Effects of directionality in deductive reasoning: I. The comprehension of single relational premises

Four experiments involving 123 university students tested directionality effects in the comprehension of spatial relations, quantified statements, and propositional connectives with a sentence-picture verification task. Presentation of the referents of terms in the statements was separated by 1 s, and presentation order was congruent or incongruent with the order of terms in the statement. Some relations showed faster verification times for congruent display order, others for incongruent display order, and still others showed no directionality effect. The authors proposed a 2-step process model for the construction of semantic representations of relational statements, in which a reference object is established first, and then the second object is attached in relation to it. This theory explains the various directionality effects as a general preference to process information about the reference object before information about the target object.     

How do generic statements impact performance? Evidence for entity beliefs

Generic statements about the abilities of children's social groups (e.g. ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game’) negatively impact children's performance – even if the statements are favorable towards children's own social groups. We explored the mechanism by which generic language impairs children's performance. Across three studies, our findings suggest that generic statements influence children's performance by creating an entity belief (i.e. a belief that a fixed ability determines performance). Children who were exposed to a generic statement about their social group's ability performed worse than children in control conditions. This effect hurt children's performance even when the person who made the generic statement was no longer present and a new person not privy to the statement replaced them. However, when children heard a generic statement paired with an effort explanation (i.e. ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game because they try really hard when they draw’) they performed better than children who heard the generic statement with no explanation (i.e. just ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game’) and children who heard the generic statement paired with a trait explanation (i.e. ‘Girls/Boys are good at this game because they are smart and really good at drawing’). This work uncovers when and how generic statements that refer to the ability of one's social group hinder performance, informing the development of practices to improve student motivation and learning.     

社会信息加工领域中的情境模型理论

自Wyer和Srull把情境模型理论引入社会信息加工领域以来,情境模型理论成了社会信息加工研究的热点,其自身结构和加工机制也得到研究者的不断完善。该文简要介绍了情境模型理论的内容、结构及其基本假设。即情境模型代表人们在社会信息加工过程中形成的关于具体事件和情节的知识,并且通常在社会信息的理解过程中自动建立。这种模式一旦建立,就为理解新信息及作出相应的判断提供基础。情境模型包括三种基本信息:时空框架、实体集合及实体之间的各种相互关系。认为人们在理解信息的过程中至少需要建构5个维度,即:(1)空间,(2)时间,(3)实体,(4)因果,(5)目的。在此基础上,文章讨论了情境模型理论的未来研究方向。     

A Theory of Algebra-Word-Problem Comprehension and Its Implications for the Design of Learning Environments

A tutoring approach is derived from a model of problem comprehension, based on the van Dijk and Kintsch (1983; Kintsch, 1988) theory of discourse processing. A problem statement is regarded as a text from which the student must glean propositional and situational information and make critical inferences. The competent student must coordinate this information with known problem models so that formal (i.e., algebraic) operations can be applied and exact solutions can be obtained. We argue that this task is a highly reading-oriented one in which poor text comprehension and an inability to access relevant long-term knowledge lead to serious errors. In particular, poor students often omit from their solutions or misspecify necessary mathematical constraints that are based on reading inferences needed to describe fully the problem situation. Furthermore, formal algebraic expressions are so abstract that their meaning is often elusive; this contributes to mistranslations and misinterpretations. The competent approach is teachable, however. We describe experimental results with ANIMATE, a learning environment that knows nothing of the problem at hand or of the student's actions. Subjects encouraged to reason explicitly about the situations described in typical word problems consistently performed as well as or better than those who were not, in both training and transfer task. We conclude that, by using an environment that gives equations situation-based meaning through computer animation, students learn to relate formal expressions to the referent situations. This enhances problem comprehension and gives a stronger representational base to the problem-solving process. A call for evaluation methods beyond just algebra problem-solving performance is made. The implications of this work for the design of future computer-based tutors and other learning environments are also discussed.     

Conditionals and directionality: On the meaning of if vs. only if

The aim of this study was to test the predictions of the current theories of reasoning about the comprehension of conditional statements. We used two types of conditional statement that are logically equivalent: if p then q and p only if q . The model theory of reasoning considers that these conditional forms differ in their initial meaning, because the negative contingency is considered only in the p only if q form. Mental-rule theories maintain that the interpretation of p only if q depends on a rephrasing of the statement as: if not q then not p . Alternatively, a directional bias may explain the differences between if p then q and p only if q . We report three experiments that demonstrate the existence of a directional bias in the comprehension of the conditionals. The results were not predicted by either the mental-rules theories or the model theory; they could, however, be easily assimilated by the model theory.     

Iffy beliefs: Conditional thinking and belief change

The ability to entertain possibilities and draw inferences about them is essential to human intelligence. We examine the hypothesis that conditional if-then statements trigger a mental simulation process in which people suppose the antecedent (if statement) to be true and evaluate the consequent (then statement) in that context. On the assumption that supposing an event to be true increases belief that the event has occurred or will occur, this hypothesis is consistent with the claim that evaluating a conditional will heighten belief in its antecedent more than in its consequent. Two experiments, employing conditionals of the form If animal A has property X, then animal B will have property X, in which X was a property that people could not readily relate to the animals, supported this claim. The effect was stronger following the evaluation of conditionals with dissimilar animal categories.     

Interviewing children with the cognitive interview: assessing the reliability of statements based on observed and imagined events

This paper investigated whether criteria stemming from the Reality Monitoring (RM) framework could be trusted to assess the reliability of statements obtained by the use of a cognitive interview (CI). Fifty-eight children, aged 10-11, participated. One-third watched a film about a fakir and were then interviewed according to a CI (n= 19). The remaining two-thirds made up a story about a fakir and were then interviewed according to either a CI (n= 21), or a structured interview (SI) (n= 18). The CI statements based on observed events contained more visual, affective, spatial and temporal information compared to CI statements based on imagined events. The CI statements based on imagined events did not differ from the SI statements based on imagined events. Considerable developmental work is recommended to turn the RM technique to a reliable test that could be used by practitioners.     

Social roles and utilities in reasoning with deontic conditionals

A set of experiments is reported in which a new formulation of deontic thinking is tested. This is that people represent subjective utilities inherent in conforming to or violating deontic statements, along with the social dynamics of these statements. The experiments used Wason's selection task and tested people's understanding of conditional permission. In the first two experiments, familiar scenarios referring to family interactions were used. In the third, an imaginary business content was used. In both cases it was apparent that people's thinking depended on their representation of the utilities associated with the agent of a permission statement (the party who lays down the rule) and the actor (the party whose behaviour is its target). The results are discussed as favouring an explanation in terms of mental models, rather than the schema theories which have dominated this field hitherto.     

When Ignorance Is Bliss The Role of Motivation to Reduce Uncertainty in Uncertainty Reduction Theory

Three studies were conducted with the goal to articulate and test models for integrating the concept of motivation to reduce uncertainty into the axiomatic structure of uncertainty reduction theory. Multiple models were considered, each model defining motivation to reduce uncertainty in a different way. Motivation to reduce uncertainty was defined as a scope condition (Model 2), as tolerance for uncertainty (Model 3), as a weighted function of uncertainty by its importance (Model 4), and as the difference between one's uncertainty level and one's tolerance for uncertainty (Models 5a and 5b). Each of these models was compared to the baseline model (Model 1) derived from the original presentation of the theory where level of uncertainty, by itself, serves as a determinant of various communication behaviors. Tests of these models in terms of their ability to predict information seeking and attraction reveal that none of the models provides a consistent integration of motivation to reduce uncertainty into uncertainty reduction theory. Rather, tolerance for uncertainty (Model 3) is one of three determinants of information seeking, while level of uncertainty (Model 1) is one of three determinants of attraction. This inability to integrate motivation to reduce uncertainty into uncertainty reduction theory can be attributed to the consistent failure to find support for deviance and incentive value as determinants of tolerance for uncertainty, the rejection of Axiom 3 in uncertainty reduction theory (which specifies a positive relationship between uncertainty and information seeking), and the rejection of Theorem 17 (which specifies a negative relationship between information seeking and liking).     

The Theory of Planned Behavior Without Compatibility? Beyond Method Bias and Past Trivial Associations1

Overreliance on one measurement approach can challenge accurate statements about reality, as findings can represent by‐products of the compulsory measurement paradigm. Within the theory of planned behavior (TPB), the compatibility principle represents one such strictly imposed paradigm. Using 2 cross‐sectional surveys of 1,394 volunteers and involving structural equation models, we demonstrate that the widely employed practice of measuring TPB constructs is confounded with method‐implied bias. This means the theory cannot conclusively reveal origins of a behavior. Our results also suggest that on an aggregated level, when method bias is eliminated, its constructs are linked in hypothesized ways. Adopting a more general model—thus, adopting a more traitlike conceptualization of attitudes—has interesting implications for social psychology and its current trends.     

Decision processes in verifying category membership statements: Implications for models of semantic memory

Current models of semantic memory assume that natural categories are well-defined. Specific predictions of two such models, the Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974a) two-stage feature comparison model and the Glass and Holyoak (1974/75) ordered search model, were tested and disconfirmed in Experiment I. We propose an alternative model postulating fuzzy categories represented as sets of characteristic properties. This model, combined with a Bayesian decision process, accounts for the results of three additional experiments, as well as for the major findings in the semantic memory literature. We argue that people verify category membership statements by assessing similarity relations between concepts rather than by using information which logically specifies the truth value of the sentence. Our data also imply that natural categories are fuzzy rather than well-defined.     

The processing of positive and negative information

An affirmative statement which is known to be false and the complementary negative statement which is known to be true, provide the same information, i.e. that something is not the case. Similarly, an affirmative statement which is known to be true and the complementary negative statement which is known to be false, both imply that something is the case. (If P is false, not-P is true and if P is true, not-P is false.) Hence there are four kinds of statement (“conditions”): true affirmatives, false affirmatives, true negativee and false negatives, but only two kinds of information: positive and negative.

This experiment investigates the times taken to process information presented in these ways. The task was to select two alternative words which would make affirmative or negative conjunctive statements agree or conflict with given situations. The four conditions were presented six times in different serial orders, so that each occurred once in every block of four trials. The mean response times were: true affirmatives 8-99 sec, false affirmatives 11 19 sec., true negatives 12-58 sec, false negatives 15-17 sec. This order was the same at each of the six presentations of the conditions, the differences being significant at the 0 001 level in each case. There was a pronounced decline in errors (without knowledge of results) for three of the conditions. These results are discussed in relation to (i) the assumption of a positive set, established through a long learning process; (ii) the inferential nature of negative information in relation to experience; and (iii) the possible emotional effects of negative terms.     

"If …": Satisficing algorithms for mapping conditional statements onto social domains

People regularly use conditional statements to communicate promises and threats, advices and warnings, permissions and obligations to other people. Given that all conditionals are formally equivalent--"if P, then Q"--the question is: When confronted with a conditional statement, how do people know whether they are facing a promise, a threat, or something else? In other words, what is the cognitive algorithm for mapping a particular conditional statement onto its corresponding social domain? This paper introduces the pragmatic cues algorithm and the syntactic cue algorithm as partial answers to this question. Two experiments were carried out to test how well these simple satisficing algorithms approximate the performance of the actual cognitive algorithm people use to classify conditional statements into social domains. Conditional statements for promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations were collected from people, and given to both other people and the algorithms for their classification. Their corresponding performances were then compared. Results revealed that even though these algorithms utilised a minimum number of cues and drew only a restricted range of inferences from these cues, they performed well above chance in the task of classifying conditional statements as promises, threats, advices, warnings, permissions, and obligations. Moreover, these simple satisficing algorithms performed comparable to actual people given the same task.     

Why do people self-harm?

The accuracy of perceptions about self-harm that are presented in the psychological and psychiatric literature was assessed with a sample of self-harmers. A list of 20 statements containing ten myths and ten accurate statements about self-harm behaviour was incorporated into an internet-based questionnaire. Respondents (n?=?243) rated their extent of agreement with each statement. Factor analysis confirmed the a priori classification of statements as being accurate. Only one item, regarding the relationship of self-harm to previous sexual abuse, did not confirm a priori classification; this statement was considered by self-harmers to be an accurate perception of self-harm. It was concluded that this questionnaire could be a useful aid for group-work training with professionals who are involved in working with people who engage in self-harm.     

视角在时间语言理解中的影响

语言学家在英语的时间语言表达中发现了隐含其中的两种不同运动视角：一种是从过去指向将来的自我运动（自我运动视角moving-ego）;另一种是从将来指向过去的时间运动（时间运动视角moving-time）。心理学家McGlone＆Harding报告了在英语中视角对时问语言理解的作用,并提出人们存在MT视角的偏向。本文报告了两个实验,实验1直接运用和修改McGlone＆Harding的范式在汉语文本探讨视角对时间语言理解的影响。实验2运用信号检测理论来验证了人们存在MT视角偏向。     

Social–Emotional Factors and Academic Outcomes Among Elementary‐Aged Children

Social–emotional comprehension involves encoding, interpreting, and reasoning about social–emotional information, and self‐regulating. This study examined the mediating pathways through which social–emotional comprehension and social behaviour are related to academic outcomes in two ethnically and socioeconomically heterogeneous samples totaling 340 elementary‐aged children. In both samples, social–emotional comprehension, teacher report of social behaviour, and academic outcomes were measured in a single school year. In both samples, structural equation models showed that the relationship between social–emotional comprehension and reading was mediated by socially skilled behaviour. In one sample, but not the other, the relationship between social–emotional comprehension and math was mediated by socially skilled behaviour. This paper advances our understanding of the mechanisms through which social–emotional factors are associated with academic outcomes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Eliciting information and cues to deception using a model statement: Examining the effect of presentation modality

Forensic interviewing involves gathering information from a suspect or eyewitness. Administering a model statement during an interview results in greater information elicitation, which can enhance lie detection. Typically, a model statement is a highly detailed statement, on an unrelated topic to that of the interview. This study examined the effect of manipulating the modality of the MS, either by allowing participants to listen to (Audio‐MS), or read (Written‐MS) a model statement. A total of 162 (81 truth tellers, 81 liars) participants were randomly allocated to one of three interviewing conditions where they received either the Audio‐MS, Written‐MS, or No‐MS (control condition). Truth tellers honestly reported a “spy” mission, whereas liars performed a covert mission and lied about their activities. Results showed both model statements were equally more effective at eliciting information and facilitating lie detection, compared with a control condition. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

When are social judgments made? Evidence for the spontaneousness of trait inferences

Do people make trait inferences, even without intentions or instructions, at the encoding stage of processing behavioral information? Tulving's encoding specificity paradigm (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) was adapted for two recall experiments. Under memory instructions only, subjects read sentences describing people performing actions that implied traits. Later, subjects recalled each sentence under one of three cuing conditions: (a) a dispositional cue (e.g., generous), (b) a strong, nondispositional semantic associate to an important sentence word; or (c) no cue. Recall was best when cued by the disposition words. Subjects were unaware of having made trait inferences. Interpreted in terms of encoding specificity, these results indicate that subjects unintentionally made trait inferences at encoding. This suggests that attributions may be made spontaneously, as part of the routine comprehension of social events.