Substitution and the explanation of action

This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in such circumstances to theories of direct reference.     

Could Treatment Matching Patients’ Beliefs About Depression Improve Outcomes?

Patients’ beliefs about depression and expectations for treatment can influence outcomes of major depressive disorder (MDD) treatments. We hypothesized that patients with weaker biological beliefs (less endorsement of [a] biochemical causes and [b] need for medication) and more optimistic treatment expectations (greater improvement and shorter time to improvement), have better outcomes in cognitive therapy (CT). Outpatients with recurrent MDD who received acute-phase CT (N = 152), and a subset of partial or unstable responders (N = 51) randomized to 8 months of continuation CT or fluoxetine with clinical management, completed repeated measures of beliefs, expectations, and depression. As hypothesized, patients with weaker biological beliefs about depression, and patients who expected a shorter time to improvement, experienced greater change in depressive symptoms and more frequent response to acute-phase CT. Moreover, responders who received continuation treatment better matched to their biological beliefs (i.e., responders with weaker biological beliefs about depression who received continuation CT, or responders with stronger biological beliefs about depression who received continuation fluoxetine) had fewer depressive symptoms and less relapse/recurrence by 32 months after acute-phase CT than did responders who received mismatched continuation treatment. Specific screening and/or intervention targeting patients’ biological beliefs about depression could increase CT efficacy.     

Do beliefs about aggression predict physical aggression to partners?

Three hypotheses concerning the association between instrumental (I) and expressive (E) beliefs about aggression and physical aggression were assessed among a sample comprising students (n=40), women from a domestic violence shelter (n=29), and male prisoners (n=46), all of whom had committed at least one act of physical aggression to a partner. Participants completed an adapted version of the EXPAGG [Archer and Haigh (1997a): British Journal of Social Psychology 35:1–23] to measure I and E beliefs about aggression, the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) [Straus (1979): Journal of Marriage and the Family 41:75–88] for themselves and their partner, and measures of fear and injuries resulting from partner violence. I beliefs predicted self‐reported physical aggression to the partner, most CTS acts of physical aggression, and injuries to the partner, with only minor and limited associations for E beliefs. Correlations for the student and prisoner samples, and for men and women, showed different strengths. The findings supported a general link between I beliefs and aggression but offered no support for the predictions that the link would be restricted to men or to men who showed a persistent pattern of violence to their partners. Aggr. Behav. 29:41–54, 2003. © 2003 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

The Potential Information Analysis of Seeing

I argue for a version of the causal analysis of seeing which I call the 'potential information' analysis. I proceed initially by considering some standard causal analyses, those of Tye and Jackson. 1 show that these analyses are too weak, for they allow cases of hallucination to count as seeing. 1 argue that what is central to seeing is that our visual experiences provide a means of gaining true beliefs about objects. This, however, does not mean that we must actually gain true beliefs about objects in any particular case. Rather, what must be the case is that a perceiver of our sort could gain true beliefs about objects on the basis of experiences like ours. 1 defend this analysis against various objections, making important qualifications to it as 1 do so.     

Referential Intentions and Communicative Luck

Brian Loar [1976] observed that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment. For communicative success to be achieved, the audience must assign the right referent in the right way. Loar, and others since, took this to motivate Fregean accounts of the semantics of singular terms. Ray Buchanan [2014] has recently responded, maintaining that, although Loar is correct to claim that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment, this is compatible with direct reference approaches, as long as one also endorses an independently motivated Gricean view of communicative intentions. This paper argues that Buchanan's Gricean view cannot account for the full range of Loar cases. In doing so, it aims to explicate the structure of Loar's cases and thus to clarify the conditions that a theory must meet in order to adequately meet his challenge.     

Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging

This paper discusses Lippert-Rasmussen’s [Philosophical Studies 104, (2001) 123–141] claim that there are reasonable question-begging arguments. It is first argued that his arguments devalue the distinction between justifiable and justified beliefs, a distinction that is important for the fallacy theory. Second, it is argued that the role of the argument in the discussed cases can be questioned. In addition, the role of second order beliefs is discussed.     

Indirect Realism with a Human Face

Epistemic Indirect Realism (EIR) is the position that justification for contingent propositions about the extra‐mental world requires an inference based on a subjective, experiential mental state. One objection against EIR is that it runs contrary to common sense and practice; in essence, ordinary people do not form beliefs about things in the external world on the basis of experiential mental states. This objection implies EIR is contrary to ordinary experience, impractical, and leads to scepticism. In this paper, I will defend EIR against this objection by distinguishing EIR based on conceptual awareness and non‐conceptual awareness. In particular, I will argue that direct acquaintance provides sufficient (non‐conceptual) awareness that can explain how ordinary folks are capable of forming justified beliefs about the external world in a way consistent with EIR. Overall, I present a framework for showing that EIR can satisfy ordinary epistemic practices without betraying human nature or over‐intellectualizing the required epistemic standards for possessing a justified belief.     

Who's afraid of the big bad wolf: a prospective paradigm to test Rachman's indirect pathways in children.

Rachman's theory [The conditioning theory of fear insition: a critical examination. Behav. Res. Ther. 15 (1977) 375-387] of fear acquisition suggests that fears and phobias can be acquired through three pathways: direct conditioning, vicarious learning and information/instruction. Although retrospective studies have provided some evidence for these pathways in the development of phobias during childhood [see King, Gullone, & Ollendick, Etiology of childhood phobias: current status of Rachman's three pathway's theory. Behav. Res. Ther. 36 (1998) 297-309 for a review], these studies have relied on long-term past memories of adult phobics or their parents. The current study was aimed towards developing a paradigm in which the plausibility of Rachman's indirect pathways could be investigated prospectively. In Experiment 1, children aged between 7 and 9 were presented with two types of information about novel stimuli (two monsters): video information and verbal information in the form of a story. Fear-related beliefs about the monsters changed significantly as a result of verbal information but not video information. Having established an operational paradigm, Experiment 2 looked at whether the source of verbal information had an effect on changes in fear-beliefs. Using the same paradigm, information about the monsters was provided by either a teacher, an adult stranger or a peer, or no information was given. Again, verbal information significantly changed fear-beliefs, but only when the information came from an adult. The role of information in the acquisition of fear and maintenance of avoidant behaviour is discussed with reference to modern conditioning theories of fear acquisition.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

The Cognitive Demands of Friendship

Recently, some philosophers have argued that friendship demands that we have positive beliefs about our friends even when such beliefs go against the evidence. Call this the doxastic account of the cognitive demands of friendship. I consider both motivations and worries for the doxastic account before developing a new account: the attentional account. According to it, friendship places demands on how we direct our attention. I argue that the attentional account accommodates the considerations that motivate the doxastic account and weathers the worries that trouble it. Along the way, I question the assumption that friendship's cognitive demands center on positivity.     

Belief and Self‐consciousness

Abstract

This paper is about what is distinctive about first‐person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first‐person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed to revise my beliefs about myself. This point develops the insight that Anscombe and others had that those of an agent’s beliefs about himself that manifest that special self‐consciousness are not based on observation, testimony or inference. The puzzles show that this kind of self‐consciousness involves, not a special kind of belief or even a special kind of self‐reference, but a special kind of belief revision policy.     

Basis for Decision: An Attitudinal Analysis of Voting Behavior1

A psychological theory which suggests that a person's attitude toward any object is a function of his beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs is presented. Thus, in the political arena, a person should like or dislike a given candidate because (a) he believes the candidate has certain personal characteristics, is affiliated with certain reference groups, or is for or against various issues; and (b) evaluated these characteristics, groups, and issues positively or negatively. Evidence from a local survey in the 1964 presidential election supports this theory and its application to voting behavior. In addition, the data clearly indicate that voters do take partisan stands on some issues, do clearly discriminate between the candidates vis-a-vis certain issues, and do change their beliefs during the course of a campaign. These data suggest that a new protrait of the American voter is overdue.     

Direct phenomenal beliefs,cognitive significance,and the specious present

Chalmers (The character of consciousness, 2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present ‘now’ are so impoverished that it barely constrains the content of a direct phenomenal belief. I argue that Chalmers’s account does not have the resources for explaining how direct phenomenal beliefs support the inference from ‘this _E is R’ to ‘that was R.’     

Belief and Subjective Well-Being in Outpatients

Background. The purpose of this study was twofold: to test the hypothesis that religious and spiritual beliefs provide medical outpatients with a system of meaning and existential understanding, and to seek to determine some elements that constitute the domain of spiritual and religious beliefs as they relate to subjective well-being. Methods. The Spiritual Well-Being Scale (SWBS) questionnaire was administered to a convenience sample of adult outpatients. Results. Patients agreed, strongly to moderately, with statements that had a direct reference to God having a significant influence (cares about me, concerned about my problems, contributes to my sense of well-being) on the daily life of the respondent. Conclusion. Religious and spiritual beliefs provide medical outpatients with a system of meaning and existential understanding. Outpatients identified with more cognitive rather than affective perceptions of well-being, in addition to a conceptualization of what a loving God may mean.     

Hypothetico-Deductivism: Incomplete But Not Hopeless

Alleged counter-examples deployed in Park (2004) [Erkenntnis 60: 229–240] against the account of selective hypothetico-deductive confirmation offered in Gemes (1998) [Erkenntnis 49: 1–20] are shown to be ineffective. Furthermore, the reservations expressed in Gemes (1998) [ibid] and (1993) [Philosophy of Science 62: 477–487] about hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) are retracted and replaced with the conclusion that H-D is a viable account of confirmation that captures much of the practice of working scientists. However, because it cannot capture cases of inference to the best explanation and cases of the observational confirmation of statistical hypotheses, it is concluded that H-D cannot supply a complete theory of confirmation.     

On Today's Two‐Worlds Interpretation: Knowledge and True Belief in Plato

This paper presents arguments against two crucial elements of recent versions of the Two‐Worlds interpretation of Plato. I argue first that in addition to knowledge of the forms, Plato allows beliefs about them as well. Then I argue that Plato sees knowledge as a state in which the subject is conscious of information about the forms. Thus, the infallibility of knowledge must be understood in a way that is consistent with its being informational. Finally, I argue that my conclusions about knowledge do not preclude the possibility that cognition of forms has a direct, nonrepresentational aspect.     

Two Puzzles Concerning Spinoza's Conception of Belief

Spinoza's account of belief entails that if A has two ideas, p and q, with incompatible content, A believes that p (and not that q) if the idea of p is stronger than the idea of q. This seems to leave little space for dominant non‐beliefs, or cases in which there is discord between one's beliefs and one's affective‐behavioral responses. And yet Spinoza does allow for two classes of dominant non‐beliefs: efficacious fictions [fictiones] and ideas that conduce to akrasia. I show how Spinoza can account for dominant non‐beliefs within his model of cognition by distinguishing between the doxastic and the affective powers of ideas and by suggesting that doxastic power is best understood diachronically. While other scholars have stressed the elegance of Spinoza's account of ideas, this paper highlights the sophistication and flexibility of his account.     

Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control

According to what I will call ‘the disanalogy thesis,’ beliefs differ from actions in at least the following important way: while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Recent arguments against the disanalogy thesis maintain that, if you find yourself in what I will call a ‘permissive situation’ with respect to p, then you can have direct control over whether you believe p, and you can do so without manifesting any cognitive defect. These arguments focus primarily on the idea that we can have direct doxastic control in permissive situations, but they provide insufficient reason for thinking that permissive situations are actually possible, since they pay inadequate attention to the following worries: permissive situations seem inconsistent with the uniqueness thesis, permissive situations seem inconsistent with natural thoughts about epistemic akrasia, and vagueness threatens even if we push these worries aside. In this paper I argue that, on the understanding of permissive situations that is most useful for evaluating the disanalogy thesis, permissive situations clearly are possible.     

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for conciliationism appeal to a principle Christensen [2011] dubs Independence. Independence says that evaluations of the beliefs of those with whom one disagrees should not be made on the basis of one's initial reasoning about p. In this paper, I show that this principle is false. I also show that two weaker principles that vindicate conciliationism are either false, unmotivated, or both.