The role of action-initiation in young children's causal explanations of action

Four studies examined preschoolers' use of the cue of action initiation to infer another's desired goal. In two studies, children watched as one protagonist self-initiated movement to a target while a second person was propelled there by an external force. Older 3-year-olds (M = 3;10) and 5-year-olds consistently judged only the self-initiated actor's movement as desire based. In the second study, however, younger 3-year-olds (M = 3;3 also participated, and they were equally likely to say that either movement was goal directed, even when the passive mover appeared to resist movement toward the goal. A third study, featuring only one protagonist, yielded no improvement among younger 3-year-olds. A fourth study emphasizing the single protagonist's persistence in approaching a target via repeated self-initiated movements revealed some improvement among younger 3-year-olds; older 3-year-olds were near ceiling performance. Altogether, these results suggest that differences in action initiation play an increasingly important role in 3-year-olds' mentalistic explanations of action. This development may be related to other critical changes occurring in 3-year-olds' developing theory of mind.     

Disagreement and causal learning: Others' hypotheses affect children's evaluations of evidence

When children evaluate evidence and make causal inferences, they are sensitive to the social context in which data are generated. This study investigated whether children learn more from evidence generated by an agent who agrees with them or from one who disagrees with them. Children in two age groups (5- and 6-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds) observed the functioning of a machine that lit up and played music in the presence of certain objects. After endorsing one of two plausible causal hypotheses, children observed a puppet either agree or disagree with their own hypotheses. The puppet then generated a further piece of evidence that confirmed, disconfirmed, or was neutral with respect to the children's hypotheses. When they were later asked to make causal inferences about objects they did not directly observe, children in both age groups responded differentially to identical evidence depending on whether the agent agreed or disagreed, and they often drew stronger inferences in response to disagreement. In addition, older children were particularly sensitive to disagreement when the evidence was ambiguous. Our results suggest that children consider the relationship between their own and others' hypotheses when evaluating evidence that others generate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

气质与父母养育对儿童社会适应的交互作用:代表性理论及其证据

最佳适配理论、素质-压力模型、差别易感模型从不同视角阐述了气质、养育方式在儿童社会适应行为中的交互作用机制。最佳适配理论强调气质特质与父母养育方式的良好匹配能促进儿童的社会适应,而不良匹配则会带来适应问题。素质-压力模型强调在不利父母养育条件下,具有"风险"气质特质的儿童更容易出现适应不良,而对"弹性"气质的儿童影响不大。差别易感模型则认为儿童"易感"的气质特质在良好的抚养条件下表现得"更好",而在不利的抚养环境中表现得"更差"。围绕三种代表性理论及其实证研究结果,对当前最新研究结果进行了分析和总结,进一步细分了儿童社会化过程中的风险因素和保护性因素。从气质与积极养育方式的交互作用、养育过程中父母角色分工的差异,以及气质与养育方式动态作用机制三个方面指出了将来进一步探索的方向。     

Alignable and nonalignable differences in causal explanations

Prior research indicates that people may base their causal explanations on distinctive features between an event and a contrasting background instance in which the event did not occur. Research on similarity judgments suggests that there are two types of distinctive features: alignable differences, which are corresponding characteristics of a pair, and nonalignable differences, which are characteristics of one item for which there are no corresponding characteristics in the other. In three experiments, the hypothesis that people's evaluations of causal explanations vary as a function of feature alignment was examined. The results suggest that people will rate explanations differently on the basis of alignable or nonalignable differences, depending on the type of the event, and that alignability depends on the relational structure among the features of the event.     

Intentional explanations and radical theories of education

In this paper I argue that Marxist studies of schools have overlooked the power of intentional explanations to explain schooling practices and policies. This oversight is at least in part due to many radical analyses failing to distinguish between explaining the acquisition and persistence of beliefs and determining the social consequences that follow from acting on beliefs. I further contend that radical researchers examining schooling practices must develop a more rigorous and refined conception of capitalist class interests.     

Naive theories and causal deduction

Evidence is presented that implicates two factors in deductive reasoning about causality. The factors are alternative causes and disabling conditions (factors that prevent effects from occurring in the presence of viable causes). A causal analysis is presented in which these factors impact on judgments concerning causal necessity and sufficiency, which in turn determine deductive entailment relations. In Experiment 1, these factors were found to impact causal deductive judgments more strongly than did logical form. In Experiment 2, causal deductive judgments were found to vary as a function of familiarity with a particular causal relationship: The more familiar the causal relationship, the less willing reasoners were to accept conclusions based on them.     

Debating drunk driving: The construction of causal explanations in television discussion programmes

The mass media are an important source of social understandings and representations. The growing genre of audience discussion programmes functions as a public forum for airing opinions on issues of social concern. The genre is structured so as to involve viewers, to validate ordinary experiences and to express opinion. Four programmes on drunk driving were analysed for the causal explanations they offer viewers. The causes, effects and causal interconnections used within each programme were analysed, and networks of the overall representations of drunk driving were constructed. These showed a broad consensus of causes and effects across programmes, but different explanations in terms of locus, stability and controllability. Programmes typically offered lists of important factors, rather than structured arguments, despite the debating framework. There was an emphasis on external, stable, controllable causes in the programmes.     

Children's theories of god: explanations for difficult-to-explain phenomena

Participants in 3 age groups (preschoolers, 3rd graders, and college students) generated explanations for various phenomena. Participants with higher levels of religious involvement provided more attributions to God than participants with lower levels of religious involvement. Also, older participants provided more attributions to God than younger participants. The results suggest that individuals who have higher levels of religious involvement develop theorylike understanding based on their conception of God. It appears that this theorylike understanding has explanatory utility that increases with age.     

Two causal theories of counterfactual conditionals

Bayes nets are formal representations of causal systems that many psychologists have claimed as plausible mental representations. One purported advantage of Bayes nets is that they may provide a theory of counterfactual conditionals, such as If Calvin had been at the party, Miriam would have left early. This article compares two proposed Bayes net theories as models of people's understanding of counterfactuals. Experiments 1-3 show that neither theory makes correct predictions about backtracking counterfactuals (in which the event of the if-clause occurs after the event of the then-clause), and Experiment 4 shows the same is true of forward counterfactuals. An amended version of one of the approaches, however, can provide a more accurate account of these data.     

Preschool children's understanding of causal connections

Preschool-aged children's understanding of causal mechanism was assessed by showing them a simple event sequence in which two objects moved in tandem. The central question was whether children would infer the presence of a mechanism linking the two objects whose movement covaried. This was tested by assessing five responses: actions when asked to move one object, explanations for how the object moved, predictions as to whether both objects would still move without a connection, inferences about the nature and location of the connection, and surprise when the objects moved without any apparent connection. The results from 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds indicated that an understanding of mechanism is firmly established by 5 years but fragile at 3 years and only revealed by some response modes. The implications of the results concerning how to characterize and test for early competence are discussed.     

The causal role of theories of relationships: consequences for satisfaction and cognitive strategies

Two studies demonstrated the causal role of relationship theories in influencing relationship satisfaction and the processes affecting satisfaction. In both studies, participants were induced to hold either the soulmate or work-it-out theory. Feelings that one's partner was ideal (or not) were associated with relationship satisfaction more strongly for people induced to hold the soulmate theory than the work-it-out theory (Study 1). In Study 2, participants' beliefs about their relationships were threatened, and strategies for responding to this threat were assessed. Inducing people to hold the soulmate theory resulted in more relationship-enhancing cognitions if participants believed they were with the right person but more relationship-detracting cognitions if participants did not believe they were with the right person. These polarizing tendencies were enhanced under threat. In contrast, inducing people to hold a work-it-out theory produced almost no biased processing, leading people to process information similarly, regardless of their feelings about their partner.     

On the origin of personal causal theories

Detecting the causal relations among environmental events is an important facet of learning. Certain variables have been identified which influence both human causal attribution and animal learning: temporal priority, temporal and spatial contiguity, covariation and contingency, and prior experience. Recent research has continued to find distinct commonalities between the influence these variables have in the two domains, supporting a neo-Humean analysis of the origins of personal causal theories. The cues to causality determine which event relationships will be judged as causal; personal causal theories emerge as a result of these judgments and in turn affect future attributions. An examination of animal learning research motivates further extensions of the analogy. Researchers are encouraged to study real-time causal attributions, to study additional methodological analogies to conditioning paradigms, and to develop rich learning accounts of the acquisition of causal theories.     

The effect of generic statements on children's causal attributions: questions of mechanism

Generic statements, or generics, express generalizations about entire kinds (e.g., "Girls are good at a game called 'tooki'"). In contrast, nongeneric statements express facts about specific (sets of) individuals (e.g., "Jane is good at tooki"). Aside from simply conveying information, generics and nongenerics also instill different causal perspectives on the facts expressed, implying that these facts stem from deep, inherent causes (e.g., talent) or from external, mechanistic causes (e.g., instruction), respectively. In the present research (with samples of 4- to 7-year-olds and undergraduates, N = 220), we proposed that children's causal attributions for the facts learned through these statements are determined not by the generic/nongeneric format of the statements themselves but rather by the generic/nongeneric format of the beliefs relevant to these statements. This proposal led to two specific predictions. First, the influence of the generic belief induced by a novel generic statement should be detected in any subsequent context that falls under its scope--even in circumstances that involve particular individuals. Confirming this prediction, participants often attributed a fact conveyed in a nongeneric statement (e.g., a particular girl's tooki ability) to deep, inherent causes if they had previously formed a relevant generic belief (e.g., by hearing that girls are good at tooki). Second, we predicted that nongeneric statements such as "Most girls are good at tooki" should also promote attributions to deep causes because they often ultimately give rise to generic beliefs, as suggested by recent evidence. This prediction was confirmed as well. These results clarify and expand our knowledge of the influence of language on children's understanding of the world.     

The power of causal beliefs and conflicting evidence on causal judgments and decision making

In two experiments, we investigated the relative impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence on both decision making and causal judgments, and whether this relative impact could be altered by previous experience. Participants had to decide which of two alternatives would attain a higher outcome on the basis of four cues. After completing the decision task, they were asked to estimate to what extent each cue was a reliable cause of the outcome. Participants were provided with instructions that causally related two of the cues to the outcome, whereas they received neutral information about the other two cues. Two of the four cues—a causal and a neutral cue—had high validity and were both generative. The remaining two cues had low validity, and were generative in Experiment 1, but almost not related to the outcome in Experiment 2. Selected groups of participants in both experiments received pre-training with either causal or neutral cues, or no pre-training was provided. Results revealed that the impact of causal beliefs and empirical evidence depends on both the experienced pre-training and cue validity. When all cues were generative and participants received pre-training with causal cues, they mostly relied on their causal beliefs, whereas they relied on empirical evidence when they received pre-training with neutral cues. In contrast, when some of the cues were almost not related to the outcome, participants’ responses were primarily influenced by validity and—to a lesser extent—by causal beliefs. In either case, however, the influence of causal beliefs was higher in causal judgments than in decision making. While current theoretical approaches in causal learning focus either on the effect of causal beliefs or empirical evidence, the present research shows that both factors are required to explain the flexibility involved in human inferences.