Consumer food waste behaviour in universities: Sharing as a means of prevention

In order to tackle food waste at the prevention stage of the waste hierarchy, an understanding of behaviour that leads to wastage is required. This article examines consumer food waste behaviour in a university setting and the implications for encouraging sharing as a means of mitigating food waste. The embodied and embedded nature of consumption and wasteful behaviours are contended, giving explanation to the transition of food into waste. By undertaking a mixed‐method study and a social media‐based intervention, behaviour that causes food to be wasted within a campus environment is discussed, furthering the current domestic focus of research. The paper argues that consumer food waste behaviour can be better understood by focusing on the practices, routines and habits of consumers given the hidden nature of the food waste issue. A number of barriers are also presented regarding the sharing of food as a means of food waste prevention. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Linking self‐determined needs and word of mouth to consumer e‐waste disposal behaviour: A test of basic psychological needs theory

E‐waste is recognized as the fastest growing waste stream in the world. It contains toxic substances such as heavy metals and flame retardants that are hazardous to human and ecological health. Despite these environmental and health hazards, the vast majority of consumers are reluctant to dispose of e‐waste and prefer to store obsolete products at home instead of returning them to manufacturers for recycling. To address this alarming problem, we use the basic psychological needs theory (BPNT) and word of mouth (WOM) to profile consumer behaviour changes and explain self‐reported consumer e‐waste disposal behaviours. Based on longitudinal survey data collected over two rounds from Pakistan, the findings support the role of BPNT. Particularly, the results show that positive WOM messages about e‐waste disposal significantly improve consumers' self‐determined needs that, in turn, fuel consumers' integrated motivation for e‐waste and subsequent e‐waste disposal behaviours. The implications of these findings for practitioners regarding consumer behavioural changes are discussed in‐depth.     

Compensatory knowledge signaling in consumer word‐of‐mouth

This paper extends prior research on consumer knowledge beliefs and word-of-mouth transmission. Findings from four studies suggest that people compensate for unfavorable discrepancies between their actual and ideal consumer knowledge with heightened efforts to signal knowledgeability through the content and volume of their word-of-mouth transmissions. This compensatory knowledge signaling effect is moderated by the self-concept relevance (psychological closeness) of the word-of-mouth target and lay beliefs in the self-enhancement benefits of transmitting product knowledge. Content analysis of participants' product communications further supports our knowledge signaling account. The relationship between actual:ideal knowledge discrepancies and heightened word-of-mouth intentions is mediated by the specific negative emotion associated with actual:ideal self-discrepancies. Overall, the findings suggest that the relationship between consumer knowledge and word-of-mouth transmission depends not only on what you think you know, but also on what you wish you knew.     

The Association Between the Attitude of Food‐Waste‐Aversion and BMI: An Exploration in India and the United States

This research proposes the existence of a hitherto undocumented attitude related to food wastage: the attitude of food‐waste‐aversion. We develop a 6‐item scale including affective, cognitive, and conative components to measure this attitude and empirically investigate its properties in two countries using novel datasets. We test for food‐waste‐aversion scale's convergent validity by demonstrating that it is correlated in the expected direction with five theoretically related constructs—frugality, social responsibility, spendthriftness, self‐control, and materialism (Studies 1a and 1b)—and with BMI (Studies 2 and 3). We provide more indirect evidence of the scale's convergent validity by documenting that the link between food‐waste‐aversion and BMI is attenuated among those who practice refrigerating leftovers (Study 3). We also document that the food‐waste‐aversion scale is distinct from general waste aversion and external meal‐cessation rules, thus providing evidence of discriminant validity (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c). Taken together, these results provide construct validity for the novel construct of food‐waste‐aversion. We discuss the theoretical and substantive contributions of our findings.     

Epistemic Gradualism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice: Responce to Hetherington

This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior to the epistemic position attained when we have (what we ordinarily call) knowledge. This is false, too, as our ordinary practices show. Ordinary epistemic appraisal does not concern our standing on a scale of evaluation which has Infallibility at its apex. For this reason, even if gradualism is correct, it does not show how Infallibilist skepticism can arise out of our ordinary practice.     

Patterns of food transfer in temminck's red colobus

This paper presents data on the behaviours and food types associated with the transfer of individual food items in Temminck's red colobus (Procolobus badius temminckii). The relevance of (a) male–female differences and (b) the properties of the individual food items are addressed. Although the data are limited, it does suggest that food transfer, in this species, is infrequent, not particularly related to increasing nutritional knowledge or value, usually involve highly visible large items and is predominantly an aggressive male behaviour—from infancy through adulthood. Aggr. Behav. 32:1–6. 2006. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

CATECHIZING THE HEAD AND THE HEART: AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR CONFIRMATION MINISTRY

In catechesis for adolescents seeking confirmation in the Roman Catholic Church, a dualistic bias unconsciously dichotomizes objective doctrine and subjective psychology. This is problematic because if a catechist does not communicate mind‐independent truth, no seed of Catholic faith will have been planted in a student. At the same time, if a catechist does not affirm a student's subjectivity, the seed cannot find receptive soil. I believe the key to integrating these intellectual and affective elements – the head and the heart – lies in the link between what Bernard Lonergan calls authentic subjectivity and objectivity. Catechists can appeal to this link by embracing the moral responsibility to ‘know our knowing,’ becoming aware of our dualistic bias and judging our faith experiences according to objective standards of knowledge.     

WISDOM,MODERATION, AND ELENCHUS IN PLATO'S APOLOGY

Abstract: This article contends that Socratic wisdom (sophia) in Plato's Apology should be understood in relation to moderation (sophrosune), not knowledge (episteme). This stance is exemplified in an interpretation of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge. The god calls Socrates wise. Socrates holds both that he is wise in nothing great or small and that the god does not lie. These apparently inconsistent claims are resolved in an interpretation of elenchus. This interpretion says that Socrates is wise insofar as he does not believe himself to know what he does not know. Whether one knows is demonstrated through elenchus, which moderates between knowledge claims. Thus, elenchus is productive of a kind of wisdom even if it does not produce knowledge. This claim, if true, forms a suitable basis for Socrates' defense of himself. That it does so serves as further evidence for the interpretation of sophia as sophrosune.     

Career development of youth: a nationwide study

The primary objective of the study described here was to assess and summarize core aspects of the career development of American youth. A nationally representative sample of approximately 32,000 8th, 9th, and 11th graders in 200 schools participated in the study in the spring of 1973. This article focuses on the study's more salient findings and presents results in terms of what students say, do, and know about career development. A major finding is the sharp contrast between students' need for help with career planning and the help they have been receiving. In general, results support the current emphasis on career guidance and career education.     

Mediating between international knowledge and local knowledge: The critical role of local field officers in an HIV prevention intervention

The outcomes of health interventions are co‐constructed through negotiation between the competing knowledges of different stakeholders. In such a context, local implementing partners – who mediate between international donors/programme managers and local beneficiary communities – have a critical ‘knowledge brokering’ role to play. With appropriate support, they can facilitate integration of internationally established knowledge with local beliefs and practices in ways that support health‐enhancing behaviour change. This paper focuses on the local field officers of an HIV prevention programme with Cambodian military couples. The paper asks: (1) what are the outcomes of knowledge encounters between international organizations and local field officers, as expressed in field officers' interpretation of programme goals, strategies and messages? (2) To what extent does the intervention context support the field officers' knowledge brokering efforts? Data collected includes semi‐structured interviews, observations of programme meetings and activities, and textual materials. The findings demonstrate that field officers privilege international knowledge, particularly in interactions with international manager–partners. However, in the field, they both hybridize programme messages and struggle to resolve dilemmas provoked by conflicting international and local knowledges. Material and symbolic asymmetries within the intervention context are shown to undermine their knowledge brokering efforts, as field officers attempt to claim identities and futures as health development professionals. Implications for programme practices and accountability systems are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem1

With what right and with what meaning does Heidegger use the term ‘truth’ to characterize Dasein's disclosedness? This is the question at the focal point of Ernst Tugendhat's long‐standing critique of Heidegger's understanding of truth, one to which he finds no answer in Heidegger's treatment of truth in §44 of Being and Time or his later work. To put the question differently: insofar as unconcealment or disclosedness is normally understood as the condition for the possibility of propositional truth rather than truth itself, what does it mean to say – as Heidegger does – that disclosedness is the “primordial phenomenon of truth” and what justifies that claim? The central aim of this paper is to show that Tugendhat's critique remains unanswered. Recent Heidegger scholarship, though it confronts Tugendhat, has not produced a viable answer to his criticism, in part because it overlooks his basic question and therefore misconstrues the thrust of his objections. Ultimately, the paper suggests that what is needed is a re‐evaluation of Heidegger's analysis of truth in light of a more accurate understanding of Tugendhat's critique. The paper concludes by sketching the profile of a more satisfactory reply to Tugendhat's critical question, advocating a return to Heidegger's ‘existential’ analyses in Being and Time in order to locate the normative resources Tugendhat finds lacking in Heidegger's concept of truth.     

The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry

The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self‐knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non‐inferential and non‐observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else's mental life in the same way as one knows one's own mind is a complete non‐starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds and also that the idea of having someone else's mind in one's own introspective reach is not obviously self‐contradictory. So the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else's mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced.     

An epistemology for practical knowledge

Anscombe thought that practical knowledge – a person’s knowledge of what she is intentionally doing – displays formal differences to ordinary empirical, or ‘speculative’, knowledge. I suggest these differences rest on the fact that practical knowledge involves intention analogously to how speculative knowledge involves belief. But this claim conflicts with the standard conception of knowledge, according to which knowledge is an inherently belief-involving phenomenon. Building on John Hyman’s account of knowledge as the ability to use a fact as a reason, I develop an alternative, two-tier, epistemology which allows that knowledge might really come in a belief-involving and an intention-involving form.     

Parents' Emotion‐Related Beliefs,Behaviours, and Skills Predict Children's Recognition of Emotion

Children who are able to recognize others' emotions are successful in a variety of socioemotional domains, yet we know little about how school‐aged children's abilities develop, particularly in the family context. We hypothesized that children develop emotion recognition skill as a function of parents' own emotion‐related beliefs, behaviours, and skills. We examined parents' beliefs about the value of emotion and guidance of children's emotion, parents' emotion labelling and teaching behaviours, and parents' skill in recognizing children's emotions in relation to their school‐aged children's emotion recognition skills. Sixty‐nine parent–child dyads completed questionnaires, participated in dyadic laboratory tasks, and identified their own emotions and emotions felt by the other participant from videotaped segments. Regression analyses indicate that parents' beliefs, behaviours, and skills together account for 37% of the variance in child emotion recognition ability, even after controlling for parent and child expressive clarity. The findings suggest the importance of the family milieu in the development of children's emotion recognition skill in middle childhood and add to accumulating evidence suggesting important age‐related shifts in the relation between parental emotion socialization and child emotional development. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework

What does it mean to know another person, and how is such knowledge different from other kinds of knowledge? These questions constitute an important part of what I call ‘second‐person epistemology’ – the study of how we know other people. I claim that knowledge of other people is not only central to our everyday lives, but it is a kind of knowledge that is unlike other kinds of knowledge. In general, I will argue that second‐person knowledge arises from repeated interactions with another person, and that it also requires employment of certain cognitive abilities and a unique kind of second‐order knowledge. This paper provides the framework for a second‐person epistemology by examining some of our ordinary claims about what it means to know another person. I describe four conditions that typically characterize knowing another person. Then I describe the psychological grounds of knowing a person. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about the unique symmetries of second person knowledge and the role of such knowledge in our broader epistemological endeavours.     

Vision,knowledge, and assertion

I report two experiments studying the relationship among explicit judgments about what people see, know, and should assert. When an object of interest was surrounded by visibly similar items, it diminished people’s willingness to judge that an agent sees, knows, and should tell others that it is present. This supports the claim, made by many philosophers, that inhabiting a misleading environment intuitively decreases our willingness to attribute perception and knowledge. However, contrary to stronger claims made by some philosophers, inhabiting a misleading environment does not lead to the opposite pattern whereby people deny perception and knowledge. Causal modeling suggests a specific psychological model of how explicit judgments about perception, knowledge, and assertability are made: knowledge attributions cause perception attributions, which in turn cause assertability attributions. These findings advance understanding of how these three important judgments are made, provide new evidence that knowledge is the norm of assertion, and highlight some important subtleties in folk epistemology.     

Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs

There is a widespread view that in order to be rational we must mostly know what we believe. In the probabilistic tradition this is defended by arguments that a person who failed to have this knowledge would be vulnerable to sure loss, or probabilistically incoherent. I argue that even gross failure to know one's own beliefs need not expose one to sure loss, and does not if we follow a generalization of the standard bridge principle between first‐order and second‐order beliefs. This makes it possible for a subject to use probabilistic decision theory to manage in a rational way cases of potential failure of this self‐knowledge, as we find in implicit bias. Through such cases I argue that it is possible for uncertainty about what our beliefs are to be not only rationally permissible but advantageous.     

What Is Wrong Indeed?

This is a critical response to Dr. Tamara Dobler's paper “What Is Wrong with Hacker's Wittgenstein? On Grammar, Context and Sense‐Determination.” It demonstrates that Dr. Dobler has no idea of what Wittgenstein meant by “grammar” or “rule of grammar.” She does not know what Wittgenstein meant by “grammatical proposition,” nor does she know what a compositional account of meaning or a category mistake is. She labours under the illusion that to say, as Wittgenstein did, that a rule of grammar excludes a form of words from use is incompatible with the claim that whether an utterance makes sense may be a context‐dependent issue. Unlike Dr. Dobler, Wittgenstein did not.     

Are you listening? Exploring a developmental knowledge–action dissociation in a speech interpretation task

Young children sometimes act inappropriately despite appearing to know what to do. Dissociations of this kind raise important questions about the organization and development of knowledge and action systems. The present study investigated a knowledge–action dissociation in 6–year–olds performing a speech interpretation task and tested the hypothesis that knowledge–action dissociations stem from a general difficulty resolving conflicting cues. When knowledge and action measures were equated in terms of the amount of conflict that needed to be resolved for a correct response, children’s knowledge no longer appeared to outstrip their ability to act appropriately. Implications of the findings for competing views of knowledge representation and knowledge–action system organization are discussed.     

Making meaning of parenting from the perspective of alienated parents

More than 13% of parents identify as being alienated by at least one of their children. Parental alienation often occurs after divorce when one parent (un)intentionally persuades his or her children to distance themselves from or reject the other parent. This study, couched in relational dialectics theory, explores the meaning of parenting from the perspective of 40 alienated parents. This analysis yielded two competing discourses: the culturally dominant discourse of parental norms (DPN) and the culturally marginalized discourse of parental victimization (DPV). Throughout the narrative interviews, the DPV resisted the DPN in four ways (diachronic separation, entertaining, countering, and negating). This study's findings provide insights into the perspective of the alienated parents, advance what we know about family distancing, and provide practical implications.