Acting virtuously as an end in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

ABSTRACT

Sometimes, in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle describes virtuous actions as the sorts of actions that are ends; it is important for Aristotle to do so if he wants to maintain, as he seems to at least until NE 10.7–8, that virtuous actions are a constituent of eudaimonia. At other times, he claims that virtuous actions are the sorts of actions that are for the sake of ends beyond themselves; after all, no one would choose to go into battle or give away a significant portion of their wealth if it did not realize some good end. In this paper, I review the familiar problem raised by Aristotle’s discussion of the nature of virtuous actions, propose a solution to this problem by appealing to a distinction between virtuous actions and ‘acting virtuously’, and sketch the significance of this solution for understanding the relationship between virtue and human happiness.     

Agent-based Theories of Right Action

In this paper, I develop an objection to agent-based accounts of right action. Agent-based accounts of right action attempt to derive moral judgment of actions from judgment of the inner quality of virtuous agents and virtuous agency. A moral theory ought to be something that moral agents can permissibly use in moral deliberation. I argue for a principle that captures this intuition and show that, for a broad range of other-directed virtues and motives, agent-based accounts of right action fail to satisfy this principle.     

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.     

Practical rationality for pluralists about the good

I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.     

自由优先于德性——罗尔斯伦理思想的一种解读

罗尔斯伦理思想总体上可归结为一种权利伦理学;“自由优先于德性”是罗尔斯伦理思想的基本原则之一,这个原则以“自我优先于目的”为形式根据,以“正义(权利)优先于德性”为质料内容。罗尔斯权利伦理揭示了现代自由社会的道德特征和道德要求,提出了诸多新的伦理理念和伦理观点,但也存在着一些局限性。     

Curiosity as a Guide to the Virtuous Life

We are concerned here with the existential question: In order to live a virtuous life, whether it is better to commit one's life to good works among humankind or to the perfection of one's spiritual being by turning away from humanity and devoting oneself entirely to God. We examine this issue—a controversy in moral philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks—in a short story by Leo Tolstoy.     

Fallacies and moral dilemmas

The continuing debate between utilitarians and deontologists often takes the form of disagreement over how particular moral dilemmas are to be resolved, but protagonists on both sides tend to overlook the possibility of resolving a dilemma with remainder, such as regret. The importance of remainder is also overlooked by critics of some absolutist ways of resolving or slipping between the horns of certain moral dilemmas. Moreover, deontologists, if not utilitarians, can be criticised for overlooking the possibility that, according to their theory, some dilemmas may be irresolvable. Virtue ethics, with its concentration on the agent, readily accommodates both mention of remainder and irresolvable dilemmas, and yields a specification of tragic dilemmas which the other two theories might like to take on.     

西方政治伦理思想的历史流变及其启示

自古至今,西哲们紧跟时代的脚步,不断把西方的政治伦理观推陈出新:美德政治伦理、神性政治伦理、非道德主义的政治伦理、权利政治伦理。全面、系统地梳理和展现西方政治伦理思想的演变及其价值诉求,对于理解和把握政治伦理学中的一些重要理论问题具有重大的启迪意义。     

Right Action and the Non‐Virtuous Agent

According to qualified‐agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non‐virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non‐virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse's account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue‐ and vice‐rules (v‐rules) for action guidance.     

中国人善良人格的结构研究

善良人格是一个具有中国文化特色的人格心理学主题。为了探究善良人格的结构和内涵,研究基于人格词汇学假设,通过开放式和半开放式问卷调查,经由意义分善良; 善良人格; 人格结构; 中国人析和初测保留了85个善良人格词汇; 在此基础上,进行探索性和验证性因素分析,揭示了中国人的善良人格是一个包括诚信友善、利他奉献、宽容和善、重情重义的二阶四因子结构。信度和效度分析表明,编制的善良人格问卷的信、效度良好,符合心理测量学的基本要求。     

市场经济、道德权利与产权伦理

产权伦理是现代市场经济的一个根本性的精神基础,是建立有效的产权制度及其运行机制的重要条件;同时,它是人类道德体系的核心价值理念之一,是基于权利,义务与道德的内在逻辑构建起来的。产权伦理的研究具有重要的理论价值和现实意义,可以构成一门具有特殊的学科特质,研究方法和理论内容的伦理学学科。     

RIGHT ACT, VIRTUOUS MOTIVE

Abstract: The concepts of virtue and right action are closely connected, in that we expect people with virtuous motives to at least often act rightly. Two well-known views explain this connection by defining one of the concepts in terms of the other. Instrumentalists about virtue identify virtuous motives as those that lead to right acts; virtue-ethicists identify right acts as those that are or would be done from virtuous motives. This essay outlines a rival explanation, based on the "higher-level" account of virtue defended in the author's Virtue, Vice, and Value . On this account rightness and virtue go together because each is defined by a (different) relation to some other, more basic moral concept. Their frequent coincidence is therefore like a correlation between A and B based not on either's causing the other but on their being joint effects of a single common cause.     

“对的”与“好的”

什么是“对的”,和对它的证立,是道德哲学中具有争议性的核心问题,也是效用主义和道义论间的主要差异之所在。统合效用主义对于“好的就是对的”这个陈述有一套完整周延的说法。而道义论对这个问题的证立不够周延或没有足够的说服力。     

To Act or Not to Act: Nonconsequentialism in Environmental Decision-Making

Research on environmental-decision making is usually based on utilitarian models, which imply that people's decisions are only influenced by the outcomes. This research provides evidence for values and moral positions that reflect nonconsequentialist rather than consequentialist views. In doing this, this article refers to “sacred values,” which are values that are seen as not-substitutable and nontradable. Two studies were designed to examine evidence for sacred values and their role on act versus omission choices within the environmental domain. The studies revealed that sacred values were closely associated with preferences for actions, trade-off reluctance, deontological focus, and position of moral universalism. The results suggest that it is important to account for sacred values and nonconsequentialist views in environmental decision-making research.     

法学和医学视角对疫情防控的思想对比分析

对于疫情防控措施,法学家坚持道义论,主张以某种最低的规范约束人们的行为,“法无禁止即自由”。而医务工作者则更多主张美德伦理,认为每个人都应该追求更高的道德品质,严于律己,宽以待人。经历了持续的经济增长之后,社会还存在一定的极端个人主义、贫富分化、阶层固化等问题,加之突然遭遇世所罕见的新冠疫情,应该搁置道义论,重新拥抱美德伦理。从个人的角度,对严格的疫情防控措施给予最大的宽容,认真地执行,并积极参与志愿服务;从政府的角度,应该在疫情防控的同时,照顾好群众的生产、生活和就医。

     

Mindsets,rationality and emotion in Multi‐criteria Decision Analysis

This paper discusses the paradigm of multi‐criteria decision analysis (MCDA), and relates it to other disciplines. It concludes that MCDA needs a larger, not smaller, emphasis on values and subjectivity to increase rationality in decision‐making. The paper bases the argument on a conciliation of ethics, philosophy, neuro‐psychology and management paradigms. It observes that the MCDA ‘mindset’ relates to consequentialism, as opposed to virtue ethics and rule based ethics. Virtues and rules play an important role in practical decision‐making, however. Findings in neuro‐psychology show that reliable decision‐making requires emotions. Elicitation of emotions is therefore required in MCDA value trade‐off processes. This leads to a concept of emotional rationality, which defines rationality as a four‐dimensional concept that includes well‐founded values and breaks radically with common notions of rationality. Virtues do not easily lend themselves to value trade‐off, but questions of virtue usually creates strong social emotions, as opposed to the feebler global emotions that may arise in connection conventional trade‐off of end values. The conclusion is that MCDA should not be shy of subjectivity and emotion, but instead put more emphasis on it to increase rationality. A part of this challenge is how to deal with questions of virtue in decision‐making. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

中国人善良人格量表的编制及信效度检验

中国的心理学研究充满了道德色彩,研究以善良人格概念及结构为基础,编制了中国人善良人格量表。研究根据已有的善良人格词汇对应编写具体条目,经过分析整合后初步保留29个善良人格条目,在此基础上研究招募960名被试,分别进行探索性因素分析和验证性因素分析,并建构了善良人格的二阶四因子结构。研究结果表明善良人格量表具有良好的信效度,是测量中国人善良人格的有效工具。