Shoemaker on emergence

Sydney Shoemaker has recently given an account of emergent properties according to which emergent properties are a special type of structural property and the determination relation holding between emergent properties and their base properties is one of “mere nomological supervenience.” According to Shoemaker, emergent properties are what he calls type-2 microstructural properties, whereas physical properties are type-1 microstructural properties. After highlighting the advantages of viewing emergent properties as a special class of microstructural properties, I show how according to his own causal theory of properties type-2 microstructural properties actually reduce to type-1 microstructural properties, and thus do not truly count as emergent. I then suggest an alternative view according to which emergent properties are actually a third type of microstructural property, one not considered by Shoemaker. I conclude with reflections why we might view the dependence relation between emergent properties and their physical base properties as a causal relation rather than one of mere supervenience.     

Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content

Sydney Shoemaker has given a sophisticated theory of phenomenal content, motivated by the transparency of experience and by the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002). It centers on the idea that color experiences represent what he calls “appearance properties”. I consider the different sorts of appearance properties that Shoemaker has suggested might enter into phenomenal content – occurrent appearance properties, dispositional appearance properties, and higher-order dispositional appearance properties – and argue that none of them are plausibly represented by color experiences. I argue that Shoemaker's theory faces a dilemma – either it makes misperception too difficult, or it does not truly accommodate veridical spectrum inversion. I then examine some alternative Russellian theories of phenomenal content that might be consistent with Shoemaker's motivations, including a different sort of proposal recently suggested by Shoemaker (forthcoming). I argue that these views are also lacking, for similar reasons as the appearance property view. Finally, I conclude that in order for a representationalist theory to properly accommodate spectrum inversion without illusion, phenomenal content must include an indexical element. Such a view requires the adoption of a broadly Fregean theory of phenomenal content, according to which sameness of phenomenal character does not entail sameness in extension. What phenomenally identical experiences have in common is not what they represent, but how they represent.     

Self And Body: Sydney Shoemaker

A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by these predicates, with the result that the physical properties that determine the person's mental states will belong to the person and not to the human animal.     

Shoemaker, Self–Blindness and Moore's Paradox

I show how the 'inner–sense' (quasi–perceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from self–blindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be self–blind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and self–knowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. There is third–person evidence available to the self–blind which Shoemaker ignores, and it can account for the considerations from Moore's paradox that he raises.     

Responses to commentaries

This paper is an author response to three commentaries, by Robert Kraut and Itamar Rosenn (2012), Barry Wellman (2012) and Mark van Vugt (2012), on our article entitled ‘Relationships and the social brain: Integrating psychological and evolutionary perspectives’ ( Sutcliffe, Dunbar, Binder, & Arrow, 2012 ).     

对批评的回应

徐竹对于笔者的拙著《唯物论者何以言规范——一项从分析形而上学到信息技术哲学的多视角考察》的主要批评是,一种试图在唯物论框架中解释规范性问题的理论,自身也很容易反过来成为一种更深刻的规范性理论的被解释对象。对此,笔者的回应是:这种带有布兰登气质的"更深刻的规范性理论"其实反而是错过了"如何从无规范的物质出发说明规范"这一更艰难的理论问题。段伟文对于拙著的主要批评是:一种基于小数据主义的信息技术,是否来得及将人类从大数据的肆虐中解救出来?而笔者的回应是:笔者并不认为小数据主义一定会打败大数据主义,而是说,在不放弃信息技术带来的便利的前提下,小数据主义是解救人类既有文明的唯一技术通道。宗宁对于拙著的主要批评是:如果笔者将日本在明治维新之后的逐步军国主义化视为纵向的信息——物质管制结构的强化——的结果的话,那么,笔者又将如何解释丸山真男关于"日本恰恰是因为在近代化的过程中没有肃清横向的封建结构而走向军国"的论断呢?对此,笔者则试图指出:日本军部对于全日本武力资源的纵向上的垄断,以及对于封建结构下的武力分散结构的破坏,才使得日本国内缺乏足够的纠错力量,无力防止国家陷入军国主义泥潭。     

Responses to Embarrassment

This study focused upon responses to the emotion of embarrassment. Specifically, the situations causing embarrassment, the degree of perceived embarrassment and the agent of the embarrassment were examined as predictive of the embarrassed party's responses. These same three factors, as well as the response of the embarrassed person, were examined in association with the responses of others. In addition, the issue of multiple responses to embarrassment by the embarrassed party was examined. Self-report data werecollected from 387 persons ranging in age from 17 to 90 years. Log-linear analyses revealed strong associations between both the type of situation and the degree of embarrassment and the type of situation and the agent of the act. The type of situation did indeed predict responses by persons involved in the event. The degree of embarrassment was predictive of neither the types of responses utilized by the embarrassed party nor the others present. Theagent of the incident was strongly associated with responses of the embarrassed party, but was not associated with others’ responses. Responses of an embarrassed party were associated with the responses of others present. Finally, it was found that combinations of responses by the embarrassed party were discovered but were not associated with the situation nor with the degree of embarrassment.