in which they learned simulated players’ behaviour with or without concurrent displays of facial emotion. Results indicated that displays of anger, but not happiness, influenced decisions to trust during initial encounters. Over the course of repeated interactions, however, emotional displays consistent with an established pattern of behaviour made independent contributions to decision making, strengthening decisions to trust. When facial display and behaviour were incongruent, participants used current behaviour to inform decision making.     

What is it to Depsychologize Psychology?

In this essay, I distinguish two ways of depsychologizing psychology: ‘anti‐psychologism’ and ‘non‐psychologism’. Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where anti‐psychologism, which I find in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's non‐psychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought and communication.     

What is it to be healthy?

According to Christopher Boorse's Bio-Statistical Theory (BST), 'health' is statistically normal function in a reference class, and 'health' and 'disease' are empirical, objective and value-free concepts. I demonstrate that the success of the BST depends on its choice of reference classes; different reference classes result in different accounts of health. I argue that nothing in nature empirically or objectively dictates the use of reference classes Boorse proposes. Reference classes in the BST, and the concept of health, are therefore not value-free. Nor is there a reason to favour the BST over accounts of health that use different reference classes.     

Emotional regulation of fertility decision making: What is the nature and structure of "baby fever"?

Baby fever-a visceral physical and emotional desire to have a baby-is well known in popular culture, but has not been empirically studied in psychology. Different theoretical perspectives suggest that desire for a baby is either superfluous to biological sex drives and maternal instincts, a sociocultural phenomenon unrelated to biological or evolutionary forces, or an evolved adpatation for regulating birth timing, proceptive behavior, and life history trajectories. A series of studies (involving 337 undergraduate participants and 853 participants from a general population Internet sample) found that: (a) a simple scale measure could elicit ratings of desire frequency; (b) these ratings exhibited significant sex differences; (c) this sex difference was distinct from a general desire for sexual activity; and (d) these findings generalize to a more diverse online population. Factor analyses of ratings for desire elicitors/inhibitors identified three primary factors underlying baby fever. Baby fever appears to be a real phenomenon, with an underlying multifactorial structure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

What is it to lose hope?

This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ orientation or ‘existential feeling’, by which I mean something in the context of which certain kinds of intentional state, including intentional hope, are intelligible. I go on to discuss severe depression, lack of aspiration, demoralisation and loss of trust in the world, in order to distinguish some qualitatively different forms that loss of hope can take.     

Unification: What is it,how do we Reach and why do we Want it?

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.