Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

Letting people off the hook: when do good deeds excuse transgressions?

Three studies examined when and why an actor's prior good deeds make observers more willing to excuse--or license--his or her subsequent, morally dubious behavior. In a pilot study, actors' good deeds made participants more forgiving of the actors' subsequent transgressions. In Study 1, participants only licensed blatant transgressions that were in a different domain than actors' good deeds; blatant transgressions in the same domain appeared hypocritical and suppressed licensing (e.g., fighting adolescent drug use excused sexual harassment, but fighting sexual harassment did not). Study 2 replicated these effects and showed that good deeds made observers license ambiguous transgressions (e.g., behavior that might or might not represent sexual harassment) regardless of whether the good deeds and the transgression were in the same or in a different domain--but only same-domain good deeds did so by changing participants' construal of the transgressions. Discussion integrates two models of why licensing occurs.     

Enfreindre sans craindre : tolérance à la dissonance dans le paradigme de l’hypocrisie induite

Induced-hypocrisy is directly derived from cognitive dissonance theory. This paradigm involves the combination of two factors: commitment factor, in which the individual advocates a pro-normative position and mindful factor in which the past transgressions are made salient. This combination arouses dissonance, which is usually reduced by changing the behavior in line with the normative advocacy. We used the induced-hypocrisy paradigm to test one of the original hypotheses of dissonance: it exists a tolerance towards dissonance. This tolerance was operationalized via the frequency of self-reported transgressions (e.g. familiarization with transgressions). Participants were made hypocritical; then they were given the opportunity to reduce dissonance through trivialization scale. According to the hypothesis, less frequent were the transgressions and higher was their trivialization.     

Sometimes it's easier to forgive my transgressor than your transgressor: effects of subjective temporal distance on forgiveness for harm to self or close other

The present research extended previous work on the third‐party (un)forgiveness effect—the tendency to be more forgiving for transgressions committed against the self than a close other—by testing how subjective temporal distance of first‐ and third‐party transgressions might influence the forgiveness process. Participants recalled a time in which they or a close other was harmed by another person, and was then made to feel either distant from or close to the transgression. As predicted, third‐party (un)forgiveness was observed when transgressions felt distant, but not when transgressions felt recent. Implications for restoring and maintaining positive relationships are discussed.     

Harmful transgressions qua moral transgressions: A deflationary view

One important issue in moral psychology concerns the proper characterisation of the folk understanding of the relationship between harmful transgressions and moral transgressions. Psychologist Elliot Turiel and associates have claimed with a broad range of supporting evidence that harmful transgressions are understood as transgressions that are authority independent and general in scope which, according to them, characterises these transgressions as moral transgressions. Recently many researchers questioned the position advocated by the Turiel tradition with some new evidence. We entered this debate proposing an original, deflationary view in which perceptions of basic-rights violation and injustice are fundamental for the folk understanding of harmful transgressions as moral transgressions in Turiel's sense. In this article we elaborate and refine our deflationary view, while reviewing the debate, addressing various criticisms raised against our perspective, showing how our perspective explains the existent evidence, and suggesting new lines of inquiry.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

Neural correlates of conventional and harm/welfare-based moral decision-making

The degree to which social norms are processed by a unitary system or dissociable systems remains debated. Much research on children’s social-cognitive judgments has supported the distinction between “moral” (harm/welfare-based) and “conventional” norms. However, the extent to which these norms are processed by dissociable neural systems remains unclear. To address this issue, 23 healthy participants were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they rated the wrongness of harm/welfare-based and conventional transgressions and neutral vignettes. Activation significantly greater than the neutral vignette baseline was observed in regions implicated in decision-making regions including rostral/ventral medial frontal, anterior insula and dorsomedial frontal cortices when evaluating both harm/welfare-based and social-conventional transgressions. Greater activation when rating harm/welfare-based relative to social-conventional transgressions was seen through much of ACC and bilateral inferior frontal gyrus. Greater activation was observed in superior temporal gyrus, bilateral middle temporal gyrus, left PCC, and temporal-parietal junction when rating social-conventional transgressions relative to harm/welfare-based transgressions. These data suggest that decisions regarding the wrongness of actions, irrespective of whether they involve care/harm-based or conventional transgressions, recruit regions generally implicated in affect-based decision-making. However, there is neural differentiation between harm/welfare-based and conventional transgressions. This may reflect the particular importance of processing the intent of transgressors of conventional norms and perhaps the greater emotional content or salience of harm/welfare-based transgressions.     

Popular and rejected children's social reasoning: linking social status and social knowledge.

The relationship between children's social status/sex and their moral judgements was examined. Sixty-four second- and third-grade children (33 boys, 31 girls) who were identified as popular or rejected by peer sociometric measures were shown pictures of children engaged in moral and second-order transgressions. The children were asked to rate each event on (a) the degree of seriousness for other and self, (b) the amount of punishment for other and self, and (c) rule alterability. The children were also asked for justification of the transgressions (why they thought the transgressions were wrong). The popular and rejected children differentiated between moral and second-order transgressions based upon criterion ratings and justifications. Differences emerged between the popular and the rejected children's ratings and justifications for moral transgressions, suggesting that children's moral judgements are related to social experiences associated with peer acceptance and rejection.     

Emotional and behavioural reactions to moral transgressions: cross-cultural and individual variations in India and Britain

Reactions to moral transgressions are subject to influence at both the cultural and individual levels. Transgressions against an individual's rights or against social conventions of hierarchy may elicit different reactions in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In the current study, affective and behavioural reactions to transgressions of autonomy (rights) and community (hierarchy) were examined in India and Britain. Results revealed that although reactions to autonomy transgressions are similar in India and Britain, Indian participants express more moral outrage than do Britons in response to transgressions of community. Results also supported the contention of emotion‐specificity in affective moral reaction: Participants in both India and Britain reported anger in response to autonomy transgressions, but contempt in response to violations of community. Importantly, these results extend previous research by demonstrating the importance of emotion specificity in moral reactions, as opposed to categorization or dilemma resolution. In addition, an individual difference measure of respect for persons was shown to moderate reactions to moral transgressions. Specifically, participants with high respect for persons were less negative to violators of the community ethic, but not the autonomy ethic. These findings highlight the importance of examining emotion‐specific responses in the moral domain and introduce a significant individual difference variable, respect for persons, into the psychology of morality.     

Reciprocal associations between young children's developing moral judgments and theory of mind

Associations between young children's developing theory of mind (ToM) and judgments of prototypical moral transgressions were examined 3 times across 1 year in 70 American middle class 2.5- to 4-year-olds. Separate path models controlling for cross-time stability in judgments, within-time associations, and children's age at Wave 1 indicated that across both 6-month intervals, children who evaluated moral acts as more wrong independent of authority had more mature ToM 6 months later; in addition, judgments of moral transgressions as less permissible at Wave 2 also led to more advanced ToM at Wave 3. Children with more advanced ToM judged that moral rules are more alterable, however, and rated moral transgressions as less deserving of punishment. Finally, more advanced ToM initially led to evaluations of moral transgressions as less independent of rules and then to judgments of moral transgressions as more independent of rules. During the preschool years, early moral judgments and theory of mind appear to develop as reciprocal, bidirectional processes.     

The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite

The present study examined the processes giving rise to moral hypocrisy, a phenomenon in which individuals judge their own transgressions to be less morally objectionable than the same transgressions enacted by others. Two alternative models of the source of hypocrisy were compared to determine whether hypocrisy results from automatic or volitional biases. Findings demonstrated not only that participants viewed their own transgressions as significantly more “fair” than the same transgressions enacted by others, but also that this bias was eliminated under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings support the view that hypocrisy stems from volitionally-guided justifications, and thereby suggest that at a more basic level, humans possess a negative response to violations of fairness norms whether enacted by themselves or others.     

Children's moral evaluations of reporting the transgressions of peers: age differences in evaluations of tattling

The way children evaluate the reporting of peers' transgressions to authority figures was investigated. Participants, ages 6-11 years (N = 60), were presented with a series of vignettes, each of which depicted a child who committed either a minor transgression (such as not finishing the vegetables at lunch) or a more serious transgression (such as stealing from a classmate). Participants were asked to evaluate the decision of a child observer who either did or did not report the transgression to a teacher. Younger children considered reporting to be appropriate for both types of transgressions, but older children considered reporting to be appropriate for major transgressions only. Results are interpreted with reference to (a) a changing peer culture in which the social cost of reporting transgressions increases and (b) a developmental change in children's cognitive capabilities.     

Effects of relational transgressions on idealization of and disillusionment with one's romantic partner: A three‐wave longitudinal study

In this three‐wave study (n = 121 couples), we tested whether one couple‐member's relational transgressions (high and low severity) at Wave 1 predicted less idealization on warmth and competence traits and greater disillusionment by the partner at the next two waves. It was hypothesized that (a) greater frequency of the target partner's severe transgressions in 1 month would be needed to reduce how much the other partner idealized the target in the competence domain, (b) higher frequency of even relatively less severe transgressions would lower the partner's idealization of the target in the warmth domain, and (c) any transgressions would raise perceivers' disillusionment. Longitudinal analyses (controlling for earlier idealization and disillusionment) substantially supported predictions.     

Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe

Highly hypnotizable participants were given a posthypnotic suggestion to feel a flash of disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word. They were then asked to rate moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies show that moral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust. These findings suggest that moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden moral intuitions.     

Social valuation and punishment assignment in transgressions of environment protection laws

The of breaches of environmental law is not always evident. This characteristic contributes to making the study of people's evaluation of anti-ecological behaviour of special interest for the understanding of environmental law compliance. In this study, 573 participants evaluated seven transgressions of environmental law, on seven scales. The results show that participants differentially evaluate the transgressions; that Indignation and the Severity of the consequences are the scales that best predict the punishment that participants think should be assigned to these transgressions; that women are stricter in evaluating; and that there are marginal differences related to area of residence and age.     

Popular and Rejected Children's Social Reasoning: Linking Social Status and Social Knowledge

The relationship between children's social status/sex and their moral judgments was examined. Sixty-four second- and third-grade children (33 boys, 31 girls) who were identified as popular or rejected by peer sociometric measures were shown pictures of children engaged in moral and second-order transgressions. The children were asked to rate each event on (a) the degree of seriousness for other and self, (b) the amount of punishment for other and self, and (c) rule alterability. The children were also asked for justification of the transgressions (why they thought the transgressions were wrong). The popular and rejected children differentiated between moral and second-order transgressions based upon criterion ratings and justifications. Differences emerged between the popular and the rejected children's ratings and justifications for moral transgressions, suggesting that children's moral judgments are related to social experiences associated with peer acceptance and rejection.     

Narcissists as "Victims": the role of narcissism in the perception of transgressions

Narcissism is a set of traits that are motivated by the desire to establish and maintain a grandiose self-image. Consistent with this conceptualization, the authors hypothesized that narcissistic people perceive themselves to be the victims of other people's inter-personal transgressions more frequently than do less narcissistic people. In a 14-day diary study, the authors found that narcissism (particularly in its exploitiveness/entitlement dimension) was associated positively with the number and frequency of transgressions that respondents reported. The narcissism-victimization relationship appears to result, at least in part, from biased recall or self-presentation. The exploitiveness/entitlement dimension of narcissism may be particularly useful for explaining why narcissistic people report higher rates of interpersonal transgressions in their daily lives.     

Individual Breaches of Environmental Laws in Cases from Public Administration Files

The characteristics of environmental transgressions and transgressors involved in 1,505 files handled by 4 public administrations were assessed. These administrations were in charge of environmental law enforcement in a highly protected setting, across federal, state, island, and municipality jurisdictions. Special attention was given to the transgressors' written responses to administrative sanctions included in the files. These were analyzed integrating the approaches of neutralization techniques and of accounts as strategies of conflict management. Results suggest that most environmental transgressions under study were carried out by private individuals in the personal domain of everyday life, and that transgressors' accounts of environmental transgressions were short, straightforward, and questioned the legitimacy of the environmental law being broken.