Fictions and facts about evolutionary approaches to human behavior: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Six misconceptions about evolutionary approaches to human behavior are exposed. Evidence is adduced to support the assertions that evolutionary approaches do not (a) adopt a reductionistic "gene-centered" level of analysis, (b) assume that natural selection is the only process that creates and designs ontogenetic processes and phenotypic outcomes, (c) assume that genes are the only agents responsible for the transgenerational inheritance of phenotypic traits and characteristics, (d) assume that genes are self-contained and impervious to extragenetic influences, (e) posit a strong form of genetic determinism, or (f) pay lip service to the role of the environment. Building straw men and knocking them down is an inherently destructive enterprise; integrating different approaches is a more constructive way of contributing to the growth of knowledge.     

Evolutionary psychology and developmental dynamics: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Evolutionary psychology provides a cogent metatheory for psychological science. It has furnished compelling theories of major domains of human functioning, including mating, parenting, kinship, morality, cooperation, conflict, aggression, and aesthetics. It has produced hundreds of empirical discoveries missed entirely by prior psychologists. Developmental dynamics, properly conceived, can add to the theoretical foundation of evolutionary psychology. But it has not provided alternative theories capable of explaining the many detailed empirical discoveries made by evolutionary' psychologists. Nor has it generated a comparable bounty of new empirical discoveries. By critical scientific standards--theoretical cogency, predictive accuracy, interdisciplinary consistency, and empirical harvest--modern evolutionary psychology fares well compared with alternatives.     

Evolutionary psychology from a developmental systems perspective: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Although agreeing with R. Lickliter and H. Honeycutt (2003) that evolutionary psychology lacks and should adopt a coherent developmental model to explain how evolved mechanisms become expressed in phenotypes, it is argued that adhering to the principles of developmental systems theory, despite enhancing evolutionary psychology, would not change appreciably its basic focus. The concepts of innateness and modularity, what is inherited and what evolves, as well as the possible role of developmental plasticity in the evolution of human cognition are discussed. It is proposed that evolutionary psychology can incorporate the developmental systems perspective into its theorizing, with the end result being a science that more closely reflects human nature.     

The second law of thermodynamics is the first law of psychology: evolutionary developmental psychology and the theory of tandem, coordinated inheritances: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Organisms inherit a set of environmental regularities as well as genes, and these two inheritances repeatedly encounter each other across generations. This repetition drives natural selection to coordinate the interplay of stably replicated genes with stably persisting environmental regularities, so that this web of interactions produces the reliable development of a functionally organized design. Selection is the only known counterweight to the tendency of physical systems to lose rather than grow functional organization. This means that the individually unique and unpredictable factors in the web of developmental interactions are a disordering threat to normal development. Selection built anti-entropic mechanisms into organisms to orchestrate transactions with environments so that they have some chance of being organization-building and reproduction-enhancing rather than disordering.     

Return of the ego--self-referent information as a filter for social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003)

The protocentrism paradigm of social prediction (R. Karniol, 2003) challenges the egocentrism paradigm tacitly accepted by many researchers. The author reviews the 2 paradigms comparatively by focusing on 3 conceptual and 3 empirical issues. On conceptual grounds, the author suggests that the egocentrism paradigm has been proven useful because of (a) its greater breadth and parsimony, (b) the difficulties in documenting the origin of protocenters, and (c) the indeterminate nature of self-as-distinct tags (which are crucial to protocentrism). On empirical grounds, the author argues that in research on perceptions of self-other similarities, the egocentric process of social projection is well-established. Self-referent knowledge (a) is most readily accessible, (b) receives greater weight in prediction tasks than does other-referent knowledge, and (c) tends to be suppressed only temporarily, with effort, and incompletely.     

Bayesian statistical inference in psychology: comment on Trafimow (2003)

D. Trafimow (2003) presented an analysis of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) using Bayes's theorem. Among other points, he concluded that NHST is logically invalid, but that logically valid Bayesian analyses are often not possible. The latter conclusion reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Bayesian inference. This view needs correction, because Bayesian methods have an important role to play in many psychological problems where standard techniques are inadequate. This comment, with the help of a simple example, explains the usefulness of Bayesian inference for psychology.     

A realistic perspective on pattern representation in growth data: comment on Bauer and Curran (2003)

D. J. Bauer and P. J. Curran (2003) cautioned that results obtained from growth mixture models may sometimes be inaccurate. The problem they addressed occurs when a growth mixture model is applied to a single, general population of individuals but findings incorrectly support the conclusion that there are 2 subpopulations. In an artificial sampling experiment, they showed that this can occur when the variables in the population have a nonnormal distribution. A realistic perspective is that although a healthy skepticism to complex statistical results is appropriate, there are no true models to discover. Consequently, the issue of model misspecification is irrelevant in practical terms. The purpose of a mathematical model is to summarize data, to formalize the dynamics of a behavioral process, and to make predictions. All of this is scientifically valuable and can be accomplished with a carefully developed model, even though the model is false.     

On the status of self in social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003)

A challenge to mainstream notions on the status of the self in social prediction is welcome. The self-as-distinct model (R. Karniol, 2003) is thoughtful, provocative, and parsimonious, but it is also underspecified, undertested, and selective in its treatment of the evidence. More important, the model does not provide compelling answers to issues pertaining to the origins of prototypic social knowledge, the status of self-knowledge, the content of the self-representation, whether the use of self in social prediction is a logical contradiction, and whether the self's role in social prediction is amotivated.     

Orientalism, representation and religion: the reality behind the myth

Said's Orientalism has been called an ‘epoch-making’ and ‘paradigm constitutive’ book. While it undoubtedly caused a stir on its appearance and proved an important influence upon post-colonial studies and other developments in literary and cultural theory, a careful re-reading of it reveals a deeply flawed work that offers a confused analysis of human representations and realities, a highly selective and partial engagement with Western and Middle Eastern history and scholarship, and a particularly unhelpful approach to religion. The argument offered here is that Said's claims about ‘Orientalism’ are actually incoherent, veering between Foucauldian social constructionism and references to trans-cultural human realities; that the theoretical approaches to religion are inconsistent and highly selective; that the account of human agency is entirely inadequate; and that, although Said condemns entire generations of Orientalist scholars as racist, imperialist and ethnocentric, he is insufficiently reflective about his own scholarly position and the implications of its inconsistencies. Although Orientalism has been hailed as a book that ‘breathed insurgency’, it actually offers a vision of human beings as remarkably powerless in the face of arbitrary and abstract discourses that define their lives as oppressors or oppressed. Said sought to demonstrate that the reality behind the myth of scholarly impartiality was a racist and ethnocentric exercise of control and authority over the Orient, but the reality behind the myth of Orientalism is a theoretically flawed work offering a reductive account of religion and an impoverished view of human beings.     

Assessment of ADHD symptoms: comment on Gomez et al. (2003)

R. Gomez, G. L. Burns, J. A. Walsh, and M. A. de Moura (2003) examined the degree to which parent and teacher ratings of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms are accounted for by trait, source, and error variance. The importance and limitations of Gomez et al.'s findings are discussed in the context of clinical and research assessments of children suspected of having ADHD. Gomez et al.'s findings make clear that multimethod and multisource assessment protocols should be used in diagnosing children with this disorder. Further, clinicians and researchers must avoid relying too heavily on 1 source of data when evaluating the severity and frequency of ADHD symptoms.     

Continuity and change in the measurement of infant attachment: comment on Fraley and Spieker (2003)

R.C. Fraley and S.J. Spieker (2003) refocused attention on the important question of continuous versus categorical measurement of infant attachment. This commentary begins with a brief response to Fraley and Spieker's position. Next, it highlights the usefulness of the categorical approach by reviewing some of the major advances in the field that have been fostered by a categorical approach. These include the identification of the disorganized attachment group, the development of the concept of conditional behavioral strategies, the creation of systems for coding attachment beyond infancy, and a greater understanding of cross-generational associations. The author then makes several propositions for future research that are necessary for clarifying how best to measure infant attachment.     

Attachment categories as reflections of multiple dimensions: comment on Fraley and Spieker (2003)

Ainsworth's system of classifying patterns of attachment behavior has served the field well and will not be easily displaced--not because of a commitment by attachment researchers to the taxonomic status of these categories but rather because of difficulties lying in the way of a dimensional approach. Foremost among these is the large number of dimensions used in making classifications and the need to develop reliable scales to tap them. Other problems include the need to capture how behavior changes across age and across the episodes of the Strange Situation. Others will debate R.C. Fraley and S.J. Spieker's (2003) arguments concerning taxonomic status. However, whether taxa or not, Ainsworth's categories at the least have represented well the multidimensional space underlying attachment behavior in conditions of mild stress. Only when an alternative approach is demonstrated to predict (with equal power, in practice) the vast range of outcomes associated with Ainsworth's categories will it be a candidate for substitution.     

The onset of receding motion captures attention: comment on Franconeri and Simons (2003)

Franconeri & Simons (2003) reported that some but not all types of motion capture attention in a visual search task, ostensibly because some types of motion are behaviorally significant. In the present article, we argue that a more parsimonious explanation of their results is that the onset of motion, but not motion per se, captures attention. This conclusion helps to resolve inconsistencies between the Franconeri and Simons findings and earlier reports from other investigators and is consistent with results that we have recently reported (Abrams & Christ, 2003). The Franconeri and Simons interpretation rests largely on their failure to find attentional capture by one type of motion-simulated receding motion. We report here the results of two experiments that demonstrate that the onset of receding motion does indeed capture attention when the motion is produced using stereo depth cues. As we have argued elsewhere, the capture of attention in displays containing motion appears to be dependent on the onset of the motion, rather than on the mere presence of specific types of motion as suggested by Franconeri and Simons. One possible explanation is that the onset of motion captures attention because it serves as a strong cue to animacy--and the detection of nearby animals can have important consequences for survival.     

Questions raised by a reasoned action approach: comment on Ogden (2003).

In her critique of social cognition or reasoned action models, J. Ogden (see record 2003-05896-016) claimed that such models are not falsifiable and thus cannot be tested, that the postulated relations among model components are true by definition, and that questionnaires used to test the models may create rather than assess cognitions and thus influence later behavior. The authors of this comment challenge all 3 arguments and contend that the findings Ogden regarded as requiring rejection of the models are, in fact, consistent with them, that there is good evidence for the validity of measures used to assess the models' major constructs, and that the effect of completing a questionnaire on cognitions and subsequent behavior is an empirical question.     

Toward assessing attachment on an emotional security continuum: comment on Fraley and Spieker (2003)

The article by R.C. Fraley and S.J. Spieker (2003) serves to remind the discipline of the possible virtues of assessing attachments on continua, a practice that has a long history in attachment research. In this commentary, the author further develops the potential contributions of this approach to assessment and advocates renewed efforts toward assessment of attachments on a single continuum of emotional security. The author contends that theory is essential as a guide for new directions in attachment assessment and that Bowlby's notions of secure base and emotional security provide the needed conceptual foundation for these further developments (E. Waters & E. M. Cummings, 2000). Moreover, challenges that have been made historically to the scoring of attachment on a security continuum are addressed. New means for continuously scoring attachment are advocated as a supplement to the primary direction of categorically assessing attachment patterns.     

Therapists as fixed versus random effects-some statistical and conceptual issues: a comment on Siemer and Joormann (2003)

The authors disagree with M. Siemer and J. Joormann's assertion that therapist should be a fixed effect in psychotherapy treatment outcome studies. If treatment is properly standardized, therapist effects can be examined in preliminary tests and the therapist term deleted from analyses if such differences approach zero. If therapist effects are anticipated and either cannot be minimized through standardization or are specifically of interest because of the nature of the research question, the study has to be planned with adequate statistical power for including therapist as a random term. Simulation studies conducted by Siemer and Joormann confounded bias due to small sample size and inconsistent estimates.     

When egocentrism breeds distinctness--comparison processes in social prediction: comment on Karniol (2003)

In contrast with R. Karniol's (2003) protocentric model, this article proposes an egocentric comparison model of social prediction. To predict the experiences and reactions of a target other, judges are assumed to relate self-knowledge to the target via a process of comparing the target with the self. Two alternative comparison processes are distinguished. Similarity testing yields target judgments that are consistent with the self, whereas dissimilarity testing leads to target judgments that are inconsistent with the self. From this perspective, social prediction is egocentric in that it makes use of self-knowledge as its primary representational basis. At the same time, egocentric prediction does not require the self to be seen and judged as similar to the target other. Conceptualizing social predictions as social comparison suggests that predicting the experiences and reactions of others is a highly flexible process.     

Statistical and substantive checking in growth mixture modeling: comment on Bauer and Curran (2003)

This commentary discusses the D. J. Bauer and P. J. Curran (2003) investigation of growth mixture modeling. Single-class modeling of nonnormal outcomes is compared with modeling with multiple latent trajectory classes. New statistical tests of multiple-class models are discussed. Principles for substantive investigation of growth mixture model results are presented and illustrated by an example of high school dropout predicted by low mathematics achievement development in Grades 7-10.     

Evaluating the MSCEIT V2.0 via CFA: comment on Mayer et al. (2003)

This investigation uncovered several substantial errors in the confirmatory factor analysis results reported by J. D. Mayer, P. Salovey, D. R. Caruso, and G. Sitarenios (see record 2003-02341-015). Specifically, the values associated with the close-fit indices (normed fit index, Tucker-Lewis Index, and root-mean-square error of approximation) are inaccurate. A reanalysis of the Mayer et al. subscale intercorrelation matrix provided accurate values of the close-fit indices, which resulted in different evaluations of the models tested by J. D. Mayer et al. Contrary to J. D. Mayer et al., the 1-factor model and the 2-factor model did not provide good fit. Although the 4-factor model was still considered good fitting, the non-constrained 4-factor model yielded a non-positive definite matrix, which was interpreted to be due to the fact that two of the branch-level factors (Perceiving and Facilitating) were collinear, suggesting that a model with 4 factors was implausible.