《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办,由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。自2011年起,中英文分开隔期出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向：符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、逻辑与认知、逻辑与语言、逻辑与文化等。《逻辑学研究》不但欢迎原创的高水平的逻辑学研究论文,而且提倡逻辑学与其它学科的交往互动;不但主张对逻辑学的各传统基本领域如数理逻辑、数学基础、逻辑哲学、中外逻辑史等展开深入研究;也欢迎对哲学逻辑各分支的探究,以及有关人工智能逻辑、归纳逻辑、语言逻辑、非形式逻辑等各方面的工作。不但关注逻辑学在认知科学、数学、计算机科学、法律推理、决策理论等相关学科中的应用;也探究逻辑学与认识论、语言和心灵哲学、符号学等领域的沟通,同时还欢迎对逻辑学与思维方式、逻辑与文化及社会的关系等方面具有真知灼见的思考。     

《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办,由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。自2011年起,中英文分开隔期出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向：符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、逻辑与认知、逻辑与语言、逻辑与文化等。《逻辑学研究》不但欢迎原创的高水平的逻辑学研究论文,而且提倡逻辑学与其它学科的交往互动;不但主张对逻辑学的各传统基本领域如数理逻辑、数学基础、逻辑哲学、     

《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

正《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办、由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向:符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、逻辑与认知、逻辑与语言、逻辑与文化等。《逻辑学研究》不但欢迎原     

《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

正《逻辑学研究》杂志是由中山大学主管、中山大学与中国逻辑学会共同主办,并由教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的逻辑学专业学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为双月刊,逢双月18日出版。《逻辑学研究》的征稿内容将主要包括下述方向:符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、逻辑与认知、逻辑与语言、逻辑与文化等。《逻辑学研究》不但欢迎原     

《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办,由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。自2011年起,中英文分开隔期出版《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向:符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、     

《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

正《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办,由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。自2011年起,中英文分开隔期出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向:符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻辑与哲学、     

《逻辑学研究》征稿启事

正《逻辑学研究》是中山大学和中国逻辑学会主办、由教育部高等院校人文社会科学重点研究基地中山大学逻辑与认知研究所承办的学术刊物,旨在积极推动我国逻辑学及相关学科的学术研究水平,增进海内外逻辑学及相关领域学术同行的交流。《逻辑学研究》是当前我国在逻辑学领域内唯一正式出版的专业刊物,采用中英双语发表论文。《逻辑学研究》目前为季刊,逢每季度第三个月的18日出版。《逻辑学研究》征稿的内容将主要包括下述方向:符号逻辑、非形式逻辑、逻     

书讯三则

谢翔宝、於世成著《海商法逻辑学》一书,已由大连海运学院出版社出版.海商法逻辑学是形式逻辑应用学科一个新的分枝.本书结合海商法的理论与实践,系统地论述了形式逻辑的基本原理,并通过国际航运实践的典型案例,由浅入深地介绍与解释了逻辑应用方法.本书可作为从事外贸、航运、     

2016年全国现代逻辑学术研讨会专辑前言

<正>"全国现代逻辑学术研讨会"是中国逻辑学会现代逻辑专业委员会主办的年会,旨在增进国内各领域逻辑学研究人员的交流,共同营造一个健康的学术氛围,提高国内逻辑学界的学术水平。2016年恰逢中国逻辑学会现代逻辑专业委员会成立二十周年,本次全国现代逻辑学术研讨会由西南大学逻辑与智能研究中心承办,于10月14日至16日在重庆北碚举行。本次会议接受三类投稿:未发表的原创学术论文、过去     

中国逻辑学会学术讨论会概述

由中国逻辑学会、湖南省社联、湖南师院等单位联合发起的逻辑学术讨论会于1983年10月8日至15日在长沙举行。与会者包括我国逻辑学界著名专家、教授共230余人。提交学术论文150余篇。讨论会分形式逻辑、辩证逻辑和西方逻辑史三个小     

从劳动逻辑到实践逻辑

马克思实践哲学面临了从劳动逻辑向实践逻辑提升和转换的需要,以拯救易被化约于"劳动"之中的伦理—政治型"实践"范畴的独立地位。但这项工作必须自觉区别于西方实践哲学传统的"实践"与"劳动"二分立场。马克思劳动概念中蕴含了属于它自身的伦理规范内涵,需要将这一伦理规范内涵释放出来,以完成向伦理—政治型实践范畴的过渡。     

Logic,Logic, and Logic

In his recent paper in History and Philosophy of Logic, John Kearns argues for a solution of the Liar paradox using an illocutionary logic (Kearns 2007 Kearns, J. 2007. ‘An illocutionary logical explanation of the Liar Paradox’. History and Philosophy of Logic, 28: 31–66. [Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Paraconsistent approaches, especially dialetheism, which accepts the Liar as being both true and false, are rejected by Kearns as making no ‘clear sense’ (p. 51). In this critical note, I want to highlight some shortcomings of Kearns' approach that concern a general difficulty for supposed solutions to (semantic) antinomies like the Liar. It is not controversial that there are languages which avoid the Liar. For example, the language which consists of the single sentence ‘Benedict XVI was born in Germany’ lacks the resources to talk about semantics at all and thus avoids the Liar. Similarly, more interesting languages such as the propositional calculus avoid the Liar by lacking the power to express semantic concepts or to quantify over propositions. Kearns also agrees with the dialetheist claim that natural languages are semantically closed (i.e. are able to talk about their sentences and the semantic concepts and distinctions they employ). Without semantic closure, the Liar would be no real problem for us (speakers of natural languages). But given the claim, the expressive power of natural languages may lead to the semantic antinomies. The dialetheist argues for his position by proposing a general hypothesis (cf. Bremer 2005 Bremer, M. 2005. An Introduction to Paraconsistent Logics, Bern: Lang.  [Google Scholar], pp. 27–28): ‘(Dilemma) A linguistic framework that solves some antinomies and is able to express its linguistic resources is confronted with strengthened versions of the antinomies’. Thus, the dialetheist claims that either some semantic concepts used in a supposed solution to a semantic antinomy are inexpressible in the framework used (and so, in view of the claim, violate the aim of being a model of natural language), or else old antinomies are exchanged for new ones. One horn of the dilemma is having inexpressible semantic properties. The other is having strengthened versions of the antinomies, once all semantic properties used are expressible. This dilemma applies, I claim, to Kearns' approach as well.     

从逻辑哲学看模糊逻辑的形式化

从逻辑哲学观点看,在“符号化、公理化的模糊逻辑”与非形式化的“人脑使用的模糊逻辑”（苗东升的说法）这两者之间,只是形式模型及其现实原型的关系,决不相互排斥。真正的问题不在于,在现实生活中人脑所使用的实际上行之有效的模糊推理,是否应该和可能符号化、公理化,而是在于如何恰当地进行形式化。笔者采用苏珊·哈克（Susan Haack）的逻辑哲学观点,认为非经典逻辑可划分为扩展逻辑和异常（deviation）逻辑,模糊逻辑归属于异常逻辑。本文以模糊逻辑系统FZ为例,具体分析了虽然经典逻辑中一些较强的公理和推理规则均不成立,但是与之对应的较弱的“合经典的”（well-behaved）公理和推理规则却仍然可以成立,由此导致一系列新奇性质。笔者采用了达·柯斯塔（da Costa）的形式化技巧,它是关于“在虚设不矛盾律成立的前提下”（相应公式可以称为“合经典的”）才能成立的逆否律。当我们撤除了“虚设不矛盾律为前提”的限定,它又重新回到了无条件成立的情况。笔者也推广了玻尔（N.Bohr）和冯·威扎克（von Weizsaecker）关于对应原理的思想,认为作为非经典逻辑的模糊逻辑与经典逻辑之间也应当遵守“对应原理”：经典逻辑是模糊逻辑的前身,模糊逻辑将构成更为普遍的逻辑形式,经典逻辑作为模糊逻辑的极限形式,在局部情况下还保持自身的意义。     

Modal Logic As Dialogical Logic

The title reflects my conviction that, viewed semantically,modal logic is fundamentally dialogical; this conviction is based on the key role played by the notion of bisimulation in modal model theory. But this dialogical conception of modal logic does not seem to apply to modal proof theory, which is notoriously messy. Nonetheless, by making use of ideas which trace back to Arthur Prior (notably the use of nominals, special proposition symbols which name worlds) I will show how to lift the dialogical conception to modal proof theory. I argue that this shift to hybrid logic has consequences for both modal and dialogical logic, and I discuss these in detail.     

Axiomatizing the Logic of Imagination

In a recent paper Berto introduces a semantic system for a logic of imagination, intended as positive conceivability, and aboutness of imaginative acts. This system crucially adopts elements of both the semantics of conditionals and the semantics of analytical implications in order to account for the central logical traits of the notion of truth in an act of imagination based on an explicit input. The main problem left unsolved is to put forward a complete set of axioms for the proposed system. In the present paper I offer a solution to this problem by providing a complete axiomatization of a generalization of the original semantics. The difficulty in proving completeness lies in the fact that the modalities that capture the notion of truth in an act of imagination are neither standard nor minimal, so that the construction of the canonical model and the proof of the truth lemma are to be substantially modified.

     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities: Predicate Logic

In a previous paper I described a range of nonmonotonic conditionals that behave like conditional probability functions at various levels of probabilistic support. These conditionals were defined as semantic relations on an object language for sentential logic. In this paper I extend the most prominent family of these conditionals to a language for predicate logic. My approach to quantifiers is closely related to Hartry Field's probabilistic semantics. Along the way I will show how Field's semantics differs from a substitutional interpretation of quantifiers in crucial ways, and show that Field's approach is closely related to the usual objectual semantics. One of Field's quantifier rules, however, must be significantly modified to be adapted to nonmonotonic conditional semantics. And this modification suggests, in turn, an alternative quantifier rule for probabilistic semantics.