How to Apply Mathematics

This paper presents a novel account of applied mathematics. It shows how we can distinguish the physical content from the mathematical form of a scientific theory even in cases where the mathematics applied is indispensable and cannot be eliminated by paraphrase.     

How Not to Criticise Scientism

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self-referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.     

How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism

Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible worlds. I conclude that the modal-logical apparatus used by Warfield obscures rather than clarifies, and distracts from the real philosophical issues involved in the metaphysical debate. These issues cannot be settled by logic alone.     

Education and How Not to Corrupt the Young

ABSTRACT The paper has three parts. The first specifies a, notion of philosophy as both a critical discipline and a process of theoria independent of utilitarian or ideological commitment. The second part shows how philosophical paradigms can be ideologically exploited, often unwittingly, by the teacher in a way that sacrifices truth and clarity to utility. Three examples are given, viz. over-simplification in science-teaching of the Lockean primary/secondary qualities distinction, misuse of Wittgenstein's nuanced theories to inculcate relativism in the social sciences, and use of the ethical fact/value paradigm to promote a simplistic liberalism in moral teaching. The third part distinguishes teaching a skill and communicating an insight. It is claimed that the theoretical capacities of the learner are routinely subordinated to the practical needs of the teacher.     

How Not to Defend Constructive Empiricism: a Rejoinder

Ladyman, Douven, Horsten and van Fraassen have attempted to defend van Fraassen's critique of abductive reasoning against the arguments offered in a recent piece of mine. My short rejoinder shows two things. First, their counter-arguments fail to refute my original arguments. Their arguments casually move from the actuality of 'empirically equivalent rivals' to the possibility of 'equally good rivals'. But pointing to the existence of the former would do nothing to establish that empirically equivalent rivals are 'equally good' or equally well supported by the evidence. Second, I show that a central claim of their paper, one which three of the four authors see as 'possibly raising serious problems for constructive empiricism and for van Fraassen's steps toward a new epistemology', is very close to the conclusion of my original piece: if explanatory considerations are jettisoned, then even common-sense existential claims are in danger of being unfounded.     

How to Improve Your College Recruiting Program

In today's ever-changing business environment, teamwork has emerged as a requirement for success. As industry faces this paradigm shift, a formal team structure is emerging that goes beyond that proposed by previous selling/buying center researchers. Accordingly, a conceptualization of the functions and roles of these formalized selling and buying teams is proposed as a starting point for future investigations. The movement toward formal self-directed teams is explored, updated definitions of the selling and buying teams are proposed, and the functions and roles of each team are reviewed. Key constructs and organizational implications also are discussed.     

How Not to Refute Quine: Evaluating Kim's Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology

This paper offers an interpretation of Quine's naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim's influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this interpretation of Quine, it is essential that a successful critic of naturalism also examine Quine's aforementioned principles. The divide between naturalist and nonnaturalist epistemology turns out to be defined by the divide between more fundamental naturalist and nonnaturalist approaches to semantics.     

The Influence of Acculturation and Enculturation on Mexican American High School Students' Decision to Apply to College

This study examined the influence of acculturation, enculturation, parental education level, financial concerns, and gender on 106 Mexican American high school students' decisions to apply to college. Results indicated that acculturation and female gender were significant predictors. Implications for interventions with Latino high school students are discussed. Este estudio examinó la influencia de la aculturación, la enculturación, el nivel de educación de los padres, las preocupaciones financieras y el sexo del sujeto sobre la decisión de 106 estudiantes de secundaria mejicanos‐americanos de solicitar acceso a estudios universitarios. Los resultados indicaron que la aculturación y el sexo femenino mostraron una capacidad de predición significativa. Se discuten las implicaciones para intervenciones con estudiantes de secundaria latinos.     

Retroductive Analogy: How to and How Not to Make Claims of Good Reasons to Believe in Evolutionary and Anti-Evolutionary Hypotheses

This paper describes an argumentative fallacy we call ‘Retroductive Analogy.’ It occurs when the ability of a favored hypothesis to explain some phenomena, together with the fact that hypotheses of a similar sort are well supported, is taken to be sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis. This fallacy derives from the retroductive or abductive form of reasoning described by Charles Sanders Peirce. According to Peirce’s account, retroduction can provide good reasons to pursue a hypothesis but does not, by itself, provide good reasons to believe the hypothesis. In successful applications of retroduction, pursuit leads to the accumulation of evidence. In retroductive analogy, comparison with other successful hypotheses is substituted for the genuine pursuit of evidence. We describe a case from ecological genetics in which retroduction plays a legitimate role as the initial phase of an ongoing research program that serves to accumulate genuine evidence for a hypothesis. We also examine two contexts in which the fallacy of retroductive analogy occurs: in defenses of Intelligent Design Theory and in defense of some hypotheses in Evolutionary Psychology.