World views and the concept of development: A reply to Lerner and Kauffman

I reply here to the argument of R. M. Lerner and M. B. Kauffman (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 309–333) that an adequate concept of human development is incompatible with a mechanist “world view” but rests instead on a principled integration of contextualist and organicist “world views.” I review how each of these metatheoretical positions is described by the philosopher who proposed them and conclude that the version of contextualism and organicism presented by Lerner and Kauffman is so diluted as to lose the essence of their original meaning. In consequence, the concept of development they propose, which includes the notion of integrative levels, causal variables that interact differently at different times in the course of ontogeny, and probabilistic outcomes is more compatible with the mechanistic metatheory they eschew than with the contextualist and organismic ones they ostensibly espouse.     

The sin of subjectivism: A reply to Shapiro

Shapiro criticises our book on two grounds. He first outlines a series of mistakes. None of them we believe, in fact, have been made and this is usually quite clear from our book. His second criticism rejects our ‘subjectivist’ approach to measurement. We argue that he misrepresents our methods and fails to grasp their ability both to collect accurate data and deal adequately with possible sources of bias. Indeed in these, in its attention to the dating of both independent and dependent variables, and in the flexibility of its approach to the respondent, we feel our approach is better equipped than other existing instruments to tackle the problem of the aetiological role of psycho-social factors in illness.     

The concept of values: A sociophenomenological approach

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

The contract ground: A reply to Jesse Kalin

Philosophical Studies -     

The missing link: A reply to Joseph Rychlak

We oppose Rychlak's (1991a, 1991b) claim that the view of mind entailed in artificial intelligence (AD and cognitive psychology is fundamentally at odds with Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory. Kelly's model and Al have much in common: They both are centrally concerned with representation, cognitive processes and their structure, and are ultimately empirical in their methodology. Many Al researchers have usefully embraced personal construct theory as a working conceptual framework, in this article, we examine Rychlak's assertions and identify several mistakes.     

The General Factor of Personality: A reply to Muncer

In previous studies we have shown that a General Factor of Personality (GFP) occupies the apex of the hierarchy of personality as well as the apex of the personality disorders in the same way that g, the general factor of mental ability, occupies the apex in the organization of cognitive abilities (Rushton & Irwing, 2011). In a critique, Muncer (2011) re-analyzed one of our data sets and concluded there was no evidence for a GFP. He also argued against the evolutionary theory we had proposed for the origin of the GFP. In this rejoinder I rebut Muncer’s conclusion and describe how directional selection can explain the GFP.     

The virtues of scientific psychology: A reply to Harzem

Harzem recently expressed the opinions that, beginning in the 1960s, the progress of scientific psychology has been deferred and that psychological research has failed to address important social issues. He proposed that progress be resumed by taking up, anew, the experimental analysis of behavior. The present reply provides evidence inconsistent with Harzem's assertions regarding the state of contemporary, scientific psychology and questions the wisdom of disregarding the significant body of data and theory that currently are available to pursue the, as yet, unfulfilled promises of the experimental analysis of human behavior.     

Feeding violence: A reply

Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1993, 115 pages, pb £6.00 from Nuffield Foundation, 28 Bedford Sq. London W1.

Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Bioethics Convention and Explanatory Report, DIR/JUR (94) 2, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, July 1994.

UNESCO International Bioethics Committee: Report of the subcommittee on genetic screening and testing, Paris; November 1994.     

The suppression model remains unsound: A reply to Deutsch

In the present issue, we critically review the influentialsuppression model of the octave illusion (Chambers, Mattingley, & Moss, 2004). In a rejoinder to our article, Deutsch (2004b) defends the utility of the suppression model. Here, we respond to Deutsch’s arguments, many of which are based on criticisms of our recent experimental report (Chambers, Mattingley, & Moss, 2002). We argue that Deutsch’s criticisms of this previous investigation are unfounded and that her defense of the suppression model fails to account for the most important weaknesses of this theory. We conclude that the suppression model remains inadequate as an explanation of the octave illusion.