What is Christian about Christian bioethics?

What is Christian about Christian bioethics? The short answer to this question is that the Incarnation should shape the form and content of Christian bioethics. In explicating this answer it is argued that contemporary medicine is unwittingly embracing and implementing the transhumanist dream of transforming humans into posthumans. Contemporary medicine does not admit that there are any limits in principle to the extent to which it should intervene to improve the quality of human life. This largely inarticulate, yet ambitious, agenda is derived first in late modernity's failed, but nonetheless ongoing, attempt to transform necessity into goodness, and second the loss of any viable concept of eternity, thereby stripping temporal existence of any normative significance. In short, medicine has become the vanguard of a profane attempt to save humankind by extracting data from flesh. In response, it is contended that an alternative Christian bioethics must be shaped by the Incarnation, the Word made flesh. This assertion does not entitle Christians to oppose the posthuman trajectory of contemporary medicine on the basis of any natural or biological essentialism. Rather, it is an evangelical witness to the grace of Christ's redemption instead of the work of self-transformation. It is Christ alone who thereby makes the vulnerability and mortality of finitude a gift and blessing. Specifically, it is maintained that the chasm separating necessity and goodness cannot be filled but only bridged through the suffering entailed in Christ's cross, and through Christ's resurrection eternity becomes the standard against which the temporal lives of human creatures are properly formed and measured. Consequently, Christian bioethics should help us become conformed to Christ rather than enabling self-transformation.     

So finally, what is Christian about Christian bioethics?

The author criticizes the essays in this issue by Waters, Erickson, Trotter and Verhey for not placing an adequate Christology at the center of their definitions what is Christian bioethics.     

What is bioethics without Christianity?

The author uses the essays in this issue as a springboard for making three points. First, he argues that most, if not all, current institutional versions of Christianity have failed to provide a meaningful framework for the spiritual life. Second, he argues that there is no ethics other than Judeo-Christian ethics and that there can be no bioethics other than Judeo-Christian bioethics. Finally, he argues that the overriding issue we face is not whether to address bioethical issues from a Christian perspective or from a non-Christian perspective, but rather whether we shall address biological and medical issues from an ethical or a scientific-technological perspective.     

What makes Christian bioethics Christian? Bible, story, and communal discernment.

Scripture is somehow normative for any bioethic that would be Christian. There are problems, however, both with Scripture and with those who read Scripture. Methodological reflection is necessary. Scripture must be read humbly and in Christian community. It must be read not as a timeless code but as the story of God and of our lives. That story moves from creation to a new creation. At the center of the Christian story are the stories of Jesus of Nazareth as healer, preacher of good news to the poor, and sufferer. The story shapes character and conduct and enables communal discernment.     

What is top-down about contingent capture?

In the present study, we explored the mechanisms involved in the contingent capture phenomenon, using a variant of the classic precuing paradigm of Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992). Rather than keeping the target fixed over a whole block of trials (as has traditionally been done with contingent capture experiments), we encouraged participants to adopt a top-down set before each trial. If top-down attentional set determines which property captures attention, as is claimed by the contingent capture hypothesis, one would expect that only properties that match the top-down set would capture attention. We showed that even though participants knew what the target would be on the upcoming trial, both relevant and irrelevant properties captured attention (Experiment 1). An intertrial analysis (Experiments 1 and 2) showed that previous contingent capture findings may, to a large extent, be explained by intertrial priming. In addition, when participants were further forced into adopting the required top-down set (Experiments 3 and 4), irrelevant cues were suppressed, suggesting that top-down control might operate through disengagement of attention from the location of a property that does not match top-down goals. The present findings suggest that top-down control and intertrial priming make their own distinct contributions to the contingent capture phenomenon.     

What is special about indexical attitudes?

In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it to share someone else’s indexical attitudes without rejecting some plausible thesis about propositional attitudes. In the end, I assess Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever’s considerations on intentional action and extract an argument from them that could – if successful – neutralize my own. I finish by arguing that their argument has an important flaw, thus failing to convince us that indexical attitudes are just as ordinary as any other.     

What is minimal about predictive inferences?

Pronunciation of a probe word that relates to a highly predictable event is typically facilitated when the probe immediately follows the target sentence, but not when it is delayed until after a second sentence. These findings suggest that inferences about highly predictable events are minimally drawn during reading. Using a similar paradigm, in which the probe was delayed, we found significant priming in a reading condition that encouraged focus on the referential state of affairs (situation level) expressed in the sentences. In contrast, significant priming forpredictive texts was not observed in a reading condition that encouraged focus on the text per se (text level). These results are interpreted within a theoretical model that assumes that predictive inferences are represented at a situational level only, whereas explicitly presented information is represented at several levels (text and situational). It is in this sense that predictive inferences may be said to be minimally represented.     

What is implicit about implicit self-esteem?

Modern advances in implicit social cognition enabled development of novel methods for examining less conscious aspects of self-worth. The use of such “implicit” measures of self-esteem is based on the premise that because they circumvent direct self-reports, they must capture more implicit, automatic components of self-evaluation. Whether self-evaluations captured via “implicit” measures actually have these functional properties requires empirical verification, however. This investigation critically examined the evidence for such assumptions regarding the Name-Letter Test, one of the most popular implicit measures, by adopting a phenomenological approach. The results revealed that many respondents were aware of the self-relevant nature of the measure at the time of assessment. Moreover, at least some variance in the “implicit” measurement outcomes was accounted for by relevant conscious beliefs, particularly among those aware of the self-relevant nature of the task. The implications for understanding the nature and assessment of unconscious self-worth are discussed.     

What is so special about embodied simulation?

Simulation theories of social cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear what simulation means and how it works. The discovery of mirror neurons, responding both to action execution and observation, suggested an embodied approach to mental simulation. Over the past few years this approach has been hotly debated and alternative accounts have been proposed. We discuss these accounts and argue that they fail to capture the uniqueness of embodied simulation (ES). ES theory provides a unitary account of basic social cognition, demonstrating that people reuse their own mental states or processes represented with a bodily format in functionally attributing them to others.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.     

Who is buying bioethics research?

Growing ties to private industry have prompted many to question the impartiality of academic bioethicists who receive financial support from for-profit corporations in exchange for ethics-related services and research. To the extent that corporate sponsors may view bioethics as little more than a way to strengthen public relations or avoid potential controversy, close ties to industry may pose serious threats to professional independence. New sources of support from private industry may also divert bioethicists from pursuing topics of greater social importance, such as the needs of medically underserved communities. To inform ongoing debates about the financing of bioethics and its transparency to those concerned about potential sources of bias, we examined funding disclosures appearing in original research reports in major bioethics journals. Reviewing research published over a 15-year period, we found little evidence that for-profit corporations are influencing bioethics research directly. Instead, we found evidence that a great number of organizations, both public and private, support bioethics research. These findings suggest that worries about the cooption of bioethics research by a few interested stakeholders are greatly overstated and undersupported by available data.     

What is magic about the magical number four?

Summary Previous studies have shown that the apprehension of number can be represented by three models according to the experimental procedure and the data analysis. The present experiment was designed to test the effect of figural characteristics of pattern on the response time. The subjects were asked to perform a same/different judgment, i.e., they were requested to decide whether a dot pattern, shown on a monitor, equalled a previously defined target number (n=2–6) or not. Different types of pattern were used and learning effects were studied. As was expected, the slopes for random and linear patterns were not so steep when the target number was low. With patterns in the dice mode, however, the slope was zero. Repeated presentations led to a slight reduction in slope for random and linear patterns only. In the case of the patterns in the dice mode, the repeated presentations caused only a change in the absolute reaction times (RTs) but had no effect on the slope. When the target numbers were larger (n=5–6), the repeated presentations led to remarkable reductions in slope for random and linear patterns. The slope discontinuity at n=4 occurred with all types of pattern but it became less pronounced in the course of training at least in the case of random and linear patterns. This result is explained by clustering effects, use of figural cues, and a more efficient scanning process.     

What is Philosophical about Kant’s Anthropology?

Abstract

In this essay, I argue that Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View is fundamentally about the sphere of civilization, and, with this, a particular kind of philosophical self-understanding. By civilization, Kant means to indicate the process by which human beings transform their inner natures based on pragmatic or prudential considerations born of our living together. Civilization is what we do to ourselves in order to get along with others with whom we share the earth. In the Anthropology, what we come to understand about ourselves is the possibility of transforming our inner natures based on our will.