Divine Persons and Their ‘Reduction’ to Relations: A Plea for Conceptual Clarity

Contemporary trinitarian ‘revisionist’ theologians frequently accuse ‘classical’ or ‘Western’ (e.g. Augustinian, Thomistic) trinitarian theologies of ‘reducing’ the divine Persons to their relations with and to one another. In response, many defenders of the Western tradition of trinitarian theology suggest that the alternative accounts of contemporary revisionists, likewise, ‘reduce’ the Persons to relations. Thus, the same charge (the reduction of Persons to relations) is employed in two opposing viewpoints as a way of critiquing the other. This article aims to note this (apparently hitherto unremarked) phenomenon and to explore the theological rationale for its development. In conclusion, the article suggests how a new conceptual clarity may be achieved in light of this semantic confusion and points toward the possibility of a renewed dialogue between classical forms of trinitarian theology and their contemporary critics.     

Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons

Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives.     

Repetition of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ responses with a different number of response alternatives in study and test trial

The reinforcement values of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ upon subsequent repetition of the response have been explained by the subject's independent memory for his previous response and its outcome ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Detailed analyses on the data of recent experiments suggest that an increasing number of response alternatives for each stimulus makes the recall of the response and the outcome ‘right’ no longer independent. Therefore it was predicted that for a given number of response alternatives at the Test Trial, the likelihood that a subject will repeat a response called ‘right’ at the study Trial will be a function of the number of response alternatives at the Study Trial. The results were confirmatory. The explanation of these results was based on there being a larger informational value in the outcome ‘right’ with an increasing number of response alternatives.     

Utility maximization and melioration: Internalities in individual choice

How do people go about choosing between alternatives in relatively simple settings? This study explores some of the variables that past work suggests may be relevant. Volunteer subjects worked for money in six procedures in which the probability of a payment from either of two alternatives was 1.0, but the rate of pay (i.e. the speed with which a payment was delivered or the size of the payment) interacted with the subjects recent allocation of choices, which we define as the ‘internalities’. Because of the internalities, choosing the currently more profitable alternative did not maximize total earnings. Subjects were more likely to fail to maximize when the interaction between present pay and past choices was spread over longer sequences of choices, or when the reward variable was the speed, rather than the value, of each payment. Subjects often disregarded the internalities and were instead guided by the current yields of the two alternatives, which is a frequently observed tendency, called ‘melioration’, in experiments on choices by animals. The tendency toward melioration was only partially counteracted by explicit instructions on how to maximize earnings. We discuss a theoretical framework for melioration that postulates both motivational and cognitive sources.     

The compatibility of spatial and non-spatial relationships

This experiment reverses the procedure used by Hedge and Marsh (1975) who obtained two-choice RTs to a relevant stimulus attribute (colour) in the presence of an irrelevant attribute (location). On the basis of their finding that RT was faster when the colour and location of the correct response button were both the same, or both different from that of the stimulus, they concluded that performance is facilitated where the same logical process ‘same’ or ‘alternative’ can be applied to both attributes. The ‘Simon effect’ it was suggested may be explained by this process.Earlier work by the author had suggested performance is facilitated where the same recording rule applies to all the spatial relations in the task. Performing Hedge and Marsh's experiment with location as the relevant attribute failed to replicate their finding. This result limits the generality of their explanation to tasks where spatial relationships are the ‘irrelevant’ variable.     

School pupils' perceptions of the police that visit schools: Not all police are ‘pigs’

This paper presents data concerning young people's perceptions of the police taking part in a police—schools liaison programme. Eighty-one 14-year-old school pupils took part in 28 semi-structured group discussions concerning their perceptions of the ‘typicality’ of police officers working in their schools. Pupils clearly differentiated between these and those ‘on the street’. Central to this differentiation was the issue of police power; the perceived atypicality of the police in schools was intimately bound up with pupils' perceptions of the qualitatively different social relations that obtain between young people and the police ‘in the school’ and ‘on the street’. The implications of these data for the literatures concerning the ‘contact hypothesis’ and police—schools liaison are discussed.     

Justice without Solidarity? Collective Identity and the Fate of the ‘Ethical’ in Habermas' Recent Political Theory

In past work, Habermas has claimed that justice and solidarity stand in a complementary relationship—that ‘ethical’ relations of solidarity are the ‘reverse side’ of justice. Yet in a recent address to the World Congress of Philosophy, he rejects this idea. This paper argues against this rejection. After explaining the idea, arguing for its centrality to Habermas' thought, and evaluating Habermas' scant reflections on this major transformation, I argue that his rejection of the idea is a result of a newfound skepticism about the power of secular reason, and should thus be understood in terms of his corresponding turn to religious traditions as alternative sources of solidarity. I argue against this ‘religious turn’ by developing an alternative advocated by Habermas himself in earlier reflections—attention to real sociopolitical movements. In particular, I analyze feminist and black liberation movements to demonstrate that Habermas' pessimism about secular sources of justice‐producing solidarity is unwarranted, and that, while ‘postsecular’ sources may provide one avenue for actionable solidarity, they are not the only one. I conclude by identifying a conceptual commonality in these two alternatives: an inclusive conception of what it means to be human.     

Truth and the ‘Politics of Ourselves’

The authors take up Amy Allen's suggestion that while Foucault's work may be able to support a certain type of self‐critique and self‐development, it does not permit the kind of interpersonal relations that are necessary for the development of intersubjective meaning in struggles against imposed identities. The authors contend that for Foucault, relations of ‘truth’ play an important constitutive role in subjectivities, and that understanding the ‘politics of ourselves’ in the context of this truth shows not only an openness to meaningful interpersonal relations, but also that these relations are capable of generating the conceptual and normative resources necessary for resisting socially imposed subjectivities. The authors present such an account of intersubjective relations based on Foucault's discussion of parrhesia, and develop a model of collaborative political action that addresses the criticisms raised.     

Individual characteristics,child-mother and child-younger sibling interactions of 4-year-olds

This paper is concerned with the relations between the individual characteristics (Temperament, Locus of Control, Self-concept) of 4-year-olds, child-mother and child-sibling interactions. The temperamental characteristics Active and Moody, and the Self-concept categories Worrying/Cross and Likes to be Alone, had generally similar relations to child-mother and child-sibling interactions, but the other characteristics did not. The relations between child-mother and child-sibling interactions did not support either the hypothesis that a ‘good ’ child-mother relationship leads to ‘good ’ interactions with a sibling, or that firstborns compensate for a ‘poor ’ child-mother relationship with a ‘good ’ sibling one. The relations were more complex than either of these hypotheses would suggest, but made intuitive sense.     

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.     

Collective Narcissism and Intergroup Hostility: The Dark Side of ‘In‐Group Love’

This paper reviews current research on intergroup consequences of collective narcissism – an emotional investment in an unrealistic belief in exaggerated greatness of an in‐group. Integrating findings of the psychology of intergroup relations with findings regarding psychological outcomes of individual narcissism, the collective narcissism construct addresses the relationship between ‘in‐group love’ and ‘out‐group hate’. Differentiating between narcissistic and genuine positive group regard uncovers the potential of genuine ‘in‐group’ love to motivate positive out‐group attitudes and intergroup tolerance. Collective narcissism is also shown to be the aspects of positive group attachment that inspires defensive and retaliatory intergroup hostility under perceived threat. Narcissistic idealization of an in‐group is contingent on external validation and underlain by internal doubts. Collective narcissists are never fully satisfied with external acknowledgement of the in‐group and they are sensitive to anything that may undermine the in‐group’s exaggerated image.     

Relevant Alternatives,Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination

This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so‐called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that is often overlooked in the literature. This distinction complicates the story regarding how an alternative becomes relevant, and in doing so weakens the connection between perceptual knowledge and discrimination. The theory that results, however—what I term a ‘two‐tiered’ relevant alternatives theory of perceptual knowledge—accommodates many of our intuitions about perceptual knowledge and so avoids the revisionism of some recent proposals in the epistemological literature.     

Ecological and person‐oriented aspects of metacognitive processes in test‐taking

This study examines critical aspects of both the ecological and the person‐oriented accounts of observed biases in confidence judgements on tests of cognitive abilities. These biases reflect metacognitive processes involved in test‐taking. According to the ecological approach, poor realism of confidence judgements is due to the nature of the items included in general knowledge tests (test‐driven biases). The person‐oriented approach, however, argues that biases in confidence judgements may be due to a general self‐monitoring trait. The present study employed the ‘de‐biasing’ procedure proposed by Juslin ( 1994 ) for the selection of general knowledge test items, and used a newly developed geographical knowledge test suitable for the Australian population. Two other cognitive tests (Raven's Progressive Matrices and Line Length) were administered in order to determine whether there is a consistency in confidence ratings across diverse tasks. Statistical procedures traditional to both approaches‐calibration curves and factor analysis ‐ were employed. The results, with minor qualifications, support both perspectives. The study found a separate confidence factor, indicative of a self‐monitoring trait. Two other potential metacognitive factors (i.e. ‘expectation’ and ‘evaluation’, corresponding to self‐assessment/planning and self‐evaluation) could not be separated from accuracy and speed measures. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Li in East Asian Buddhism: One Approach from Plato's Parmenides

In Plato's Parmenides, Socrates proposes a ‘Day’ analogy to express one possible model of part/whole relations. His analogy is swiftly rejected and replaced with another analogy, that of the ‘Sail’. In this paper, it is argued that there is a profound difference between these two analogies and that the ‘Day’ represents a distinct way to think about part/whole relations. This way of thinking, I argue, is the standard way of thinking in East Asian Buddhism. Plato's ‘Day’ analogy can then be used to illuminate the meaning of an opaque but very important concept in East Asian Buddhism: li, which in this paper is developed as a modal concept of ‘Wholeness’.     

The relationship between acculturation strategies,relative fit and intergroup relations: immigrant‐majority relations in Germany

This study examined the impact of the acculturation strategy preferences of both immigrants and host society on intergroup relations. It was expected that integration would lead to the best outcome for both groups. Moreover, it was tested whether the relative ‘fit’ between host society and immigrant strategy preference would predict intergroup relations. The predictive power of two different operationalisations of fit was compared. School students (193 German host society members and 128 immigrants to Germany) participated in a questionnaire study. Findings revealed that both acculturation strategies of one group and relative ‘fit’ between immigrant and host society strategy preference were predictive of intergroup relations. In general, a strategy of integration was associated with more favourable intergroup relations in both groups, and a mismatch between host and immigrant preferred strategies yielded the most negative outcomes. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Acceptance and Elimination Procedures in Choice: Noncomplementarity and the Role of Implied Status quo

The present research contrasts two seemingly complementary decision strategies: acceptance and elimination. In acceptance, a choice set is created by including suitable alternatives from an initial set of alternatives, whereas in elimination it is created by removing inappropriate alternatives from that same initial set. The research used realistic career decision-making scenarios and presented to respondents sets of alternatives that varied in their preexperimental strength values. Whereas complementarity of acceptance and elimination is implied by three standard (normative) assumptions of decision theory, we find a systematic discrepancy between the outcomes of these procedures: choice sets were larger in elimination than in acceptance. This acceptance–elimination discrepancy is directly tied to subcomplementarity. The central tenet of the theoretical framework developed here is that acceptance and elimination procedures imply different types of status quo for the alternatives, thereby invoking a different selection criterion for each procedure. A central prediction of the dual-criterion framework is that middling alternatives should be most susceptible to the type of procedure used. The present studies focus on this prediction which is substantiated by the results showing that middling alternatives yield the greatest discrepancy between acceptance and elimination. The implications of this model and findings for various research domains are discussed.     

Non‐epistemic perception as technology

Some epistemologists and philosophers of mind hold that the non‐epistemic perceptual relation of which feature‐seeing and object‐seeing are special cases is the foundation of perceptual knowledge. This paper argues that such relations are best understood as having only a technological role in explaining perceptual knowledge. After introducing the opposing view in §1, §2 considers why its defenders deny that some cases in which one has perceptual knowledge without the relevant acquaintance relations are counterexamples, detailing their case for lurking inferential epistemology. §§3–4 suggest that this strategy fails in many other cases. While there is a computational tale that might be deemed ‘inferential’ in these cases, there is no corresponding tale in epistemic structure, not even if one rejects what Siegel (2017) calls the ‘Reckoning Model’ of inference. §5 offers a more fundamental dilemma. §6 concludes that there is only a technological role for non‐epistemic perception in grounding perceptual knowledge, but allows that it might play a more‐than‐technological role elsewhere.     

Replicated alternatives and the role of confusion,chasing, and regret in decisions from experience

The current paper explores choice among alternatives that can be classified into distinct classes. All the members of a particular class were ‘replicated alternatives’: they promised the same payoff distribution. Information to decision makers was limited to feedback concerning the realized (obtained and foregone) payoffs. Experiment 1 demonstrates that increasing the number of replicated alternatives creates confusion (which facilitates random choice) and changes the implications of the tendency to chase recent returns (i.e., select the alternative with the best recent outcomes). This effect, termed ‘confused chasing,’ facilitates risk seeking even when this behavior impairs expected earnings. Experiment 2 reveals that increasing the number of replicated alternatives can reduce (but does not eliminate) the tendency to underweight rare events. Experiment 3 shows that the relative importance of chasing and confusion is sensitive to the likelihood of realizing lower payoffs than the forgone payoffs. The main results are summarized with a simple model assuming that payoff sensitivity decreases with experienced regret. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Empowerment,agency, and power

As ‘empowerment’ and ‘agency’ have received wider usage within development research and policy, ambiguities and variant meanings have proliferated. Amidst this conceptual drift, there has also been a tendency to assimilate the two concepts. This tendency is problematic in a number of ways. First, ‘agency’ has various meanings, and the weakest of these captures little of the concept of empowerment. Second, empowerment has a conceptual link with well-being that agency cannot have. Third, when empowerment is assimilated with expanded agency, that agency is not considered in a relational way: the focus is on how the agency of a group or individual becomes greater than it was, not on the degree to which their agency is dependent on or dominated by the agency of others. If ‘empowerment’ no longer refers to social relations, it loses its direct relevance to the transformation of those relations and, as some critics have claimed, it ceases to be a ‘transformative’ concept. After showing that there are cases of empowerment that cannot be captured by conceptions of empowerment that ‘take power out’, I draw upon the capability approach to propose relational conceptions of agency and empowerment that ‘bring power back in’.