Gender stereotypes as situation–behavior profiles

Recent research suggests that social perceivers’ dispositional inferences are influenced by information about the ways others’ behavior varies stably across situations. We extend this research to stereotypes. Specifically, we examined peoples’ preconceptions about the situation–behavior profiles that social groups are likely to display, as well as the implications of such preconceptions for behavioral judgments. Focusing on gender stereotypes, in Study 1 we found that perceivers’ expectations about men’s and women’s assertiveness are qualified by situational information. Study 2 revealed that perceivers’ beliefs about the mentalistic attributes (e.g., goals, beliefs, motivations) that characterize men and women mediated the relationship between target gender and perceivers’ expectations about situation–behavior patterns. Study 3 explored how such contextualized stereotypes affect on-line judgments of targets’ behavior, showing that perceivers judge a given behavior’s assertiveness based not only on target gender but also on situation type.     

Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing

The beliefs that individuals hold about knowledge and knowing have been the focus of a growing body of work on “personal epistemology.” There has been general agreement among researchers about a developmental trajectory of epistemological understanding that takes place in adolescence and adulthood. Rarely has this research included children, however, and we know little about the origins of epistemological awareness or its early development. A separate group of researchers have investigated children's “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand others’ beliefs, actions, and desires, with primary attention to the onset of this cognitive achievement between the ages of 3 and 5. This article reviews the theoretical foundation for a proposed relation between these constructs, and reports on an exploratory investigation with 3–5 year olds, in which epistemological level was significantly related to theory of mind ability. Results are discussed in relation to a general timeline depicting the development of children's beliefs about knowledge and knowing, a process that involves an ongoing tension between objective and subjective perspectives. We propose that the trajectory of epistemological development be expanded to include an initial period of egocentric subjectivity that characterizes epistemological thinking prior to the achievement of theory of mind.     

“I think it, therefore it’s true”: Effects of self-perceived objectivity on hiring discrimination

A sense of personal objectivity may prompt an “I think it, therefore it’s true” mindset, in which people assume that their own beliefs and introspections are, by definition, valid and therefore worthy of being acted on. In the present studies, priming a sense of personal objectivity increased gender discrimination, particularly among decision-makers who endorsed stereotypic beliefs or who had stereotypic thoughts made cognitively accessible through implicit priming. Implications for discrimination in organizational contexts, and for theories of attitude–behavior consistency, are discussed.     

The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?

Thefalse consensus effectand theoverconfidence in judgmenteffect are often referred to as established “facts” of psychology. At present, the empirical support for these effects is inadequate and logically flawed. We argue that, absent other information, using one's own response to a situation as an observation of size 1 could be an effective use of data and could lead to anincreasein the accuracy of predicting others’ behavior. In an empirical examination of such use, we find a robustpositivecorrelation between the degree to which people believe that a majority of others are like them and their accuracy in predicting those others’ responses, whether this correlation is evaluated within items across people, across items within people, or across items across people. In addition, we show that the finding of overconfidence in judgment follows analytically from the functional relationship used to demonstrate it, a “finding” that is easily reversed by considering the inverse relationship. Specifically, we argue that regression effects account for the evidence cited in support of overconfidence. While not definitive, our empirical findings call into the question the acceptance of these two effects—as commonly defined—as facts.     

Perceived Sources of Happiness: A Network Analysis

This study investigated the perceived sources of happiness among young men and women. Rank scores of the perceived reasons for happiness were compared between the two groups and seven significant differences were discerned. Men ranked “sexual activity”, “sports”, being “liked” and having a “good social life” significantly higher than women. Women ranked “helping others”, having a “close family” and being “loved by loved ones” significantly higher than men. A modified form of network analysis was also conducted. Both networks demonstrated similar core representations of happiness with a focus on self-confidence, being free of stress, occupational and social factors, family support and personal relationships. However, the networks show an association between sexual activity and male personal relationships, whereas emotional factors are associated with female personal relationships. The male network also demonstrates the importance of sports and physical activity in male happiness. Despite some gender differences, it is suggested that the similarities within the mean rank scores and networks form the core elements of a shared social representation of happiness.     

Investor's Pessimistic and False Belief About Trustworthiness and Stake Size in Trust Decision1

Trust is a vital element of any society. Previous studies using trust games have provided insight into understandings of trusting behavior. However, investors' behaviors can be confounded by their risk preferences in the game, and little is known about the relationship between stake size and beliefs of others' good intentions underlying trust. We thus used a variant of the trust game and conducted two experiments to examine how stake size affects investors' beliefs about receivers' trustworthiness, with model-based analyses. We showed that, when holding all else equal, investors trusted more, but their expectations of reciprocation declined as stake size increased. However, actual receivers' reciprocation rates showed the opposite trend to investors' pessimistic beliefs. Furthermore, following previous studies in social psychology, we hypothesized that investors' social preferences (social value orientation) moderated the beliefs underlying trust, but they had no explanatory powers in investors' expectations of reciprocation. These results suggest that peoples' naive beliefs about stake size play a more important role in trust decisions than expected.     

Powerful perceivers, powerless objects: Flexibility of powerholders’ social attention

We argue that the effect of power on social attention is a function of flexible, instrumental information processing that allows the high power perceiver to attain situation specific goals using whatever means are available, including attention. Study 1 assigned powerful participants to more “people-centered” or more “product-centered” goals, and found that people-centered powerholders better individuated low-power targets. Study 2 examined responses by both high- and low-power organization members, and found powerful judges more responsive to organizational goals in setting priorities and using information about the organization than powerless judges. Together, these results suggest that powerholders use social attention, like other resources, in order to advance their ability to fulfill organizational goals.     

Speech-associated gestures, Broca’s area, and the human mirror system

Speech-associated gestures are hand and arm movements that not only convey semantic information to listeners but are themselves actions. Broca’s area has been assumed to play an important role both in semantic retrieval or selection (as part of a language comprehension system) and in action recognition (as part of a “mirror” or “observation–execution matching” system). We asked whether the role that Broca’s area plays in processing speech-associated gestures is consistent with the semantic retrieval/selection account (predicting relatively weak interactions between Broca’s area and other cortical areas because the meaningful information that speech-associated gestures convey reduces semantic ambiguity and thus reduces the need for semantic retrieval/selection) or the action recognition account (predicting strong interactions between Broca’s area and other cortical areas because speech-associated gestures are goal-direct actions that are “mirrored”). We compared the functional connectivity of Broca’s area with other cortical areas when participants listened to stories while watching meaningful speech-associated gestures, speech-irrelevant self-grooming hand movements, or no hand movements. A network analysis of neuroimaging data showed that interactions involving Broca’s area and other cortical areas were weakest when spoken language was accompanied by meaningful speech-associated gestures, and strongest when spoken language was accompanied by self-grooming hand movements or by no hand movements at all. Results are discussed with respect to the role that the human mirror system plays in processing speech-associated movements.     

Science undergraduates’ and graduates’ epistemologies of science: the notion of interpretive frameworks

First-year science (biology, chemistry, physics) undergraduates’ and advanced graduate students’ understanding of the scientific research process was assessed using two clinical interviews: the “Nature of Science Interview” (International Journal of Science Education 11 (1989) 514; Cognition and Instruction 18 (2000) 349) and the “Nature Nurture Interview” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, 1992) which offered a context (a fictitious conflict of a nature and a nurture theorist about the causes of nervousness in dogs). The participants’ answers were then subjected to a categorical analysis using a coding scheme that progresses from an undifferentiated understanding of science as action (Level 1) to an understanding of science as an iterative process of theory formation, testing, and revision with increasing depth of explanation (Level 5). Results indicate that neither group had a clear understanding of the necessity of framework theories for the scientific research process. While no clear developmental progression was found, differences between students majoring in different fields emerged.     

Threshold adjustment in response to asymmetric loss functions: The case of auditors’ “substantial doubt” thresholds

Thresholds play a critical role in linking judgments and choices. One way they do so is by dividing a continuous judgment variable, such as probability, into two regions that imply different choices and actions, such as operate/do not operate, admit/do not admit, or invest/do not invest. We examine this link by focusing on the tendency of professional decision makers to adjust their thresholds when the risks associated with negative decision outcomes are elevated. We report two studies involving experienced auditors that investigate thresholds in a “going-concern” setting. In this setting, the auditor assesses the probability that a business firm will be unable to continue in existence for the coming year; if that probability exceeds a “substantial doubt” threshold (also assessed by the auditor), the auditor is required to disclose the relevant information in the firm’s annual report to the public. Our studies use two experimental cases based on actual business firms that differ in their objective likelihoods of not continuing as going concerns. We derive the auditors’ substantial doubt thresholds from the relationship between their probability assessments and their disclosure choices, unlike all prior research which has simply asked auditors to state the probability they believe represents substantial doubt. We find that auditors’ derived thresholds are adjusted downward for the more problematic firm, a result that we attribute to the asymmetric loss functions inherent in going-concern settings. The second study has some of the auditors directly provide their substantial doubt thresholds (SDTs). The downward adjustment is again found for derived thresholds but not for elicited thresholds, suggesting that the method of capturing thresholds may be an important issue in understanding judgment and choice.     

Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality

We observed the behaviors of the same people across five games – two prisoner’s dilemma games, a trust game (in which the subject took on the role of both truster and trustee), a dictator game, and a faith game – any pair of which was separated by an interval of several months to reduce potential carry-over effects, and found strong consistency in behaviors among these games. We also found consistency between the expectations of other players’ behaviors and the player’s own behavior across games. We further found that the consistent behavioral pro-sociality observed across different games was related to the general measures of pro-social value orientation and perceiving the game situations. These findings suggest that individual and cultural differences in game behaviors can reflect both the ways in which people perceive game situations and their general social preferences.     

Hindsight bias redefined: It’s about time

Four experiments introduced a new conceptual and methodological approach to hindsight bias, traditionally defined as the tendency to exaggerate the a priori predictability of outcomes after they become known. By examining likelihood estimates rooted to specific time points during an unfolding event sequence (videos and short text stories), judged both in foresight and hindsight, we conceptualized hindsight bias as a contrast between two “inevitability curves,” which plotted likelihood against time. Taking timing into account, we defined three new indicators of accuracy: linear accuracy (how well hindsight judgments capture the linear trend of foresight judgments over time), rate accuracy (how well hindsight judgments reflect the slope of foresight judgments over time), and temporal accuracy (how well hindsight judgments specify the overall timing of the full envelope of foresight judgments). Results demonstrated that hindsight judgments showed linear and rate accuracy, but were biased only in terms of lack of temporal accuracy. The oft-used catchphrase “knew it all along effect” was found to be a misnomer, in that participants were well aware in hindsight that their earlier foresight judgments reflected uncertainty. The current research therefore points to one way in which retrospective judgments can be considered biased, yet simultaneously suggests that considerable accuracy exists when people render such judgments.     

The illusion of courage in social predictions: Underestimating the impact of fear of embarrassment on other people

The results of two experiments support the thesis that emotional perspective taking entails two judgments: a prediction of one’s own preferences and decisions in a different emotional situation, and an adjustment of this prediction to accommodate perceived differences between self and others. Participants overestimated others’ willingness to engage in embarrassing public performances—miming (Experiment 1) and dancing (Experiment 2)—in exchange for money. Consistent with a dual judgment model, this overestimation was greater among participants facing a hypothetical rather than a real decision to perform. Further, participants’ predictions of others’ willingness to perform were more closely correlated with self-predictions than with participants’ estimates of others’ thoughts about the costs and benefits of performing.     

Minds at rest? Social cognition as the default mode of cognizing and its putative relationship to the "default system" of the brain

The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings and their propensity to engage in such activities, we relate our results to findings from neuroimaging studies of social cognition. This demonstrates a remarkable overlap between the brain regions typically involved in social cognitive processes and the “default system”.We, henceforth, suggest that the physiological ‘baseline’ of the brain is intimately linked to a psychological ‘baseline’: human beings have a predisposition for social cognition as the default mode of cognizing which is implemented in the robust pattern of intrinsic brain activity known as the “default system”.     

Broca’s aphasia, verbs and the mental lexicon

Verb production is notoriously difficult for individuals with Broca’s aphasia, both at the word and at the sentence level. An intriguing question is at which level in the speech production these problems arise. The aim of the present study is to identify the functional locus of the impairment that results in verb production deficits in Broca’s aphasia. Levelt’s (1989) model is used as a theoretical framework for this study. Two experiments have been conducted, one on verb movement and one on verbs with alternating transitivity. The results suggest that the functional impairment in Broca’s aphasia should be located in Levelt’s “grammatical encoder.”     

Peirce on Educational Beliefs

This article contends that Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) may enhance our understanding of educational beliefs and that Peirce’s logic may be a tool to distinguish between a dogmatic and a pragmatic justification of such beliefs. The first part of the article elaborates on Peirce’s comprehension of beliefs as mediated, socially situated and future-oriented. The second part points to how Peirce promotes his “method of inquiry” as an ethos of science. The method is not judged by the conclusions it lead to or by the knowledge it may produce. Contrary, as the results are unavoidably provisional and rectifiable, Peirce holds the method productive due to the norms guiding the inquiry: (1) the pragmatic principle, (2) the social principle, (3) fallibilism and (4) abduction. In sum, when adopting a peircean conception, educational research, theory building and practice should be characterized as a mutual commitment towards shared processes of joint learning. In that, Peirce’s method of inquiry may be fruitful in sorting dogmatism from pragmatism.     

Changes in Negative Reciprocity as a Function of Age

Standard economic models assume people exclusively pursue material self‐interests in social interactions. However, people exhibit social preferences; that is, they base their choices partly on the outcomes others obtained in a social interaction. People care about fairness, and reciprocity affects behavior. This study examines the differences in negative reciprocity (costly punishment for unfair divisions) as a function of age. Sixty‐one kindergarteners (5‐year‐olds), 53 second graders (8‐year‐olds), and 57 sixth graders (12‐year‐olds) played a dictator game or a mini–ultimatum game either with a human proposer or with a random machine that determined the division between the two players. By keeping the divisions between the players constant and varying the source of the unfair proposal, we were able to differentiate between reciprocity‐based and inequality‐aversion preferences. We found that kindergarteners proposed and accepted unfair divisions regardless of the source of the offer, behaving according to the standard economic model. Children in the sixth grade tended to reject unfair offers from a human proposer but accept unfair divisions from a random device, indicating the emergence of negative reciprocity preferences by age eight (and contrary to inequality aversion). Children at this age also tended to give more fair offers in the ultimatum game than in the dictator game, indicating the emergence of strategic thinking. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Extraversion predicts individual differences in women’s face preferences

Extraversion is positively associated with various indices of women’s mate quality (e.g., facial symmetry and attractiveness). Since such indices are thought to predict variation in women’s preferences for masculine men, we investigated the relationships between each of the ‘Big 5’ personality factors and women’s preferences for facial masculinity. Extraversion, but not the other four personality factors, was positively correlated with women’s preferences for masculinity in men’s, but not women’s, faces. Additionally, extraversion mediated the positive relationship between women’s self-rated attractiveness and their preferences for masculinity in men’s faces, suggesting that extraversion may play a role in condition-dependent mate preferences. Unexpectedly, openness to experience was associated with women’s preferences for femininity in faces of both sexes and this association was independent of that between extraversion and women’s preferences for masculine men. This is the first study that we know of to implicate personality traits in individual differences in women’s preferences for masculine men.     

The experience of self-awareness and its relation to level of self-consciousness: An experiential sampling study

The present research studied self-awareness by utilizing experiential sampling methodology, which allows for the random sampling of individuals' thoughts and feelings as they go about their normal daily activities. Neither Study 1 nor 2 found a relation between private or public self-awareness and negative affect. However, attention to private self-aspects was generally more positive and less ruminative for low as opposed to high private self-conscious subjects, and awareness of oneself as a social object was generally more positive but less important for low as opposed to high public self-conscious subjects. What may have accounted for the negative relation between private self-consciousness and average affect was that low private self-conscious subjects were more likely to attend to their private self-aspects if they were pleasant than if they were unpleasant, while high private self-conscious subjects' degree of private self-awareness was unrelated to whether the content of this state was pleasant or not. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that low private self-conscious individuals engage in a more selective type of self-attention when in the private self-aware state than do high private self-conscious individuals. Regarding the relation between self-awareness and social context, both studies found that the presence of others results in a heightened public self-awareness. However, even though subjects were more attentive to public self-aspects when with others than when alone, in general, they were more attentive to their “private self” than to their “public self”. Results are discussed in terms of current self-awareness theory.