Judgements of Deontic Relevance in Reasoning: A Reply to Jackson and Griggs

Facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task can be produced by deontic content. Jackson and Griggs (1990) claimed that this finding depends on the presence of an explicit negative on the not-q card. We hypothesized that the removal of the explicit negative from this card made its deontic status ambiguous. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a not-q card presenting implicit negative is not selected, and most subjects select the only card that appears to be relevant from a deontic point of view (i.e. the p card). Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the presence of the explicit negative on the not-q card is not necessary for producing facilitation, provided that the form of this card makes it clear that the not-q individual is a potential violator. Experiment 4 showed that a high success rate can be obtained even with a not-q card presenting an implicit negative. The results are discussed in terms of the specificity of reasoning in the deontic domain.     

The elusive pragmatic reasoning schemas effect

The present study examined the pragmatic reasoning schema theory of deductive reasoning—specifically, its explanation of performance on the selection task. Experiment 1 replicated a result crucial to the theory, the finding of facilitation on abstract versions of the selection task based on pragmatic reasoning schemas. However, Experiments 2, 3, and 4 established that this facilitation was dependent upon two presentation factors: (1) the presence of explicit negatives on the NOT P and NOT Q cards and (2) the inclusion of a checking context in the problem statement. These results are discussed in terms of Evans's two-stage (heuristic/analytic processing) model of reasoning.     

To What Extent Do Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas Affect Performance on Wason's Selection Task?

Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) most persuasive evidence for pragmatic reasoning schema theory has been the finding that an abstract permission version of Wason's selection task yields higher rates of solution than a nonpragmatic control. Experiment 1 presented two problem sets, one modelled after Cheng and Holyoak's abstract permission problem, which is relativley rich in extraneous features, and one after Wason's, relatively impoverished, standard problem. Each problem set varied type of rule (permission, obligation, or nonpragmatic) and task type (to reason from or about a rule). Results revealed that enriched problems were solved more often than impoverished ones, that reasoning-from problems were solved more often than reasoning-about problems, and that there was a beneficial interaction between enriching features and the permission rule. Experiment 2 demonstrated that although explicit negatives were crucial for solution of reasoning-from permission problems, they played no role in solution of enriched nonpragmatic-rule problems. Experiment 3 provided a replication of the enriched reasoning-from permission problem, again revealed no beneficial effect for obligation-rule problems, and further revealed no influence of instructions to provide brief written justifications. We argue that the results show that the scope of pragmatic reasoning schema theory needs to be narrowed, that although a permission rule does have an effect, an obligation rule does not, and that some beneficial task features are independent of anything explained by pragmatic reasoning schema theory.     

Evoking the permission schema: The impact of explicit negation and a violation-checking context

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) proposed that realistic reasoning in deontic contexts is based on pragmatic schemas such as those for assessing compliance with or violation of permission and obligation rules, and that the evocation of these schemas can facilitate performance in Wason's (1966) selection task. The inferential rules in such schemas are intermediate in generality between the content-independent rules proposed by logicians and specific cases stored in memory. In one test of their theory, Cheng and Holyoak demonstrated that facilitation could be obtained even for an abstract permission rule that is devoid of concrete thematic content. Jackson and Griggs (1990) argued on the basis of several experiments that such facilitation is not due to evocation of a permission schema, but, rather, results from a combination of presentation factors: the presence of explicit negatives in the statement of cases and the presence of a violation-checking context. Their conclusion calls into question both the generality of content effects in reasoning and the explanation of these effects. We note that Jackson and Griggs did not test whether the same combination of presentation factors would produce facilitation for an arbitrary rule that does not involve deontic concepts, as their proposal would predict. The present study tested this prediction. Moreover, we extended Jackson and Griggs' comparisons between performance with an abstract permission rule versus an arbitrary rule, introducing clarifications in the statement of each. No facilitation was observed for an arbitrary rule even when explicit negatives and a violation-checking context were used, whereas strong facilitation was found for the abstract permission rule under the same conditions. Performance on the arbitrary rule was not improved even when the instructions indicated that the rule was conditional rather than biconditional. In contrast, a small but reliable degree of facilitation was obtained for the abstract permission rule, with violation-checking content even in the absence of explicit negatives. The theory of pragmatic reasoning schemas can account for both the present findings and those reported by Jackson and Griggs.     

Reducing cognitive complexity in a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

The confusion/non-consequential thinking explanation proposed by Newstead, Girotto, and Legrenzi (1995) for poor performance on Wason's THOG problem (a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task) was examined in three experiments with 300 participants. In general, as the cognitive complexity of the problem and the possibility of non-consequential thinking were reduced, correct performance increased. Significant but weak facilitation (33-40% correct) was found in Experiment 1 for THOG classification instructions that did not include the indeterminate response option. Substantial facilitation (up to 75% correct) was obtained in Experiment 2 with O'Brien et al.'s (1990) one-other-THOG classification instruction. In Experiment 3, a revised version of O'Brien et al.'s pre-test problem format also led to substantial facilitation, even with the use of the standard three-choice THOG classification instruction. These findings are discussed in terms of Newstead et al.'s theoretical proposal and possible attentional factors.     

Facilitation and analogical transfer in the THOG task

This study was concerned with Wason's THOG task, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning problem for which performance is typically very poor (<20% correct). Recently, however, Needham and Amado (1995) and Koenig and Griggs (2004) have observed both facilitation and spontaneous analogical transfer effects for the Pythagoras version of this task. Based on their findings, Koenig and Griggs concluded that in addition to the separation of the data (the properties of the designated THOG) from the hypotheses that need to be generated (the possible combinations of properties written down), an explicit request to generate these hypotheses is necessary to obtain significant analogical transfer. In the present study we extended the generalisability of this conclusion in three experiments with 214 undergraduate participants using O'Brien et al.'s (1990) Blackboard version of the task. We discuss the relationship of the results to dual process theories of reasoning and propose that analogical transfer may be a better criterion than task facilitation for judging participants' task understanding.     

Facilitation in the abstract selection task: The effects of attentional and instructional factors

The present study examined performance on Wason's four-card abstract selection task. Baseline performance is very poor, usually less than 10% correct; and this task has a long record of resistance to facilitation. It was hypothesized that the two primary sources of difficulty are selective encoding of the problem information and the lack of satisfactory analytic processing. Three experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, performance was improved by explicating the implication rule. The majority of subjects, however, still failed to make the correct selection. Subjects were required in Experiment 2 to provide reasons for their selection or non-selection of each of the cards. This response procedure, paired with an explicated rule, led to further improvements in performance (over 50% correct selections). In Experiment 3, the influence of the type of selection instruction (true-false vs. violation) was examined. Paired with an explicated rule and the reasons response format, violation instructions led to one of the highest correct selection rates ever observed for any version of the selection task: over 80% correct. Because of the importance of this result, it was replicated twice. The results of these three experiments are discussed in terms of Johnson-Laird and Byrne's mental models theory and Evans's two-stage model of reasoning.     

Pragmatic reasoning schemas

We propose that people typically reason about realistic situations using neither content-free syntactic inference rules nor representations of specific experiences. Rather, people reason using knowledge structures that we term pragmatic reasoning schemas, which are generalized sets of rules defined in relation to classes of goals. Three experiments examined the impact of a “permission schema” on deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 demonstrated that by evoking the permission schema it is possible to facilitate performance in Wason's selection paradigm for subjects who have had no experience with the specific content of the problems. Experiment 2 showed that a selection problem worded in terms of an abstract permission elicited better performance than one worded in terms of a concrete but arbitrary situation, providing evidence for an abstract permission schema that is free of domain-specific content. Experiment 3 provided evidence that evocation of a permission schema affects not only tasks requiring procedural knowledge, but also a linguistic rephrasing task requiring declarative knowledge. In particular, statements in the form if p then q were rephrased into the form p only if q with greater frequency for permission than for arbitrary statements, and rephrasings of permission statements produced a pattern of introduction of modals (must, can) totally unlike that observed for arbitrary conditional statements. Other pragmatic schemas, such as “causal” and “evidence” schemas can account for both linguistic and reasoning phenomena that alternative hypotheses fail to explain.     

Reasoning about Conditional Promises and Warnings: Darwinian Algorithms, Mental Models, Relevance Judgements or Pragmatic Schemas?

It is proposed that reasoning about social contracts, such as conditional promises and warnings, is under the control of a compound schema made of two pragmatic schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), expressing an obligation and a permission. Two experiments were run using thematic versions of the Wason selection task in which the rule and the core of the scenario were kept constant and the point of view of the actor (e.g. promisor or promisee) was varied. The results supported the predictions (including the occurrence of a correct pattern of response that consists of all four cards) and falsified predictions derived from Cosmides' (1989) theory of social exchange. The mental models theory and Evans' two-stage theory of reasoning are also discussed in the light of the present results.     

Pragmatic Schemas and the Selection Task: To Reason or Not to Reason

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) have proposed that people possess classes of linguistically based schemas that have an internal structure that is determined by pragmatic considerations. They found that when permission schemas (“If you want to do P, then you must do Q”) are used in the selection task, the success rate is much superior to what is usually observed. According to Cheng and Holyoak, this is due to the fact that the permission schema is defined by a set of production rules that give the same answers to problems of conditional inference as those of formal logic. In order to test this hypothesis specifically, 160 university students were given one of two tests. The first contained two sets of inferential reasoning tasks, one using a permission schema, the second using a relation of multiple causality. The second test employed the same two conditional relations, but in an appropriate context. The results indicated that subjects did better on the reasoning task with the schema of multiple causality when presented in context, but, as predicted, their performance was much worse on the inferential reasoning task with the permission schema, which generated a higher proportion of logically incorrect responses. These results suggest that contrary to what has been affirmed, permission schemas might not have a logical structure that is equivalent to conditional logic. A second experiment examined selection task performance using the same two relations in context. Performance on the permission schema was superior to that found with the relation of multiple causality. This confirmed previous results indicating that permission schemas do improve selection task performance, but also suggests that this effect is not related to understanding of conditional reasoning.     

Effects of Explicit Instruction to “Be Creative” Across Domains and Cultures

To explore whether the facilitation effects of an explicit instruction to “be creative” vary across cultures and types of tasks, 248 U.S. and 278 Chinese college students were administered a battery of tests of verbal, artistic, and mathematical creativity. Half of the participants were tested under the standard condition, and the other half under the explicit instruction condition. Results showed that the facilitation effects of the explicit instruction varied by domains of the creativity tasks (greater for artistic and mathematical creativity than for verbal creativity), but not across cultural and ethnic groups. The explicit instruction had a small “detrimental” effect on the clarity and grammar of story writing, but not on any other aspects of the technical quality of creative products. Methodological and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Priming arithmetic reasoning in an amnesic patient

The present study elucidates the role of implicit memory in problem solving by evaluating priming effects in a severely amnesic patient. An arithmetic series completion task was adopted to investigate the effects of lags, of items difficulty, as well as the influence of different distractor tasks on priming numerical reasoning. The results indicated that the priming effect was maximized in difficult trials and disappeared after long lags. On the other hand, the facilitation effect was not modulated by the nature of the distractor tasks. Critically, the experimental design controlled for peripheral facilitation of visual input and verbal output processes and a recognition task indicated that the effect may not be attributed to explicit memory. Thus, the facilitation must be located to a more central stage, possibly at the stage in which the abstract formula of the underlying algorithm are generated (Langdon & Warrington, 1997).     

任务图式对文章修改的影响研究

本研究探讨任务图式对文章修改的影响。高低水平的作者先完成一个写作任务,再修改文章的初稿。修改时,实验组学生先接受关于正确修改的任务图式指导,控制组学生则直接进行修改。实验结果表明,任务图式指导有明显的主效应,高低水平作者均提高了对字面错误与意义错误的正确修改,而水平间的差异主要表现在意义错误的修改上。本研究还分析了任务图式指导对修改的字数(包括改变意义与保留意义的字数)、修改的句法水平(包括字、词和句子)以及修改的方式(包括插入、替换、删除和移动句子)的影响。     

Pragmatic schemas and conditional reasoning in children

Solving problems involving conditional relationships has been postulated to play a central role in the development of deductive reasoning, which itself underpins much cognitive developmental theory. The traditional Piagetian and “natural logic” approaches to this topic have more recently been challenged by findings that are more readily explained in terms of the concept of pragmatic schemas. On this basis it was predicted that even young “pre-formal” children would be able to succeed in a Reduced Array Selection Task if the test statement (referring to a previously told story about bees living in a hive) was couched in such a way as to evoke an authorization or permission schema. This proved to be the case in the present study involving 54 nine- and ten-year-old children: The permission condition elicited 70% globally correct solutions, compared to the 11% elicited by the formal control condition. Moreover, this facilitatory effect of the permission condition carried over to a second trial conducted in a standard way across all the conditions.     

驾驶员选择性注意过程中的规则图式启动效应

本研究将驾驶无意视盲范式与交通违规事件识别任务相结合, 通过两个实验分别探究任务性质(有提示、无提示)和规则图式训练(训练、未训练)对驾驶员识别交通信号和违规事件的影响。结果发现, 交通规则提示能够提高有经验的驾驶员识别交通信号的正确率(实验1); 对于新手驾驶员, 则需要结合规则图式训练才能起到相同效果(实验2)。研究表明驾驶员选择性注意过程中存在规则图式启动效应, 图式训练能够弥补新手驾驶员经验的不足。     

Using dual-process theory and analogical transfer to explain facilitation on a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task

Using the analogical transfer paradigm, the present study investigated the competing explanations of Girotto and Legrenzi (Psychological Research 51: 129–135, 1993) and Griggs, Platt, Newstead, and Jackson (Thinking and Reasoning 4: 1–14, 1998) for facilitation on the SARS version of the THOG problem, a hypothetico-deductive reasoning task. Girotto and Legrenzi argue that facilitation is based on logical analysis of the task [System 2 reasoning in Evans’s (Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7: 454–459, 2003) dual-process account of reasoning] while Griggs et al. maintain that facilitation is due to an attentional heuristic produced by the wording of the problem (System 1 reasoning). If Girotto and Legrenzi are correct, then System 2 reasoning, which is volitional and responsible for deductive reasoning, should be elicited, and participants should comprehend the solution principle of the THOG task and exhibit analogical transfer. However, if Griggs et al. are correct, then System 1 reasoning, which is responsible for heuristic problem solving strategies such as an attentional heuristic, should occur, and participants should not abstract the solution principle and transfer should not occur. Significant facilitation (68 and 82% correct) was only observed for the two SARS source problems, but significant analogical transfer did not occur. This lack of transfer suggests that System 1 reasoning was responsible for the facilitation observed in the SARS problem, supporting Griggs et al.’s attentional heuristic explanation. The present results also underscore the explanatory value of using analogical transfer rather than facilitation as the criterion for problem understanding.     

A preliminary study of distinctive features in problem solving

The abstract logical structure of family relationship problems, such as, “What relationship to a man is his mother's father?” was described in terms of a “distinctive-feature-transition count (dft)”, where the answer to the problem was characterized in terms of the distinctive features of descendancy, co-linearity, and sex. On average, it proved possible to predict the difficulty of such problems from such a count; thus tending to support the idea of a relational rather than an associative memory structure.     

Alternative antecedents, probabilities, and the suppression of fallacies in Wason's selection task

Three experiments examined the influence of a second rule on the pattern of card selections on Wason's selection task. In Experiment 1 participants received a version of the task with a single test rule or one of two versions of the task with the same original test rule together with a second rule. The probability of q was manipulated in the two-rules conditions by varying the size of the antecedent set in the second rule. The results showed a significant suppression of q card and not-p card selections in the alternative-rule conditions, but no difference as a function of antecedent set size. In Experiment 2 the size of the antecendent set in the two-rules conditions was manipulated using the context of a computer printing double-sided cards. The results showed a significant reduction of q card selections in the two-rules conditions, but no effect of p set size. In Experiment 3 the scenario accompanying the rule was manipulated, and it specified a single alternative antecedent or a number of alternative antecedents. The q card selection rates were not affected by the scenario manipulation but again were suppressed by the presence of a second rule. Our results suggest that people make inferences about the unseen side of the cards when engaging with the task and that these inferences are systematically influenced by the presence of a second rule, but are not influenced by the probabilistic characteristics of this rule. These findings are discussed in the context of decision theoretic views of selection task performance (Oaksford & Chater, 1994).     

Analogical transfer in the THOG task

The influences of surface and structural similarity on analogical transfer were examined with 318 undergraduate participants in four experiments using Needham and Amado's (1995) Pythagoras THOG problem as the source problem and Wason's standard abstract THOG task as the target problem. In Experiments 1-3, systematic changes in surface similarity between the source and target problems were introduced by changing the named exemplar, the dimensional values, and the dimensions, respectively, in the target problem. Significant transfer was obtained in all three experiments. In Experiment 4, we explored the basis of this transfer by examining three versions of the Pythagoras THOG problem, factorially combining its facilitating features as source problems. Results indicated that the inclusion of a hypothesis generation request was necessary for significant transfer. The implications of our findings for using transfer versus facilitation as the performance criterion for deductive reasoning are considered.     

Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Whether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime. When the SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long (84 ms), primes congruent with the task set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition (36 ms), no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the conscious decision.