Epistemic justification: its subjective and its objective ways

Objective standards for justification or for being a reason would be desirable, but inductive skepticism tells us that they cannot be presupposed. Rather, we have to start from subjective-relative notions of justification and of being a reason. The paper lays out the strategic options we have given this dilemma. The paper explains the requirements for this subject-relative notion and how they may be satisfied. Then it discusses four quite heterogeneous ways of providing more objective standards, which combine without guaranteeing complete success.     

Deculturation: its lack of validity

Deculturation's history as well as its use in the social science literature is reviewed and its construct validity questioned. According to J. W. Berry (1980), deculturation results when members of nondominant cultures become alienated from the dominant culture and from their own minority society. A reported consequence of deculturation is increased stress and psychopathology for the individuals involved. Deculturation's basic assumption that there can be culture loss without replacement is critically assessed. In particular, the idea that members of nondominant groups can become deculturated, devoid of any culture, is challenged.     

A deletion ahead of its time

An alleged defect in transformational treatment of syntax acquisition is the absence from child speech of certain predicted errors with ‘wh-’ constructions. In this paper, a theory of acquisition dynamics and intensive longitudinal data are brought to bear on this issue. The key observations involve an early precursor, at 24—28 months, of the relative clause. The analysis sheds light on two fundamental issues in transformational acquisition theory: The permissibility of simultaneous rule changes and whether a transformation can be acquired before the associated deep structure. The issues and analysis can be translated into non-transformational terms.     

The developmental/emergent model of archetype, its implications and its application to shamanism

This paper addresses the ongoing debate in the JAP to do with archetype theory and supports an emergent/developmental model which sees archetypal imagery as an emergent phenomenon arising out of neural bio-structures laid down in early infant life as a result of developmental experience. This model is supported by the current findings of those developmental biologists who adhere to Developmental Systems Theory. The themes of Developmental Systems Theory are examined and corroborative parallels are drawn with the model. A number of implications follows: the model has substantial explanatory power and leads to a new perspective on innatism; it implies an archetype-environment nexus; it collapses the nature-nurture debate in relation to archetype theory; it collapses the 'sacred heritage' approach to archetypes and it removes the conceptual division between the collective and personal unconscious. This developmental/emergent perspective is then applied to the shaman archetype, using ethnographic records of the Sakha (Yakut) Siberian tribe. The material supports the hypothesis that the shamanic complex is laid down in early infancy by a combination of events which cause emotional ruptures in the mother-infant dyad. Siberian shamanism is then understood to arise out of developmental experience and not from the constellation of an autochthonous archetype.     

Perceived threat: exploring its association with worry and its hypothesized antecedents

Two studies with college student participants (n's=262, 239) examined the relation between perceptions of threat (i.e., perceptions of the probabilities and costs of future undesirable outcomes) and: (a) worry; and (b) hypothesized antecedents of perceived threat. In both studies, higher levels of worrying were associated with higher perceived probability and cost. In Study 2, the association between perceived threat and worrying remained even when taking into account maladaptive worry beliefs and the desire for predictability; in fact, the relation between worrying and worry beliefs and desire for predictability were moderated by perceptions of threat. Higher levels of perceived probability were associated with perceiving oneself and others less favorably, whereas higher levels of perceived cost were associated with higher standards.     

Manic-depressiveness and its correlates

Manic-depressiveness is the name here given to a hypothesized personality continuum that has, at one extreme, manic-depressive psychosis. A Manic-Depressiveness Scale is described, which comprises three scales, Manic Experience, Depressive Experience, and the sum of the two, since they are correlated. 250 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Adelaide and at Goldsmiths' College, London, were administered the Manic-Depressiveness Scale along with 12 measures including the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Revised). Scores on the total Manic-Depressiveness Scale tended (in order of size of association) to be correlated with Schizotypal Personality (and three subscales), Neuroticism, Magical Ideation, Mystical Experience, Belief in the Paranormal, absence of Social Na?veté, and Psychoticism. Manic Experience showed a pattern of relationships with the above variables broadly similar to that of Depressive Experience but included Creative Personality, while Depressive Experience included introversion. The relationship between manic-depressiveness and schizotypy is discussed.     

Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments

The aim of my paper is to show the discussion concerning the idea of cosmopolitan society. I intend to examine the structure and content of the argumentation which put into question the very notion of cosmopolitanism, as well as the contemporary content of this concept. I will look at nationalistic discourse as presented, for instance, by Gertrude Himmelfarb, which puts emphasis on national values as an indispensable part of group and individual identity. On the other hand, I am going to analyze left-wing evaluation of cosmopolitanism (for instance, that of Chantal Mouffe) as an ideologically motivated attempt to hide the real contradictions of the contemporary world. Finally, I will prove that these critiques cannot undermine the concept of cosmopolitanism, but they force us to rethink a way in which cosmopolitan society can be achieved. If cosmopolitan society is to emerge, we need to reconstruct the idea of democracy and the notion of multi-cultural pluralistic society. I propose such rethinking of cosmopolitanism by the introduction of the notion of “dialogical cosmopolitanism,” which refers to M.M. Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue and G.H. Mead’s idea of “taking the role of the other.”     

Design and its discontents

The design argument was rebutted by David Hume. He argued that the world and its contents (such as organisms) were not analogous to human artifacts. Hume further suggested that there were equally plausible alternatives to design to explain the organized complexity of the cosmos, such as random processes in multiple universes, or that matter could have inherent properties to self-organize, absent any external crafting. William Paley, writing after Hume, argued that the functional complexity of living beings, however, defied naturalistic explanations. In effect he dared anyone to come up with an alternative to his inference to design, and hence a designer, outside of nature. Charles Darwin explained the apparent design of functional complexity by his theory of natural selection. Asa Gray, however, in essays as well as in correspondence with Darwin argued that natural selection allowed for a type of ‘evolutionary teleology’ in which design at most could be considered the result of universal principles. F.E. Hicks updated Hume by specifically objecting to the use of design arguments by Paley. Hicks argued that the apparent design seen in nature reflected order at a deep level in nature. The design argument was briefly revived by Lawrence Henderson early in the twentieth century but he ultimately concluded that design and teleology were not necessarily mutually entailing and he retracted his design argument in favor of one that he termed ‘natural teleology’. The current claims of ‘intelligent design’ have the same logical problems that have beset previous design arguments. If design is divorced from teleology and its discontents put behind us, then there is a possibility that the latter can have a place in the development of theories to explain the phenomena of emergent complexity.     

Scepticism and its Sources

A number of recent philosophers, including Michael Williams, Barry Stroud and Donald Davidson, have argued that scepticism about the external world stems from the founda-tionalist assumption that sensory experience supplies the data for our beliefs about the world. In order to assess this thesis, I offer a brief characterisation of the logical form of sceptical arguments. I suggest that sceptical arguments rely on the idea that many of our beliefs about the world are'underdetermined'by the evidence on which they are based. Drawing on this characterisation of scepticism, I argue that Williams, Stroud and Davidson are right to see the foundationalist assumption as essential to the sceptic's argument, but wrong to think that scepticism is inevitable once that assumption is in place. By pursuing an analogy with some recent debates in the philosophy of science, I try to locate the additional assumptions which the sceptic must make, in order to derive her conclusion.