Does Moral Virtue Require Knowledge? A Response to Julia Driver

A long-standing tenet of virtue theory is that moral virtue and knowledge are connected in some important way. Julia Driver attacks the traditional assumption that virtue requires knowledge. I argue that the examples of virtues of ignorance Driver offers are not compelling and that the idea that knowledge is required for virtue has been taken to be foundational for virtue theory for good reason. I propose that we understand modesty as involving three conditions: 1) having genuine accomplishments, 2) being aware of the value of these accomplishments, and 3) having a disposition to refrain from putting forward one’s accomplishments. When we understand modesty this way, we can properly identify genuine cases of modesty and see how modesty requires knowledge. Something similar can be said about other alleged virtues of ignorance. With the proposal in place, we have no serious reason to think that moral virtue requires ignorance. Additionally, we have good reasons for thinking that acting virtuously requires having good intentions and that a necessary condition of having a virtue is having knowledge. Although some might take these results to be trivial or obviously true, I think the Julia Driver’s challenge should not be dismissed out of hand. Even though there are some reasons for thinking that some situations suggest that knowledge and virtue can be separated from one another, close analysis reveals this impression is only surface deep.     

Does Philosophy Require a Weak Transcendental Approach?

Despite any shortcomings of Kant's transcendental philosophy, the spirit (rather than the letter) of Kant's approach is correct. In particular, Kant is correct to believe (1) an accurate account of the types of “access” humans possess to internal and empirical content should form the groundwork for epistemic and ethical investigation and (2) epistemic and ethical investigations cannot successfully circumvent this groundwork. In this context, the term “access” concerns the mental processes that render internal and external experience possible. In supporting the above claims, this article outlines and defends what can be considered a weak version of Kant's transcendental approach. This weaker approach does not require the achievement of synthetic a priori judgments, which permit deductive conclusions concerning possible experience (as opposed to a strong approach, which maintains these requirements).     

What Sort of Ethics Does Technology Require?

This essay critically examines thenon-essentialist and anti-deterministicphilosophy of technology developed in the workof Andrew Feenberg. As I interpret the work,Feenberg achieves an important``demystification' of technology. His analysispeels away the facade of ironclad efficiency,rationality, and necessity that permeates ourexperience of technology. Through theoreticalargument and rich examples, he illuminated thecontingent interests, values, meanings, andvoices that are built into specifictechnologies, often by experts. He shows howtechnology is transformed by lay actors whochallenge its design on behalf of a wideragenda of interests, values, meanings andvoices. My critique focuses on Feenberg'sattempt to argue from his demystification oftechnology to the full democratization of alltechnical design and decision-making. I arguethat Feenberg's framework lacks the ethicalresources required both to (1) justify thedemocratization of technical decisions, andmore basically, (2) to determine when laychallenges to technology do and when theydon't, advance democratic ideals, and why. Itrace these problems to ethical inadequacies inhis notions of interests, democratization, andan alternative modernity. A sub-theme of myargument is that our society's Lockeanmorality of property rights and market freedomsposes fundamental ethical objections to hisphilosophy of technology with which it isill-equipped to deal.     

Does Moral Disagreement Pose a Semantic Challenge to Moral Realism?

Philosophia - Many philosophers have argued that moral disagreement raises metaphysical and/or epistemological challenges for moral realism. In this paper, I consider whether widespread moral...     

Does the Public Intellectual Have Intellectual Integrity?

This article is concerned with the devaluation of the work of public intellectuals within the academic community. The principal reason given for this devaluation is that the work of the public intellectual does not have intellectual integrity as independent thought and original scholarship. I develop three models of public intellectual work: the permanent–critic model, the popularizer model, and the public–theorist model. I then consider each model in relation to the concern with intellectual integrity and conclude that both independent thought and original scholarship are possible within work that is engaged with nonacademic publics.     

Does Particularism Solve the Moral Problem?

Abstract

Moral cognitivism, internalism about moral judgements, and Humeanism about motivating reasons all possess attractions.Yet they cannot all be true.This is the so–called moral problem. Dancy offers an interesting particularist response to the moral problem. However, we argue that this response, first, provides an inadequate basis for the distinction between motivating states and states necessary for motivation although not themselves motivators; second, draws no support from considerations about weakness of the will; and third, involves an implausible account of desire.We conclude that particularism ú whatever other attractions it may have ú does not solve the moral problem.     

Does Skeptical Theism Lead to Moral Skepticism?

The evidential argument from evil seeks to show that suffering is strong evidence against theism. The core idea of the evidential argument is that we know of innocent beings suffering for no apparent good reason. Perhaps the most common criticism of the evidential argument comes from the camp of skeptical theism, whose lot includes William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Stephen Wykstra. According to skeptical theism the limits of human knowledge concerning the realm of goods, evils, and the connections between values, undermines the judgment that what appears as pointless evil really is pointless. For all we know the suffering of an innocent being, though appearing pointless, in fact leads to a greater good. In this paper I argue that no one who accepts the doctrines of skeptical theism has a principled way of avoiding moral skepticism.     

Does Marriage Require a Head? Some Historical Arguments*

Are hierarchies necessary in human relationships’! This issue is a central one for feminist theory, and there is a continuing need to rethink relationships and to envision what they might be like without any sort of dominance of some over others. To aid this process of envisioning alternatives, this paper examines more closely the way one of the most intimate of hierarchies — marriage — has been argued and envisioned historically.     

Counselor Liability: Does the Risk Require Insurance Coverage?

Counselors face various types of liability risk. Knowledge of case law can help minimize those risks, but insurance is a must.     

Does Conscientiousness Explain the Relationship Between Integrity and Job Performance?

There is a meta-analytic evidence that scores on integrity tests are related to measures of overall job performance, but it is not clear why this relationship exists. One hypothesis that would account for this correlation is that both integrity and performance measures are related to the personality trait conscientiousness, and that statistically controlling for conscientiousness would substantially reduce the integrity-performance correlation. To test this hypothesis, we used the results of three meta-analyses to estimate the components needed to calculate the partial correlation between integrity and performance, controlling for conscientiousness. Partialling had little effect; the best estimate of the corrected zero-order and partial correlations between integrity and performance were 0.34 and 0.28, respectively. Sensitivity analyses suggest that imprecision in the estimates of the various components of this partial correlation cannot reasonably explain the small effects of partialling.     

Moral Machines?

Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen??s Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right From Wrong (Oxford University Press, 2009) explores efforts to develop machines that, not only can be employed for good or bad ends, but which themselves can be held morally accountable for what they do??artificial moral agents (AMAs). This essay is a critical response to Wallach and Allen??s conjectures. Although Wallach and Allen do not suggest that we are close to being able to create full-fledged AMAs, they do talk seriously about making incremental progress in the direction of creating them (even if we never fully succeed). However, there are important questions about the moral development of AMAs that Moral Machines does not address. Given the responsibilities entrusted to human moral agents, we take questions about their moral development very seriously. In the case of children, the hope is that eventually they will develop into full-fledged moral agents. How might we expect this to go with less than fully formed AMAs? Will there be a comparable story of moral development and moral education that we can tell?     

What Does the Frame Problem Tell us About Moral Normativity?

Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals have significant import regarding both the nature of moral normativity and the human capacity for mastering moral normativity. The morals of the frame problem bode well, we argue, for the claim that moral normativity is not fully systematizable by exceptionless general principles, and for the correlative claim that such systematizability is not required in order for humans to master moral normativity.

Stripping Citizenship: Does Membership Have Its (Moral) Privileges?

If states have the moral authority to decide their memberships by denying citizenship, I argue that they may also strip citizenship, from law-abiding members, for the same reasons. The only real difference is that when states revoke citizenship they may need to compensate people for their prior contributions, but that is not unlike what frequently occurs in divorce. Once just termination rules are established, stripping citizenship could become, like divorce, an everyday event. Partly because of this implication, we should reject the membership authority of states.     

Moral Development and Hawaiian Youths: Does Gender Make a Difference?

This study was designed to assess the moral reasoning of Hawaiian youths. The findings challenge C. Gilligan's (1982) theoretical proposition that gender differences exist in moral development. Implications for counseling theory, research, and practice are discussed.     

Does Repeated Exposure to Popular Media Strengthen Moral Intuitions?: Exploratory Evidence Regarding Consistent and Conflicted Moral Content

Previous studies have indicated that media consumption may influence moral intuition sensitivity. The present exploratory studies sought to expand on these findings by employing a three-phase, longitudinal experiment conducted over nine weeks, where participants were exposed to two genres of films (romance, action) mixed in various ratios (high = 100% romance, medium = 60% romance, low = 20% romance, none = 0% romance). Findings from the initial study indicate that repeated exposure to romantic films led to increases in sensitivity for four of the five moral intuitions (i.e., care, fairness, authority, purity); at the same time, any exposure to action films seemed to erode these changes. A follow-up post-hoc content analysis sought to confirm these findings and test an operationalization of “moral conditioning.” We discuss the results in regards to media entertainment theory and research, and the societal implications of the role of media entertainment to reinforce standards of moral judgment.