When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement

Scientific consensus is widely deferred to in public debates as a social indicator of the existence of knowledge. However, it is far from clear that such deference to consensus is always justified. The existence of agreement in a community of researchers is a contingent fact, and researchers may reach a consensus for all kinds of reasons, such as fighting a common foe or sharing a common bias. Scientific consensus, by itself, does not necessarily indicate the existence of shared knowledge among the members of the consensus community. I address the question of under what conditions it is likely that a consensus is in fact knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is likely to be knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus, and I identify three conditions—social calibration, apparent consilience of evidence, and social diversity, for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus.     

The epistemic significance of consensus

Philosophers have often noted that science displays an uncommon degree of consensus on beliefs among its practitioners. Yet consensus in the sciences is not a goal in itself. I consider cases of consensus on beliefs as concrete events. Consensus on beliefs is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for presuming that these beliefs constitute knowledge. A concrete consensus on a set of beliefs by a group of people at a given historical period may be explained by different factors according to various hypotheses. A particularly interesting hypothesis from an epistemic perspective is the knowledge hypothesis: shared knowledge explains a consensus on beliefs. If all the alternative hypotheses to the knowledge hypotheses are false or are not as good in explaining a concrete consensus on beliefs, the knowledge hypothesis is the best explanation of the consensus. If the knowledge hypothesis is best, a consensus becomes a plausible, though fallible, indicator of knowledge. I argue that if a consensus on beliefs is uncoerced, uniquely heterogeneous and large, the gap between the likelihood of the consensus given the knowledge hypothesis and its likelihoods given competing hypotheses tends to increase significantly. Consensus is a better indicator of knowledge than “success” or “human flourishing”.     

The false consensus effect: A meta-analysis of 115 hypothesis tests

False consensus refers to an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate consensus for their own behaviors. Specifically, the false consensus hypothesis holds that people who engage in a given behavior will estimate that behavior to be more common than it is estimated to be by people who engage in alternative behaviors. A meta-analysis was conducted upon 115 tests of this hypothesis. The combined effects of the tests of the false consensus hypothesis were highly statistically significant and of moderate magnitude. Further, the 115 tests of false consensus appear to be relatively heterogeneous in terms of significance levels and effect sizes. Correlational analyses and focused comparisons indicate that the false consensus effect does not appear to be influenced by the generality of the reference population, nor by the difference between alternative choices in actual consensus. However, the significance and magnitude of the false consensus effect was significantly predicted by the number of behavioral choices/estimates subjects had to make, and the sequence of measurement of choices and estimates. These patterns of results are interpreted as being inconsistent with the self-presentational, motivational explanation for the false consensus effect.     

When do stereotypes become really consensual? Investigating the group-based dynamics of the consensualization process

Although it has long been recognized that stereotypes achieve much of their force from being shared by members of social groups, relatively little empirical work has examined the process by which such consensus is reached. This paper tests predictions derived from self-categorization theory that stereotype consensus will be enhanced (a) by factors which make the shared social identity of perceivers salient and (b) by group interaction that is premised upon that shared identity. In Experiment 1 (N=40) the consensus of ingroup stereotypes is enhanced where an ingroup is judged after (rather than before) an outgroup. In Experiment 2 (N=80) when only one group is judged, group interaction is shown to enhance the consensus of outgroup stereotypes more than those of the ingroup—an apparent ‘outgroup consensus effect’. In Experiment 3 (N=135) this asymmetry is extinguished and group interaction found to produce equally high consensus in both ingroup and outgroup stereotypes when the ingroup is explicitly contrasted from an outgroup. Implications for alternative models of consensus development are discussed. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consensus change, conflict, and relationship satisfaction in romantic relationships

In this cross-sectional study of 92 romantic relationships, both the S. S. Hendrick (1988) Relationship Assessment Scale and a 16-item negative conflict scale were independently associated with the consensus items of the Short Marital Adjustment Test (H. J. Locke & K. M. Wallace, 1959), but not with change from initial to present consensus. However, consensus change was significantly correlated with relationship satisfaction and negative conflict in those reporting decreased consensus or no change but not increased consensus. Furthermore, relationship satisfaction was accounted for solely by negative conflict in the increased consensus group and by present consensus in the decreased consensus group. These results suggest that the association of relationship satisfaction with consensus and negative conflict may differ according to perceived consensus change.     

The legal consensus about foregoing life-sustaining treatment: its status and its prospects

The legal consensus that has evolved through adjudication and legislation since the Karen Quinlan case in 1976 is founded on the premise that there is a bright line between passive euthanasia and active euthanasia. Indeed, the term passive euthanasia is often eschewed in favor of less emotionally-laden terminology such as "forgoing life-sustaining treatment" or "terminating life support" so as to further sever any possible connection with active euthanasia. Legal approval has been bestowed upon passive euthanasia under certain circumstances while active euthanasia is routinely condemned. This consensus was put to a test in 1990 when the United States Supreme Court ruled on the Cruzan case. However, the Court's narrow decision did not upset the consensus, and in the most significant appellate decisions handed down by state courts since Cruzan, there has been a reaffirmation--and possibly even an extension--of the consensus. Two other threats to the legal consensus about forgoing life-sustaining treatment have begun to manifest themselves: the increasing pressure for mercy killing and "futility" cases. Both of these challenge the fundamental premises on which the consensus is grounded.     

Goal Interference, Perceived Consensus, and Preferences for Conflict-Resolution Strategies

This study is a survey of recreational users ( n = 85) of a scenic reservoir that was at the center of a controversy about whether the use of motorboats should be restricted or banned. We examined the hypothesis that the amount of goal interference that respondents experienced in the pursuit of recreational activities would be related to perceptions of consensus for their activities and for the regulations they preferred. We also hypothesized that perceived consensus would be related to greater preference for majority rule and less preference for compromise as the preferred strategy for resolving the conflict. Results show that goal interference was related to perceived consensus and that greater perceived consensus was related to unwillingness to compromise and preference for majority rule. Discussion centered on how perceptions about consensus arise from different experiences and on the role of perceived consensus in conflict resolution.     

Prejudiced People Perceive More Community Support for Their Views: The Role of Own,Media, and Peer Attitudes in Perceived Consensus

People often overestimate others' support for their views (false consensus effect). Recent research has shown that this is particularly marked in the relation between perceived consensus and prejudice. The current research asked whether this partly arises in an in‐group stereotype of the community as prejudiced. We investigated relations between different sources of normative information (self, media, peers), estimates of community attitudes, and perceived consensus in a sample of 135 community members. Media prejudice predicted community attitudes, and this further predicted consensus. However, strongest was a direct relation between own prejudice and perceived consensus. The results indicate a desire to appear nonprejudiced, relative to others. Confronting prejudiced people with information about community norms is a promising intervention under these circumstances.     

Populism vs. elitism: social consensus and social status as bases of attitude certainty

This study examined the effects of social consensus and social status on attitude certainty that is conceptualized multi-dimensionally as perceived clarity and correctness of one's attitude. In a mock opinion exchange about a social issue, participants were either supported (high consensus) or opposed (low consensus) by most of the confederates. They were informed that their opinion (high status) or their opponents' opinion (low status) had the alleged psychological significance indicative of future success. Post-experimental attitude clarity was significantly greater when attitudinal position was associated with high rather than low status. Attitude correctness was interactively affected by social status and social consensus. Supporting the compensatory effect hypothesis, attitude correctness was comparable across the levels of social consensus as long as they were associated with high status, and across the levels of social status as long as they were associated with high social consensus.     

Effects of Consensus and Devill's Advocacy On Strategic Decision-Making

Strategic consensus within management teams is thought to affect company performance because of its effects on the quality of team decision-making (Bourgeois, 1985, p. 571). Past research dealing with the relationship between consensus and company performance, however, has not specifically examined the effects of consensus on decision-making. The debate on the effects of strategic consensus parallels a debate on the effects of consensus-based and conflict-based decision aids (Schweiger & Finger, 1984; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986; Schwenk, 1988). The experiment described in this paper is the first which deals with the effects of group consensus and conflict-based decision aids on group decision-making. The results showed that high-consensus groups generally had higher performance, suggesting that consensus improves group decision-making. Further, groups given the decision technique of devil's advocacy had higher levels of critical evaluation in decision-making but less desire to work with each other in the future, suggesting that devil's advocacy has mixed effects on decision-making groups. An interaction effect showed that devil's advocacy increased the commitment of high-consensus group members to the decisions their groups had reached but did not have a similar effect on low-consensus groups. This result demonstrates the importance of examining both consensus and decision aids simultaneously. The implications of the results for the interpretation of past research on consensus and on conflict-based decision aids are offered in the conclusion.     

Ego depletion and its paradoxical effects on ethical decision making

Whereas previous research has shown that ego depletion can lead to an increase in unethical behavior, we suggest that this effect hinges on the social consensus of the unethical behavior. Drawing from theories on social consensus and dual-process decision-making, we hypothesize and confirm that ego depletion is associated with increased unethical behavior of comparatively low social consensus. We then find that, as hypothesized, ego depletion is associated with decreased unethical behavior of high social consensus (Studies 1 and 2). Results further suggest that, controlling for state self-control resources, depleted participants are less likely to engage in unethical behavior of high social consensus as a result of increased subjective fatigue (Study 3). Taken together, our findings challenge a widely-held assumption about the negative effects of ego depletion on ethical decision making.     

The Place of Comprehensive Doctrines in Political Liberalism: On Some Common Misgivings About the Subject and Function of the Overlapping Consensus

In this paper I argue that Rawlsians have largely misunderstood the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, thereby failing to delineate in an appropriate way the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism. My argument rests on two core claims. The first claim is that (i) political liberalism is committed to three theses about the overlapping consensus. The first thesis concerns the subject of the overlapping consensus; the second thesis concerns the function of the overlapping consensus; the third thesis explains how the overlapping consensus can serve its function in accordance with political liberalism??s commitment to epistemic neutrality. The second claim on which my argument relies is empirical: (ii) Rawlsians typically deny at least one of the three theses to which political liberalism is committed. Based on (i) and (ii), I conclude that Rawlsians have hitherto provided unconvincing accounts of the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism.     

The malleable influence of social consensus on attitude certainty

People often reflect on the opinions of others and express greater attitude certainty when they perceive their attitudes to be shared by others (high attitude consensus). The present research tests the possibility that either high or low attitude consensus can increase attitude certainty depending on people's salient social identification needs. In particular, high attitude consensus with a target group is found to be more validating when people seek to belong to the group, as this identification motive promotes a search for similarities between themselves and the group. In contrast, low attitude consensus with a target group is found to be more validating when people seek to be unique from a group, as this identification motive promotes a search for dissimilarities between themselves and the group. Two experiments support these hypotheses, offering insight into the intra-personal motives that alter the diagnostic value of social consensus information.     

When consensus counts: Exploring the impact of consensus claims in advertising

Consensus claims are broad declarative statements used in an advertisement purporting that a majority of a certain group of consumers prefer or use the sponsor's product or service. While consensus claims are frequently used by advertisers, little is known about how they operate or their effectiveness. We utilize attribution theory to provide insight about how consensus claims operate, and to investigate the impact of consensus claims on attributions and brand attitudes. Results suggest consensus claims are an effective advertising strategy, but their persuasive impact varies according to the featured social information and the processing motivation of audience members.     

Defensive pride and consensus: strength in imaginary numbers

Failure (Study 1) and attachment separation thoughts (Study 2) caused exaggerated consensus estimates for personal beliefs about unrelated social issues. This compensatory consensus effect was most pronounced among defensively proud individuals, that is, among those with the combination of high explicit and low implicit self-esteem (Study 1) and the combination of high attachment avoidance and low attachment anxiety (Study 2). In Study 3, another form of defensive pride, narcissism, was associated with exaggerated consensual worldview defense after a system-injustice threat. In Study 4, imagined consensus reduced subjective salience of proud individuals' troubling thoughts. Compensatory consensus is seen as a kind of defensive self-affirmation that defensively proud people turn to for insulation from distressing thoughts.     

A methodological note about the measurement of the false‐consensus effect

Although the existence of the false consensus effect is beyond all doubt, its interpretation as a judgemental bias is still a matter of debate. Krueger recently proposed a new measure for this phenomenon, called the truly false consensus effect (TFCE). This measure consists of correlating the subject's endorsement of each item with the error he or she made in estimating the popularity of that same item. I question the validity of this measure, arguing that it could be negative even in cases where false consensus is at work. I present an inter‐group study where participants made percentage estimates for various behaviours. The results yielded a significantly negative TFCE, although other measures of false consensus demonstrate that the phenomenon is present. I discuss the differences between Krueger's studies and my own, and suggest that a better measure of false consensus might be the particle correlation between endorsement and estimated popularity, controlling for true popularity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The other way around: Effects of causal attributions on estimates of consensus,distinctiveness, and consistency

It was hypothesized that the attributed cause of a given person's behavior will affect inferences about its generalizability over persons (consensus), stimuli (distinctiveness), and circumstances (consistency). Moreover, these effects were expected to parallel the effects of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information on causal attributions. Experiment 1 provided support for these predictions but also showed that attribution affected consensus judgments less than it affected judgments of distinctiveness and consistency, particularly when consensus was not the first characteristic estimated. Using a different set of stimulus materials and a different manipulation of attribution, Experiments 2 and 3 provided further evidence for the effects of attribution on inferences of consensus information. Experiment 3 indicated that the false consensus effect—actors' tendency to assume that the majority of people share their behavior—may be due to actors' tendency to attribute their behavior to situational factors. Implications of the present studies for biased estimates of consensus and the use of consensus and attribution as mediating variables are discussed.     

Climate quality and climate consensus as mediators of the relationship between organizational antecedents and outcomes

Research has shown that climate quality (average climate ratings) is related to organizational antecedents and outcomes, but researchers have yet to examine climate consensus (the variance of climate ratings). Similarly, studies have investigated typical behavior (members' average performance), but have neglected behavioral similarity (within-group variance). Data from 1,196 members in 180 organizations were used to test relationships of climate quality and consensus with organizational antecedents and outcomes. Climate quality and consensus both had significant correlations with organizational antecedents and outcomes, but climate consensus did not contribute a significant increment to the prediction of organizational outcomes. Finally, quality mediated many relationships between organizational antecedents and outcomes.     

Group Consensus and Psychological Well-Being: A Large Field Study1

Models of group process propose that stressful social environments develop when there is a lack of consensus among group members about issues of relevance to the group. Based on these models, we expected that levels of consensus would be positively related to the average levels of psychological well-being in naturally occurring work groups. An examination of data from 3,546 respondents within 73 work groups revealed that levels of consensus about leadership and peer relations were positively related to the average psychological well-being of the group members, even after controlling for absolute level effects and covariates. In contrast, levels of consensus were not related to the average psychological well-being of group members when identical analyses were conducted using pseudogroups.