The recognition heuristic in memory‐based inference: is recognition a non‐compensatory cue?

The recognition heuristic makes the strong claim that probabilistic inferences in which a recognized object is compared to an unrecognized one are made solely on the basis of whether the objects are recognized or not, ignoring all other available cues. This claim has been seriously challenged by a number of studies that have shown a clear effect of additional cue knowledge. In most of these studies, either recognition knowledge was acquired during the experiment, and/or additional cues were provided to participants. However, the recognition heuristic is more likely to be a tool for exploiting natural (rather than induced) recognition when inferences have to be made from memory. In our study on natural recognition and inferences from memory, around 85% of the inferences followed recognition information even when participants had learned three cues that contradicted recognition and when some of the contradictory cues were deemed more valid than recognition. Nevertheless, there were strong individual differences in the use of recognition. Whereas about half of the participants chose the recognized object regardless of the number of conflicting cues—suggestive of the hypothesized noncompensatory processing of recognition—the remaining participants were influenced by the additional knowledge. The former group of participants also tended to give higher estimates of recognition's validity. In addition, we found that the use of recognition for an inference may be affected by whether additional cue knowledge has been learned outside or within the experimental setting. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic postulates that individuals should choose a recognized object more often than an unrecognized one whenever recognition is related to the criterion. This behavior has been described as a one‐cue, noncompensatory decision‐making strategy. This claim and other assumptions were tested in four experiments using paired‐comparison tasks with cities and other geographical objects. The main results were (1) that the recognized object was chosen more often than the unrecognized one when the recognition cue was valid; (2) that participants' behavior did not reflect the recognition validity of their own knowledge; (3) that a less‐is‐more effect (i.e., better performance with less knowledge) was either absent or of only small size; and (4) that judgments were influenced by further knowledge, which could even compensate for the recognition cue. In sum, the recognition cue represents an important piece of knowledge in paired comparisons, but apparently not the only one. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of familiarity in binary choice inferences

In research on the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, Psychological Review, 109, 75–90, 2002), knowledge of recognized objects has been categorized as “recognized” or “unrecognized” without regard to the degree of familiarity of the recognized object. In the present article, we propose a new inference model—familiarity-based inference. We hypothesize that when subjective knowledge levels (familiarity) of recognized objects differ, the degree of familiarity of recognized objects will influence inferences. Specifically, people are predicted to infer that the more familiar object in a pair of two objects has a higher criterion value on the to-be-judged dimension. In two experiments, using a binary choice task, we examined inferences about populations in a pair of two cities. Results support predictions of familiarity-based inference. Participants inferred that the more familiar city in a pair was more populous. Statistical modeling showed that individual differences in familiarity-based inference lie in the sensitivity to differences in familiarity. In addition, we found that familiarity-based inference can be generally regarded as an ecologically rational inference. Furthermore, when cue knowledge about the inference criterion was available, participants made inferences based on the cue knowledge about population instead of familiarity. Implications of the role of familiarity in psychological processes are discussed.     

Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?

The recognition heuristic (RH) claims that people base inferences on recognition only. This has been questioned by several studies which found that additional knowledge was influential. However, in some of these studies, participants' additional knowledge might have encompassed criterion knowledge thus rendering any inferential strategy superfluous. The present study was therefore designed to test the effect of criterion knowledge on use or non‐use of the RH. Eighty‐one participants made pair‐wise comparisons with respect to the size of Belgian cities and also provided estimates of the cities' actual size. We found that relative criterion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the relative position of an object on the criterion dimension) did indeed play some role, but its exclusion left the main critical findings intact, nonetheless. We thus conclude that previous studies conducted in the paradigm of natural recognition should not be generally refuted by the argument of participants possessing criterion knowledge. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Familiarity-Matching: An Ecologically Rational Heuristic for the Relationships-Comparison Task

Previous studies have shown that people often use heuristics in making inferences and that subjective memory experiences, such as recognition or familiarity of objects, can be valid cues for inferences. So far, many researchers have used the binary choice task in which two objects are presented as alternatives (e.g., “Which city has the larger population, city A or city B?”). However, objects can be presented not only as alternatives but also in a question (e.g., “Which country is city X in, country A or country B?”). In such a situation, people can make inferences based on the relationship between the object in the question and each object given as an alternative. In the present study, we call this type of task a “relationships-comparison task.” We modeled the three inference strategies that people could apply to solve it (familiarity-matching [FM; a new heuristic we propose in this study], familiarity heuristic [FH], and knowledge-based inference [KI]) to examine people's inference processes. Through Studies 1, 2, and 3, we found that (a) people tended to rely on heuristics, and that FM (inferences based on similarity in familiarity between objects) well explained participants' inference patterns; (b) FM could work as an ecologically rational strategy for the relationships–comparison task since it could effectively reflect environmental structures, and that the use of FM could be highly replicable and robust; and (c) people could sometimes use a decision strategy like FM, even in their daily lives (consumer behaviors). The nature of the relationships–comparison task and human cognitive processes is discussed.     

Recognition-based inference: When is less more in the real world?

Common wisdom tells us that more information can only help and never hurt. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) highlighted an instance violating this intuition. Specifically, in an analysis of their recognition heuristic, they found a counterintuitive less-is-more effect in inference: An individual recognizing fewer objects than another individual can, nevertheless, make more accurate inferences. Goldstein and Gigerenzer emphasized that a sufficient condition for this effect is that the recognition validity be higher than the knowledge validity, assuming that the validities are uncorrelated with the number of recognized objects, n. But how is the occurrence of the less-is-more effect affected when this independence assumption is violated? I show that validity dependencies (i.e., correlations of the validities with n) abound in empirical data sets, and I demonstrate by computer simulations that these dependencies often have a strong limiting effect on the less-is-more effect. Moreover, I discuss what cognitive (e.g., memory) and ecological (e.g., distribution of the criterion variable, environmental frequencies) factors can give rise to a dependency of the recognition validity on the number of recognized objects. Supplemental materials may be downloaded from http://pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.     

世界大学排名比较中的再认启发式和线索推断

针对三种世界大学排名比较任务(综合实力、商业与管理专业、农业与林业专业),用问卷调查了208名大学生并考察其利用再认启发式和额外线索作推断的情况。结果发现:(1)被试在前两种任务中的正确率均超过60%,选择可再认学校的比率及其正确率也较高;(2)比较类别对再认的选择率及其正确率均有显著影响,效应量很大;(3)再认效度较低或无法利用再认时,被试的选择在不同程度上符合外国线索或专长线索的预测;(4)多出一条不利线索时,再认选择率比只有再认线索时有所降低但不低于50%,多出一条有利线索时,再认选择率的变化因线索而异,不一定显著地增加。     

Preschoolers search for hidden objects

The issue of whether young children use spatio-temporal information (e.g., movement of objects through time and space) and/or contact-mechanical information (e.g., interaction between objects) to search for a hidden object was investigated. To determine whether one cue can have priority over the other, a dynamic event that put these cues into conflict was created, with only spatio-temporal information being valid. The 3-year-olds used in the study were found to use the valid spatio-temporal cue exclusively and seemed to ignore the contact-mechanical cue. Both search behavior and eye tracking during the event support the view of a sophisticated sensitivity to the validity of a cue in indicating a target’s hidden location.     

On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: two critical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic is claimed to be distinguished from notions of availability and fluency through its categorical or “binary” treatment of information and the “inconsequentiality” of further knowledge to inferences based on recognition. Using the city‐size task of Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) we demonstrate that: (1) increasing the validity of other information in the environment decreases the reliance on recognition; (2) cities that are both recognized and have other information known about them (e.g. they have a soccer team) are chosen more often than those which are simply recognized; and (3) there is a negative correlation between the time taken to identify a city and the proportion of times it is selected as the larger of a pair. None of these results is predicted by the process model of the recognition heuristic. The implication of the results for the distinction between the recognition, availability and fluency heuristics is discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Infants learn about objects from statistics and people

In laboratory experiments, infants are sensitive to patterns of visual features that co-occur (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Once infants learn the statistical regularities, however, what do they do with that knowledge? Moreover, which patterns do infants learn in the cluttered world outside of the laboratory? Across 4 experiments, we show that 9-month-olds use this sensitivity to make inferences about object properties. In Experiment 1, 9-month-old infants expected co-occurring visual features to remain fused (i.e., infants looked longer when co-occurring features split apart than when they stayed together). Forming such expectations can help identify integral object parts for object individuation, recognition, and categorization. In Experiment 2, we increased the task difficulty by presenting the test stimuli simultaneously with a different spatial layout from the familiarization trials to provide a more ecologically valid condition. Infants did not make similar inferences in this more distracting test condition. However, Experiment 3 showed that a social cue did allow inferences in this more difficult test condition, and Experiment 4 showed that social cues helped infants choose patterns among distractor patterns during learning as well as during test. These findings suggest that infants can use feature co-occurrence to learn about objects and that social cues shape such foundational learning in distraction-filled environments.     

How forgetting aids heuristic inference

Some theorists, ranging from W. James (1890) to contemporary psychologists, have argued that forgetting is the key to proper functioning of memory. The authors elaborate on the notion of beneficial forgetting by proposing that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. To this end, the authors bring together 2 research programs that take an ecological approach to studying cognition. Specifically, they implement fast and frugal heuristics within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Simulations of the recognition heuristic, which relies on systematic failures of recognition to infer which of 2 objects scores higher on a criterion value, demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized. Simulations of the fluency heuristic, which arrives at the same inference on the basis of the speed with which objects are recognized, indicate that forgetting aids the discrimination between the objects' recognition speeds.     

Memory for object location and route direction in virtual large-scale space

In everyday life people have to deal with tasks such as finding a novel path to a certain goal location, finding one's way back, finding a short cut, or making a detour. In all of these tasks people acquire route knowledge. For finding the same way back they have to remember locations of objects like buildings and additionally direction changes. In three experiments using recognition tasks as well as conscious and unconscious spatial priming paradigms memory processes underlying wayfinding behaviour were investigated. Participants learned a route through a virtual environment with objects either placed at intersections (i.e., decision points) where another route could be chosen or placed along the route (non-decision points). Analyses indicate first that objects placed at decision points are recognized faster than other objects. Second, they indicate that the direction in which a route is travelled is represented only at locations that are relevant for wayfinding (e.g., decision points). The results point out the efficient way in which memory for object location and memory for route direction interact.     

Category specificity in normal episodic learning: applications to object recognition and category-specific agnosia

Studies of patients with category-specific agnosia (CSA) have given rise to multiple theories of object recognition, most of which assume the existence of a stable, abstract semantic memory system. We applied an episodic view of memory to questions raised by CSA in a series of studies examining normal observers' recall of newly learned attributes of familiar objects. Subjects first learned to associate arbitrarily assigned colors or textures to objects in a training phase, and then attempted to report the newly learned attribute of each object in a recall task. Our subjects' pattern of recall errors was similar both quantitatively and qualitatively to the identification deficits among patients with CSA for biological objects. Furthermore, errors tended to reflect conceptually and structurally based confusions. We suggest that object identification involves recruitment and integration of information across distributed episodic memories and that this process is susceptible to interference from objects that are structurally similar and conceptually related.     

Memory for object location and route direction in virtual large-scale space

In everyday life people have to deal with tasks such as finding a novel path to a certain goal location, finding one's way back, finding a short cut, or making a detour. In all of these tasks people acquire route knowledge. For finding the same way back they have to remember locations of objects like buildings and additionally direction changes. In three experiments using recognition tasks as well as conscious and unconscious spatial priming paradigms memory processes underlying wayfinding behaviour were investigated. Participants learned a route through a virtual environment with objects either placed at intersections (i.e., decision points) where another route could be chosen or placed along the route (non-decision points). Analyses indicate first that objects placed at decision points are recognized faster than other objects. Second, they indicate that the direction in which a route is travelled is represented only at locations that are relevant for wayfinding (e.g., decision points). The results point out the efficient way in which memory for object location and memory for route direction interact.     

Configural Processing in Memory Retrieval: Multiple Cues and Ensemble Representations

When retrieving information from memory, a number of contextual cues may interact to determine which ideas will be easily accessible. Even the simplest case in which joint cue action obtains (two cues) is very revealing of the principles of memory access and representation of compounds. Mechanisms by which dual cues interact to constrain retrieval from episodic memory are considered. A holistic mechanism of cue integration is contrasted with two nonholistic mechanisms: a multiplicative or intersection mechanism and an independent-contributions mechanism. Holistic- and intersection-cuing mechanisms are consistent with different variants of compound cue models of priming. The independent cuing mechanism is consistent with spreading activation models of priming. Data from four experiments which examined dual-cued recognition of items from (newly learned) triples demonstrated strongly configural, holistic, action of dual cues. The two cues and test item must form an encoded compound to yield cuing advantages. Two independent cues to the test item are ineffective if the two cues and test were not learned together as a triple; one valid and one invalid cue are also ineffective. This is so despite the availability of pairwise information for each cue–test relation, and despite the fact that these cues are effective when operating alone. A compound cue model which predicts precisely this surprising pattern of priming is developed. The compound cue model also predicts previously obtained configural priming of associative judgments, as well as the bias priming generally observed in item recognition and similar paradigms.     

The Growth of Flexible Problem Solving: Preschool Children Use Changing Verbal Cues to Infer Multiple Word Meanings

Flexible induction is the adaptation of probabilistic inferences to changing problems. Young children's flexibility was tested in a word-learning task. Children 3 to 6 years old were told 3 novel words for each of several novel objects. Children generalized each word to other objects with the same body shape, the same material, or the same part as the first object. Each word was preceded by a different predicate (i.e., "looks like a ...," "is made of ...," or "has a ...") that implies a different attribute (shape, material, or part, respectively). Three-year-olds showed limited use of predicates to infer word meanings, and they used predicates from previous trials to infer the meanings of later words. 4- to 6-year-olds used predicate cues more consistently and made inferences that were implied by the most recent predicate cue. Notably, 3-year-olds performed near ceiling in a control task that eliminated the need to use probabilistic inductive cues (Experiment 3). The results suggest that flexibility develops as a function of (a) sensitivity to between-problem variability and indeterminacy and (b) ability to decontextualize the most recent verbal cue to guide of inductive inferences.     

Constructing visual representations of natural scenes: the roles of short- and long-term visual memory

A "follow-the-dot" method was used to investigate the visual memory systems supporting accumulation of object information in natural scenes. Participants fixated a series of objects in each scene, following a dot cue from object to object. Memory for the visual form of a target object was then tested. Object memory was consistently superior for the two most recently fixated objects, a recency advantage indicating a visual short-term memory component to scene representation. In addition, objects examined earlier were remembered at rates well above chance, with no evidence of further forgetting when 10 objects intervened between target examination and test and only modest forgetting with 402 intervening objects. This robust prerecency performance indicates a visual long-term memory component to scene representation.     

Use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity,not on the recognition validity of selected sets of objects

According to the recognition-heuristic theory, decision makers solve paired comparisons in which one object is recognized and the other not by recognition alone, inferring that recognized objects have higher criterion values than unrecognized ones. However, success—and thus usefulness—of this heuristic depends on the validity of recognition as a cue, and adaptive decision making, in turn, requires that decision makers are sensitive to it. To this end, decision makers could base their evaluation of the recognition validity either on the selected set of objects (the set’s recognition validity), or on the underlying domain from which the objects were drawn (the domain’s recognition validity). In two experiments, we manipulated the recognition validity both in the selected set of objects and between domains from which the sets were drawn. The results clearly show that use of the recognition heuristic depends on the domain’s recognition validity, not on the set’s recognition validity. In other words, participants treat all sets as roughly representative of the underlying domain and adjust their decision strategy adaptively (only) with respect to the more general environment rather than the specific items they are faced with.