Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition

The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and the accompanying conscious feeling of will (Libet et al., 1983; pg. 640). Here, we demonstrate that volitional movement can occur without an accompanying feeling of will. We additionally show that the neural processes indexed by RPs are insufficient to cause the experience of conscious willing. Specifically, RPs still occur when subjects make self-timed, endogenously-initiated movements due to a post-hypnotic suggestion, without a conscious feeling of having willed those movements.     

The concept of free will: philosophy, neuroscience and the law

Various philosophical definitions of free will are first considered. The compatibilist definition, which says simply that acts are freely willed if they are not subject to constraints, is identified as much used in the legal system and essentially impervious to scientific investigation. A middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, which requires that freely willed acts be consciously initiated, is shown to be relevant to the idea of mens rea and in the author's view not actually incompatible in principle with a fully scientific worldview. Only the strong libertarian definition, which requires that freely willed acts have no physical antecedents whatsoever, makes the existence of free will very hard to swallow scientifically. However, with regard to the middle-ground "incompatibilist" definition, three different lines of scientific experimental evidence are then described, which suggest that, in fact, consciousness is not the real cause of much of what is generally considered as voluntary behavior. Many voluntary actions are initiated preconsciously, with consciousness kept informed only after the neural events leading to the act have begun. It is suggested that a reasonable way of integrating these experimental findings with the idea that persons do have a somewhat more than compatibilist version of free will is to acknowledge explicitly that a person is a mixture of conscious and unconscious components. In this scenario, the mind in mens rea would have to be judged guilty if it contained either conscious or unconscious intentions to perform the guilty act.     

MALEBRANCHE'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM / CONSENT AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF GOD'S VOLITIONS

‘God needs no instruments to act’, Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; ‘it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will’ (450). After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that ‘[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious... [H]is power differs not at all from [H]is will’ (116). God's causal power, here, clearly traces only to His volitions - not merely to the fact that He wills, but specifically to the content of His volitions (‘“what” He wills’). Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope to rectify this situation here. The plan of this paper is this: first, to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained; second, to show that Malebranche clearly allows and uses something like this notion; third, to apply the notion to Malebranche's doctrine of human freedom. In so doing, I believe, we can understand this doctrine in a new way, and one which: (i) is clearly consistent with his texts, and (ii) unlike other interpretations makes coherent sense out of the conflicting streams in his heroic attempt to reconcile his occasionalism - the doctrine that no finite substances have genuine causal powers - with our freedom; fourth, Contrast my interpretation with those of two recent writers: Sleigh et al. (1998) and Schmaltz (1996); and Fifth, Summarize the major results.     

Necessity, control, and the divine command theory

The simplest Divine Command Theory is one which identifies rightness with being commanded or willed by God. Two clear and appealing arguments for this theory turn on the idea that laws require a lawgiver, and the idea that God is sovereign or omnipotent. Critical examination of these arguments reveals some fundamental principles at odds with the Divine Command Theory, and yields some more penetrating versions of traditional objections to that theory. This paper is dedicated to the memory ofPhilip L. Quinn, in honor of his long and generous service to the profession of philosophy, the discipline of philosophy of religion, and for his kind and uncommonly helpful comments on this paper.     

Discussion about the Triple Foundational Relationship between Intellect,Emotion, and Willing from the Perspective of the Phenomenology of Consciousness

There are at least three foundational relationships between the three conscious acts of intellect, emotion, and willing. Section 2 covers the structural foundational relationship (Brentano and Husserl in his early period): all conscious acts are intentional and can be divided into objectifying (intuition and representation) and non-objectifying acts (emotion and willing). Because a non-objectifying act cannot constitute an object, things must be based on objectifying acts and the object constituted by the latter; in this sense, a non-objectifying act is rooted in an objectifying one. Section 3 explains the genetic foundational issue with consciousness (Husserl in his later period, Scheler, and Heidegger): the stream of consciousness has its earliest origins and follows a process where it gradually unfolds. The earliest origin is the intentional willing, followed by nonintentional feelings, and, finally, the representation and thinking of willing. Intentional activity taking place afterward must be based on the conscious activity that has come already. Section 4 points out that, apart from the two aforementioned kinds of foundational relationships (i.e. structural and genetic), a third foundational relationship (i.e. dynamic) can also be found between the conscious acts of intellect, emotion, and willing in the Consciousness-only school (a Buddhist tradition in the East). In a continuous activity, the foundational relationship between the three aspects of intellect, emotion, and willing always remains encased in dynamic changes, and the change of primary and secondary roles (i.e. a change in the foundational relationship) could happen at any time. From this perspective, one can explain and resolve the confrontation and conflicts between the two former foundational relationships.     

The doctor-proxy relationship: the neglected connection

Advance directives have been lauded by scholars and supported by professional organizations, Congress, and the United States Supreme Court. Despite this encouragement, only a small number of capable patients execute living wills or appoint health care agents. When patients do empower proxies, doctors may be uncertain about the scope of their duties and obligations to these persons who, in theory, stand in the shoes of the patient. This article argues for a conscious focus on the ethical duties, emotional supports, and guidance owed by physicians to health care agents.     

FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM: A CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSION

Abstract. The problem of freedom of the will and determinism is one of the most intriguing and difficult in the whole area of philosophy. It constüutes a paradox. If we look at ourselves, at our ability to deliberate and make moral choices, it seems obvious that we are free. On the other hand, if we look at what we believe about causality (i.e., that every event and thing must have a cause), then it appears that we do not have free wills but are determined. Thus we seem to have inconsistent beliefs. In this paper I set forth and analyze the major contemporary arguments for free will and determinism as well as for compatibilism, the position that tries to combine insights from both theories. I end with a brief conclusion regarding my assessment of the status of the arguments.     

Is predictive processing a theory of perceptual consciousness?

Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offered by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched.     

From the Exclusion of Women to the Transformation of Philosophy: Reclamation and its Possibilities

In the mid‐1980s, feminist philosophers began to turn their critical efforts toward reclaiming women in the history of philosophy who had been neglected by traditional histories and canons. There are now scores of resources treating historical women philosophers and reclaiming them for philosophical history. This article explores the four major argumentative strategies that have been used within those reclamation projects. It argues that three of the strategies unwittingly work against the reclamationist end of having women engaged as philosophers. The fourth type, the one that seeks to transform philosophical practice and reconstruct its history, is the only strategy that will result in that engagement because it is the only strategy that pays sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which women have been excluded from philosophy and its history.     

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory

I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

     

The Indetermination of Reason and the Roleof the Will in Aquinas's Accountof Human Freedom

Thomas Aquinas argues that human choices are made by the will and reason working together. It is easy to misinterpret his argument and suppose that the reason alone works out what should be done while the will simply ratifies this. Instead Aquinas believes that in practical matters the reason is often undetermined since it arrives at many simultaneous conclusions. This is the often unacknowledged heart of Aquinas's account of freedom. All these simultaneous rational conclusions derive from the objective circumstances of the world; each one could give rise to a different rationally justified course of action; yet only one can be acted upon. The reason cannot decide between them. It is the will that accepts and affirms one of these conclusions and gives force to the reasonableness of one course of action. This is why a choice is always rational and personally willed – which is what makes it free. The indetermination of reason is what allows the future to be open-ended for the deliberating agent; it allows past and present to be interpreted in different ways, each of which has its own coherence and rationality. In this way Aquinas's account of human freedom avoids both an irrational voluntarism and a deterministic intellectualism     

Overcoming Philosophy: Heidegger, Metaphysics, and the Transformation to Thinking

Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics is central to his attempt to re-instantiate the question of being. This paper examines Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics by looking at the relationship between metaphysics and thought. This entails an identification of the intimate relationship Heidegger maintains exists between philosophy and metaphysics, an analysis of Heidegger’s critique of this association, and a discussion of his proposal that philosophy has been so damaged by its association with metaphysics that it must be replaced with meditative thinking. It is not quite clear, however, how the overcoming of metaphysical thinking is to occur especially given Heidegger’s insistence that relying on human will to effect an alteration in thinking simply re-instantiates the metaphysical perspective to be overcome. While several critics have argued Heidegger has no solution to this issue, instead holding that thought must simply be open to being’s ‘self’-transformation if and when it occurs, I turn to Heidegger’s notion of trace and a number of scattered comments on the relationship between meditative thinking and willing as non-willing to show Heidegger: (a) was aware of this issue; and (b) tried to resolve it by recognising a reconceptualised notion of willing not based on or emanating from the aggressive willing of metaphysics.     

Should scientists think? Comment on Machado and Silva (2007)

The author has previously claimed that neural activity in a medial frontal brain area represents conscious motor intentions. A. Machado and F. J. Silva attempted to challenge this claim by arguing that such intentions are not necessarily causally effective and must be caused by something else, so that they therefore cannot be the unmoved first movers in action. The author's reply is that he made no such claims about the causal status and origin of conscious intentions. In fact, he has elsewhere presented empirical evidence in support of the idea that intentions are not necessarily causal. But this does not stop researchers from studying the neural basis for the conscious impression that one intends and wills one's actions. One can feel and attend to such intentions, be they causal or not. The author's claim is that there is neural activity in the medial frontal wall that reflects such conscious feelings. Other recent empirical evidence that supports this view is described.     

Schopenhauer on the aimlessness of the will

Schopenhauer asserts that ‘the will, which is objectified in human life as it is in every appearance, is a striving without aim and without end’. The article rejects some recent readings of this claim, and offers the following positive interpretation: however many specific aims of my specific desires I manage to attain, none is a final aim, in the sense that none terminates my ‘willing as a whole’, none turns me into a non-willing being. To understand Schopenhauer’s claim we must recognize his central contrast between happiness and will-lessness. Happiness is the satisfaction of individual desire, but no act of will that succeeds in satisfying individual desire is the attainment of a final aim, in that none brings about a conscious state in which the subject experiences no more unfulfilled desires. Such a state is the ultimate goal of existence, in Schopenhauer’s view, but happiness does not provide a route along which it can be attained.     

Business Ethics without Philosophers? Evidence for and Implications of the Shift From Applied Philosophers to Business Scholars on the Editorial Boards of Business Ethics Journals

This article considers the relationship between business ethics and philosophy, specifically in relation to the field and persons working in it. The starting point is a grammatical one: business ethics by the rules of grammar belongs to ethics. In terms of academic disciplines, it belongs to applied ethics, which belongs to ethics, which belongs to practical philosophy, which belongs to philosophy. However, in the field of business ethics today one will seldom meet colleagues from philosophy; instead, they will come from business, applying business studies perspectives, approaches, and increasingly quantitative methods. This article provides empirical evidence that today the three top journals with “business ethics” in their titles (and “awarded” a high impact factor) are mostly run (in terms of their editorial boards) by business scholars with PhDs in business. The article compares the three journals today with their inaugural issues and finds that at their inception all three were run by a majority of philosophers. The article discusses six possible explanations for this shift and provides suggestions for how to bring business ethics back to philosophers (and vice versa).     

Nietzsche contra contra: Difference and opposition

Nietzsche sees base morality and traditional philosophy as reactive, essentially predicated on negation and opposition. But is it possible to reject negation? To oppose oppositionality? This issue has been addressed by a variety of 20th century thinkers who think that the paradox is insurmountable. I use the thought of Deleuze to propose a way Nietzsche can respond to the accusation of paradox. Specifically, I believe Nietzsche proposes a set of philosophical terms that allow him to refer the question of opposition to a critical analysis of types of wills. Nietzsche attempts to show us a will that does not negate and oppose, but is rather affirmative. Its affirmation will be creative, rather than recognizing and reacting to an antecedent state of affairs or set of values. The purpose of this paper is to argue for the coherence and novelty of this conception of affirmative, noble will.     

The Expansion of Epistemology: The Metaphysical vs. the Practical Approach

From the perspective of world philosophy, one phenomenon of the 20th century is quite intriguing. Certain philosophers in China as well as in the West, finding the traditional conception of epistemology too narrow-minded, argued that its scope should be expanded. The Chinese way of expanding epistemology might be called the metaphysical approach, and the Western way the practical approach. In this article, I will first give an outline of both approaches and then try to demonstrate that a substantial dialogue can be created between them. By focusing on the problem of the articulation of what we know, I will make the metaphysical approach and the practical approach engage each other and thus prove to be mutually complementary.     

ON CLASSICAL AND NEO-ANALYTIC FORMS OF PRAGMATISM

Abstract: Pragmatism as it originally arose in America has always been pluralist, always willing to find space for those who understood it in other ways. But in the emergence of neo‐analytic pragmatism it is possible that the term has been stretched beyond its limits in a way that does more harm than good in veiling if not actually obscuring central tenets that are well worth preserving. The aim of this article is to describe some aspects of this phenomenon and to draw some tentative conclusions.     

Augustine on the Impossibility of Teaching

The information-transference account of teaching takes it to be a process in which information is transferred from one person's mind to another's. Augustine argues that this is impossible, since in order to understand something the person who understands must come to see why it is so, and that is an internal episode of awareness that isn't caused by an outside source. Augustine's insight here is contrasted with the contemporary view, following Wittgenstein, that learning is a matter of conformity to rules (public norms). The case is made that teaching and learning pose philosophical problems that contemporary theories don't address, and a brief examination of Searle's Chinese Room example suggests that its plausibility derives from Augustine's insight that mere rule-following behavior isn't enough to explain the phenomenon of understanding at the heart of knowledge. A reconstruction of Augustine's epistemological claims, divorced from his discredited views in the philosophy of language, is also provided.