Core knowledge and its limits: The domain of food

Adults, preschool children, and nonhuman primates detect and categorize food objects according to substance information, conveyed primarily by color and texture. In contrast, they perceive and categorize artifacts primarily by shape and rigidity. The present experiments investigated the origins of this distinction. Using a looking time procedure, Experiment 1 extended previous findings that rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) generalize learning about novel food objects by color over changes in shape. Six additional experiments then investigated whether human infants show the same signature patterns of perception and generalization. Nine-month-old infants failed to detect food objects in accord with their intrinsic properties, in contrast to rhesus monkeys tested in previous research with identical displays. Eight-month-old infants did not privilege substance information over other features when categorizing foods, even though they detected and remembered this information. Moreover, infants showed the same property generalization patterns when presented with foods and tools. The category-specific patterns of perception and categorization shown by human adults, children, and adult monkeys therefore were not found in human infants, providing evidence for limits to infants’ domains of knowledge.     

Token mediated tool exchange between tufted capuchin monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>)

Three experiments were conducted to test whether a pair of tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) could generalize their ability to exchange tokens and tool objects with a human experimenter to similar exchanges with a conspecific partner. Monkeys were tested in side-by-side enclosures, one enclosure containing a tool-use apparatus and one or more token(s), and the other enclosure containing one or more tool object(s). The monkeys willingly transferred tokens and tools to a conspecific with little practice. Following a small amount of training, we also found that the monkeys would select situation-appropriate tokens to exchange for specific tools, but did not select appropriate tool objects in response to another monkey’s token transfers. Implications regarding role reversal are discussed.     

Learning of object-object associations by monkeys

Monkeys were trained in tasks where stimulus objects were presented in pairs, one object of a pair concealing the other, and the monkeys had to displace the top object followed by the bottom object in order to obtain a food reward. In two experiments it was demonstrated that under these conditions the animals formed object-object associations such that the top object recalled in memory the bottom object that had previously been found underneath it. The monkeys were able to discriminate in recall between bottom objects that were identical in secondary reinforcing value and differed only in colour.     

Can rhesus monkeys spontaneously subtract?

Animals, including pigeons, parrots, raccoons, ferrets, rats, New and Old World monkeys, and apes are capable of numerical computations. Much of the evidence for such capacities is based on the use of techniques that require training. Recently, however, several studies conducted under both laboratory and field conditions have employed methods that tap spontaneous numerical representations in animals, including human infants. In this paper, we present the results of 11 experiments exploring the capacity of semi-free-ranging adult rhesus monkeys to spontaneously compute (i.e. single trial, no training) the outcome of subtraction events. In the basic design, we present one quantity of objects on one stage, a second quantity on a second stage, occlude both stages, and then remove one or no objects from each stage. Having watched these events, a subject is then allowed to approach one stage and eat the food objects behind the occluder. Results show that rhesus monkeys correctly compute the outcome of subtraction events involving three or less objects on each stage, even when the identity of the objects is different. Specifically, when presented with two food quantities, rhesus monkeys select the larger quantity following subtractions of one piece of food from two or three; this preference is maintained when subjects must distinguish food from non-food subtractions, and when food is subtracted from either one or both initial quantities. Furthermore, rhesus monkeys are capable of representing zero as well as equality when two identical quantities are contrasted. Results are discussed in light of recent attempts to determine how number is represented in the brains of animals lacking language.     

Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: experiments with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

How do we come to recognize and represent different kinds of objects in the world? Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized that learning language plays a crucial role in this capacity. If this hypothesis were correct, then non-linguistic animals should lack the capacity to represent objects as kinds. Previous research with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) has shown that this species can successfully individuate different kinds of objects - monkeys who saw one kind of object hidden inside a box searched longer after finding a different kind of object. However, in these studies and the infant studies on which they were based, the objects to be individuated differed both in kind and in properties. Thus, subjects in these experiments may not be representing the kinds of objects per se, but instead only their immediate perceptual properties. Here, we show that rhesus monkeys successfully individuate different kinds of objects even when their perceptual properties are held constant. Although these data provide the best evidence to date that language is not necessary to represent kinds, we discuss our findings in terms of possible associative hypotheses as well.     

An assessment of memory awareness in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Humans, apes, and rhesus monkeys demonstrate memory awareness by collecting information when ignorant and acting immediately when informed. In this study, five capuchin monkeys searched for food after either watching the experimenter bait one of four opaque tubes (seen trials), or not watching (unseen trials). Monkeys with memory awareness should look into the tubes before making a selection only on unseen trials because on seen trials they already know the location of the food. In Experiment 1, one of the five capuchins looked significantly more often on unseen trials. In Experiment 2, we ensured that the monkeys attended to the baiting by interleaving training and test sessions. Three of the five monkeys looked more often on unseen trials. Because monkeys looked more often than not on both trial types, potentially creating a ceiling effect, we increased the effort required to look in Experiment 3, and predicted a larger difference in the probability of looking between seen and unseen trials. None of the five monkeys looked more often on unseen trials. These findings provide equivocal evidence for memory awareness in capuchin monkeys using tests that have yielded clear evidence in humans, apes, and rhesus monkeys.     

Rhesus monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting

Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.     

Searching for food in the wild: a nonhuman rimate’s expectations about invisible displacement

Five experiments involving invisible displacements were run on a population of semi‐free‐ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). The goal of these experiments was to assess, without training, the kinds of expectations individuals spontaneously set up when an object has moved out of sight. The first experiment, modeled after studies of human infants and children, involved a table with one box on the top surface and a second box lined up below on the ground. An occluder was placed in front of the table, blocking the subject’s view. A piece of food was then dropped behind the occluder, above the top box. The presenter then removed the occluder, walked away, and allowed the subject to approach. Consistently, subjects searched in the incorrect bottom box. This error can be interpreted as a failure to understand solidity, containment, or some other factor. It can also be interpreted as an error guided by a gravity bias, i.e. an expectation that all falling objects fall straight down or to the lowest point. Experiments 2–5 tested these alternative hypotheses. Results show that rhesus monkeys do not have an inherent bottom box bias, are not avoiding the top box, and do recognize that in some contexts boxes can contain or hold food. Thus, for example, when the two boxes are placed on the ground, one in front of the other, and occluded, subjects search in the near box after a piece of food has been rolled behind the occluder (horizontal trajectory). This shows that rhesus can solve an invisible displacement problem that involves solid containers, where one container blocks travel to the other container. We conclude that the rhesus monkey’s error in Experiment 1 is guided by an expectation that all falling objects fall straight down or, at least, to the lowest point. This expectation represents a limitation of their knowledge of physical objects and events.     

Acquisition of prerequisites to conservation by macaques.

Through a progressive series of learning sets, two rhesus macaques were trained to discriminate transformations that produce change of substance from other transformations and manipulations. Several tests were administered to assess the generalization of this discrimination to a variety of objects and shapes and to assess the effects, if any, of size cues, experimenter familiarity, and various methods to problem presentation. After training was completed, performance was not greatly affected by differences in problems and presentations. The results of these experiments suggest that monkeys can acquire this prerequisite for substance conservation as a result of learning set training.     

Fourteen-month-olds know what others experience only in joint engagement

We investigated how 14‐month‐old infants know what others know. In two studies, an infant played with each of two objects in turn while an experimenter was present. Then the experimenter left the room, and the infant played with a third object with an assistant. The experimenter returned, faced all three objects, and said excitedly ‘Look! Can you give it to me?’ In Study 1, the experimenter experienced each of the first two toys in episodes of joint visual engagement (without manipulation) with the infant. In response to her excited request infants gave the experimenter the object she did not know, thus demonstrating that they knew which ones she knew. In Study 2, infants witnessed the experimenter jointly engage around each of the experienced toys with the assistant, from a third‐person perspective. In response to her request, infants did not give the experimenter the object she had not experienced. In combination with other studies, these results suggest that to know what others have experienced 14‐month‐old infants must do more than just perceive others perceiving something; they must engage with them actively in joint engagement.     

Inferring the goals of a nonhuman agent

Johnson, Slaughter, and Carey [Dev. Sci. 1 (1998) 233.] used infants' ability to follow the ‘gaze’ of novel objects to claim that infants' recognition of mentalistic agents is not isomorphic with person recognition but rather based on a set of nonarbitrary object recognition cues including the presence of a face and the ability to interact contingently with other agents. The current studies extend these findings with data based on infant imitation and the production of communicative gestures. The first study replicated Meltzoff's [Dev. Psychol. 31 (1995) 838.] reenactment of goals paradigm with a novel, nonhuman agent. Fifteen-month-olds were found to reenact both the completed and uncompleted/unseen goals of a novel object that had a face and interacted contingently with the experimenter and infant. Concurrently, infants directed many communicative gestures at the object. A second study excluded the possibility that the communicative gestures apparently directed at the object in Study 1 were in fact imitations of the experimenter's own behavior. The suggestion that novel, nonhuman objects are capable of eliciting such divergent behaviors as gaze-following, goal reenactment, and communicative gestures from infants, supports the claim that all of these behaviors are mediated by a central conceptual notion of mentalistic being, at least by the ages studied, and that that concept is not isomorphic with the concept person.     

Picture recognition of food by macaques (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca silenus</Emphasis>)

Pictorial representations of three-dimensional objects are often used to investigate animal cognitive abilities; however, investigators rarely evaluate whether the animals conceptualize the two-dimensional image as the object it is intended to represent. We tested for picture recognition in lion-tailed macaques by presenting five monkeys with digitized images of familiar foods on a touch screen. Monkeys viewed images of two different foods and learned that they would receive a piece of the one they touched first. After demonstrating that they would reliably select images of their preferred foods on one set of foods, animals were transferred to images of a second set of familiar foods. We assumed that if the monkeys recognized the images, they would spontaneously select images of their preferred foods on the second set of foods. Three monkeys selected images of their preferred foods significantly more often than chance on their first transfer session. In an additional test of the monkeys’ picture recognition abilities, animals were presented with pairs of food images containing a medium-preference food paired with either a high-preference food or a low-preference food. The same three monkeys selected the medium-preference foods significantly more often when they were paired with low-preference foods and significantly less often when those same foods were paired with high-preference foods. Our novel design provided convincing evidence that macaques recognized the content of two-dimensional images on a touch screen. Results also suggested that the animals understood the connection between the two-dimensional images and the three-dimensional objects they represented.     

Essentialism in the absence of language? Evidence from rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

We explored whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) share one important feature of human essentialist reasoning: the capacity to track category membership across radical featural transformations. Specifically, we examined whether monkeys – like children ( Keil, 1989 ) – expect a transformed object to have the internal properties of its original category. In two experiments, monkeys watched as an experimenter visually transformed a familiar fruit (e.g. apple) into a new kind of fruit (e.g. coconut) either by placing a fruit exterior over the original, or by removing an exterior shell and revealing the inside kind of fruit. The experimenter then pretended to place an inside piece of the transformed fruit into a box which the monkey was allowed to search. Results indicated that monkeys searched the box longer when they found a piece of fruit inconsistent with the inside kind, suggesting that the monkeys expected that the inside of the transformed fruit would taste like the innermost kind they saw. These results suggest that monkeys may share at least one aspect of psychological essentialism: They maintain category‐specific expectations about an object’s internal properties even when that object’s external properties change. These results therefore suggest that some essentialist expectations may emerge in the absence of language, and thus raise the possibility that such tendencies may emerge earlier in human development than has previously been considered.     

The use of experimenter-given cues by South African fur seals (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Arctocephalus pusillus</Emphasis>)

Dogs can use a variety of experimenter-given cues such as pointing, head direction, and eye direction to locate food hidden under one of several containers. Some authors have proposed that this is a result of the domestication process. In this study we tested four captive fur seals in a two alternative object choice task in which subjects had to use one of the following experimenter-given cues to locate the food: (1) the experimenter pointed and gazed at one of the objects, (2) the experimenter pointed at only one of the objects, (3) the experimenter gazed at only one of the objects, (4) the experimenter glanced at only one of the objects, (5) the experimenter pointed and gazed at one of the objects but was sitting closer to one object than to the other, (6) the experimenter pointed only with the index finger at one of the objects, (7) the experimenter presented a replica of one of the objects. The fur seals were able to use cues which involved a fully exposed arm or a head direction, but failed to use glance only, the index finger pointing and the object replica cues. The results showed that a domestication process was not necessary to develop receptive skills to cues given by an experimenter. Instead, we hypothesize that close interactions with humans prior to testing enabled fur seals to use some gestural cues without formal training. We also analyzed the behavior of the seals depending on the level of difficulty of the task. Behavioral signs of hesitation increased with task difficulty. This suggests that the fur seals were sensitive to task difficulty.     

Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) spontaneously generalize to novel quantities in a reverse-reward contingency task

Abstracting generalities from concrete experience allows the application of acquired knowledge to novel situations, a hallmark of primate cognition. Abstraction may also enable some animals to overcome prepotent biases, by allowing them to treat prepotent stimuli and responses more flexibly. The aim of the current study was to determine whether rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) could generalize successful performance on an executive control task with one training exemplar to novel exemplars. Three monkeys learned a reverse-reward task in which they chose between one and four food items. They had to select the smaller quantity to receive the larger one, and so had to inhibit the prepotent selection of the larger quantity. After they learned the task, a transfer test assessed whether they had learned only about the quantities experienced or whether they could generalize to novel quantities. All three rhesus monkeys spontaneously generalized to novel quantities, showing that this species has the ability to generalize significantly beyond the immediate perceptual experience and use this ability to control lower-level, prepotent responses.     

Infants Detect Patterns of Choices Despite Counter Evidence,but Timing of Inconsistency Matters

Understanding others’ preference for a relational category of objects (e.g., prefer darker colored shirts) can be challenging for young children, as it involves comparison of choice options within and across exemplars. Adding to the challenge is occasional inconsistency in choices made by others. Here the authors examined whether 14-month-olds could detect an experimenter’s preference for taller objects when they observed choices that were somewhat inconsistent. Infants watched four familiarization events involving different object pairs: The experimenter chose the taller of two objects thrice and the shorter object once—the inconsistent choice was presented at different time points of familiarization. The infants detected the experimenter’s preference for taller objects only when they had observed three consistent choices consecutively from the beginning. This finding is in line with relational learning, specifically the significant role of initial data in the extraction of relational commonality. It also connects to the hierarchical Bayesian models of rational learning: Inconsistency can be discounted when the initial data allow learners to distinguish a highly probable hypothesis.     

Effects of the menstrual cycle on looking preferences for faces in female rhesus monkeys

Fluctuations of ovarian hormones across the menstrual cycle influence a variety of social and cognitive behaviors in primates. For example, female rhesus monkeys exhibit heightened interest for males and increased agonistic interactions with other females during periods of high estrogen levels. In the present study, we hypothesized that females’ preference for males during periods of high estrogen levels is also expressed at the level of face perception. We tested four intact females on two face-tasks involving neutral portraits of male and female rhesus monkeys, chimpanzees and humans. In the visual preference task (VP), monkeys had to touch a button to view a face image. The image remained on the screen as long as the button was touched, and the duration of pressing was taken as an index of the monkey's looking time for the face stimulus. In the Face-Delayed Recognition Span Test (Face-DRST), monkeys were rewarded for touching the new face in an increasing number of serially presented faces. Monkeys were tested 5 days a week across one menstrual cycle. Blood was collected every other day for analysis of estradiol and progesterone. Two of the four females were cycling at the time of testing. We did not find an influence of the cycle on Face-DRST, likely due to a floor effect. In the VP however, the two cycling individuals looked longer at conspecific male faces than female faces during the peri-ovulatory period of the cycle. Such effects were absent for human and chimpanzee faces and for the two noncycling subjects. These data suggest that ovarian hormones may influence females’ preferences for specific faces, with heightened preference for male faces during the peri-ovulatory period of the cycle. Heightened interest for stimuli of significant reproductive relevance during periods of high conception risk may help guide social and sexual behavior in the rhesus monkey.     

Naming and Exclaiming: Infants' Sensitivity to Naming Contexts

In three experiments, we examined 17-month-olds' acquisition of novel symbols (words and gestures) as names for object categories. Experiment 1 compares infants' extension of novel symbols when they are presented within a familiar naming phrase (e.g., "Look at this [symbol]!") versus presented alone (e.g., "Look! ... [symbol]!") Infants mapped novel gestures successfully in both naming contexts. However, infants mapped novel words only within the context of familiar naming phrases. Thus, although infants can learn both words and gestures, they have divergent expectations about the circumstances under which the 2 symbolic forms name objects. Experiments 2 and 3 test the hypothesis that infants' expectations about the circumstances under which words that name objects are acquired by monitoring how adults indicate their intention to name. By employing a training paradigm, these two experiments demonstrated that infants can infer how an experimenter signals his or her intention to name an object on the basis of a very brief training experience.     

An infant chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) follows human gaze

The ability of non-human primates to follow the gaze of other individuals has recently received much attention in comparative cognition. The aim of the present study was to investigate the emergence of this ability in a chimpanzee infant. The infant was trained to look at one of two objects, which an experimenter indicated by one of four different cue conditions: (1) tapping on the target object with a finger; (2) pointing to the target object with a finger; (3) gazing at the target object with head orientation; or (4) glancing at the target object without head orientation. The subject was given food rewards independently of its responses under the first three conditions, so that its responses to the objects were not influenced by the rewards. The glancing condition was tested occasionally, without any reinforcement. By the age of 13 months, the subject showed reliable following responses to the object that was indicated by the various cues, including glancing alone. Furthermore, additional tests clearly showed that the subject's performance was controlled by the "social" properties of the experimenter-given cues but not by the non-social, local-enhancing peripheral properties. Electronic Publication     

Food pleasantness affects visual selective attention

Fundamental to adaptive behaviour is the ability to select environmental objects that best satisfy current needs and preferences. Here we investigated whether temporary changes in food preference influence visual selective attention. To this end, we exploited the fact that when a food is eaten to satiety its motivational value and perceived pleasantness decrease relative to other foods not eaten in the meal, an effect termed sensory-specific satiety. A total of 26 hungry participants were fed until sated with one of two palatable foods. Before and after selective satiation, participants rated the pleasantness of the two foods and then viewed the same as stimuli on a computer screen while attention was assessed by a visual probe task. Results showed that the attentional bias for the food eaten decreased markedly from pre- to postsatiety, along with the subjective pleasantness for that food. By contrast, subjective pleasantness and attentional bias for the food not eaten did not show any such decrease. These findings suggest that the allocation of visual selective attention is flexibly and rapidly adjusted to reflect temporary shift in relative preference for different foods.