On empirical interpretation

The view that scientific theories are partially interpreted deductive systems (theoretical deductivism) is defended against recent criticisms by Hempel. Hempel argues that the reliance of theoretical inferences (both from observation to theory and also from theory to theory) uponceteris paribus conditions orprovisos must prevent theories from establishing deductive connections among observations. In reply I argue, first, that theoretical deductivism does not in fact require the establishing of such deductive connections: I offer alternative H-D analyses of these inferences. Second, I argue that when the refined character of scientific observation is taken into account, we find that a theorymay after all establish such deductive connections among scientific observations, without reliance on provisos.These conclusions are based on the multi-level Popperian contextualist account of empirical interpretation sketched in a previous paper. As before, I claim that the supposed objections to theoretical deductivism depend upon questionable empiricist theses unnecessarily conjoined with theoretical deductivism by the Logical Positivists. Theoretical deductivism itself is unaffected by these arguments, and remains (when empirical interpretation is properly analyzed) the best account of scientific theories.This paper develops points first made very briefly in my forthcoming review (c). I would like to thank Professor Hempel for correspondence regarding an earlier version of that review, and Professor Demopoulos for commissioning the review.     

Psychoanalysis and empirical research

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the idea of reason began to lose its universal and absolute value, undermining the view of science as a form of objective knowledge that reveals a fundamental reality. These changes have also had an impact on psychoanalysis, leading to a proliferation of theories and the end of a positivistic approach, epitomized by a 'neutral' analyst who knows the contents of the patient's mind. Hermeneutic philosophy provides a tool with which to explore both theoretical multiplicity and the contribution of the analyst's subjectivity to the analytic process. Furthermore, a hermeneutic approach does not have to be hostile to empirical science, but can be integrated with it in a 'scientific-hermeneutic model' in which historical and biological principles are given equal value.     

The problem of empirical redundancy of constructs in organizational research: An empirical investigation

Construct empirical redundancy may be a major problem in organizational research today. In this paper, we explain and empirically illustrate a method for investigating this potential problem. We applied the method to examine the empirical redundancy of job satisfaction (JS) and organizational commitment (OC), two well-established organizational constructs. Analysis based on responses from a sample of 292 employees collected at two occasions showed that: (a) the construct-level correlation between JS and OC was very high (.91) and (b) both JS and OC are similarly related to positive affectivity and negative affectivity. These results suggest that the constructs may be empirically indistinguishable, despite their well-established conceptual distinction. These findings illustrate the problem of empirical redundancy of organizational constructs and provide a basis for a possible movement towards parsimony in the realm of constructs that could open the way to more rapid advances in knowledge in organizational research.     

Two dogmas of empirical justification

Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justification and knowledge, and a great number of epistemologists endorse a particular two‐part view about how this happens. That view is that perceptual beliefs get their justification from perceptual experiences, and that they do so by being based on them. Despite the wide acceptance of these two views, I think that neither has very much going for it; on the contrary, there's good reason not to believe either one of them.     

Christian ethics and empirical research

What significance might empirical research have for a constructive theory of Christian ethics? This article discusses this question by bringing results from a concrete empirical study of aspects of Christian ethics into conversation with two theories of the same phenomenon: those of William Schweiker and Stanley Hauerwas/Samuel Wells. After mapping the results of the empirical study to the views offered by the two constructive accounts, I discuss more generally whether empirical studies of this kind can have significance for constructive ethical theory. I discuss three possible objections against such a position: that introducing empirical research to constructive theory of Christian ethics undermines normativity, that it blocks criticism, and that its contributions are likely to be divergent, incoherent and unsystematic, thus adding little of significance to constructive theory. I argue that none of these objections can definitively exclude empirical research from constructive theory. But they certainly have implications concerning not only how empirical research might have significance, but also regarding criteria it must meet in order to legitimately claim constructive relevance. Some concrete suggestions to this effect are launched in a final argumentative move.     

Assessing empirical research in bioethics

Empirical research can aid ethical reflection in bioethics by identifying issues, by seeing how they are currently resolved, and by assessing the consequences of these current resolutions. This potential can be misused when the ethical issues in question are fundamentally non-consequentialist or when they are consequentialist but the empirical research fails to address the important consequences. An example of the former problem is some recent studies about bad consequences resulting from commercialized living kidney donor programs. These consequences could be avoided, but the crucial non-consequentialist ethical issues about exploitation and commercialization would still remain. Examples of the latter problem are provided by recent studies of the allocation of ICU beds and of physician deception, where important consequences were not adequately studied.     

Relevant consequence and empirical inquiry

A criterion of adequacy is proposed for theories of relevant consequence. According to the criterion, scientists whose deductive reasoning is limited to some proposed subset of the standard consequence relation must not thereby suffer a reduction in scientific competence. A simple theory of relevant consequence is introduced and shown to satisfy the criterion with respect to a formally defined paradigm of empirical inquiry.Research support was provided by the Office of Naval Research under contract No. N00014-89-J-1725 to Osherson and Weinstein, Swiss National Science Foundation under contract No. 21-32399.91 and by a Siemens Corporation grant to Osherson.     

Causal beliefs and empirical evidence

Causal beliefs often facilitate decision making. However, strong causal beliefs can also lead to neglect of relevant empirical evidence causing errors in risky decision making (e.g., medical, financial). We investigated the impact of pre-training and post-experience on the evaluation of empirical evidence in a two-alternative medical diagnostic task. Participants actively searched for information about two patients on the basis of four available cues. The first experiment indicated that pre-training can weaken the strong influence of causal beliefs reducing neglect of empirical evidence. The second experiment demonstrated that increasing amounts of empirical evidence can improve people's ability to decide in favor of a correct diagnosis. The current research converges with other recent work to clarify key mechanisms and boundary conditions shaping the influence of causal beliefs and empirical evidence in decisions and causal judgments.