Exploring the coherence of young children's explanatory abilities: Evidence from generating counterfactuals

Researchers who advocate the hypothesis that cognitive development is akin to theory formation have also suggested that young children possess distinct systems for explaining physical, psychological, and biological principles (see, e.g., Wellman & Gelman, 1992). One way this has been investigated is by examining how children explain human action: Children explain intentional and accidental actions by appealing to psychological principles, and explain impossible physical or biological action in terms of the underlying principles of those domains (Schult & Wellman, 1997). The current investigation examined the coherence of children's explanatory systems by eliciting explanations of possible and impossible physical, psychological, and biological events. Then, in a separate set of stories, children were asked to generate counterfactual alternatives for characters who wanted to perform an event, but did not, either because of a mishap or because the event was impossible. Overall, children were better at generating explanations for why events were impossible than recognizing that no alternative could be generated for impossible events. However, there was some evidence that children's explanatory abilities predicted whether they could correctly reject cases where no counterfactual alternative could be generated. The results lend support to the hypothesis that children's causal knowledge is coherently organized in domain‐specific knowledge structures.     

The explanatory structure of unexplainable events: Causal constraints on magical reasoning

A common intuition, often captured in fiction, is that some impossible events (e.g., levitating a stone) are “more impossible” than others (e.g., levitating a feather). We investigated the source of this intuition, hypothesizing that graded notions of impossibility arise from explanatory considerations logically precluded by the violation at hand but still taken into account. Studies 1–4 involved college undergraduates (n = 357), and Study 5 involved preschool-aged children (n = 32). In Studies 1 and 2, participants saw pairs of magical spells that violated one of 18 causal principles—six physical, six biological, and six psychological—and were asked to indicate which spell would be more difficult to learn. Both spells violated the same causal principle but differed in their relation to a subsidiary principle. Participants’ judgments of spell difficulty honored the subsidiary principle, even when participants were given the option of judging the two spells equally difficult. Study 3 replicated those effects with Likert-type ratings; Study 4 replicated them in an open-ended version of the task in which participants generated their own causal violations; and Study 5 replicated them with children. Taken together, these findings suggest that events that defy causal explanation are interpreted in terms of explanatory considerations that hold in the absence of such violations.     

Children's reasoning about the causes of human behavior

Three studies examined young children's ability to predict how certain internal and external conditions affect behavior. Study 1 included 136 children from early preschool, late preschool, kindergarten, and second grade. A forced choice procedure revealed that even the youngest group could predict the effect of various internal-personal causes (e.g., interest, intelligence) and external-situational causes (e.g., rewards, adult pressure). Older preschoolers and second graders considered these internal causes more powerful than these external causes. With the same procedure, in Study 2 the 16 preschoolers predicted that both physical characteristics (e.g., strength, energy level) and the internal-personal characteristics of Study 1 affect performance in athletic activities. In addition, they considered the physical causes more important. Study 3 examined more complex types of causal reasoning. Younger preschoolers responded randomly but older preschoolers combined two causes to create a greater effect than one cause and used an external cause to enhance, rather than discount, an internal cause. The discussion focused on the cognitive development underlying developmental differences in the ability to predict behavior on the basis of one or two causes.     

When similarity and causality compete in category-based property generalization

Five experiments were performed to investigate the category-based generalization of nonblank properties, properties that were novel but that were attributed to existing category features with causal explanations. Experiments 1-3 tested how such explanations interact with the well-known effects of similarity on such generalizations. The results showed that when the causal explanations were used, standard effects of typicality (Experiment 1), diversity (Experiment 2), or similarity itself (Experiment 3) were almost completely eliminated. Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated that category-based generalizations exhibit some of the standard properties of causal reasoning; for example, an effect (i.e., a novel category property) is judged to be more prevalent when its cause (i.e., an existing category feature) is also prevalent. These findings suggest that category-based property generalization is often an instance of causal inference.     

Learning the Relevance of Relevance and the Trouble with Truth: Evaluating Explanatory Relevance across Childhood

ABSTRACT

In four experiments, we investigate how the ability to detect irrelevant explanations develops. In Experiments 1 and 2, 4- to 8-year-olds and adults rated different types of explanations about “what makes cars go” individually, in the absence of a direct contrast. Each explanation was true and relevant (e.g., “Cars have engines that turn gasoline into power”), true and irrelevant (e.g., “Cars have radios that play music”), or a false statement that would be relevant if it were true (e.g., “Cars have rockets that speed them up”). Participants of all ages spontaneously indicated that false explanations were less helpful than relevant explanations. However, there was a developmental shift for irrelevant explanations: 4-year-olds only detected irrelevant explanations that did not involve internal features of cars (e.g., “Cars have parking lots that they park in”). Crucially, this shift between age 4 and 5 cannot be explained by 4-year-olds’ lack of knowledge since 4-year-olds correctly indicated that relevant explanations were more helpful than irrelevant feature explanations when given a direct contrast in Experiment 3. These results are further clarified in Experiment 4, in which we provided a different explanatory goal (“where to find cars”) and found that even young children have a nuanced understanding of explanatory relevance that is sensitive to differing explanatory goals. Together, these four experiments suggest an early-emerging ability to understand relevance, but a shift between age 4 and 5 in the ability to spontaneously use this understanding when evaluating individual explanations in isolation.     

A Factor-Analytic Investigation of Child Animism

Summary

From a factor analysis of 33 variables on 83 first-grade children an animism factor, involving children's conceptions of life, was identified. Animism was found to be relatively independent of operational thought, Piagetiantype problem solving, and the ability to give causal explanations of physical phenomena. In a second study, a similar animism factor emerged from a factor analysis of 11 variables, Animistic conceptions were unrelated to children's reasoning about various interpersonal situations: i.e., morality, justice, and psychological causality. In addition to an interpretation of the factor involving possible differences in criteria used for life attribution, the specificity of the factor was underscored.     

Judgments of voluntary and physical causes in causal chains: probabilistic and social functionalist criteria for attributions

Four experiments investigated judgments about voluntary human actions and physical causes that were embedded in causal chains ending in negative outcomes (e.g., a forest fire). Causes were judged for their explanatory quality, their effect on the probability of the outcome, and the extent to which they could be socially controlled. Results supported legal theorists' claim that voluntary actions are judged better explanations than physical causes. Indices derived from theories of probability change generally failed to predict the preference for voluntary actions. In contrast, this preference was mediated by the perceived extent to which voluntary versus physical causes may be brought under social control. These results suggest that causal explanation, at least within causal chains, is not driven solely by changes in the probability of an outcome when a cause is added, and that observers recognize the potential social function of explanations in drawing attention to socially controllable causes. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Concepts of God and Germs: Social Mechanisms and Cognitive Heuristics

Previous research has shown that the more individuals view observable entities as animate, the more those entities are associated with having psychological and physiological experiences. This study examined the relationship between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for concepts of unobservable scientific (i.e., germ) and religious (i.e., God) entities. This study further explored how children's conceptions vary according to the social learning opportunities (i.e., discourse, rituals) parents reportedly create. Parent–child dyads with young children from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds participated. Three central findings emerged. First, children readily associated God with psychobiological characteristics but did not do so to the same extent for germs. Second, children applied more psychobiological properties to both entity types when they believed that the entity was animate. Third, engaging in rituals and discourse with parents was indirectly related to children's concepts of God but not related to their concepts of germs. Overall, this study presented support for a connection between children's animistic and anthropomorphic reasoning for unobservable entities, and an indirect effect of cultural input on this reasoning. The implications of these findings will be discussed.     

儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习

儿童的选择性学习是目前认知发展领域的热点问题。儿童在因果知识领域内的选择性学习(即选择性因果学习)对于回答儿童如何获取知识这个经典问题具有重要意义。儿童的选择性因果学习表现在对他人解释的辨别、评估与采纳上。他们会主动向可靠的信息提供者寻求解释, 并在接收回答后表现出选择性跟进反应。对于他人的回答, 年幼儿童不仅能根据言语线索辨别出解释性陈述, 还能依据解释的结构特征选择更好的陈述加以采纳, 年长儿童甚至可以从不同模式的解释中灵活地学习更适宜的因果知识。未来研究应深入关注解释的其它特征在儿童选择性因果学习中的作用, 进一步探讨选择性因果学习的认知机制。     

Are Children's Concerns About Punishment Related to Their Aggression?

Although moral reasoning is recognized as an influence on students' behavior, it is often overlooked in policies and interventions developed to change their behavior. Relations between specific types of moral reasoning (i.e., imminent, probable, physical, and psychological) and teacher-reported overt aggression were examined in 203 first and second graders. Regression analyses indicated that psychological reasoning explained a significant amount of the variance in overt aggression. Follow-up analyses indicated that overtly aggressive boys demonstrated more concern for the imminent consequences of their behavior on themselves (e.g., punishment) and less concern for the psychological consequences of their actions on others (e.g., hurting others' feelings) than nonaggressive boys. Implications for the prevention and treatment of aggressive behavior are discussed.     

Full-Time versus Part-Time Employees: Understanding the Links between Work Status, the Psychological Contract, and Attitudes

Research findings comparing the work attitudes of full-time and part-time employees have been inconsistent and inconclusive. Furthermore, empirical studies have tended to be atheoretical, and there are few convincing psychological explanations to explain differences where found. This article tests the psychological contract as an explanatory framework for attitudinal differences across work status (i.e., whether employed on a part-time or full-time basis). The model is tested across samples from two different organizations using structural equation modeling. The analysis reveals that part-time and full-time employees differed on a number of attitudes and that psychological contract fulfillment could be used to explain differences in certain attitudes (e.g., satisfaction) but not others (e.g., affective commitment). Analyses also show that the relationships between psychological contract fulfillment and outcomes were rarely moderated by work status, suggesting that part-time employees will respond in a similar way as full-time employees to adjustments in their psychological contract.     

Explaining Emotions

Emotions and cognition are inextricably intertwined. Feelings influence thoughts and actions, which in turn can give rise to new emotional reactions. We claim that people infer emotional states in others using commonsense psychological theories of the interactions among emotions, cognition, and action. We present a situation calculus theory of emotion elicitation representing knowledge underlying commonsense causal reasoning involving emotions, and show how the theory can be used to construct explanations for emotional states. The method for constructing explanations is based on the notion of abduction. This method has been implemented in a computer program called AbMaL. The results of computational experiments using AbMaL to construct explanations of examples based on cases taken from a diary study of emotions indicate that the abductive approach to explanatory reasoning about emotions offers significant advantages. We found that the majority of the diary study examples cannot be explained using deduction alone, but they can be explained by making abjuctive inferences. These inferences provide useful information relevant to emotional states.     

Time to get a new mountain? The role of function in children's conceptions of natural kinds

Prior research indicates that young children are promiscuously teleological, attributing purpose not only to artifacts, but also to living and non-living natural entities. This study further examines the role of function in children's reasoning about different object kinds by indirectly probing children's intuitions about what types of entities can be rendered functionless. Specifically, children were asked to decide whether entities that could no longer perform certain activities should be fixed/replaced (e.g. "Do you need to get a new one?"). Results reveal that young children broadly view both artificial and natural kinds that can no longer perform certain activities as needing to be fixed or replaced. These findings suggest that the teleo-functional bias not only influences children's explanatory preferences but also their category judgments.     

Preschoolers' understanding of germs as invisible mechanisms

Recent studies have presented conflicting claims regarding whether young children's reasoning about biological content involves a unique set of causal mechanisms and theoretical entities. Three studies examined preschoolers' understanding of nonobservable causal mechanisms in causes of illness. According to traditional accounts, these children know that certain behaviors lead to illness but have no idea why or how. Many of the behaviors children cite as causes are actually mediated by the action of germs (e.g., contamination and contagion). Do children recognize that germs (nonobvious, invisible particles) are the mechanisms involved in some cases of illness causation? Study 1 demonstrates that 4- and 5-year-olds' predictions of who will get sick in cases of contamination and contagion are based on the presence or absence of germs. Study 2 serves as a control and further tests how children generalize this mechanism: Which causes do children think are mediated by germs? Data suggest that preschoolers understand but undergeneralize the role of germs. A final study indicates that younger preschoolers (3-year-olds) recognize that appearances may be deceiving when it comes to judging causes of illness. This understanding would seem to be a precursor to beliefs about specific mechanisms. Results are discussed in terms of commonsense theories and early conceptions of biology.     

Generating explanations via analogical comparison

Generating explanations can be highly effective in promoting learning in both adults and children. Our interest is in the mechanisms that underlie this effect and in whether and how they operate in early learning. In adult reasoning, explanation may call on many subprocesses—including comparison, counterfactual reasoning, and reasoning by exclusion; but it is unlikely that all these processes are available to young children. We propose that one process that may serve both children and adults is comparison. In this study, we asked whether children would use the results of a comparison experience when asked to explain why a model skyscraper was stable. We focused on a challenging principle—that diagonal cross-bracing lends stability to physical structures (Gentner et al., Cognitive Science, 40, 224–240, 2016). Six-year-olds either received no training or interacted with model skyscrapers in one of three different conditions, designed to vary in their potential to invite and support comparison. In the Single Model condition, children interacted with a single braced model. In the comparison conditions (Low Alignability and High Alignability), children compared braced and unbraced models. Following experience with the models, children were asked to explain why the braced model was stable. They then received two transfer tasks. We found that children who received highly alignable pairs were most likely to (a) produce brace-based explanations and (b) transfer the brace principle to a dissimilar context. This provides evidence that children can benefit from analogical comparison in generating explanations and also suggests limitations on this ability.     

Examining Explanatory Biases in Young Children's Biological Reasoning

Despite the well-established literature on explanation in early childhood, little is known about what constrains children's explanations. State change and negative outcomes were examined as potential explanatory biases in the domain of naïve biology, extending upon previous work in the domain of naïve physics. In two studies, preschool children (N = 70, 3- to 5-year-olds) were informed of the distinct health outcomes of characters in four between-subjects conditions (i.e., becoming ill, recovering from illness, continuous health, and continuous illness) and were asked to provide explanations. Whereas children in both studies provided relevant information for health outcomes, they more often explained outcomes that included a salient health-state change. Presence of a state change also influenced the interpretation of potentially relevant information and improved memory for health outcomes. We discuss how biases in children's explanations constrain children's reasoning and may exacerbate difficulties with reasoning about important health-related topics such as illness prevention.     

Investigating the origins of political views: biases in explanation predict conservative attitudes in children and adults

We tested the hypothesis that political attitudes are influenced by an information‐processing factor – namely, a bias in the content of everyday explanations. Because many societal phenomena are enormously complex, people's understanding of them often relies on heuristic shortcuts. For instance, when generating explanations for such phenomena (e.g., why does this group have low status?), people often rely on facts that they can retrieve easily from memory – facts that are skewed toward inherent or intrinsic features (e.g., this group is unintelligent). We hypothesized that this bias in the content of heuristic explanations leads to a tendency to (1) view socioeconomic stratification as acceptable and (2) prefer current societal arrangements to alternative ones, two hallmarks of conservative ideology. Moreover, since the inherence bias in explanation is present across development, we expected it to shape children's proto‐political judgments as well. Three studies with adults and 4‐ to 8‐year‐old children (N = 784) provided support for these predictions: Not only did individual differences in reliance on inherent explanations uniquely predict endorsement of conservative views (particularly the stratification‐supporting component; Study 1), but manipulations of this explanatory bias also had downstream consequences for political attitudes in both children and adults (Studies 2 and 3). This work contributes to our understanding of the origins of political attitudes.     

Associative and causal reasoning accounts of causal induction: Symmetries and asymmetries in predictive and diagnostic inferences

Associative and causal reasoning accounts are probably the two most influential types of accounts of causal reasoning processes. Only causal reasoning accounts predict certain asymmetries between predictive (i.e., reasoning from causes to effects) and diagnostic (i.e., reasoning from effects to causes) inferences regarding cue-interaction phenomena (e.g., the overshadowing effect). In the experiments reported here, we attempted to delimit the conditions under which these asymmetries occur. The results show that unless participants perceived the relevance of causal information to solving the task, predictive and diagnostic inferences were symmetrical. Specifically, Experiments 1A and 1B showed that implicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by having participants review the instructions favored the presence of asymmetries between predictive and diagnostic situations. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that explicitly stressing the relevance of causal information by stating the importance of the causal role of events after the instructions were given also favored the asymmetry.     

Children’s causal reasoning: Counterfactual thinking occurs for ‘negative’ outcomes only

Harris, German and Mills (Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61 (1996), 223–259), following Mackie, argue that children make explicit use of counterfactual thinking in arriving at causal judgments. They showed that children as young as 3, in explaining simple mishap events, made reference to courses of action that a protagonist had rejected, when that course of action would have prevented the observed outcome. It is hypothesized here that such counterfactual thinking might have been invoked by the ‘negative’ mishaps rather than as part of the causal reasoning process. Although the generation of counterfactuals in explanation was replicated using mishap outcomes such as those used by Harris et al., counterfactual thinking was not evident in children’s explanations of ‘positive’ outcomes. These results undermine the view that a counterfactual thinking process, as indexed by reference to possible actions rejected by a protagonist, is necessary for causal reasoning. Alternative characterizations of the relationship between causals and counterfactuals are discussed.