Two Concepts of Basic Equality

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else).     

Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value

Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians have disagreed, but rather two distinct concepts. I state a number of principles about intrinsic value that have typically (though not universally) been held by Mooreans, all of which are typically denied by Kantians. I show that there are distinct theoretical roles for a concept of intrinsic value to play in a moral framework. When we notice these distinct theoretical roles, we should realize that there is room for two distinct concepts of intrinsic value within a single moral framework: one that accords with some or all of the Moorean principles, and one that does not.     

马丁·路德·金的“两种法律”观

法有好坏、善恶的区分。换言之 ,法律有两种即公正的法律和非公正的法律。人们不仅有法律义务 ,也有道义责任 ,去服从公正的法律。同时 ,人们也有道义的责任不服从非公正的法律。因为 ,不公正的法律根本就算不上是法律。这是美国 2 0世纪著名黑人民权运动领袖马丁·路德·金为驳斥当局和其他方面对其为争取黑人与白人的平等权利而发动的抗议运动的诽谤和攻击 ,特别是所谓示威者不守法的指责 ,而于 196 3年在伯明翰市监狱中写下的《伯明翰狱中书简》里所表达的一个重要思想。该书简被公认为是五六十年代美国黑人民权运动乃至整个美国历史上最…     

Many Concepts and Two Logics of Algorithmic Reduction

Within the program of finding axiomatizations for various parts of computability logic, it was proven earlier that the logic of interactive Turing reduction is exactly the implicative fragment of Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus. That sort of reduction permits unlimited reusage of the computational resource represented by the antecedent. An at least equally basic and natural sort of algorithmic reduction, however, is the one that does not allow such reusage. The present article shows that turning the logic of the first sort of reduction into the logic of the second sort of reduction takes nothing more than just deleting the contraction rule from its Gentzen-style axiomatization. The first (Turing) sort of interactive reduction is also shown to come in three natural versions. While those three versions are very different from each other, their logical behaviors (in isolation) turn out to be indistinguishable, with that common behavior being precisely captured by implicative intuitionistic logic. Among the other contributions of the present article is an informal introduction of a series of new — finite and bounded — versions of recurrence operations and the associated reduction operations. Presented by Robert Goldblatt     

"Two Concepts of Liberty" Through African Eyes

In "Two Concepts of Liberty" Berlin notes the protean nature of the word "freedom" and then systematically proceeds to narrow its range of meanings. In the process, Berlin eliminates much of what most people, in everyday communication, regard as freedom, believing that this is in the best interest of intellectual clarity. As he puts it:
[N]othing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my freedom: I may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that I am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow men. I should be guilt-stricken, and rightly so, if I were not, in some circumstances, ready to make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedom, however great the moral need or the compensation for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. (Emphasis added).
Berlin's other, perhaps overarching, aim is to show how inattention to the specificity of the meanings of concepts might have potentially dangerous political repercussions. He implicitly argues that the intellectuals who promoted the idea of positive freedom as opposed to that of negative freedom contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism and fascism in Europe.     

When Effort Is Enjoyed: Two Studies of Intrinsic Motivation for Personally Salient Activities

Distinctions between two philosophical conceptions of happiness, hedonism and eudaimonism, were applied to the study of intrinsic motivation. Modified versions of the Personally Expressive Activities Questionnaire (PEAQ) were used in two studies to contrast activities, all of which were enjoyed, but which differed in the level of effort involved. In Study 1, 173 college students were free to choose any type of activity that met the selection criteria. In Study 2, the activities chosen by 95 undergraduates were limited to activities associated with a particular leisure time or hobby activity in which the respondents engaged on a regular basis. Consistent results across the two studies indicate that High Effort–Liked activities, in comparison to Low Effort–Liked activities, were associated with greater interest, flow, and feelings of personal expressiveness, greater perceived competence, and higher scores for both self-realization values and importance. These differences are discussed for their implications for the conceptual understanding of intrinsic motivation.     

Testing a SEM Model of Two Religious Concepts and Experiential Spirituality

Guided by Atchley’s Continuity Theory of the Spiritual Self as presented in Aging, spirituality, and religion, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, MN (1995), this study tested the validity of two dimensions of religiosity and one dimension of spirituality. It then examined the extent to which each dimension of religiosity influenced having spiritual experiences for 221 chronically ill older adults. Mean age of the sample was 80 years. Structural equation modeling was used to test a conceptual model. Substantive findings were that private religiosity (prayer and coping), but not public religiosity (participation and other church involvement) may influence reporting spiritual experiences by the older adults in the study. Findings revealed a good model fit to the data and strong factor loadings revealed sound construct validity for the latent variables (i.e., public and private religiosities, and experiential spirituality) in the model.     

伯林的两种自由概念探析

以塞亚·伯林自由理论的基本致思取向是以多元论对抗一元论.以多元论思想为基础,他于1958年在<两种自由概念>的演说中提出了著名的消极自由与积极自由理论.从本质上来看,伯林的两种自由概念是分别从个人自由与社会自由的角度来加以阐释的.     

Two Concepts of Mechanism: Componential Causal System and Abstract Form of Interaction

Although there has been much recent discussion on mechanisms in philosophy of science and social theory, no shared understanding of the crucial concept itself has emerged. In this paper, a distinction between two core concepts of mechanism is made on the basis that the concepts correspond to two different research strategies: the concept of mechanism as a componential causal system is associated with the heuristic of functional decomposition and spatial localization and the concept of mechanism as an abstract form of interaction is associated with the strategy of abstraction and simple models. The causal facts assumed and the theoretical consequences entailed by an explanation with a given mechanism differ according to which concept of mechanism is in use. Research strategies associated with mechanism concepts also involve characteristic biases that should be taken into account when using them, especially in new areas of application.     

Effort feels meaningful

People often dislike effort and avoid it when they can, but effort can also imbue tasks with meaning. This is the case for real-life tasks, but also novel tasks devoid of true purpose. Why does effort feel meaningful, under what conditions, and for whom?     

The Psychological Citizen and the Two Concepts of Social Contract: A Preliminary Analysis

A shift in focus from the logical to the psychological social contract allows us to better explore the socialization of the psychological citizen, and the relationship between identity of individuals and the socio‐political order, with its particular group‐based inequalities. Traditional psychological studies have provided valuable insights into certain aspects of identity, but the new narrative research is leading to novel insights into longer term processes associated with the positioning of identity. The new approach recognizes the dual nature of mental processes and the integral role of context in individual development. Illustrative examples are discussed of the role of cultural carriers in the formation of identity, highlighting the infusion of the macrolevel normative system to thought and action at the microlevel of individuals.     

Effort denial in self-deception

We propose a mixed belief model of self-deception. According to the theory, people distribute belief over two possible causal paths to an action, one where the action is freely chosen and one where it is due to factors outside of conscious control. Self-deceivers take advantage of uncertainty about the influence of each path on their behavior, and shift weight between them in a self-serving way. This allows them to change their behavior to provide positive evidence and deny doing so, enabling diagnostic inference to a desired trait. In Experiment 1, women changed their pain tolerance to provide positive evidence about the future quality of their skin, but judgments of effort claimed the opposite. This “effort denial” suggests that participants’ mental representation of their behavior was dissociated from their actual behavior, facilitating self-deception. Experiment 2 replicated the pattern in a hidden picture task where search performance was purportedly linked to self-control.