Welcome to the ‘Paradigm War’: the case of antidepressant medication

Mindfulness-based therapies are a recent development within the cognitive-behavioural tradition and an important element of the third wave cognitive behavioural therapy models. A number of these therapies could be considered to have mindfulness as a major component of the therapy. There has been a considerable growth of interest in these therapies with an accompanying increase in their evidence base. While a number of reviews have been conducted, these therapies were not comprehensively appraised. The most prominent of these therapies, mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, was developed to reduce relapse in recurrent depression. We conducted a meta-analysis which looked at therapies considered to have mindfulness as a major component. We investigated whether this group of therapies was effective in reducing current depressive symptomatology as measured by the Beck depression inventory (BDI). A total of 11 studies were included in the analysis. We found a significant mean reduction score in current depressive symptomatology, as measured by the BDI, of 8.73 points (95% confidence interval?=?6.61, 10.86). We found evidence for the effectiveness of these major-component therapies in reducing levels of active depression. The robustness of these findings is discussed alongside the implications for research and practice within the context of the current literature.     

What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation

When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood as a candidate for an explanatorily basic form of blame. Second, its point and purpose in our lives is investigated and found to reside in its power to increase the alignment of the blamer and the wrongdoer's moral understandings. Third, the hypothesis that Communicative Blame is an explanatorily basic form of blame is tested out by seeing how far other kinds of blame can reasonably be understood as derivative, especially in respect of blame's point and purpose. Finally, a new and quasi‐political worry about blame is raised.     

What is the Cause of Confidence Inflation in the Life Events Inventory (LEI) Paradigm?

Briefly imagining, paraphrasing, or explaining an event causes people to increase their confidence that this event occurred during childhood—the imagination inflation effect. The mechanisms responsible for the effect were investigated with a new paradigm. In Experiment 1, event familiarity (defined as processing fluency) was varied by asking participants to rate each event once, three times, or five times. No inflation was found, indicating that familiarity does not account for the effect. In Experiment 2, richness of memory representation was manipulated by asking participants to generate zero, three, or six details. Confidence increased from the initial to the final rating in the three- and six-detail conditions, indicating that the effect is based on reality-monitoring errors. However, greater inflation in the three-detail condition than in the six-detail condition indicated that there is a boundary condition. These results were also consistent with an alternative hypothesis, the mental workload hypothesis.     

Expect the Unexpected? Variations in Question Type Elicit Cues to Deception in Joint Interviewer Contexts

We examined the effect of (i) a second interviewer's demeanour and (ii) asking expected and unexpected questions on cues to deception. We predicted that liars compared with truth tellers would provide more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second interviewer is supportive. Liars prepare answers for expected questions, and a supportive interviewer will encourage them to provide more detail. By definition, liars have not prepared answers for unexpected questions, and their answers to such questions will be less detailed. Participants (N = 168) appeared before two interviewers: The first asked all the questions, and the second remained silent. The second interviewer exhibited either a supportive or a neutral demeanour. As predicted, liars provided more detail to expected questions and less detail to unexpected questions, particularly when the second interviewer was supportive. In conclusion, a supportive second interviewer elicits cues to deceit. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Challenging the Limits of Critique in Education Through Morin’s Paradigm of Complexity

The position adopted in this paper is inspired by Edgar Morin’s paradigm of complexity and his critique of scientific and philosophical forms of reductionism. This paper is based on research focusing on the diversity of conceptions of critique developed in academic discourses. It aims to challenge the fragmentation and the reduction framing the understanding of this notion in educational sciences. The reflection begins with the introduction of some of Morin’s assumptions concerning the paradigm of complexity. The next section provides a definition of the idea of critique and explores some limits associated with contemporary references framing this notion. Theories of critique are at the core of several educational theories. Based on the literature identified in French-speaking and English-speaking critical traditions in education, several factors determining the way the idea of critique is reduced in education are highlighted. Stressing the tacit character of those variables challenges the limits of traditional conceptions of critique in contemporary education. The position adopted denounces therefore the fact that the current development of theories of critique in education does not provide a framework considering more systematically their conditions of emergence, their own limitations, as well as the antagonistic, complementary and contradictory relationships, which connect them to one another. Based on this position, this paper finally suggests that a distinction be made between “hypocritique” and “hypercritique” as a semantic artifact, stressing the importance of challenging existing theories of critique in education according to the level of complexity that one may attribute to them.     

“Fighting an Unseen Enemy”: The Infectious Paradigm in the Conquest of Pellagra

This essay is concerned with popular and biomedical accounts of the appearance of pellagra at the turn of the last century. Many of these accounts portrayed the disease as communicable despite early evidence to the contrary, which suggested it was attributable to nutritional factors. The nonspecific nature of its symptom profile, along with the enormous range of cure-alls offered to the public, made the etiology of pellagra open to a variety of interpretations. However, as the author shows, the infection paradigm and genetic determinism hindered efforts to understand and treat pellagra.     

The Biomedical Paradigm and the Nobel Prize: Is It Time for a Change?

An examination of the early history of Nobel Committee deliberations, coupled with a survey of discoveries for which prizes have been awarded to date – and, equally revealing, discoveries for which prizes have not been awarded – reveals a pattern. This pattern suggests that Committee members may have internalized the received, biomedical model and conferred awards in accord with the physicalistic premises that ground this model. I consider the prospect of a paradigm change in medical science and the possible repercussions of such a change on the distribution of Nobel prizes within the domain of physiology or medicine. For expository purposes, I contrast a model based on a science of pathophysiology with one based on a science of pathopsychophysiology. I propose a means whereby members might minimize the potentially blinding effects of model-dependence and come to evaluate medical discoveries from an inter-model rather than an exclusively intra-model perspective. By bringing to light questions rarely asked and proposing answers, I seek to open a dialogue and furnish a vehicle by which the putative delimiting effects of model-dependence might be overcome.     

Does Practice Make the Perfect Liar? The Effect of Rehearsal and Increased Cognitive Load on Cues to Deception

Recent studies have explored ways to increase cognitive load in liars to identify cues to deception. This study used a driving simulator as a load‐inducing technique to explore differences between truth‐tellers and liars during an investigative interview scenario and also investigated the effect of rehearsing lies in this context. Deception affected driving performance. Truth‐tellers drove more slowly compared with their own baseline, whereas unrehearsed liars sped up. There was no difference in speed between truth‐tellers and rehearsed liars. In addition, truth‐tellers had significantly faster reaction times compared with their own baseline, than both rehearsed and unrehearsed liars. During the interviews, truth‐tellers provided significantly more visual and auditory details and mentioned significantly fewer cognitive operations than liars. The findings add to the body of literature exploring the optimal relationship between cognitive load and secondary task performance to identify cues to deception.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Predicting Behavior From Actions in the Past: Repeated Decision Making or a Matter of Habit?

This paper summarizes research on determinants of repeated behaviors, and the decision processes underlying them. The present research focuses on travel mode choices as an example of such behaviors. It is proposed that when behavior is performed repeatedly and becomes habitual, it is guided by automated cognitive processes, rather than being preceded by elaborate decision processes (i.e., a decision based on attitudes and intentions). First, current attitude-behavior models are discussed, and the role of habit in these models is examined. Second, research is presented on the decision processes preceding travel mode choices. Based on the present theoretical and empirical overview, it is concluded that frequently performed behavior is often a matter of habit, thereby establishing a boundary condition for the applicability of attitude-behavior models. However, more systematic research is required to disentangle the role of habit in attitude-behavior models and to learn more about the cognitive processes underlying habitual behavior.     

Diagnostic Accuracy of the MMPI–2 Malingering Discriminant Function Index in the Detection of Malingering Among Inmates

The MMPI–2 Malingering Discriminant Function Index (M-DFI) was designed to detect malingerers educated about MMPI–2 validity indicators. However, given current attorney practices, the clinical utility of the M-DFI lies in its ability to detect examinees who are cautioned about the indicators. In this study, we compared 45 inmate simulators cautioned to avoid detection on the MMPI–2 with 46 psychiatric inmates who completed the MMPI–2 under standard instructions. Logistic regression analyses indicated that although the M-DFI performed better than several individual indicators, results were mixed for combinations of indicators, and the M-DFI did not outperform different sets of existing indicators. These findings support existing strategies to detect malingering on the MMPI–2. We discuss considerations concerning the clinical applicability of M-DFI.     

Change Detection Without Awareness: Do Explicit Reports Underestimate the Representation of Change in the Visual System?

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on the redeployment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene perception, and propose a reinterpretation of the role of attention in representing change.     

How not to be a metaethical naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals

This paper is an analysis of the performance of one reading of Charles Taylor's general criticisms of naturalist accounts of morality (excluding the issue of moral realism) when measured against a specific naturalist account, in this case J.L. Mackie's moral theory. It is argued that Taylor's criticisms, read in this way, fail to find purchase, despite his singling out of Mackie's theory as a prime example of a theory that exhibits the flaws Taylor believes are inherent in this kind of approach to moral theory. This points the supporter of Taylor's position towards an alternative reading of his challenge to naturalist accounts of morality.