Self-awareness and self-deception: a Sartrean perspective

In spite of the fact that many find Jean-Paul Sartre’s account of la mauvaise foi puzzling, unclear and troublesome, he remains a recurring figure in the debate about self-deception. Indeed, Sartre’s exposition of self-deception is as puzzling as it is original. The primary task of my paper will be to expose why this is the case and to thereby correct a recurrent misunderstanding of Sartre’s theory of consciousness. In the end, will we see that Sartre offers the following theory: self-deception is to be accounted for by assuming that there are intrinsically self-deceptive epistemic states. The latter are self-deceptive in so far as they claim certainty while nevertheless being accompanied by an inbuilt and incorruptible awareness of being unwarranted. For Sartre, developing this rather peculiar account of self-deception, is, as we will see, not primarily intended as an end in itself. Rather, Sartre thereby hopes to illuminate the nature of self-awareness as (i.) epistemically super-secure, (ii.) pre-reflexive, (iii.) non-positional and “embryonic” knowledge that (iv.) does not necessitate but can still ground epistemically super-secure reflexive knowledge, and (v.) that can replace Freud’s notion of unconscious knowledge. As an account of self-deception, Sartre’s suggestion, however, comes at a high price. Apart from the presuppositions Sartre makes in the theory of consciousness and intentionality, his account is deflationist with regard to local cases of self-deception.     

What am I supposed to be looking at? Controls and measures in inter-modal preferential looking

Intermodal preferential looking (IMPL) is widely used in experimental studies of infant development, especially language development. Control measures vary, and it is not clear how these affect findings. We examined effects of parental awareness of stimuli. Infants (17–19 months) looked at paired pictures, one name-known and one name-unknown, each assigned target status in 50 % of trials. Infants looked longer at a name-known than a name-unknown target, regardless of parents’ awareness. When parents were aware, looking to a name-unknown target increased over a paired name-known non-target. There is evidence that infants’ looking at pictures in this paradigm is not due to direct matching of targets to novel names, but is influenced by additional cues present, in a way that could alter the conclusions of studies of infant word learning and other aspects of infant learning. Implications of these findings are discussed, emphasising replicability and theoretical conclusions drawn from studies using this method.     

The question of the other in French phenomenology

I would like to show how with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, we have to do with three different ways of understanding the experience of the other. For Sartre it is a visual experience, the experience of being looked at by the other, so that the experience of the other is understood as a confrontation; for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the other necessarily implies coexistence and what he calls “intercorporeality,” so that for him the other is never to be found in front, but instead beside me, in reciprocity with me; for Levinas, the experience of the other is the experience of a non-reciprocity, of an assymetrical relation, because the experience of the other is for him an ethical and not an ontological experience, and because this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other : the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas.     

Infants attend to what happens at the rim when they perceive containment

A series of experiments revealed that 9- and 12-month-old infants, in contrast to 6-month-olds, paid attention to what was happening at the rim of a container when a block arrived at this opening. The rim of an enclosure marks the boundaries of containment for an object, and thus specifies an important source of information with respect to the event. Infants actually observed a solid block that repeatedly lowered into a container in both the habituation phase and in the test phase. In the test phase, infants looked longer to events showing a block that miraculously passed through the opening, although colliding against the rim on one to three places than to the same event without collision. This effect occurred depending on the number of places on the rim the block collided against and the age of the infant. However longer looking times did not show up when the block collided against a flexible rim, deforming this rim and passed through. Together, these results indicate that infants sample information that is meaningful to the event they see and that it is not the perceptual discrepancy with respect to the habitation phase that drives their looking in the test phase.     

Sartre and the Doctors

Abstract

This paper considers how the experience of illness fits within Sartre’s account of embodiment in Being and Nothingness. Sartre makes some remarks about illness, but does not develop a full account. I show that the anti‐naturalistic ontological framework in which Sartre’s discussion of the body is placed, which opposes my ‘being‐for‐Others’ to my ‘being‐for‐myself’, imposes a revisionary account of illness, and how Sartre’s model of interpersonal relations affects his view of doctors, and their role in the illness experience. I note and discuss the connection Sartre draws between illness and bad faith. I also point out that recent phenomenologically inspired criticisms of the medical establishment that draw on Sartre’s account of the body are limited by their failure to engage with Sartre’s ontology.     

Executive attention and self-regulation in infancy

This study investigates early executive attention in infancy by studying the relations between infant sequential looking and other behaviors predictive of later self-regulation. One early marker of executive attention development is anticipatory looking, the act of looking to the location of a target prior to its appearance in that location, a process that involves endogenous control of visual orienting. Previous studies have shown that anticipatory looking is positively related to executive attention as assessed by the ability to resolve spatial conflict in 3–4-year-old children. In the current study, anticipatory looking was positively related to cautious behavioral approach in response to non-threatening novel objects in 6- and 7-month-old infants. This finding and previous findings showing the presence of error detection in infancy are consistent with the hypothesis that there is some degree of executive attention in the first year of life. Anticipatory looking was also related to the frequency of distress, to looking away from disturbing stimuli, and to some self-regulatory behaviors. These results may indicate either early attentional regulation of emotion or close relations between early developing fear and later self-regulation. Overall, the results suggest the presence of rudimentary systems of executive attention in infants and support further studies using anticipatory looking as a measure of individual differences in attention in infancy.     

Are average and symmetric faces attractive to infants? Discrimination and looking preferences

Young infants prefer to look at faces that adults find attractive, suggesting a biological basis for some face preferences. However, the basis for infant preferences is not known. Adults find average and symmetric faces attractive. We examined whether 5-8-month-old infants discriminate between different levels of averageness and symmetry in faces, and whether they prefer to look at faces with higher levels of these traits. Each infant saw 24 pairs of female faces. Each pair consisted of two versions of the same face differing either in averageness (12 pairs) or symmetry (12 pairs). Data from the mothers confirmed that adults preferred the more average and more symmetric versions in each pair. The infants were sensitive to differences in both averageness and symmetry, but showed no looking preference for the more average or more symmetric versions. On the contrary, longest looks were significantly longer for the less average versions, and both longest looks and first looks were marginally longer for the less symmetric versions. Mean looking times were also longer for the less average and less symmetric versions, but those differences were not significant. We suggest that the infant looking behaviour may reflect a novelty preference rather than an aesthetic preference.     

Sartre and Ricoeur on Productive Imagination

Commenting on Jean‐Paul Sartre's theory of imagination, Paul Ricoeur argues that Sartre fails to address the productive nature of imaginative acts. According to Ricoeur, Sartre's examples show that he thinks of imagination in mimetic terms, neglecting its innovative and creative dimensions. Imagination, Ricoeur continues, manifests itself most clearly in fiction, wherein new meaning is created. By using fiction as the paradigm of imaginative activity, Ricoeur is able to argue against Sartre that the essence of imagination lies not in its ability to reproduce absent objects, but rather in the ability to transform reality through creative acts. Motivated by the intuition that Sartre the writer could not have forgotten to address such crucial dimensions of imagination, I examine Sartre's philosophical and literary work, showing that not only does he develop a notion of productive imagination, he also puts this notion to work by articulating the relationship between imagination, narrative, and identity formation, well before Ricoeur advanced his narrative‐identity theory. I argue that Sartre, like Ricoeur and MacIntyre, another representative of narrative‐theory whose criticism of Sartre I address in this essay, views imagination and narrativity as necessary conditions for the formation of a coherent and meaningful sense of self.     

Size constancy in infants: 4-month-olds' responses to physical versus retinal image size

This study tested whether 4-month-old infants respond primarily to objects' physical or retinal image sizes. In the study's main experiment, infants were habituated to either a 6-cm-diameter disk at a distance of 18 cm or a 10-cm disk at 50 cm. They were then given 2 test trials in which the 6- and 10-cm disks were presented side by side at a distance of 30 cm. For each infant, one test object had a novel physical size but a familiar retinal image size, and the other had a familiar physical size but a novel retinal image size. The infants exhibited a significant looking preference for the object that had a novel physical size. A preliminary experiment found that 4-month-olds' looking preferences are based on novelty, not familiarity, under the conditions of this study. Given this finding, the results suggest that 4-month-old infants attend and respond primarily to physical size, not to retinal image size.     

The relation between infants' activity with objects and attention to object appearance

The authors examined the relation between infants' motor skills and attention to objects features in events in which a hand acted on an object (e.g., squeezed it) that then produced a sound (e.g., squeaking). In this study, 6- to 7-month-old infants (N = 41) were habituated to a single event and then tested with changes in appearance and action. Infants robustly responded to changes in action, but as a group did not respond to changes in appearance. Moreover, more skilled activity with objects during naturalistic play was associated with longer looking in response to a change in appearance, but not to a change in action. Implications for the relation between perception and action in infancy are discussed. (     

Vocalization and looking behaviour of Down's syndrome infants.

The effect of contingent and non-contingent vocal stimulation on vocalization and looking behaviour was investigated for 10 Down's syndrome infants. There were two experimental sessions consisting of four stages, namely 1 min base-line, 1 min experimental condition, a further 1 min base-line and a final 2 min experimental condition. Maternal vocal stimulation was contingent upon infant vocalization for the experimental conditions of one session and was presented every 10 s independent of infant vocalization for the experimental conditions of the other session. Neither condition increased infant vocalization but there was a significant decrease in looking at mother during the base-line stages which followed maternal vocalization (F = 5.07, d.f. = 4, 28, P less than 0.01). It is suggested that looking behaviour may be an important indication of competence in pre-linguistic social communication for developmentally delayed infants.     

The normative bond between Kantian autonomy and Sartrean authenticity: A critical existentialist perspective

Sartre and Kant are not often compared, especially because the former is frequently considered a theorist of a totally arbitrary free will. Nevertheless, this is not a fair interpretation of Sartre. Starting already from Being and Nothingness, he conceived an ethical difference between bad faith and authenticity. More unequivocally, in Notebooks for an Ethics he developed an existentialist ethics, which is more Kantian than expected. In that text, the ethical ideal of authenticity is not so different from the ethical ideal of autonomy in Kant. The aim of this article is to characterize Sartrean authenticity as a radicalization of Kantian autonomy. In both cases, there is a normative criterion, which implies a correct exercise of freedom towards oneself and others. This correct exercise of freedom implies for Kant the exclusion of the will determined by material conditions. For Sartre, this correct exercise means the rejection of bad faith. There is also a similar connection between autonomy and respect in Kant, and between authenticity and generosity in Sartre. Highlighting this little‐known affinity between the two most radical philosophers of freedom could also reveal a non‐ideological Sartre, ready to dialogue with contemporary ethical debate.     

Pattern perception in infants: effects of structure and transformation

Four experiments on pattern perception in 4-month-old infants are reported. The first two experiments examined the perception of pattern structure as defined by Garner (1974). Although the infants did not show an immediate preference for well-structured patterns (Experiment 1), during habituation they showed a reliable decrement in looking only to well-structured patterns (Experiment 2). On recovery trials in Experiment 2 infants were presented with two types of pattern change: a new configuration of the habituation pattern and a change in the orientation of the habituation pattern. The infants recovered looking to the orientation change, but generally not to the changes in configuration. It is argued that the results of Experiment 2 highlight the role of symmetry, especially vertical symmetry, in infant pattern perception. Recovery of looking to changes in the orientation, size, and position of the habituation pattern was examined in Experiments 3 and 4 where it was demonstrated that such changes are salient to the infant, arguably because of the presence of a surrounding, external frame.     

Sartre, dialectic, and the problem of overcoming bad faith

InBeing and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre affirms a circle of relations between oneself and another. This circle moves between the relations of love and desire and results from the fact that both love and desire are attempts to capture the other who always remains out of reach. Sartre denies that there can be a dialectic of such relations with others: never can there be a motivated movement beyond the frustrations and failures of each of these attempts to relate to the other. The only way out of this circle is, therefore, according to Sartre, a radical conversion.Like the master in Hegel'sPhenomenology of Mind, each individual caught in this circle wants what cannot be attained: the assimilation or the negation of the freedom of the other. He is thus, like Hegel's master, impervious to any reasons that could count against what he is seeking; his failures cannot in any way motivate him to want what can be. From the point of view of such desires, any negative evaluation of these desires must seem arbitrary. Therefore, to the extent that Sartre's earlier writings indicate no other possibilities of human existence except those premised on such impossible demands, Sartre's negative evaluations concerning the bad faith of these individuals must seem arbitrary.My conclusion is not, however, simply negative since I argue that inSaint Genet Sartre presents Genet's life as a dialectical movement beyond failure to triumph. This is not a dialectic of bad faith. Rather it is a dialectic based on a very different desire from the desire for what cannot be. If Sartre thus develops another level, another fundamental desire, from which the level of bad faith can be judged to be wrong, then at least from this level the judgment is not a merely arbitrary one.For their many perceptive and helpful comments and suggestions, I am especially indebted and grateful to Dieter Turck and John Beverslius. A version of this paper is scheduled to be read at a workshop on Sartre during the 1975 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.     

Effects of gesture and target on 12- and 18-month-olds' joint visual attention to objects in front of or behind them

Factors affecting joint visual attention in 12- and 18-month-olds were investigated. In Experiment 1 infants responded to 1 of 3 parental gestures: looking, looking and pointing, or looking, pointing, and verbalizing. Target objects were either identical to or distinctive from distractor objects. Targets were in front of or behind the infant to test G. E. Butterworth's (1991b) hypothesis that 12-month-olds do not follow gaze to objects behind them. Pointing elicited more episodes of joint visual attention than looking alone. Distinctive targets elicited more episodes of joint visual attention than identical targets. Although infants most reliably followed gestures to targets in front of them, even 12-month-olds followed gestures to targets behind them. In Experiment 2 parents were rotated so that the magnitude of their head turns to fixate front and back targets was equivalent. Infants looked more at front than at back targets, but there was also an effect of magnitude of head turn. Infants' relative neglect of back targets is partly due to the "size" of adult's gesture.     

Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it.     

Infants' comprehension of toy replicas as symbols for real objects

Infants' understanding of toy model-real exemplar relations was assessed through preferential looking and habituation tasks. Results from the preferential looking task suggest that 18-month toddlers are just beginning to demonstrate comprehension of symbolic relations between iconic models and their real object counterparts. Performance of 10- and 14-month-old infants in the preferential looking task did not improve when across-domain pairs of videos were used in place of within-domain pairs. Habituation task results indicated that 10-month-olds do not comprehend symbolic relations between miniature toy replicas and their "real" counterparts, but that such understanding begins to emerge by age 14 months. Interactions between symbolic processing and early lexical development are considered, as are methodological implications for the study of infant categorization.     

Different Gestalt processing for different actions? Comparing object-directed reaching and looking time measures

Six experiments compared the Gestalt processing that mediates infant reaching and looking behaviors. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the positioning and timing of 8- and 9-month-olds' reaching was influenced by remembered relative motion. Experiment 2 suggested that a visible gap, without this relative motion, was not sufficient to produce these effects. Experiment 3 found that 6- and 7-month-olds required both remembered relative motion and a continuously visible gap to affect reaching; when two separate objects were placed adjacent to one another, they were treated as though they were connected. Experiments 4 and 5, using a looking time measure, identified a dissociation between looking and reaching performance. In Experiment 6, 6- and 7-month-olds' reaching was influenced when display parts differed in shape and color. In these experiments, Gestalt processing for looking was more influenced by remembered information than was Gestalt processing for reaching. For reaching, a low weighting of separation cues was also apparent.     

Nine-month-olds’ shared visual attention as a function of gesture and object location

Two factors hypothesized to affect shared visual attention in 9-month-olds were investigated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of different attention-directing actions (looking, looking and pointing, and looking, pointing and verbalizing) on 9-month-olds’ engagement in shared visual attention. In Experiment 1 we also varied target object locations (i.e., in front, behind, or peripheral to the infant) to test whether 9-month-olds can follow an adult’s gesture past a nearby object to a more distal target. Infants followed more elaborate parental gestures to targets within their visual field. They also ignored nearby objects to follow adults’ attention to a peripheral target, but not to targets behind them. In Experiment 2, we rotated the parent 90° from the infant’s midline to equate the size of the parents’ head turns to targets within as well as outside the infants’ visual field. This manipulation significantly increased infants’ looking to target objects behind them, however, the frequency of such looks did not exceed chance. The results of these two experiments are consistent with perceptual and social experience accounts of shared visual attention.     

On perception of a partially occluded object in 6-month-olds

An Event Set x Event Set design used the occluded stick, solid stick, and divided stick stimulus events from Experiment 1 by Kellman and Spelke (1983). The design was analyzed using five different psychological models of the additive components of infant looking time in the nine cells of the design. Application of linear regression analysis to the data revealed that four of the models fit well. The best fitting model was shown to have two possible psychological interpretations. In one interpretation the infants represent the occluded stick as a solid stick but in the other the infants look longer in response to changes involving the divided stick. The fit of this model was greatly improved by assuming that some of the infants prefer looking at the novel stimulus but others prefer looking at the familiar stimulus. The implications of familiarity preference for the conduct and interpretation of other research are discussed.