Resource-Allocation Behavior in Complex but Commonplace Tasks

We all face resource-allocation tasks, yet little is known about how people make resource-allocation decisions. Three earlier papers (Langholtz, Gettys, & Foote, 1993, 1994, 1995) established that people can intuitively solve technical two-dimensional resource-allocation problems, where allocations are made on a continuous scale, reaching solutions that approach the optimum solution determined with Linear Programming (LP). In this research we expand our understanding of how people make resource-allocation decisions by examining how people perform complex but commonplace problems using a discrete scale where optimal solutions are determined with Integer Programming. We also contrast performance under conditions where progressively unequal scheduling is required to reach the optimum solution. The data show people can achieve solutions that provide most of the payoffs found with LP, even when they are faced with a complicated three-dimensional problem, but there is a tendency toward equal scheduling under all conditions.     

Resource-Allocation Strategies: A Verbal Protocol Analysis

The current study examined the strategies used by people to solve resource-allocation problems. Verbal protocols were recorded as participants provided meal choices for seven consecutive days with limited resources available to spend on meals and with daily constraints imposed on meal consumption. None of the participants incorporated the established mathematical procedures (i.e., Linear Programming) to arrive at the optimum number of meals possible in a week. However, the strategies they did use enabled them to achieve meal totals on average at 94% of this optimal amount. A few participants attempted to first solve the maximum meals possible in a week before scheduling this solution across the seven days (solve-and-schedule strategy), but the majority of participants simply selected meals on a day-to-day basis while checking resource availability each day to allow for full resource consumption (consume-and-check strategy). The findings of this study provide a preliminary step toward understanding how people make intuitive resource-allocation decisions.     

Certainty and uncertainty in genetic counselling: a qualitative case study

This study examines the communication that occurs during routine genetic counselling sessions. It involves the qualitative analysis of nine consultations with one member of a clinical genetics team. The consultations were characterised by a contrast between the sense of certainty apparent in how the clinicians talked about the power and promise of the new genetics and the uncertainty communicated regarding the actual information produced by genetic tests and their limitations in solving people's problems. There was also a contrast between how the clinician seemed to control the format and agenda of the consultation and the apparently uncontrollable personal and social implications of the topics discussed. We speculate that this may be explained in terms of the clinician giving some order and certainty in an area of inherent uncertainty, and where great promises are as yet unrealised.     

Social dilemmas as strong versus weak situations: Social value orientations and tacit coordination under resource size uncertainty

This study investigates how environmental uncertainty in resource dilemmas influences the decisions of participants differing in social value orientations. We argue that under resource size certainty people anchor their decisions on tacit coordination rules such as the equal division rule, whereas under resource size uncertainty people rely more on their own social value orientations to determine their choice behavior. The results corroborate our line of reasoning. When the size of the resource was certain, proselfs as well as prosocials anchored their decisions on the equal division rule. Under resource size uncertainty, the equal division rule appeared to lose its coordinating potential, inducing proselfs to harvest more than prosocials.     

Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces of the Hindsight Bias

“Hindsight Bias” is a person's tendency, after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, to distort a previous judgment in the direction of this new information. In the literature, hindsight bias has been mostly discussed as an inevitable result of a “judgment under uncertainty.” We think that the hindsight bias is due to memorial as well as inferential processes: Whereas certainty about the recollection is memorial and concerns the recollective experience, certainty at the time of the judgment is inferential and concerns the individual's metaknowledge (“I know that I knew that”). In two experiments participants' feelings of certainty were measured indirectly (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) by giving participants the option of leaving those questions unanswered about which they felt uncertain. This free-report option was offered to half of the participants in the first estimate phase (concerning time of judgment) and to the second half in the memory phase (concerning the recollective experience). At the end of the session, participants were presented again with the questions they had skipped and were now required to answer them. This procedure allowed us to compare the amount of hindsight bias for the skipped, uncertain items to the spontaneously answered, certain ones. Both experiments demonstrated that the hindsight bias is a result of the interaction of both uncertainty and certainty.     

Fate or fight: Exploring the hedonic costs of competition

As a resource-allocation method, free competition is generally considered more efficient and fairer than binding assignment, yet individuals’ hedonic experiences in these different resource-allocation conditions are largely ignored. Using a minimalistic experimental simulation procedure, we compared participants’ hedonic experiences between a free-competition condition (in which participants could equally and freely compete for the superior resource) and a binding-assignment condition (in which the superior and inferior resources were unequally and irreversibly assigned to different participants). We found that individuals in the binding-assignment condition – even the disadvantaged ones – were happier than those in the free-competition condition. We attributed the effect to individuals’ peace of mind, and supported the peace-of-mind notion by identifying two moderators: ease of social comparison and enjoyability of the inferior resource. In sum, this research highlighted the hedonic aspects of resource allocation methods and identified when accepting one’s fate is hedonically better than fighting for the best.     

Editorial

Abstract

This study examines the communication that occurs during routine genetic counselling sessions. It involves the qualitative analysis of nine consultations with one member of a clinical genetics team.

The consultations were characterised by a contrast between the sense of certainty apparent in how the clinician talked about the power and promise of the new genetics and the uncertainty communicated regarding the actual information produced by genetic tests and their limitations in solving people's problems. There was also a contrast between how the clinician seemed to control the format and agenda of the consultation and the apparently uncontrollable personal and social implications of the topics discussed. We speculate that this may be explained in terms of the clinician giving some order and certainty in an area of inherent uncertainty, and where great promises are as yet unrealised.     

Fairness in Children's Resource Allocation Depends on the Recipient

ABSTRACT— Sixty-six children between 4.5 and 6 years of age were tested in a resource-allocation game with three different recipients. When the recipient was a friend, children made equitable decisions and shared as much when there was a cost to themselves as when there was no cost. When the recipient was another familiar child who was not a friend, children were less likely to allocate resources to that child. When the recipient was a stranger, children allocated resources as much as with a friend and more than with a nonfriend when there was no cost to themselves. However, when there was a cost to themselves, children treated strangers like nonfriends. These results show that resource-allocation decisions made by young children depend on the recipient. Young children prefer equitable division of resources with friends, treat nonfriends less well, and make prosocial moves with strangers when the cost to self is not high.     

Doubting one’s doubt: A formula for confidence?

People feel, think, and act differently when doubt rather than confidence is accessible. A traditional perspective on the accessibility of doubt holds that multiple sources of doubt activation should lead to increased levels of uncertainty. In contrast, we find that under some conditions two sequential sources of doubt activation result in decreased levels of uncertainty. We suggest that this follows from a meta-cognitive process in which people come to “doubt their doubt.” In Study 1, individuals with chronically accessible uncertainty who were further exposed to an uncertainty manipulation paradoxically reported reduced uncertainty. In Study 2, participants were first primed with doubt or certainty and then exposed to a manipulation associated with either confidence (i.e., head nodding) or doubt (head shaking). Supporting the idea that people can either trust or doubt their own doubts, head nodding (vs. shaking) accentuated (vs. attenuated) the impact of the initial doubt vs. certainty manipulation. These findings advance the literature on meta-cognition, self-doubt, and embodiment, and may have clinical applications.     

Uncertainty impairs grating detection performance in the cat

Using behavioral techniques, contrast thresholds for detection of grating patterns by the cat were measured under conditions of certainty and uncertainty. For certainty trials, the same combination of spatial and temporal frequencies was presented throughout a test session, whereas with uncertainty, the cat was unable to anticipate which of two spatial (or temporal) frequencies would be presented on a given trial. For most spatiotemporal combinations, uncertainty served to elevate contrast thresholds by almost .3 log units, a finding that parallels the outcome found in human vision. The uncertainty paradigm may provide a useful inferential tool for determining channel bandwidth in cat vision.     

When autocratic leaders become an option--uncertainty and self-esteem predict implicit leadership preferences

We investigated the impact of uncertainty on leadership preferences and propose that the conjunction of self-esteem level and stability is an important moderator in this regard. Self-threatening uncertainty is aversive and activates the motivation to regain control. People with high and stable self-esteem should be confident of achieving this goal by self-determined amelioration of the situation and should therefore show a stronger preference for democratic leadership under conditions of uncertainty. By contrast, people with low and unstable self-esteem should place their trust and hope in the abilities of powerful others, resulting in a preference for autocratic leadership. Studies 1a and 1b validate explicit and implicit leadership measures and demonstrate a general prodemocratic default attitude under conditions of certainty. Studies 2 and 3 reveal a democratic reaction for individuals with stable high self-esteem and a submissive reaction for individuals with unstable low self-esteem under conditions of uncertainty. In Study 4, this pattern is cancelled out when individuals evaluate leadership styles from a leader instead of a follower perspective.     

Representational momentum,internalized dynamics,and perceptual adaptation

In this paper I look at dynamic mental representations, motion detection under conditions of certainty or uncertainty, perceptual adaptation, and priming of motion direction. The goal is to bridge the boundaries created in part by the use of different terminology within different literatures. The most fruitful parallel may be between the phenomenon of dynamic mental representation and representational momentum on the one hand, and perceptual adaptation as revealed by motion priming on the other. I suggest an overlap between the two phenomena.     

The effects of uncertainty in error monitoring on associated ERPs

A series of experiments were conducted to address the effect of uncertainty regarding performance for predicting the likelihood of a correct-response negativity (CRN) in addition to error-related negativity (ERN). In Study 1, 18 healthy young adults completed letter discrimination tasks during single and dual attention conditions designed to manipulate response certainty. In the second study, the same participants completed easy and difficult tone discrimination tasks designed to influence stimulus certainty. In the third study, task difficulty was manipulated to produce different error rates without altering certainty. Studies 1 and 2 indicated that error and correct responses are processed more similarly when uncertainty is present (i.e., ERN approximately CRN). Furthermore, uncertainty was associated with attenuation of the ERN and enhancement of the CRN, consistent with an error detection hypothesis. Study 3 indicated that task difficulty alone does not influence the ERN or likelihood of a CRN. These results offer support for the error detection account of the ERN and establish the role of uncertainty in predicting the CRN, as postulated by .     

高确定性情绪（开心、愤怒）与低确定性情绪（悲伤）对信任的影响

本研究通过信任游戏的实验范式探讨了在与“受信任者”高/低可信赖性有关的信任线索时,具体情绪的确定性维度对信任行为的影响。实验一发现,当被试被告知“受信任者”在可信赖量表上的得分（高/低）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断上更容易被受信任者的“可信赖性”水平的高低所影响;实验二发现,当告知被试“受信任者”的群体身份（内/外群）时,个体在高确定性情绪（开心和愤怒）下的信任判断比低确定性情绪（悲伤）下的信任判断更容易被受信任者的“内外群”身份所影响。上述结果表明,高确定性的情绪比低确定性的情绪更容易使被试的信任判断受到与“受信任者”是否值得信赖有关的线索所影响。     

Am I guilty or not? Deontological guilt,uncertainty, and checking behavior

Literature suggests that checking behaviors are aimed at reducing feelings of uncertainty both in clinical samples with obsessive‐compulsive disorder and in general population. Previous studies also showed that deontological guilt is an emotion often associated with obsessive‐compulsive disorder. Thus, the aim of the current study was to investigate the differences in checking behaviors in the condition of high versus low uncertainty, by exploring the moderating role of deontological versus altruistic guilt. Participants were 108 undergraduate Italian university students who took part in a visual search task designed to elicit checking behavior. Ahead of the visual task, participants were administered one scenario in order to manipulate either deontological or altruistic guilt. The results showed that in the condition of uncertainty, compared with the condition of certainty, participants spent more time in checking behaviors and that such a difference was more consistent when participants experienced deontological rather than altruistic guilt. Limitations and further directions are discussed.     

Uncertainty reduction, self-enhancement, and ingroup identification

Two experiments tested the prediction that uncertainty reduction and self-enhancement motivations have an interactive effect on ingroup identification. In Experiment 1 (N = 64), uncertainty and group status were manipulated, and the effect on ingroup identification was measured. As predicted, low-uncertainty participants identified more strongly with a high- than low-status group, whereas high-uncertainty participants showed no preference; and low-status group members identified more strongly under high than low uncertainty, whereas high-status group members showed no preference. Experiment 2 (N = 210) replicated Experiment 1, but with a third independent variable that manipulated how prototypical participants were of their group. As predicted, the effects obtained in Experiment 1 only emerged where participants were highly prototypical. Low prototypicality depressed identification with a low-status group under high uncertainty. The implications of these results for intergroup relations and the role of prototypicality in social identity processes are discussed.     

Ipsilesional arm reaching movements are not affected by the postural configuration adopted by individuals with stroke

Individuals with stroke present several impairments in the ipsilesional arm reaching movements that can limit the execution of daily living activities. These impairments depend on the side of the brain lesion. The present study aimed to compare the arm reaching movements performed in sitting and standing positions and to examine whether the effects of the adopted posture configuration depend on the side of the brain lesion. Twenty right-handed individuals with stroke (half with right hemiparesis and a half with left hemiparesis) and twenty healthy adults (half used the left arm) reached toward a target displayed on a monitor screen placed in one of three heights (i.e., upper, central, or lower targets). Participants performed the reaches in sitting and standing positions under conditions where the target location was either well-known in advance (certainty condition) or unknown until the movement onset (uncertainty condition). The values of movement onset time, movement time, and constant error were compared across conditions (posture configuration and uncertainty) and groups for each target height. Individuals with stroke were slower and spent more time to start to move than healthy participants, mainly when they reached the superior target in the upright position and under the uncertainty condition. Individuals who have suffered a right stroke were more affected by the task conditions and those who suffered a left stroke showed less accurate reaches. Overall, these results were observed regardless of the adopted posture. The current findings suggested that ipsilesional arm reaching movements are not affected by the postural configuration adopted by individuals with stroke. The central nervous system modulates the reaching movements according to the target position, adopted posture, and the uncertainty in the final target position to be reached.     

Self-esteem uncertainty and depression vulnerability

Previous research has typically failed to show a difference between the self-esteem ratings of persons who are at-risk for depression and those who are not. Despite these null findings, it is possible that problems with self-esteem do precede depression but are masked by thought suppression. The present research investigated the possibility that at-risk individuals' relatively positive self-appraisals belie uncertainty about the self that is related to high levels of thought suppression and reassurance seeking. To test this idea, participants completed Rosenberg's (1965) Self-Esteem Scale and immediately reported certainty of their responses. Participants then completed measures of excessive-reassurance seeking and chronic thought suppression. Participants also reported past and present experiences with depression. The results indicated that at-risk individuals did not differ from never-depressed individuals in their reported levels of trait self-esteem. However, at-risk individuals were more uncertain about their beliefs than were never-depressed individuals. Moreover, this uncertainty was associated with high levels of thought suppression and excessive reassurance seeking.     

Incidental emotions associated with uncertainty appraisals impair decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task

With the Appraisal Tendency Framework, it has been established that (un)certainty appraisals associated with incidental emotions trigger the kind of information processing to cope with situation. We tested the impact of (un)certainty-associated emotions on a sequential task, the Iowa Gambling Task. In this task, intuitive processing is necessary to lead participants to rely on emotional cues arising from previous decisions and to making advantageous decisions. We predicted that certainty-associated emotions would engage participants in intuitive processing, whereas uncertainty-associated emotions would engage them in deliberative processing and lead them to make disadvantageous decisions. As expected, we observed in two distinct experiments, that participants induced to feel uncertainty (fear, sadness) were found to decide less advantageously than participants induced to feel certainty (anger, happiness, disgust).     

The impact of emotions on stereotyping in workplace selection: The role of certainty appraisals

An appraisal tendency approach was adopted to explore the influence of emotional certainty on stereotyping and judgment in a workplace context. Across two studies, participants completed an emotional memory task designed to induce emotions representing two different levels of emotional certainty (certain versus uncertain). They then reviewed interview footage, a résumé, and qualifying criteria before rating a hypothetical job candidate’s personality and employability. Study 1 revealed that emotions high in certainty (compared to uncertainty) led to more favorable personality and employability ratings for attractive compared to unattractive candidates. Study 2 produced the same pattern of results for younger (compared to older) candidates. We conclude that certainty appraisals associated with temporary, incidental emotions are a useful predictor of the likelihood that stereotypes will be applied during decision making.