There is a fire burning in my heart: The role of causal attribution in affect transfer

The role of causal attribution in affect transfer of primes was addressed by examining the consequences of explicit evaluation of primes within the framework of the affect misattribution procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). We reasoned that affect transfer occurs when primed affect remains diffuse and not bound to a specific object, hence capable of freely colouring subsequent evaluations of ambiguous objects. Accordingly, we propose that when people explicitly evaluate the prime, affect is clearly bound to the prime and becomes less capable of influencing subsequent judgements. Supporting this notion, affect transfer in the AMP was observed when participants ignored the primes, thereby keeping the primed affect relatively unbound. However, this effect disappeared when participants explicitly evaluated the primes before target stimuli were presented. Implications of these findings in determining how and when affect arising from one object carries over to another is discussed.     

Temporal delays can facilitate causal attribution: Towards a general timeframe bias in causal induction

Does reasoning occur on the Wason selection task, or are card selections determined purely on the basis of heuristic processes? To answer this question two relevance-based theories of reasoning are compared: (1) the theory of Evans (1984, 1989; Evans &; Over, 1996), which takes the heuristic viewpoint, and (2) the theory of Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995), which takes the reasoning viewpoint. In three experiments, the effect of removing matching cards from the selection task array is examined. It is argued that the Sperber et al. theory makes clearer predictions about the results of these manipulations, which are confirmed, and that the Evans theory can only accommodate them if it allows the operation of reasoning processes. The results are also discussed in relation to Roth's (1979) account of the selection task, mental models theory, and information gain theory.     

My heart is on my tongue: the untranslated self in a translated world

Abstract: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was the first body to provide translation in all the languages of the country, setting people free from groping around with distorted tongues, unable to see, talk or hear one another … After three centuries of silence South Africans could daily hear the black voice talking and being translated; for the first time white South Africans could hear and listen. Through translation we could access our deepest emotions and feelings. But among the two thousand testimonies there were some that were incomprehensible, that confirmed every racial stereotype built up over many years of apartheid. What does one do with these ‘untranslatable’ narratives? This paper looks at one TRC testimony and one Bushmen story, both of them translated from indigenous languages and both posing enormous moral dilemmas. Read in a particular way, the Bushmen story seems to say that they had no sense of responsibility. I will look at the story in its cultural context as revealed through translation to see if another conclusion is possible. In the TRC testimony, I and two colleagues looked at the slippages between the original Xhosa testimony and the interpreted version and explore the consequences thereof. I want to make the point that a narrative can be experienced as discriminatory and ethically problematic when read through a particular, in this case a western, perspective. But the moment there is an attempt to interpret the narrative via its embeddedness in an indigenous worldview, it becomes breathtakingly ethical, fair and logical.     

Performance monitoring and the causal attribution of errors

The present study investigated the role of causal attribution for performance monitoring in the medial frontal cortex. To this end, we compared internally and externally-caused errors in a selective attention task with respect to error-related EEG activity and error-induced adjustments of speed and attentional selectivity. Both error types evoked early negativities and later positivities in the response-locked event-related potential. However, whereas internally-caused errors caused posterror slowing, externally-caused errors were followed by reduced attentional selectivity. Moreover, the amount of reduced attentional selectivity was related to the amplitude of the early negativity on externally-caused errors. This suggests that posterror adjustments are initiated on the basis of perceived causality and, thus, causal attribution of errors.     

An empirical test of the covariation analysis in causal attribution

The present investigation was designed to reveal the cognitive inference processes associated with both detection and utilization of covariation information in causal attribution. Male undergraduates were (a) informed that a test was easy or difficult and shown a videotape in which (b) the test-taker's performance was high or low, and (c) covariation between the test-taker's effort expenditure and trial-by-trial outcome was present or absent. High performance was attributed to the test-taker's effort and ability, whereas low performance was attributed to the difficulty of the test. However, recognition of the covariance relationship decreased the attribution of high performance to ability and of low performance to test difficulty and increased the attribution of low performance to effort. Effort attribution in the high performance condition was independent of covariation information. The results are discussed in terms of the relationship between covariation information and typical beliefs about the causes of achievement outcomes.     

A test of the joint model of causal attribution

The joint model integrates Mill's methods of difference and agreement for making causal attributions, and introduces a novel type of context attributions which reflect the opposite categories of the standard attribution responses provided in previous covariation research external versus the person, general versus the stimulus, and stable versus the occasion). The joint model predicts that attributions to standard causes require Mill's method of difference and that attributions to context causes require Mill's method of agreement. Two empirical studies demonstrated that the joint model fitted adequately with all of subject's standard and context attribution responses, in contrast to earlier theorizing and data involving only the method of difference (cf. Cheng & Novick, 1990) or only the method of agreement (cf. Hilton, Smith & Kim, 1995) which received less empirical support. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Achievement and morality: a cross-cultural analysis of causal attribution and evaluation.

A recent study by Weiner and Peter has considered the emergence of certain patterns of attribution and evaluation in achievement and moral situations. According to their analysis, judgments should generally follow a Piagetian sequence in which younger children are influenced more by the outcome of an episode and older children by the intent of the protagonist. With a sample of U.S. subjects they found overall support for this analysis. A major of the present study is to determine how sociocultural factors may influence the judgmental patterns outlined by Weiner and Peter by essentially replicating their study in the manifestly different cultural context provided in Iran. Important discrepancies with Weiner and Peter were found which can be attributed to sociocultural factors. However, the cognitive-developmental framework proved generally valuable in working toward a comparative understanding of socialization patterns extant in the two cultures.     

The knowledge-structure and inductivist strategies in causal attribution: A direct comparison

Two different strategies for making causal attributions are distinguished. The first is the classic inductivist approach, which uses covariation information to arrive at causal attributions. The second is the knowledge-structure approach, which uses information relevant to knowledge about plans and goals to explain behaviour. Two experiments are reported in which information activating both types of strategy is given. The results indicate that goal-relevant information activates expectancies that resist the presence of explicit covariation information. The results are interpreted as indicating that expectancies generated by knowledge-structures are therefore different to those activated by verbs, which do not resist the effect of explicit covariation information. It is concluded that knowledge-structures constitute an alternative strategy of causal attribution to the inductivist strategy, and the nature of the relationship between the two strategies is considered.     

There aren't plenty more fish in the sea: A causal network approach

The current research investigated how lay representations of the causes of an environmental problem may underlie individuals' reasoning about the issue. Naïve participants completed an experiment that involved two main tasks. The causal diagram task required participants to depict the causal relations between a set of factors related to overfishing and to estimate the strength of these relations. The counterfactual task required participants to judge the effect of counterfactual suppositions based on the diagrammed factors. We explored two major questions: (1) what is the relation between individual causal models and counterfactual judgments? Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Green et al., 1998, Br. J. Soc. Psychology, 37, 415), these judgments were best explained by a combination of the strength of both direct and indirect causal paths. (2) To what extent do people use two‐way causal thinking when reasoning about an environmental problem? In contrast to previous research (e.g., White, 2008, Appl. Cogn. Psychology, 22, 559), analyses based on individual causal networks revealed the presence of numerous feedback loops. The studies support the value of analysing individual causal models in contrast to consensual representations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in relation to causal reasoning as well as environmental psychology.     

There is a Balm in Gilead

The purpose of this essay is to contribute to the understanding that mental health problems are often endemic to the life experiences of Black women, and that the ways of womanists within the context of therapeutic Black churches can offer healing responses to problems that are occasioned primarily by the oppressive social infrastructures of racism, sexism, and classism. This paper will attempt to draw connections between the political, social, and economic contexts of Black women's lives and "dis-eased" states, and to promote an integrated understanding of the life and mental health experiences of "churched" African American womanists.     

There is a problem of change

Impostors are pseudo-problems masquerading as genuine problems. Impostors should be exposed. The problem of change appears genuine. But some, such as Hofweber (2009) and Rychter (2009), have recently denounced it as an impostor. They allege that it is mysterious how to answer the meta-problem of saying what problem it is: for even if any problem is genuinely about change per se, they argue, it is either empirical or trivially dissolved by conceptual analysis. There is indeed an impostor in our midst. But it is the meta-problem of change. I defend the appearance that the problem of change is a genuine metaphysical problem about change. This vindicates philosophers’ lasting interest in it. It also illuminates what makes a problem metaphysical, how metaphysics relates to other inquiries, and how best to respond to attempts to undermine metaphysical problems.     

The role of surprise in the attribution process

Abstract

We report five studies which compared two theories linking surprise to causal attribution. According to the attributional model, surprise is frequently caused by luck attributions, whereas according to the expectancy-disconfirmation model, surprise is caused by expectancy disconfirmation and stimulates causal thinking. Studies 1 to 3 focused on the question of whether surprise is caused by luck attributions or by unexpectedness. In Studies 1 and 2, subjects had to recall success or failure experiences characterised by a particular attribution (Study 1) or by low versus high surprisingness (Study 2), whereas in Study 3, unexpectedness and luck versus skill attributions were independently manipulated within a realistic setting. The main dependent variables were unexpectedness (Studies 1 and 2), degree of surprise (Studies 1 and 3), and causal attributions (Study 2). The results strongly suggest that surprise is caused by expectancy disconfirmation, whereas luck attributions are neither sufficient nor necessary for surprise. Studies 4 and 5 addressed the question of whether surprise stimulates attributional thinking, again using a remembered-incidents technique. The findings of the previous studies were replicated, and it was confirmed that surprising outcomes elicit more attributional search than unsurprising ones. Additional results from Study 5 suggest that causal thinking is also stimulated by outcomes that are both negative and important.     

The dispositional inference strikes back: situational focus and dispositional suppression in causal attribution

The authors propose that correction of dispositional inferences involves the examination of situational constraints and the suppression of dispositional inferences. They hypothesized that suppression would result in dispositional rebound. In Study 1, participants saw a video of either a free or a forced speaker. Participants shown a forced speaker later made stronger dispositional inferences about a 2nd, free speaker than control participants did. Study 2 provided evidence for higher rebound among participants who reported trying harder to suppress dispositional inferences during the 1st video. In Study 3, participants were asked to focus on situational constraints or to avoid thinking about the speaker's characteristics. Only the latter instructions led to a dispositional rebound. These data support the view that the correction of dispositional inferences involves 2 processes that lead to distinct consequences in subsequent attribution work.     

The role of causal attribution in hurt feelings and related social emotions elicited in reaction to other's feedback about failure

The present research addressed the question of what it is that makes certain types of feedback on the reasons for failure hurtful. The results of two studies demonstrated that the causal structure implied by an explanation for failure explains the degree to which the explanation is perceived as hurtful and likely to elicit anger, shame, and guilt. In contrast, the perceived validity of the explanations is of relatively less importance for the elicitation of hurt feelings and anger than the content of the explanation. Overall, these results provide further evidence for the importance of attributional information for social emotions, whereas the validity of the information had a relatively lesser effect.     

The role of attribution in the experience of crowding

The theory that the subjective experience of crowding results from an attribution of arousal process was examined. Specifically, it was predicted that subjects who were aroused by having their personal space violated would experience less crowding if they were led to believe that some other environmental factor was responsible for the arousal. Groups of subjects were placed in a room in which their personal space was either violated or not violated. Some subjects were told that either an arousing or a relaxing subliminal noise would be played into the room. (Actually there was no noise.) Other subjects were told nothing about subliminal noise. The subjects worked on a number of tasks and were then asked to report how crowded they felt. The noise manipulation had no effect on subjects' performance nor on feelings of crowdedness when their personal space was not being violated. However, when there was a violation of personal space, subjects who felt the noise would arouse them reported being less crowded and performed better than subjects in the relaxing noise or no explanation conditions. It was suggested that subjects attributed their arousal to the “arousing noise” and hence felt less crowded.