谈判者第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响：角色的调节作用

谈判者在大多数情况下都希望能顺利达成协议,但很多时候多种因素使得谈判进入僵局或者破裂。本研究利用模拟谈判的手段,综合考察了第一次出价对谈判破裂的影响。很多谈判者出于害怕吃亏或者希望获得更多收益,向对手提出较高的第一次开价。研究一证明第一次出价越高,谈判越容易失败。有趣的是,第一次开价的高低与谈判破裂之间的关系会受到谈判角色的影响,谈判者的权力不同会使得他们的第一次开价具有不同的作用。研究二证实,当谈判双方权力不对等时,第一次出价对谈判破裂的负面作用受到了权力的影响。弱者的第一次出价越高,谈判越容易破裂。中介分析表明,当弱者出价较高时,容易让对方感到竞争性过强,因此不愿意达成协议。本研究不仅丰富了谈判破裂和第一次出价的理论研究,而且对于谈判者具有实践意义     

When competition breeds equality: Effects of appetitive versus aversive competition in negotiation

Competitive motivation is prevalent in negotiation but systematic insight into its effects is missing. We introduce the distinction between appetitive competition, in which negotiators seek relative gain, and aversive competition, in which negotiators seek to prevent relative loss. Two experiments tested the predictions that (i) appetitive competitors are less vigilant and more confident than aversive competitors, and are (ii) therefore more likely to reach an agreement. However, we further hypothesized that (iii) information about one's opponent undermines appetitive competitors' confidence, yet enables trust in aversive competitors. Results supported these predictions. Appetitive competitors more often reached an impasse than aversive competitors when information was provided about the opponent, whereas aversive competitors more often reached an impasse without this information.     

Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement

The authors tested a motivated information-processing model of negotiation: To reach high joint outcomes, negotiators need a deep understanding of the task, which requires them to exchange information and to process new information systematically. All this depends on social motivation, epistemic motivation (EM), and their interaction. Indeed, when EM (manipulated by holding negotiators process accountability or not) was high rather than low and prosocial rather than proself, negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive tactics (Experiment 1), had more trust, and reached higher joint outcomes (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that under high EM, negotiators who received cooperative, rather than competitive, tactics reached higher joint outcomes because they engaged in more problem solving. Under low EM, negotiators made more concessions and reached low joint outcomes. Implications for negotiation theory and for future work in this area are discussed.     

The prospect of negotiating: Stress, cognitive appraisal, and performance

Despite a significant literature on the impact of stress on performance in achievement settings, little is known about whether and how stress might matter for would-be negotiators. In two studies, we investigate how bargainers cognitively appraise a looming negotiation, whether its prospect is stressful and what the consequences are for performance. Individuals who appraised a prospective negotiation as a threat experienced more stress ahead of a negotiation, and reached lower quality deals compared to those who had appraised a challenge. Results from a follow-up experiment showed that would-be negotiators who had appraised a threat behaved more passively and were less likely to use tough tactics compared to those who appraised a challenge. Those who appraised a threat also had relatively inaccurate perceptions of their partners’ priorities and interests, which undermined their outcomes. The outcome advantage for those who appraised a challenge was limited to negotiations that contained integrative potential.     

Integrative bargaining in a competitive market

The behavioral decision theory literature was used to identify the determinants of negotiation success in an integrative bargaining, free-market exercise. This study provides a novel methodology for studying negotiation. Specifically, buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in negotiations with as many competitors as possible in a fixed time period. The results suggest that integrative bargaining behavior increases and the market converges toward a Nash equilibrium as negotiators gain experience. In addition, the results suggest that (1) positively framed negotiators (“What will be my net profit from the transaction?”) complete more transactions than negatively framed negotiators (“What will be my expenses on this transaction?”), (2) negotiators who are given moderately difficult profit constraints in order to be allowed to complete a transaction achieve more profitable transactions than negotiators without such constraints, and (3) both framing and the existence of constraints affect the total profitability of the negotiator.     

"Inside Information" and Negotiator Decision Behavior

In negotiation, information about the other party may be a source of strength or weakness, depending on the context, the type of information, its availability and quality, and how a negotiator uses it. An empirical study examines the way negotiators use "inside" information specifically designed to increase bargaining strength. The scoop-privileged information about the other party′s deadline-does not inform negotiators about possible deals; rather, it suggests a process of negotiating agreement. Misuse of the scoop, therefore, poses potential costs that may diminish its possible advantages. In a two-party negotiation exercise, access to inside information affected negotiators′ thoughts and behaviors. It enhanced their feelings of success and shifted the criterion for success away from final price toward a relative, interpersonal standard. Furthermore, informed negotiators used the scoop appropriately to manage the negotiation process and enhance both joint and individual profits.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Gender and Negotiator Competitiveness: A Meta-analysis

Although there have been numerous investigations into the relationship between gender and bargaining competitiveness over the past several decades, few conclusions have been reached. The results of 62 research reports on the relationship between gender and competitive behavior in dyadic bargaining interactions were examined by meta-analytic review. The average weighted effect size indicated that women appear to behave more cooperatively in negotiations than men, but this difference is slight. Results suggest that constraints on negotiators (imposed by abstract bargaining paradigms and restrictions on communication) lessen gender differences in negotiation behavior. Women were significantly more competitive than men when competing against an opponent who pursued a “tit-for-tat” bargaining strategy.     

Distributive spirals: negotiation impasses and the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy

Negotiations do not always end in agreements. Yet, we know little about impasses and how they affect negotiators. In three studies, we compare how negotiators experience impasses and agreements, paying particular attention to the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy. Specifically, we propose and find that negotiators who impasse find themselves caught in a distributive spiral-they interpret their performance as unsuccessful, experience negative emotions, and develop negative perceptions of their counterpart and the process. In terms of their future behavioral intentions, they are less willing to work together in the future, plan to share less information, plan to behave less cooperatively, and they lose faith in negotiation as an effective means of managing conflicts. As predicted, negotiators with relatively high levels of self-efficacy were insulated from some of these negative outcomes.     

The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes

The following paper offers both a framework and empirical test of the importance of negotiators′ aspiration levels and settlement expectancies on negotiated outcomes. In particular, we demonstrate that, in the presence of a stable bargaining zone, negotiators′ aspirations significantly affect negotiated outcomes. Further, we find that asymmetries in negotiators′ aspirations with respect to the bargaining zone are a source of inefficiency in bargaining-i.e., asymmetries increase the likelihood of impasse in the presence of a positive bargaining zone. We also present data which examine the role of settlement expectancies as another source of settlement inefficiency.     

Power, propensity to negotiate, and moving first in competitive interactions

Five experiments investigated how the possession and experience of power affects the initiation of competitive interaction. In Experiments 1a and 1b, high-power individuals displayed a greater propensity to initiate a negotiation than did low-power individuals. Three additional experiments showed that power increased the likelihood of making the first move in a variety of competitive interactions. In Experiment 2, participants who were semantically primed with power were nearly 4 times as likely as participants in a control condition to choose to make the opening arguments in a debate competition scenario. In Experiment 3, negotiators with strong alternatives to a negotiation were more than 3 times as likely to spontaneously express an intention to make the first offer compared to participants who lacked any alternatives. Experiment 4 showed that high-power negotiators were more likely than low-power negotiators to actually make the first offer and that making the first offer produced a bargaining advantage.     

Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations

Most research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation.     

买卖交易中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的机制

现实生活中的谈判通常发生在特定的社会情境中, 谈判者也总在扮演着某种角色。本研究探索了买卖交易谈判中谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制。研究提出了一个关于谈判者角色诱发框架效应的理论模型, 然后通过两个模拟谈判实验对这一模型进行验证。实验1表明, 买家知觉到的馅饼大于卖家知觉到的馅饼, 且谈判者知觉到的馅饼在谈判者角色与谈判者绩效间起部分中介作用。实验2发现, 即使保留买家与卖家的角色标签, 如果剥离了金钱作为交易介质这一重要特征, 两个谈判角色知觉到的馅饼也没有差异。研究揭示了谈判者角色影响谈判结果的作用机制, 对谈判者如何利用情境因素取得更好的谈判结果具有实践意义。     

Negotiation, Persuasion and Argument

Argument is often taken to deal with conflicting opinion or belief, while negotiation deals with conflicting goals or interests. It is widely accepted that argument ought to comply with some principles or norms. On the other hand, negotiation and bargaining involve concession exchange and tactical use of power, which may be contrasted with attempts to convince others through argument. However, there are cases where it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between bargaining and argument: notably cases where negotiators persuade others through `framing' and cases where the aims of negotiation have to do with public assertion and acceptance. Those cases suggest that the distinction between negotiation and argument is not absolute, and this raises the question whether rules about what is acceptable in argument and rules about what is acceptable in negotiation can all be viewed as instances of more general common norms about human interaction.     

Regulatory focus at the bargaining table: promoting distributive and integrative success

The authors demonstrate that in dyadic negotiations, negotiators with a promotion regulatory focus achieve superior outcomes than negotiators with prevention regulatory focus in two ways. First, a promotion focus leads negotiators to claim more resources at the bargaining table. In the first two studies, promotion-focused negotiators paid more attention to their target prices(i.e., their ideal outcomes) and achieved more advantageous distributive outcomes than did prevention-focused negotiators. The second study also reveals an important mediating process: Negotiators with a promotion focus made more extreme opening offers in their favor. Second, a promotion focus leads negotiators to create more resources at the bargaining table that benefit both parties. A third study demonstrated that in a multi-issue negotiation, a promotion focus increased the likelihood that a dyad achieved a jointly optimal or Pareto efficient outcome compared to prevention-focused dyads. The discussion focuses on the role of regulatory focus in social interaction and introduces the notion of interaction fit.     

The evolution of policy arguments in teachers' negotiations

Argument is a critical component in policy deliberations. In this study, negotiation is viewed as a type of policy deliberation, one characterized by attack and defense of proposals, interdependence between disputants, and mixed motives of cooperation and competition. Argument in negotiation, then, functions as a reason-giving activity to enact policy. Employing a category system based on rhetorical stasis, the researchers examine whether bargainers specialize in their use of argument types and whether this specialization remains consistent throughout a teacher-school board negotiation and whether it differs for the type of settlement of agenda items. Results of the study suggest that bargainers specialize in argument types at different times during the bargaining. In the early stages of negotiation, teachers center on harm and workability arguments to prepare their case and justify the merits of their proposals, but in the latter phases of bargaining they switch to arguments on implementation to reaffirm their demands and to prioritize issues. Board members, in the early stages, rely on disadvantage, workability, and implementation arguments to establish resistance points and to refute appeals for change, but in the latter stages of negotiation they employ harm-inherency and disadvantage arguments to weigh the costs of concessions and to rationalize the settlement. This study, then, supports the existence of phase variation in bargaining and argues for a developmental approach in deciphering how negotiators who hold antithetical positions reach mutually satisfactory settlements.     

谈判中的时间因素

研究时间因素对谈判的影响有利于提高人们对时间重要性的认识,有效谈判策略的运用和整合结果的实现。时间因素对谈判者认知、行为和谈判结果的影响具体表现在：时间压力会降低谈判者的认知动机,使谈判者更加依赖认知启发式;暂停和中场休息是否会为谈判带来积极影响应该视不同的谈判事件和不同的心理状态而定;拉大谈判与结果实现之间的时间距离会提高谈判的共同结果,这可以从折扣效应和建构水平理论中得到解释。将来的谈判研究会进一步从时间向空间拓展     

How Negotiator Self-Efficacy Drives Decisions to Pursue Mediation

We examined the role of self-efficacy in negotiators' choice of dispute-resolution procedures and responsiveness to third-party recommendations after an impasse. Results show that high self-efficacy negotiators were more likely to choose continued negotiation over mediation than were their low self-efficacy counterparts. In addition, we found that these negotiators were more likely to reject a mediator's recommendation for settlement, even when this recommendation was evenhanded and met their interests. As predicted, however, the influence of self-efficacy on the acceptance of recommendations was moderated by mediator credibility. When disputants perceived that the mediator had low credibility, the pattern of effects remained unchanged. However, when disputants viewed the mediator as being highly credible, self-efficacy had no influence on the acceptance/rejection of mediator recommendations.     

The Impact of Alcohol on Negotiator Behavior: Experimental Evidence1

Business‐related drinking is an important organizational and managerial activity with particular relevance to the negotiation process. This paper investigates the influence of a moderate amount of alcohol on negotiator behavior and negotiated outcomes. We conducted 2 negotiation studies involving inebriated and sober participants, and found that inebriated negotiators used more aggressive tactics, made more mistakes, and reached less integrative agreements than did sober negotiators. Across both studies, we found that inebriated negotiators were unaware that alcohol had affected their negotiations.     

Too much information: the perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.