Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues

Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality (representation per se), transparency (immediacy of cognitive content consequent upon the unawareness of underlying representational processes), subjectivity (first-person perspective) or reflexivity (autonoetic awareness). However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime.     

A Process Perspective and Multicriteria Approach in Decision-Aiding Contexts

This paper illustrates the underlying structures and logic of a multicriteria modelling and validation process, using the case study of an intervention on behalf of a regional Government in Italy. The hospital service emergency department reorganization was investigated in interaction with the many actors involved in the implementations of a previous regional plan. The principal elements of the modelling were: (1) the representation and structuring of opinions, proposals and implementations of actors involved in the organizational change process and/or in the plan implementation process; (2) the identification and representation of situation types by the elaboration of multidimensional reference profiles in relationship to different interpretations of the emergency treatment; (3) the development of multidimensional models related to the different profiles and the formulation of hypotheses on the evolution of models in a constructive approach. Basic elements of an interactive procedure applied to the model validation process and to the development of a validated reference frame for organizational action are also presented.     

Consciousness and the brainstem

In the first part of this article we summarize a theoretical framework and a set of hypotheses aimed at accounting for consciousness in neurobiological terms. The basic form of consciousness, core consciousness is placed in the context of life regulation; it is seen as yet another level of biological processing aimed at ensuring the homeostatic balance of a living organism; and the representation of the current organism state within somato-sensing structures is seen as critical to its development. Core consciousness is conceived as the imaged relationship of the interaction between an object and the changed organism state it causes. In the second part of the article we discuss the functional neuroanatomy of nuclei in the brainstem reticular formation because they constitute the basic set of somato-sensing structures necessary for core consciousness and its core self to emerge. The close relationship between the mechanisms underlying cortical activation and the bioregulatory mechanisms outlined here is entirely compatible with the classical idea that the reticular formation modulates the electrophysiological activity of the cerebral cortex. However, in the perspective presented here, that modulation is placed in the setting of the organism's homeostatic regulation.     

Considerations on the precedence of the scenes,the contact barrier and the separation of conscious and unconscious

In this essay the term ‘scene’ which has been developed in the German psychoanalytic discussion, is confronted with the terms ‘total situation’ and ‘psychoanalytic field’, showing common features as well as differences. Thereafter four child observations are presented, through which light is thrown onto the scenic structures which make the foundations of early experience. In the precedence of scenes those structures are omnipresent whereas subjectivity only gradually builds up. It is shown how the development of subjectivity and the differentiation of consciousness and unconscious go along with overcoming the precedence of scenes, by breaking them up and reorganizing them. Thus scenes can become metaphors, which are used for ‘translating’ experience and for building up the contact barrier.     

Could stress cause psychosis in individuals vulnerable to schizophrenia?

It has long been considered that psychosocial stress plays a role in the expression of symptoms in schizophrenia (SZ), as it interacts with latent neural vulnerability that stems from genetic liability and early environmental insult. Advances in the understanding of the neurobiology of the stress cascade in both animal and human studies lead to a plausible model by which this interaction may occur: through neurotoxic effects on the hippocampus that may involve synaptic remodeling. Of late, the neurodevelopmental model of SZ etiology has been favored. But an elaboration of this schema that credits the impact of postnatal events and considers a role for neurodegenerative changes may be more plausible, given the evidence for gene-environment interaction in SZ expression and progressive structural changes observed with magnetic resonance imaging. Furthermore, new insights into nongliotic neurotoxic effects such as apoptosis, failure of neurogenesis, and changes in circuitry lead to an expansion of the time frame in which environmental effects may mediate expression of SZ symptoms.     

The dependency of schema formation on type of verbal material: Linear orderings and set inclusions

Two paragraph structures, linear orderings (Potts, 1972) and set inclusions (Frase, 1969), were equated on relevant independent variables to examine recognition memory for relationships between pairs of terms. Experiment 1 replicated Potts' findings: Proportion correct was greater on remote than on adjacent linear pairs. For set pairs, however, there was an interaction between remoteness and truth, giving better performance on remote false and adjacent true pairs. It was suggested that the memory representation (schema) for linear structure was predicted by Potts' end-term anchoring and rating-scale strategies, while set structure performance reflected logical errors in processing. Experiment 2, an "open book" test, confirmed this view: In the nonmemory task, there was no evidence of schema formation for linear structure, whereas set performance still merely reflected logical errors in processing.     

Consciousness during dreams

Two aspects of consciousness are first considered: consciousness as awareness (phenomenological meaning) and consciousness as strategic control (functional meaning). As to awareness, three types can be distinguished: first, awareness as the phenomenal experiences of objects and events; second, awareness as meta-awareness, i.e., the awareness of mental life itself; third, awareness as self-awareness, i.e., the awareness of being oneself. While phenomenal experience and self-awareness are usually present during dreaming (even if many modifications are possible), meta-awareness is usually absent (apart from some particular experiences of self-reflectiveness) with the major exception of lucid dreaming. Consciousness as strategic control may also be present in dreams. The functioning of consciousness is then analyzed, following a cognitive model of dream production. In such a model, the dream is supposed to be the product of the interaction of three components: (a) the bottom-up activation of mnemonic elements coming from LTM systems, (b) interpretative and elaborative top-down processes, and (c) monitoring of phenomenal experience. A feedback circulation is activated among the components, where the top-down interpretative organization and the conscious monitoring of the oneiric scene elicitates other mnemonic contents, according to the requirements of the dream plot. This dream productive activity is submitted to unconscious and conscious processes.     

Five levels of self-awareness as they unfold early in life

When do children become aware of themselves as differentiated and unique entity in the world? When and how do they become self-aware? Based on some recent empirical evidence, 5 levels of self-awareness are presented and discussed as they chronologically unfold from the moment of birth to approximately 4-5 years of age. A natural history of children's developing self-awareness is proposed as well as a model of adult self-awareness that is informed by the dynamic of early development. Adult self-awareness is viewed as the dynamic flux between basic levels of consciousness that develop chronologically early in life.     

Rule-based schema matching for ontology-based mediators

Mediating heterogeneous data sources heavily relies on explicit domain knowledge expressed, for example, as ontologies and mapping rules. We discuss the use of logic representations for mapping schema elements onto concepts expressed in a simplified ontology for cultural assets. Starting with a logic representation of the ontology, criteria for a rule-based schema matching are exemplified. Special requirements are the handling of uncertain information and the processing of hierarchical XML structures representing instances.     

From concepts to lexical items.

In this paper we address the question how in language production conceptual structures are mapped onto lexical items. First we describe the lexical system in a fairly abstract way. Such a system consists of, among other things, a fixed set of basic lexical entries characterized by four groups of information: phonetic form, grammatical features, argument structure, and semantic form. A crucial assumption of the paper is that the meaning in a lexical entry has a complex internal structure composed of more primitive elements (decomposition). Some aspects of argument structure and semantic form and their interaction are discussed with respect to the issue of synonymy. We propose two different mappings involved in lexical access. One maps conceptual structures to semantic forms, and the other maps semantic forms to conceptual structures. Both mappings are context dependent and are many-to-many mappings. We present an elaboration of Levelt's (1989) model in which these processes interact with the grammatical encoder and the mental lexicon. Then we address the consequences of decomposition for processing models, especially the nature of the input of lexical access and the time course. Processing models that use the activation metaphor may have difficulties accounting for certain phenomena where a certain lemma triggers not one, but two or more word forms that have to be produced with other word forms in between.     

Elaborative processing of pictures in verbal domains

Four experiments were performed to evaluate the effect of semantic and nonsemantic verbal elaboration of the names of pictures on free recall, picture-name recognition, and picture recognition. Elaboration was manipulated by having subjects decide if the names of pictures contained two letters, rhymed with another word, or were appropriate in a sentence frame. Semantic elaboration of the names of pictures in sentence contexts requiring positive responses resulted in better name recall (Experiment 1) and name recognition (Experiments 1 and 2) than did nonsemantic elaborations (rhyme- and letter-identification tasks). However, the effects of elaborating pictures-names were greatly reduced for picture recognition (Experiments 3 and 4). The results are described in terms of elaborative processing after semantic access. Following initial semantic access, the names of pictures may be further elaborated. Semantic elaboration of the names of pictures typically leads to better retention than does nonsemantic elaboration. However, perceptual records about the appearance of objects may be relatively independent of orienting tasks that elaborate pictures- names.     

The exploration of meditation in the neuroscience of attention and consciousness

Many recent behavioral and neuroscientific studies have revealed the importance of investigating meditation states and traits to achieve an increased understanding of cognitive and affective neuroplasticity, attention and self-awareness, as well as for their increasingly recognized clinical relevance. The investigation of states and traits related to meditation has especially pronounced implications for the neuroscience of attention, consciousness, self-awareness, empathy and theory of mind. In this article we present the main features of meditation-based mental training and characterize the current scientific approach to meditation states and traits with special reference to attention and consciousness, in light of the articles contributed to this issue.     

Three Facets Of Consciousness

Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distinction in ontology among the form,appearance, and substrate of any entity. Applying this three-facet ontology toconsciousness, we distinguish: the intentionality of consciousness (its form),the way we experience consciousness (its appearance, including so-called qualia),and the physical, biological, and cultural basis of consciousness (its substrate).We can thus show how these very different aspects of consciousness fit togetherin a fundamental ontology. And we can thereby define the proper domains ofphenomenology and other disciplinesthat contribute to our understanding of consciousness.     

Advancing the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism: A comment on O’Nualláin

In a recent contribution to New Ideas in Psychology, Seán O’Nualláin draws out a distinction between inner and outer empiricism, and suggests that consciousness research can benefit from analysis in both directions, that is, via the exploration of facts and relations that facilitate a third-person understanding of consciousness (by reference to an analysis of the structures, processes, and functions of the brain) and via the direct exploration of conscious experience itself, both in terms of its computational (content filled) and non-computational (content empty) aspects. In positing a substrate of subjectivity independent of the contents of consciousness (and, more specifically, a state of “nothingness”), Ò’Nualláin follows a long tradition deeply rooted in mythical, religious, and esoteric schools of belief and practice. Although there is considerable debate amongst philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists as to whether or not a non-computational view of consciousness is viable, O’Nualláin accepts that such a possibility does exist. Further, he suggests that a dialogue between the inner and outer empiricists will be fruitful. In this comment I, critique Ò’Nualláin's initial thoughts on the subject and draw out a series of useful distinctions that will help to advance the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism. Critical amongst these distinctions is explicit reference to (1) ontological and epistemological interdependencies in consciousness research, and (2) states of consciousness that describe the transition from “mindfulness” through “nothingness” to “no-mind”.     

A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness

In the past, researchers have focused mainly on the effects and consequences of self-awareness; however, they have neglected a more basic issue pertaining to the specific mechanisms that initiate and sustain self-perception. The author presents a model of self-awareness that proposes the existence of 3 sources of self-information. First, the social milieu includes early face-to-face interactions, self-relevant feedback, a social comparison mechanism that leads to perspective taking, and audiences. Second, contacts with objects and structures in the physical environment foster self-world differentiation in infants; this environment also contains self-focusing and reflecting stimuli, such as mirrors and video cameras. Third, the self can develop bodily awareness through proprioception and can reflect on itself using imagery and inner speech. Furthermore, self-awareness is mainly mediated by the prefrontal lobes. The author establishes various links among these different neurological, social, ecological, and cognitive elements of the model.     

Toward a Connectionist Model of Recursion in Human Linguistic Performance

Naturally occurring speech contains only a limited amount of complex recursive structure, and this is reflected in the empirically documented difficulties that people experience when processing such structures. We present a connectionist model of human performance in processing recursive language structures. The model is trained on simple artificial languages. We find that the qualitative performance profile of the model matches human behavior, both on the relative difficulty of center-embedding and cross-dependency, and between the processing of these complex recursive structures and right-branching recursive constructions. We analyze how these differences in performance are reflected in the internal representations of the model by performing discriminant analyses on these representations both before and after training. Furthermore, we show how a network trained to process recursive structures can also generate such structures in a probabilistic fashion. This work suggests a novel explanation of people's limited recursive performance, without assuming the existence of a mentally represented competence grammar allowing unbounded recursion.     

Memory, autonoetic consciousness, and the self

Memory is a general attribute of living species, whose diversification reflects both evolutionary and developmental processes. Episodic-autobiographical memory (EAM) is regarded as the highest human ontogenetic achievement and as probably being uniquely human. EAM, autonoetic consciousness and the self are intimately linked, grounding, supporting and enriching each other's development and cohesiveness. Their development is influenced by the socio-cultural-linguistic environment in which an individual grows up or lives. On the other hand, through language, textualization and social exchange, all three elements leak into the world and participate to the dynamic shaping and re-shaping of the cultural scaffolding of the self, mental time traveling and EAM formation. Deficits in self-related processing, autonetic consciousness, emotional processing and mental time traveling can all lead to or co-occur with EAM disturbances, as we illustrate by findings from EAM impairments associated with neurological or psychiatric disorders.     

Coherence,Brain Evolution,and the Unity of Consciousness: The evolution of Planetary Consciousness in the Light of Brain Coherence Research

The law of coherence helps us understand the physical force behind the increasing complexity of the evolutionary process, from quanta, to cells, to self-awareness and collective consciousness. The coherent electromagnetic field is the inner glue of every system, the “intelligent” energy–information communication that assures a cooperative and synergic behavior to all the components of the system, as a whole, allowing harmonious evolution and unity of consciousness. Neuropsychological experiments show that the different brain areas communicate with more or less coherence according to different states of consciousness: high values are correlated with states of psychophysical integrity and well-being, whereas low values with states of conflict and depression. If we expand isomorphically these brain discoveries, we will have four main general states of coherence: from disgregation to unity, which represents an important element, in the General System Theory, to differentiate between inanimate and animate system, and to understand how billions cells become a single living organism, and then how billions of human beings could eventually generate planetary consciousness. In this light the resolution of the global ecosystem crisis implicates human transformation from a low to a highly coherent state of consciousness. The key to the entire process seems to be the coherent nature of consciousness.     

The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach

In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible for her to easily obtain as much information as she may need. The argument for this account of consciousness' functional role will proceed in three main stages. First, the phenomenological approach to consciousness as peripheral self-awareness will be expounded and endorsed. Second, an account of the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness will be offered. Finally, the account of the functional role of peripheral self-awareness will be obtained by straightforward extension from the functional role of peripheral perceptual awareness. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.