JOB ORIENTATION OF MALES AND FEMALES: ARE SEX DIFFERENCES DECLINING?

Sex differences in job orientation found by Manhardt (1972) were explored to determine if they still exist, or if a trend toward similarity as found in studies on traits and behaviors prevails. Significant sex differences were found on 8 of 25 job characteristics, compared with 11 found by Manhardt. In the original study, factor analysis indicated that males value long-range career objectives while females prefer a comfortable working environment and pleasant interpersonal relationships. This study extracted similar factors which explained twice the variance found in the original. However, sex differences on factor preference were mixed. Further, results show that males are less homogeneous in their preference than are females, a complete reversal of results found previously. Implications for personnel managers in handling differences on job orientation of males and females are discussed.     

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MORAL REASONING Stable or Situational?

Some researchers have proposed that women prefer care reasoning, which considers issues of need and sacrifice, and men prefer justice reasoning, which considers issues of fairness and rights. However, differences in approach to moral reasoning may be due to the different types of dilemmas women and men encounter rather than to differences in the ways men and women approach moral problems. The present study employed parenting dilemmas to determine whether restriction of domain would reduce gender differences in moral reasoning orientation. Dilemmas were presented or elicited and differed in difficulty, importance, and personal relevance to investigate the relationship between situational characteristics and care or justice reasoning. Women and men did not differ in their use of care or justice reasoning when the domain was restricted, supporting the conclusion that differences in moral reasoning orientation result from differences in current life situations rather than from stable gender characteristics.     

ARE EVOLUTIONARY/COGNITIVE THEORIES OF RELIGION RELEVANT FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?

Biological theories of religious belief are sometimes understood to undermine the very beliefs they are describing, proposing an alternative explanation for the causes of belief different from that given by religious believers themselves. This article surveys three categories of biological theorizing derived from evolutionary biology, cognitive science of religion, and neuroscience. Although each field raises important issues and in some cases potential challenges to the legitimacy of religious belief, in most cases the significance of these theories for the holding of religious beliefs is not very great.     

EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS: ARE THEY IN HARMONY?

Abstract. Does modern evolutionary theory (specifically Darwinism) pose a problem for the Christian's thinking about morality? It certainly poses threats for those who would argue that certain practices are wrong because they are “unnatural.” Liberal Christians can probably get around these questions. But at a deeper level, despite superficial similarities between its conclusions and the Love Commandment, Darwinism points to an essential relativism about morality, thereby striking at the very core of all Christian thought on moral behavior. Thus, those who are worried about the clash between science and religion have good reasons for their worries.     

FROM EVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS TO CONSCIOUS EVOLUTION: ARE WE IN CONTROL?

This article discusses implicit assumptions in the conference theme to understand the complexity involved in trying to gain control of globalization, in particular: (1) We, (2) being in control (not only in cybernetic way) and (3) globalization. I introduce distinctions between single conscious agents, systems of conscious agents, and emergent we, as a collective entity understood as a Collective Being (a complex, multidimensional society to be studied with multiple, systemic knowledge) that has collective consciousness. The focus is the issue of being in control. This issue is understood as the ability to design and manage emergent processes of development.     

RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYEE RETENTION: ARE DIVERSITY CLIMATE PERCEPTIONS THE KEY?

Given considerable racial differences in voluntary turnover ( Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006 , Table 28), the present study examined the influence of diversity climate perceptions on turnover intentions among managerial employees in a national retail organization. The authors hypothesized that pro-diversity work climate perceptions would correlate most negatively with turnover intentions among Blacks, followed in order of strength by Hispanics and Whites (Hypothesis 1), and that organizational commitment would mediate these interactive effects of race and diversity climate perceptions on turnover intentions (Hypothesis 2). Results from a sample of 5,370 managers partially supported both hypotheses, as findings were strongest among Blacks. Contrary to the hypotheses, however, White men and women exhibited slightly stronger effects than Hispanic personnel.     

IN PRAISE OF FOLLY? THEOLOGY AND THE UNIVERSITY

To suppose the possibility of dialogue between theology and science is to suppose that theology is an intellectually worthy partner to engage in dialogue with science. The status of theology as a discipline, however, remains contested, one sign of which is the absence of theology from the university. I argue that a healthy theology‐science dialogue would benefit from the presence of theology as an academic discipline in the university. Theology and theologians would benefit from the much closer contact with university disciplines, including the sciences. The university and the sciences would benefit from the presence of theology, providing a department of ultimate concern, where big questions may be asked and ideologies critiqued. A university theology would need to meet standards of academic integrity.     

THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR WHAT'S IN IT FOR US?

When we publish behavioral research, we are not allowed to communicate the thrill, the poetry, or the exhilaration that are outcomes of the discovery process. Yet, these are among our most potent reinforcers. Explicit recognition of the emotional accompaniments to research could help attract students into the experimental analysis of behavior.     

IS THERE A TENSION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION?

This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill‐phrased and should be re‐worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method.     

DOES PERCEPTION OUTSTRIP OUR CONCEPTS IN FINENESS OF GRAIN?

We seem perfectly able to perceive fine‐grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck among others. 1     

EPISTEMOLOGICAL ORIGINS–EPISTEMOLOGICAL AIMS: RETHINKING POSTMODERN THERAPY IN RESPONSE TO HELD

There has been a great deal of controversy over Barbara Held's use of the term "antirealism" in her now popular critique of postmodern therapy. Many of her respondents have rejected this label, claiming that it restricts the debate and oversimplifies their position. Recognizing that this is so, I nevertheless accept Held's term as a useful signifier of the epistemological framework of postmodern therapy, and, thus, challenge her critique on its own grounds. I argue that Held's critique of this epistemological approach, in fact, misses the epistemological point, targeting ontological issues where there are none, and misinterpreting the original aim behind the shift to epistemological antirealism. It is Held's contention that the antirealist turn aimed at "maximizing individuality" in therapy - a goal which can and should be achieved through realism. Her justification for the latter is a supposed "oscillation" between realism and antirealism in the theory of this movement. To the contrary, l suggest that the aim of this epistemological shift was the resolution of strictly epistemological problems, and that the oscillation that Held identifies is the product of her own conflation of epistemological and ontological issues.     

A ROLE FOR NEGATIVE REINFORCEMENT OF RESPONSE OMISSION IN PUNISHMENT?

This experiment attempted to disentangle response-rate reductions controlled by the direct suppressive effects of a punisher from those due to negative reinforcement of response omission. Key-peck responding of pigeons was maintained by a conjoint variable-interval 3-min schedule of food presentation variable-interval 30-s schedule of response-dependent electric shock presentation. Omission of responses for 5, 10, or 30 s resulted in the possibility of canceling a scheduled shock. Response rates were a function of required pause duration, with lower rates occurring when longer periods of response omission were required for shock cancellation. These results show that, with several parameters of punishment held constant, response rates were controlled by the negative reinforcement contingency. Such a finding argues for renewed consideration of the role of negative reinforcement in punishment contingencies.     

IS THE SELF-CONCEPT A HABITUAL REFERENT IN JUDGMENTS OF SIMILARITY?

Abstract— People typically provide higher similarity ratings in response to the question "How similar is the typical preppie to you?" than to the question "How similar are you to the typical preppie?" Observed asymmetries in comparisons of the self and person prototypes have been offered as evidence that the self-concept acts as a habitual reference point in social judgment However, such a task does not test the habitual placement of a concept in the referent position of a comparison. In this study, participants judged the similarity between the self and person prototypes in response to linguistic (forced directional) queries or to spatial (nonforced) queries in which the self was positioned above or below the person concept Participants also rated pairs of familiar and unfamiliar countries in a similar manner, to replicate and extend the work of Tversky (1977) Expected asymmetries were observed in forced comparisons. The self and the familiar country were seen as more similar to other people and less familiar countries, respectively, when the former concepts served as the referent of a comparison than when they served as the subject Asymmetries were not observed in the nonforced conditions, and mean similarity in these conditions was of the same magnitude as in the forced condition in which the more familiar stimulus was the referent of the comparison. This result provides the first direct evidence that the self serves as a habitual referent in similarity judgments     

MATCHING-TO-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE IN RATS: A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY?

Three rats had previously acquired a simultaneous matching-to-sample performance with steady and blinking lights. In training, the sample stimulus had always appeared on the middle of three horizontally arranged keys with the comparison stimuli on the side keys. In Experiment 1, the sample stimulus appeared on any of the three keys with the comparison stimuli on the remaining two. The matching-to-sample performance broke down with variable sample and comparison locations; the sample stimulus did not control responding to the comparison stimuli when it appeared on a side key, but it retained control when it appeared on the middle key (as in training). In Experiment 2, the rats were trained with the sample always on the left key. When the sample appeared on either of the trained locations (left or middle key), it retained control for both locations. When the sample then appeared on any of the three keys, as in Experiment 1, sample control did not transfer to the untrained location (right key). The experiments demonstrate that training with fixed sample and comparison locations may establish spatial location as an additional controlling aspect of the stimuli displayed on the keys; stimulus location had become part of the definition of the controlling stimuli. The rats' performance seemed best described as specific discriminations involving the visual stimuli and their spatial locations rather than as identity matching.