The clinical inference process and the role of theory

Perhaps the most challenging and creative aspect of clinical testing is the clinical inference process, the sequential steps the examiner takes in transforming the raw test data into a clinically relevant testing report. Unfortunately, this part of the testing process has received little attention in the testing literature. In this article, the specific steps in the inferential process are outlined. In addition, the ways in which theory enter into the inferential process are also discussed.     

Social influences on the emotion process

Philosophical and psychological theory has traditionally focused on intra-individual processes that are entailed in emotions. Recently sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and also social psychologists have drawn attention to the interpersonal nature of emotions. In this chapter we focus on the influence of others on emotional experiences and expressions. We summarise research on social context effects which shows that both emotional expression and experience are affected by the presence and expressiveness of other people. These effects are most straightforward for positive emotions, which are enhanced in the company of others. In the case of negative emotions, the effects of social context depend on the circumstances in which the emotion is elicited, and on the role of other persons in this situation. We discuss these social context effects in the light of a more general theoretical framework of social appraisal processes.     

The elements of emotion

I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion (IRT). In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three pieces of content: representations of (1) the emoter’s body, (2) something in the world, and (3) a relevance relation between the objects of these first two pieces of content. I describe four general advantages I think the IRT offers. Finally, in Section 3, I elucidate and defend my account by contrasting it with another, similar proposal: Barlassina and Newen’s Impure Somatic Theory. In so doing, I explain two additional advantages of my view: first, it supports a unified explanation of all types of emotional response; and second, it offers the best framework for explaining how the representational contents of an emotion are integrated.     

消极情绪抑制了老年人的口语产生过程

采用面孔图片启动不同的情绪,在青年人和老年人两组被试中考察积极、消极和中性情绪,以及不同情绪和年龄之间的交互作用对口语产生年老化的影响。要求青年组和老年组被试在不同的情绪启动条件下对图片进行命名。结果显示,与积极和中性情绪相比,消极情绪显著地延长了青年人和老年人口语产生的潜伏期;与青年人相比,消极情绪对老年人的影响更大。结果表明,随着年龄的增长,消极情绪对口语产生的抑制作用更强,这提示老年人应该在生活中尽量保持愉悦心情。     

The assessment of emotional clarity via response times to emotion items: shedding light on the response process and its relation to emotion regulation strategies

Researchers have begun to use response times (RTs) to emotion items as an indirect measure of emotional clarity. Our first aim was to scrutinise the properties of this RT measure in more detail than previously. To be able to provide recommendations as to whether (and how) emotional intensity – as a possible confound – should be controlled for, we investigated the specific form of the relation between emotional intensity and RTs to emotion items. In particular, we assumed an inverted U-shaped relation at the item level. Moreover, we analysed the RT measure’s convergent validity with respect to individuals’ confidence in their emotion ratings. As a second aim, we compared the predictive validity of emotional clarity measures (RT measure, self-report) with respect to daily emotion regulation. The results of three experience sampling studies showed that the association between emotional intensity and RT followed an inverted U shape. RT was in part related to confidence. Emotional clarity measures were unrelated to reappraisal. There was some evidence that lower emotional clarity was related to a greater use of suppression. The findings highlight that emotional intensity and squared emotional intensity should be controlled for when using the RT measure of emotional clarity in future research.     

The epistemology of absence-based inference

Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The Equivalence Schema–a well-known alethic principle–says that it is true that $p$ if and only if $p$ . We take epistemic coverage to underwrite a suitably qualified evidential analogue of the Equivalence Schema: for a high proportion of values of $p$ , subject $S$ has evidence that $p$ due to her reliance on source $S^{*}$ if and only if $p$ . We show how this evidential version of the Equivalence Schema suffices for the reliability of certain absence-based inferences. Section 4 is dedicated to exploring consequences of the Evidential Equivalence Schema. The slogan ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’ has received a lot of bad press. More elaborately, what has received a lot of bad press is something like the following idea: absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $p$ is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . A striking consequence of the Evidential Equivalence Schema is that absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in p is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . We establish this claim in Section 4 and show how this supports the reliability of an additional type of absence-based inference. Section 4 immediately raises the following question: how can we make philosophically good sense of the idea that absence of evidence is evidence of absence? We address this question in Section 5. Section 6 contains some summary remarks.     

The intricacies of inference chaining

This article describes some of the common errors made in inference chaining by novice as well as experienced REBTers. These errors are presented in a three stage process: first, false starts in initiating the chain; second, going deeper into the chain but following the wrong path caused by inattention to client data signposting the right one; third, stopping short of the critical A because of insufficient refinement of the activating event. Then we present the complete inference chain with annotations showing how the aforementioned mistakes can be avoided. Finally, we suggest that inference chaining does not have to be a daunting prospect but its successful execution usually requires more than just REBT training.     

The automaticity of emotion recognition

Evolutionary accounts of emotion typically assume that humans evolved to quickly and efficiently recognize emotion expressions because these expressions convey fitness-enhancing messages. The present research tested this assumption in 2 studies. Specifically, the authors examined (a) how quickly perceivers could recognize expressions of anger, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, happiness, pride, sadness, shame, and surprise; (b) whether accuracy is improved when perceivers deliberate about each expression's meaning (vs. respond as quickly as possible); and (c) whether accurate recognition can occur under cognitive load. Across both studies, perceivers quickly and efficiently (i.e., under cognitive load) recognized most emotion expressions, including the self-conscious emotions of pride, embarrassment, and shame. Deliberation improved accuracy in some cases, but these improvements were relatively small. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the cognitive processes underlying emotion recognition.     

The cognitive control of emotion

The capacity to control emotion is important for human adaptation. Questions about the neural bases of emotion regulation have recently taken on new importance, as functional imaging studies in humans have permitted direct investigation of control strategies that draw upon higher cognitive processes difficult to study in nonhumans. Such studies have examined (1) controlling attention to, and (2) cognitively changing the meaning of, emotionally evocative stimuli. These two forms of emotion regulation depend upon interactions between prefrontal and cingulate control systems and cortical and subcortical emotion-generative systems. Taken together, the results suggest a functional architecture for the cognitive control of emotion that dovetails with findings from other human and nonhuman research on emotion.     

The emotion account of blame

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the resulting emotion account of blame.     

The demanding world of emotion: A Gestalt approach to emotion experience

Psychology is biased towards thinking of emotions as feelings rather than as an experiences of the world. But they are both. World-focused emotion experiences (WFEE) are how the world appears or is consciously perceived in one's emotion experience. For example, when happy the world may seem welcoming, or when sad the world may seem barren of possibilities. What explains these experiences? This article discusses explanations of WFEE from phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. Influenced by Lewin, I propose an “emotional demand model” of WFEE. The emotional demand character of objects (e.g. bear-to-be-run-from) is distinguished from their expressive character (e.g. angry bear). It is a mistake to think of emotion faces only as expressions—they are also demands. This distinction explains some anomalous findings in infancy and autism research. The model highlights another tool for recognizing our own emotions: noticing when we feel “demanded of” by the world, with implications for emotion regulation.     

Investigating the role of emotion during the search process in free recall

Typically, research has shown that emotional words are remembered better than neutral words; however, most studies have reported only the mean proportion of correctly recalled words. The present study looked at various dependent measures used by search models to determine whether emotion can influence the search process as well. The results from Experiment 2 showed that when emotionality was made salient, participants were able to utilize emotional associations, in addition to temporal associations, to cue retrieval of additional emotional words during subsequent sampling but relied mainly on temporal context when the emotional information was not made salient (Experiment 1). Additionally, both experiments showed that emotional words were more likely to be output earlier in the recall sequence, which would suggest that emotion also serves to boost relative strength during initial sampling. Overall, the results suggest that emotion contributes to enhanced memory dynamically by influencing the probability of sampling an item during the search process—specifically, by boosting relative strength and strengthening interitem associations.     

群体共享情绪的放大效应

相比独自经历情绪事件,在群体中与他人共享情绪事件会放大个体的情绪体验,该效应被称之为群体共享情绪的放大效应。以往研究为群体共享情绪放大效应提供了部分间接的实验证据,但以往的理论,如群体共同关注理论和情绪传染理论,并不能对该效应做出很好的解释。基于社会评估理论和共享现实理论提出的评估–证实–放大模型可较好地解释群体共享情绪的放大效应。未来研究可在真实互动的群体情境中检验群体共享情绪放大效应及评估–证实–放大模型。     

The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

The rediscovery of philosophy in emotion

Abstract

Reviews of The Rationality of Emotion by Ronald de Soma. Cambridge, Mass. and London: M.I.T. Press (1987), pp. 333. ISBN 0-262-04092-1, £22.50, $25 The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy by Robert M. Gordon. Cambridge University Press (1987), pp. 155. ISBN 0-521-33164-1, £22.50, $29.95