Differentiating Two Kinds of Neutrality

Neutrality is a most important concept, yet a controversial one. Theorists of different analytic schools have defined it in their own terms, leaving behind them a legacy of disparate and often contradictory formulations. In this paper, the author reviews briefly some of these ideas about neutrality. Then, from a contemporary interpersonal/relational perspective, the author takes a new look at the idea of neutrality. The author points out how unacknowledged discrepancies among these ideas get in the way of understanding and so complicate analytic discourse, and argues that useful work with this concept requires that analysts differentiate between two aspects of neutrality, specifically operational neutrality and intentional neutrality. The theoretical discussion is followed by a case vignette illustrating the clinical usefulness of this differentiation.     

Toward a definition of psychoanalytic neutrality

The word and concept of neutrality play an important but confusing role in the history of psychoanalysis. Does neutrality imply indifference? The origin of this ambiguity is traced to the fact that Freud himself never used the word "neutrality" (Neutralitaet) in his own writings. (His term Indifferenz was translated as "neutrality" by Strachey.) The essence of the controversy that has simmered in the psychoanalytic literature ever since is contained in the question: "Is remaining true to the concept of neutrality somehow antithetical to the analyst's genuine involvement with the patient?" In this paper, I examine the feeling and power aspects of the word and suggest that the concept of neutrality becomes clinically useful when the analyst asks himself the question, "Neutral to what?" The analyst's awareness of his motives for recognizing and addressing certain conflicts and for overlooking others is heightened. With three clinical vignettes as illustrations, I explore the role of the concept of neutrality in deepening our understanding of (1) the analytic relationship; (2) The influence, on the conduct of the treatment, of the analyst's goals and theoretical persuasion regarding how the goals are to be achieved. As examples, I use the current debates over the relative value of the analyst's focusing his attention on: (a) the patient's mind in the hour rather than his life outside the hour and, (b) transference over nontransference interpretation. Finally, I emphasize the far-reaching implications of adding an explicit concept of "external reality" to A. Freud's exclusively intrapsychic definition of the "objective" analyst's position of neutrality as equidistant from id, ego, and superego. The addition of this fourth point to the analyst's "compass" widens the analytic field toward which the analyst is neutral. The concept of neutrality with respect to specifiable conflicts is thereby also broadened to include (a) interpersonal conflict within the psychoanalytic relationship and (b) conflict within the analyst. With these explicit additions, the concept of neutrality with respect to conflict becomes congruent with the current emphasis on the nonauthoritarian two-persons aspects of the psychoanalytic relationship, without detracting from the primary analytic goal of deeper understanding of intrapsychic conflict.     

Neutrality, interpretation, and therapeutic intent.

Neutrality is a central concept within the theory of psychoanalytic technique. We spell out the major controversies in which the concept has become embroiled, and provide a definition that we believe coincides with actual psychoanalytic practice. We discuss its merits and weaknesses, noting also the negative consequences of relying on older definitions. We relate neutrality to the interpretive process, indicating ways interpretation protects neutrality and is made more effective by it. We discuss the complex and controversial relation between neutrality and the analyst's therapeutic intent.     

Raiding the inarticulate: The internal analytic setting and listening beyond countertransference

The analytic setting exists not only externally but also internally as a structure in the mind of the analyst. The internal analytic setting constitutes an area of the analyst's mind where reality is defined by unconscious symbolic meaning. Clinical examples illustrate how a secure internal setting allows flexibility in the external setting without sacrifice of its analytic quality. The internal setting can help analysts listen inwardly to themselves in a way that is free-floating with regard to their internal processes. This points beyond usual ideas of countertransference. An analytic encounter may stir up elements that belong to the analyst's psyche which, rather than impeding the analysis, can actively enrich it. Seamus Heaney's writings evoke comparisons between listening to poems and listening to patients, and a week in a patient's analysis is described in relation to these themes.     

Some images of the analyst's participation in the analytic process

This paper was originally presented at a workshop (with G. Atwood and S. Parks) on The analyst's participation in the analytic process'. The analyst's 'vulnerability' is highlighted, with specific reference to the ideas of Winnicott, Searles and Jung. Some personal metaphors for the nature of the analytic engagement are offered, as is the image of the 'troubled analyst' from a patient's dream. The burden and necessity of the analyst's participation are emphasized.     

Finding the neutral position: patient and analyst perspectives

In light of current debates between classical and intersubjective schools of psychoanalysis, the challenge posed by the latter to such basic concepts as the analyst's neutrality, anonymity, and abstinence is taken up. It is maintained that the term neutral position is today more germane and meaningful than the term neutrality, which frequently has been taken to prescribe the analyst's posture. It is proposed that for each patient the neutral position is uniquely sited and that it is incumbent on the analyst to find its location. The neutral position is defined within the context of the interaction between analyst and patient. The concept is therefore compatible with--indeed it is essential to--an intersubjective or relational orientation. The manifold reasons, conscious and unconscious, why the analyst is vulnerable to leaving the neutral position are considered. The patient's reaction to the analyst who has left the neutral position and the analyst's clinical use of this reaction are discussed.     

Some vicissitudes of aggression in the interpretive process.

Interpretation is a product of compromise formation that requires optimal use of the analyst's aggression to be an effective analytic intervention. Aggressive aims useful for the interpretive act are problematic for analysts and have led both to clinical difficulties and to various theoretical reactions against considering interpretation essential for analytic progress. In analysis, diverging aims of analyst and patient are highlighted in connection with the analyst's function as interpreter. The interactions between patient and analyst pertaining to interpretation provide insights into the patient's intrapsychic conflicts that may be less apparent in other material.     

The analyst's theory: A third source of countertransference

The author asserts that the analyst's theory, personal and/or academic, is an important source of countertransference which complicates our traditional understanding of the analyst's emotional responses as being constructed from a mix of his transferences and the patient's effects on him. From this perspective, theory - because it has no intrinsic relevance to the essential phenomena of individual analytic processes - may be a confounding, as well as a necessary, factor in clinical work. Although the analyst's theory might be conceptualized as a component of his personality that shapes his emotional reactions to a patient, the author believes that there is a valuable increment of conceptual clarity and additional clinical utility to thinking about a more direct role of theory in the process of countertransference formation. He uses aspects of the clinical analysis of narcissistic resistances to illustrate how some theories might predispose an analyst to confounding unconscious enactments by generating either positive or negative countertransferences which can be used defensively by the patient and/or analyst. He also illustrates how, in some contexts, an analyst's theory might attenuate potentially informative countertransference reactions and interfere in this way with the analyst's apprehension of the patient's psychic functioning. Finally the author addresses the importance of 'fit' between an analyst's working theory and a patient's psychopathology, and considers implications of his ideas for psychoanalytic training and practice.     

The problem of self-disclosure in psychoanalysis

The problem of self-disclosure is explored in relation to currently shifting paradigms of the nature of the analytic relation and analytic interaction. Relational and intersubjective perspectives emphasize the role of self-disclosure as not merely allowable, but as an essential facilitating aspect of the analytic dialogue, in keeping with the role of the analyst as a contributing partner in the process. At the opposite extreme, advocates of classical anonymity stress the importance of neutrality and abstinence. The paper seeks to chart a course between unconstrained self-disclosure and absolute anonymity, both of which foster misalliances. Self-disclosure is seen as at times contributory to the analytic process, and at times deleterious. The decision whether to self-disclose, what to disclose, and when and how, should be guided by the analyst's perspective on neutrality, conceived as a mental stance in which the analyst assesses and decides what, at any given point, seems to contribute to the analytic process and the patient's therapeutic benefit. The major risk in self-disclosure is the tendency to draw the analytic interaction into the real relation between analyst and patient, thus diminishing or distorting the therapeutic alliance, mitigating transference expression, and compromising therapeutic effectiveness.     

The analyst's witnessing and otherness

The analyst's active though silent witnessing of the patient's self-inquiry is presented as an essential aspect of the analytic process. Witnessing, though rooted in the analyst's empathy and holding, represents a more advanced development of those functions based on relational muturation from union to self-other differentiation. Self-definition and regard for otherness are seen as intrinsically unitary. Psychoanalytic witnessing is first illustrated and defined, then located as a derivative of negation in the unfolding of the analytic process, next considered in relation to current concerns for intersubjectivity, and finally linked to current shifts in philosophical thought.     

Enactment controversies: a critical review of current debates

This critical review of the current disputes concerning countertransference enactment systematically outlines the various issues and the perspectives adopted by the relevant psychoanalytic authors. In the light of this the 'common ground ' hypothesis concerning the unifying influence of contemporary countertransference theory is challenged. While the existence of enactments, minimally defined as the analyst's inadvertent actualization of the patient's transference fantasies, is widely accepted, controversies regarding the specific scope, nature, prevalence, relationship to countertransference experience, impact on the analytic process, role played by the analyst's subjectivity, and the correct handling of enactments abound. Rather than taking a stand based on ideological allegiance to any particular psychoanalytic school or philosophical position, the author argues that the relative merits of contending perspectives is best evaluated with reference to close process scrutiny of the context, manifestation and impact of specific enactments on patients' intrapsychic functioning and the analytic relationship. A detailed account of an interpretative enactment provides a context for the author's position on these debates.     

The analyst's insights

The patient's fresh perceptions of himself come through mutative work shared with the analyst in the focused intimacy of their interaction. In finding transferential expectancies realized, the patient can experience these as yet different, providing he has the analyst's optimal participation. In this concurrence of crucial differences he can discount and discard the old perceptions that had shaped his psychic reality, and build out of them fresh insights. The analyst's regressive lapses in his best work are a liability inherent in the compromise formations comprising his work ego, built as it is out of the needs and motives of his own transferential past. The stagnation and tensions his regressive transferences contribute to the analytic work produce vivid actualization of the intrapsychic conflicts of both, now intertwined and mutually reinforcing. The analyst's self-analysis at such times can lead to resolving insights about himself that redress the impasse and restore the analytic work both must do.     

Analyzing disavowed action: the fundamental resistance of analysis

Several detailed analytic hours illustrate how, with the analyst's full participation, patients use the words, setting, and activity of analysis to gratify the very wishes they are analyzing, and so disavow the work of analysis. These gratifications, which are hidden in plain sight, are themselves disavowed in the apparent pursuit of analytic understanding. In this way the patient's and the analyst's use of the analytic situation becomes the fundamental resistance to the work itself. This process shares features in common with perversion. The painful but necessary task for both analyst and patient is to analyze this process as it is occurring, moment by moment, in the real time of the hour.     

Analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and elective self-disclosure

Recent contributions to the psychoanalytic literature propose new ways of understanding analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and self-disclosure. They advocate elective self-disclosure by the analyst as an antidote to the allegedly game-playing quality of transference and resistance analysis. The analytic relationship, they assert, becomes unreal when attempts are made to observe the principles of neutrality and abstinence. Both are seen as ill-conceived because of the irreducible subjectivity and unwarranted authority of the analyst. These relational and interactional views are criticized because (1) they ignore the fact that transference and resistance analysis have from Freud onward been accepted as minimal criteria qualifying a clinical process as psychoanalytic; (2) elective self-disclosure carries metapsychological implications dismissing not only Freud's theory of motivation but motivation as a basic feature of human personality; (3) they do not recognize interpersonal relations as mental events and so do not consider the ego's ability to create intrapsychic representations of object relations; (4) elective self-disclosures within the empathic parameters of the analytic situation are themselves unreal compared to the reality of the patient's experience with other objects. Abstinence and neutrality as ideals facilitate maintenance of an internal holding environment or container for the analyst's countertransference.     

Insight and the analytic dyad

Insight reflects the unitary nature of psychic activity in contrast to the fragmentation created in abstracting categories for the purpose of study and discussion. The unique analytic clinical dyad offers a structure in which intrapsychic fragments can be actualized and integrated. As a result, the analyst's contribution is more crucially one of exploration than of revelation. Whatever the area of examination, past or present, the link to analytic immediacy offers the opportunity to make meanings meaningful, to convert known facts to psychic truths. The analyst's clinical task requires his private self-analysis as part of the collaborative exploration of how the patient's mind works. Higher level ego functioning, including acutely active remembering, is at times transiently loosened in order for the analyst to share in the clinical work of discovery. The words the analyst uses to communicate his understanding convey only approximate manifest meanings, though they structurally reveal deeper messages of importance to the patient. These verbal approximations help stimulate self-reflection in the analysand as a step in the process of gaining insight.     

Exploring a patient's shift from relative silence to verbal expressiveness: Observations on an element of the analyst's participation

By tracing a portion of close process of a patient's shifts from a relatively silent and inhibited stance to one in which he is beginning to verbalize more about his experience and fantasy, I will illustrate some tensions between the analyst's role as facilitating expressiveness and as occupying a place in the patient's internalized world. Since the analyst's functions as facilitator and as internal object (often an obstacle to the patient's expressiveness) are sometimes in conflict with one another, it is important for the analyst to be able to work internally with this conflict as he works with his patient. Splitting processes between these two functions may provide the analyst with cues related to the patient's and the analyst's resistance to understanding the patient's communication of unconscious conflict and the patient's recruitment of the analyst into the patient's internalized world.     

What the analyst does not hear

In the clinical situation, the analyst fails to hear more than he or she hears and spends much time working in the dark. The author raises questions about how we can take cognizance of that state of affairs in our thinking about analytic work. A clinical example illustrates how, in an analytic atmosphere, a patient will correct an analyst's failure to hear. Some ideas are offered about how to maximize the patient's participation in that effort. The author suggests that the problem may not fall precisely under the heading of technique so much as reflecting the analyst's attitude.     

This art of psychoanalysis

It is the art of psychoanalysis in the making, a process inventing itself as it goes, that is the subject of this paper. The author articulates succinctly how he conceives of psychoanalysis, and offers a detailed clinical illustration. He suggests that each analysand unconsciously (and ambivalently) is seeking help in dreaming his 'night terrors' (his undreamt and undreamable dreams) and his 'nightmares' (his dreams that are interrupted when the pain of the emotional experience being dreamt exceeds his capacity for dreaming). Undreamable dreams are understood as manifestations of psychotic and psychically foreclosed aspects of the personality; interrupted dreams are viewed as reflections of neurotic and other non-psychotic parts of the personality. The analyst's task is to generate conditions that may allow the analysand-with the analyst's participation-to dream the patient's previously undreamable and interrupted dreams. A significant part of the analyst's participation in the patient's dreaming takes the form of the analyst's reverie experience. In the course of this conjoint work of dreaming in the analytic setting, the analyst may get to know the analysand sufficiently well for the analyst to be able to say something that is true to what is occurring at an unconscious level in the analytic relationship. The analyst's use of language contributes significantly to the possibility that the patient will be able to make use of what the analyst has said for purposes of dreaming his own experience, thereby dreaming himself more fully into existence.     

Getting cold feet, defining "safe-enough" borders: dissociation, multiplicity, and integration in the analyst's experience.

This paper attempts to explore the fate of the analyst's multiple self/other organizations during times of heightened countertransferential enactment. It is suggested that such countertransference activity involves the "de-homogenization" of otherwise indecipherably integrated self/other constellations, evoked independently or in response to, but always in interaction with, the patient's own unique organization of multiple centers of psychic awareness and unconscious receptivity. An extended clinical example is used to illustrate the theoretical conceptualization.