Consistent egoists and situation managers: two problems for situationism

According to philosophical “situationism”, psychological evidence shows that human action is typically best explained by the influence of situational factors and not by “global” and robust character traits of the agent. As a practical implication of their view, situationists recommend that efforts in moral education be shifted from character development to situation management. Much of the discussion has focused on whether global conceptions of virtue and character, and in particular Aristotelian virtue ethics, can be defended against the situationist challenge. After several rounds of debate, both sides claim victory, and they seem to have reached a stalemate. In this paper, I refocus the debate on the arguments offered in support of situationism itself. I argue that two serious problems have so far gone unnoticed in the literature. First, the argument in support of situationism is unsound. It is based on evidence that agents’ morally relevant behavior reliably covaries with morally irrelevant situational variables. Using the example of egoism, I show that this evidence does not warrant the situationist inference because the evidence permits a plausible alternative interpretation. Second, I argue that the situationists’ advocacy of situation management is at odds with their core thesis because situation management requires exactly the type of agency they reject as unrealistic.     

Situationism and the problem of moral improvement

A wealth of research in social psychology indicates that various ethically arbitrary situational factors exert a surprisingly powerful influence on moral conduct. Empirically-minded philosophers have argued over the last two decades that this evidence challenges Aristotelian virtue ethics. John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt have argued that situationist moral psychology – as opposed to Aristotelian moral psychology – is better suited to the practical aim of helping agents act better. The Aristotelian account, with its emphasis on individual factors, invites too much risk of morally bad conduct insofar as it ignores the power of situational factors which lead us astray. Moral agents are often better off detecting and intervening on situational factors to help themselves act better. This paper offers an argument against the claim that situationism enjoys practical advantages over Aristotelian virtue ethics. There is empirical evidence suggesting that people can improve their behavior via Aristotelian strategies of deliberate self-improvement. This evidence also suggests that focusing our ethical attention on morally trivial factors may result in worse overall conduct. Accordingly, Aristotelianism may fare better than situationism on the practical issue of moral improvement.     

This is a Tricky Situation: Situationism and Reasons-Responsiveness

Situations are powerful: the evidence from experimental social psychology suggests that agents are hugely influenced by the situations they find themselves in, often without their knowing it (this, roughly-speaking, is the thesis of situationism). In our paper, we evaluate how situational factors affect our reasons-responsiveness, as conceived of by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and, through this, how they also affect moral responsibility. We argue that the situationist experiments suggest that situational factors impair, among other things, our moderate reasons-responsiveness, which is plausibly required for moral responsibility. However, even though we argue that situational factors lower the degree of our reasons-responsiveness, we propose that agents remain moderately reasons-responsive to the degree required for moral responsibility. Nonetheless, those (adversely) affected by situational factors are arguably less morally responsible than those who are not subject to similar situational factors. We further evaluate an understanding of reasons-responsiveness (developed by Manuel Vargas in the light of situationist data) which relativizes reasons-responsiveness to agents’ circumstances. We argue that the situationist data do not warrant this kind of divergence from Fischer’s and Ravizza’s account. We conclude by discussing what situationist experiments tell us about our relationship to non-reasons.     

Individual Differences in Situation Awareness: Validation of the Situationism Scale

This article concerns the construct of lay situationism—an individual’s belief in the importance of a behavior’s context. Study 1 identified a 13-item Situationism Scale, which demonstrated good reliability and validity. In particular, higher situationism was associated with greater situation-control (strategies to manipulate the environment in order to avoid temptation). Subsequent laboratory studies indicated that people higher on the situationism subscales used greater situation-control by sitting farther from junk food (Study 2) and choosing to drink non-alcoholic beverages before a cognitive task (Study 3). Overall, findings provide preliminary support for the psychometric validity and predictive utility of the Situationism Scale and offer this individual difference construct as a means to expand self-regulation theory.     

怎样花钱更幸福?购买类型对幸福感的影响

以往研究认为满足基本生活需求后, 消费者购买与幸福感不显著相关。近期研究发现, 购买是否能够提升幸福感, 取决于如何购买, 例如购买体验产品比物质产品更有利于提升幸福感, 但存在边界条件。文章从个人层面的享乐适应、预期利益、非对称后悔视角及社会层面的社会利益视角对这一结论进行解释, 并从个人因素、情境因素及幸福感的类型三个层面识别了物质购买在提升幸福感上表现更优异的边界条件, 同时对该领域未来可能的创新研究方向进行展望。     

Statistical word learning at scale: the baby's view is better

A key question in early word learning is how children cope with the uncertainty in natural naming events. One potential mechanism for uncertainty reduction is cross‐situational word learning – tracking word/object co‐occurrence statistics across naming events. But empirical and computational analyses of cross‐situational learning have made strong assumptions about the nature of naming event ambiguity, assumptions that have been challenged by recent analyses of natural naming events. This paper shows that learning from ambiguous natural naming events depends on perspective. Natural naming events from parent–child interactions were recorded from both a third‐person tripod‐mounted camera and from a head‐mounted camera that produced a ‘child's‐eye’ view. Following the human simulation paradigm, adults were asked to learn artificial language labels by integrating across the most ambiguous of these naming events. Significant learning was found only from the child's perspective, pointing to the importance of considering statistical learning from an embodied perspective.     

Validity generalization: Some critical remarks on the Schmidt-Hunter procedure*

This article presents some critical comments on the validity generalization procedure which has been presented by Schmidt, Hunter and others. They have put forward a method for testing the hypothesis that the variance in validity coefficients across situations for job-test combinations is due to what they consider to be statistical artifacts. The Schmidt-Hunter approach is criticized on the following points: the compilation of validity data, the use of criterion measures, and the test of the hypothesis of no situational specificity. Further, the relation between the concepts ‘situational specificity’ and ‘validity generalization’ is considered. In addition, it is noted that Schmidt, Hunter and others have defined the concept ‘situation’ in a different way than classical writers. It is concluded that the Schmidt-Hunter approach to validity generalization shows fundamental shortcomings. As a consequence their far-reaching conclusions for the practice of personnel selection should be considered premature.     

How Do You Assess a Manager’s Decision-Making Abilities? The Use of Situational Inventories

Decision-making capabilities are absolutely crucial to a manager. Unfortunately, existing methods of assessing managers in this area for selection and development purposes (in-tray exercises, situational interviews, ability tests, etc.) leave a lot to be desired. This article focuses on an alternative for assessing managerial decision making – the situational inventory – and presents research findings and information on practical applications. Detailed findings are also presented for ‘Scenarios’, the UK’s first published situational measure of managerial judgement. Situational inventories work by presenting participants with realistic but difficult real-life management scenarios. Each scenario is accompanied by a number of possible responses which participants rate for effectiveness in dealing with the scenario. Participants’ ratings are then scored against a set of ideal answers, producing an assessment of current decision-making ability. Decision-making ability can be developed in individuals, making feedback invaluable to participants. Evidence that has been accumulating in the United States and the UK for at least 15 years is presented to support the general situational inventory approach. Additionally, specific evidence is presented for ‘Scenarios’. It was found to correlate significantly with a number of managerial performance and responsibility indicators while appearing to be largely separate from existing psychometric (ability and personality) tests.     

Walking as a ‘Radicalized’ Critical Psychological Method? A Review of Academic,Artistic and Activist Contributions to the Study of Social Environments

The study of social environments is a neglected site of research not only in psychology, but across academic disciplines ranging from human geography to cultural studies. This paper will review contributions to studying social environments through academic writings, situationism and psychogeographical groups. It will be argued that disorientating walking practices can be used as a means to reflect on experiences of places in order to begin to think how social environments could be radically changed. It is important to question the taken for granted ways that people make sense of urban environments. It is argued that psychogeographic practice can be used to extend qualitative epistemologies and methods to argue for a ‘turn to place’ in psychology and to open up new methods and approaches in critical psychology. Finally, the implications for radicalizing critical psychological research methods will be considered in relation to the current status of critical psychology, which suffers from an apathetic vision of radicalism and criticality.     

If I Only Had a Membrane: A Review of Amoebic Self Theory

Beginning from the premise that organisms must ‘eat, retreat, and excrete’ to survive, Amoebic Self Theory (AST) posits that humans also struggle for survival of the psychological sense of self – engulfing that which is desirable, resisting external threats, and disposing that which is toxic or redundant. These motives manifest across three related but distinct domains – the bodily, the social, and the spatial-symbolic – as facilitated by a boundary that differentiates ‘self’ from ‘not-self’. AST-inspired research has demonstrated both situational and chronic variation in the strength of these motives across domains, as well as their relevance to a breadth of diverse phenomenon, although advocates of other theoretical perspectives have focused primarily on the ‘dust mites experiment’. After considering their interpretations and claims, a case is made for AST as an integrative, generalist theory that generates novel predictions.     

Why did he do it? attribution of obedience and the phenomenon of dispositional bias

Two studies are reported which demonstrate the influence of perceptual or ‘perspective’ variables in mediating attribution processes. In both studies subjects first observed a re-enactment of Milgram's (1963) experiment of obedience in which a ‘teacher’ obeys an experimenter's request to deliver dangerously high levels of shock. They were then asked to make judgements concerning the magnitude of situational forces acting upon the teacher and also to make inferences about his personality dispositions. Study I showed that passage of time can lead observers to assume more situational control when they were required to think and write about the witnessed re-enactment of the Milgram situation compared with observers who had no time to contemplate or who were prevented from doing so. Study II did not support the notion that focus of attribution is a simple function of what one pays attention to, or a function of the differing perspectives which actors and observers employ. Both of these results seriously challenge Jones and Nisbett's (1972) contention that the differences in attribution tendencies between actors and observers arise from the difference in perspective, Moreover, considerable evidence suggests that changes in situational and dispositional attributions may not follow a simple ‘zero-sum’ model, and that subjects seem to be unwilling to treat the two sources of control as if they were inversely correlated.     

Situationism,Manipulation, and Objective Self-Awareness

Among those taking the implications of situationism seriously, some have suggested exploiting our tendency to be shaped by our environments toward desirable ends. The key insight here is that if experimental studies produce reliable, probabilistic predictions about the effects of situational variables on behavior—for example, how people react to the presence or absence of various sounds, objects, and their placement—then we should deploy those variables that promote prosocial behavior, while avoiding or limiting those that tend toward antisocial behavior. Put another way, some have suggested that we tweak situations to nudge or influence others toward good behavior. A question arises: Isn’t this manipulative? In this paper, I describe some existing proposals in the literature and consider the manipulation worry. Drawing on classical Confucian ethics, I argue that, when all is considered, it is chimerical to think we can refrain from influencing or manipulating others. We must rather accept that influence (whether intended or not) is part of social existence. Once we accept this, the only remaining question is how to influence others. I suggest that this should make us conceive ourselves in an objective fashion.     

Law,Charity and Taboo or Kant's Reversal of St. Paul's Spirit‐Letter Opposition and its Theological Implications

This article gives the first account of Kant's reversal of St. Paul's Spirit‐Letter opposition. By means of such reversal Kant defines both charity and law as obtaining a complete autonomy from ‘profane’ life. In Kant's interpretative framework Judaism and Jews represent the ‘profane’, whereas Christ symbolizes the complete transcendence of the empirical. I shall discuss how different Jewish writer – Walter Benjamin, Georg Simmel and Franz Baermann Steiner – respond to such a body‐spirit dichotomy in which ‘the Jew’ functions as the representation of that which is devalued as the material, the bodily.     

Emotional Intelligence: Toward a Consensus of Models and Measures

This article outlines the many different ways that emotional intelligence (EI) has been conceptualized, measured, and used from the early antecedents of emotional abilities such as facial expression research to the recent multimedia assessment paradigms. The divide between models describing EI as a character trait versus modeling EI as a form of information processing or knowledge is described, with both kinds of models evaluated based on theory and empirical evidence. It is concluded that the latter type of model, exemplified by the four-branch hierarchical model of EI, is the only logical construct to bear the label ‘EI’. Potential emendations to the way EI is currently conceptualized and measured are discussed, with this review covering emotion recognition assessments, situational judgment tests, and multimedia assessments such as the empathic agent paradigm. The article concludes with a suggested agenda for future research in the EI field.     

Situationism and Confucian Virtue Ethics

Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits.     

Rethinking Sellars’ Myth of the Given: From the Epistemological to the Modal Relevance of Givenness in Kant and Hegel

ABSTRACT

Here, I pursue consequences, for the interpretation of Sellars’ critique of the ‘Myth of the Given’, of separating the modal significance that Kant attributed to empirical intuition from the epistemological role it also played for him. It is argued that Kant’s approach to modality in the Critique of Pure Reason can best be understood as a transcendental variation on Leibniz’s earlier ‘possibilist’ approach that treated the actual world as just one of a variety of possible alternative worlds. In this context, empirical intuitions seem to work like the mythical Givens subject to Sellars’ critique. This Kantian possibilism is then contrasted with an ‘actualist’ alternative approach to modality found in the contemporary work of Robert Stalnaker, but also recognizable in Hegel. In particular, the role of immediate perceptual judgments in Hegel is likened to that played by ‘witness statements’ in Robert Stalnaker’s attempt to distinguish the logic of judgments about the actual world from those about its alternate possibilities.     

Yu in the Xunzi: toward a precise understanding

An ongoing dialogue in Xunzi scholarship addresses the role of yu (欲), often rendered as ‘desire,’ in motivation, but little has been said about what yu actually is, or whether the translation of ‘desire’ accurately reflects Xunzi’s use of the term. Employing textual analysis alongside research in cognitive science, most notably work on the so-called ‘wanting-liking’ distinction, I work toward a more precise understanding of Xunzi’s notion of yu and its functions. I suggest that yu be construed as a kind of desire with an emphasis on ‘wanting’ that, while motivational, differs from broader, less precise notions of desire, and that this feature constitutes a distinctive aspect of Xunzi’s philosophy of psychology. In so doing, I propose a particular methodological approach for the interpretation of classical Chinese philosophy: when interpreting concepts that are subjects of empirical inquiry, empirical findings should lead us to favor some interpretations over others.     

Verbal probabilities: a question of frame?

Verbal expressions of probability and uncertainty are of two kinds: positive (‘probable’, ‘possible’) and negative (‘not certain’, ‘doubtful’). Choice of term has implications for predictions and decisions. The present studies show that positive phrases are rated to be more optimistic (when the target outcome is positive), and more correct, when the target outcome actually occurs, even in cases where positive and negative phrases are perceived to convey the same probabilities (Experiments 1 and 2). Selection of phrase can be determined by linguistic frame. Positive quantifiers (‘some’, ‘several’) support positive probability phrases, whereas negative quantifiers (‘not all’) suggest negative phrases (Experiment 3). Positive frames induced by numeric frequencies (e.g. the number of students to be admitted) imply positive probability phrases, whereas negative frames (e.g. the number of students to be rejected) call for negative probability phrases (Experiment 4). It is concluded that choice of verbal phrase is based not only on level of probability, but also on situational and linguistic cues. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.