Some notes on the nature of methodological indeterminacy

This paper is an attempt to extend the meaning of the concept of indeterminacy for the human sciences. The authors do this by coining the term methodological indeterminacy and arguing that indeterminacy is better understood when linked to specific methodological techniques. Paradoxically, while specific research techniques demonstrate that the issue of indeterminacy is complex, yielding the possibility of types and degrees, it does not eliminate the problem of translation first raised by Quine. However, the authors go on to argue that, from a research perspective, indeterminacy can and must be approached in such a way that it is possible to reduce cases of it, even though never completely eliminating it in the human sciences.     

Stuffed Cabbage in the Old New School Cafeteria

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.     

On the scholastic or Aristotelian roots of “intentionality” in Brentano

The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano.     

Three views of demonstrative reference

Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) are rejected as implausible; the third (originally proposed by Kaplan in Dthat) is argued to be highly plausible.     

Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment

Until 1917 Lenin and Trotsky believed that an isolated revolutionary Russia would have no chance of survival. However, from 1917 to 1923 Lenin's standpoint on this matter underwent a complete reversal. First he came to the conclusion that socialism could be built in an isolated Russia, although it would remain incomplete in the absence of the world revolution. By 1923 he was abandoning that latter qualification too. The standpoint of Stalin and Bukharin in the debate on socialism in one country of 1925–26 was more orthodox-Leninist than the position taken by Trotsky, who had at first also embraced the notion of incomplete socialism, but subsequently returned to the old concept, abandoned by Lenin, that the restoration of capitalism was inevitable in the absence of the world revolution.     

REBT and Rationality: Philosophical Approaches

This paper argues that philosophical critiques of concepts in psychotherapy are inappropriate unless the context in which they are used is taken into account. In the case of REBT it is misleading to try to evaluate Ellis' use of rationality by matching it with the concept which has developed in modern philosophy of science. There is no pure essence of rationality which could enable it to be applied normatively in all contexts. The pitfalls of attempting this are illustrated by analysing two recent attempts to criticise rationality in REBT, by Erwin (1997) and O'Donohue and Vass (1996). We argue that Rationality in REBT can only be understood by seeing it as part of a network of categories and practices (a discursive formation) that has evolved over the last 45 years.     

The ω-rule

We prove that all proofs in -logic (a first order logic with -rule added) in which -rule is used finitely many times can be turned into proofs in which the -rule is used at most one time. Next, we prove that the word finitely above cannot be changed by the word infinitely.     

Dowód aksjomatyzowalności pewnychn-wartościowych rachunków zdań

Praca ta zostaa wykonana pod kierunkiem prof. drJerzego Supeckiego. Jej szczególny przypadek dotyczcyn-wartociowego rachunku zda o jednej wartoci wyrónionej by referowany w Warszawie na zjedzie Grupy Logiki Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN. Streszczenie tego referatu [5] zostao wydrukowane w Sprawozdaniach Wydziau Nauk Spoecznych PAN.Allatum est die 19 Aprilis 1963     

Deduction,induction and probabilistic support

Elementary results concerning the connections between deductive relations and probabilistic support are given. These are used to show that Popper-Miller's result is a special case of a more general result, and that their result is not very unexpected as claimed. According to Popper-Miller, a purely inductively supports b only if they are deductively independent — but this means that a b. Hence, it is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, is untenable. Finally, it is shown that Popper-Miller's claim that deductive relations determine probabilistic support is untrue. In general, probabilistic support can vary greatly with fixed deductive relations as determined by the relevant Lindenbaum algebra.     

Utility theory with inexact preferences and degrees of preference

a–b* c–d is taken to mean that your degree of preference for a over b is less than your degree of preference for c over d. Various properties of the strength-of-preference comparison relation * are examined along with properties of simple preferences defined from *. The investigation recognizes an individual's limited ability to make precise judgments. Several utility theorems relating a–b * c–d to u(a)–u(b) are included.     

Early German approaches to experimental reading research: The contributions of Wilhelm Wundt and Ernst Meumann

Summary Wundt looked at the reading process from a predominantly theoretical perspective. He opposed the total shape theory formulated by Erdmann and Dodge and insisted on the occurrence of attention shifts during word recognition. As an alternative to the total shape theory, he formulated a two-stage theory of word recognition. An initial, apperceptive phase of reading is concerned with the active analysis of visually salient local details, and a second, assimilative phase fills in the unanalyzed parts of words on the basis of a passive evocation of earlier experiences with graphemic input. Meumann looked at the reading process from the point of view of an educational psychologist. His review of experimental reading research presents most of the basic issues which are still controversial today. In his recommendations for the teaching of reading, he emphasized the importance of analyzing words into their constituent sounds and of articulatory awareness as a precondition for the firm establishment of connections between graphemes and speech sounds. The review discusses some of the reasons why the experimentally based approach to the psychology of reading failed to evoke the interest of German educators after World War I.     

Metaphysics and the interpretation of persons: Davidson on thinking and Conceptual Schemes

Certain metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions are shown to play a role in the defense of Davidson's claims that an empirically constructed theory of truth provides an adequate theory of meaning for any natural language. Dadivson puts forward demonstrative arguments in favor of these presuppositions in On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, Thought and Talk, and The Method of Truth in Metaphysics. These arguments are examined and found to include controversial and dubitable assumptions as premises. It is then suggested that both these controversial assumptions and Davidson's metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions can be partially defended, however, by dialectical, interpretive, and historical arguments that elucidate the nature of persons.     

On some structural aspects of physical problems

Bachelard's concept of the problématique is used in order to classify physical problems and their interrelations. This classification is effectuated along two dimensions. Along the horizontal dimension, physical problems are divided into the kinds that the different modes of physics' development define. These modes are themselves determined by the interplay among the conceptual system, the object and the experimentation transactions specific to physics. Along the vertical dimension, physical problems are classified according to the different stages of maturation they have to undergo before the process of their solution is effectively undertaken. To determine these maturation stages, the Althusserian conception of ideology is used. The interrelations between physical problems are examined through the introduction and elaboration of the notion interdependence network.It is a pleasure to thank Marcello Pera and Kostas Gavroglou for their very helpful comments and criticisms.     

How to frame the free will problem

Conclusion The exchange is almost complete. I have argued that if we wish to view the free will problem in a non-question-begging way, we should frame the problem in more radical terms than we usually do. If we frame the problem this way, then we discover a compelling reason for rejecting all of the familiar isms in favor of my non-realism thesis. This thesis holds that free choice has a coherent meaning just in case it is treated as a subjective term; thus, if we try to view free choice as denoting classes of entities that themselves possess the characteristic of freeness, it is logically inconsistent. My thesis is supported by a certain metaphilosophical view. I admit that this metaphilosophical view — which tries to locate everything where it belongs — is neither provable nor refutable. But if my argument in this paper is correct, when we assert any of the positions that presuppose the coherence of free will (Hard Determinism, Soft Determinism, Libertarianism, Incompatibilism, Compatibilism), we should add the fact that we have adopted a metaphilosophical view that supports these. Since these metaphilosophies are non-truth-tracking views, our joint declaration of our lower level free will theory and its supporting metaphilosophy will sound Pickwickian (e.g., I believe that Libertarianism is true and I support that view with the metaphilosophical thesis that the most important role of philosophy is not to track truth, but to create an intellectual climate best for improving the human condition.) If I have shown that my opponents are forced to such declarations, I will be satisfied.     

Analytic/synthetic and semantic theory

A somewhat simplified version of Jerrold J. Katz's theory of the analytic/synthetic distinction for natural languages is presented. Katz's account is criticized on the following grounds. (1) the antonymy operator is not well defined; it leaves certain sentences without readings. (2) The account of negation is defective; it has the consequence that certain nonsynonymous sentences are marked as synonymous. (3) The account of entailment is defective; it has the consequence that analytic sentences entail synthetic ones. (4) Katz's account of indeterminable sentences is criticized; it has the consequence that certain logical truths are not marked as analytic. (5) Katz's semantics provides no account of truth, so that he is unable to show that analytic sentences are true and that indeterminable sentences are not.     

‘Now I can go on:’ Wittgenstein and our embodied embeddedness in the ‘Hurly-Burly’ of life

Wittgenstein is not primarily concerned with anything mysterious going on inside people's heads, but with us simply going on with each other; that is, with us being able to inter-relate our everyday, bodily activities in unproblematic ways in with those of others, in practice. Learning to communicate with clear and unequivocal meanings; to send messages; to fully understand each other; to be able to reach out, so to speak, from within language-game entwined forms of life, and to talk in theoretical terms of the contacts one has made., as an individual, with what is out there; and so on — all these abilities are, or can be, later developments. Wittgenstein's investigations into our pre-individual, pre-theoretical, embodied, compulsive activities are utterly revolutionary. They open up a vast new realm for empirical study to do with the detailed and subtle nature of the bodily activities in the background to everything that we do. The relational character of such pre-theoretical, Ur-linguistic, spontaneous bodily activities—and the way in which they display us as seeing connections from within a synopsis of trivialities — is explored through the paradigm of currently fashionable 3–13 random dot autostereograms.     

On defining necessity in terms of entailment

In their book Entailment, Anderson and Belnap investigate the consequences of defining Lp (it is necessary that p) in system E as (pp)p. Since not all theorems are equivalent in E, this raises the question of whether there are reasonable alternative definitions of necessity in E. In this paper, it is shown that a definition of necessity in E satisfies the conditions { _E Lpp, _EL(pq)(LpLq), _E pLp} if and only if its has the form C ₁.C₂ .... C_np, where each C _iis equivalent in E to either pp or ((pp)p)p.     

On finite approximability of ψ-intermediate logics

The aim of this note is to show (Theorem 1.6) that in each of the cases: = {, }, or {, , }, or {, , } there are uncountably many -intermediate logics which are not finitely approximable. This result together with the results known in literature allow us to conclude (Theorem 2.2) that for each : either all -intermediate logics are finitely approximate or there are uncountably many of them which lack the property.     

Think Before You Speak: Utterances and the Logic of Indexicals

This essay discusses some aspects of the logical behaviour of sentences in languages containing indexical and demonstrative expressions. After some preliminary remarks in section one, sections two and three focus on instances of logically true sentences that may be uttered falsely, and on cases of logically equivalent sentences whose utterances may have distinct truth-values. The logical and semantic problems taken into consideration include the validity of a Principle of Translation, the so-called puzzle of addressing, and examples related to measurement and approximation. Section four discusses the complementary phenomenon of sentences that may presumably always be uttered truly, but that do not qualify as logically true. In particular, I argue against the widespread tendency to consider I am here now or I exist as truths of the logic of indexicals.     

A game-based formal system for Ł∞

A formal system for , based on a game-theoretic analysis of the ukasiewicz prepositional connectives, is defined and proved to be complete. An Herbrand theorem for the predicate calculus (a variant of some work of Mostowski) and some corollaries relating to its axiomatizability are proved. The predicate calculus with equality is also considered.