On specification and the senses

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.     

Direct Learning in Auditory Perception: An Information-Space Analysis of Auditory Perceptual Learning of Object Length

The theory of direct learning characterizes perception of a given property as occupying a locus in an information space and characterizes perceptual learning as continuous movement in that information space toward a more optimal locus. Three experiments investigated whether such an information-based account of learning could be applied to perceptual learning in audition. The results of Experiment 1 showed that perception of length by audition could be characterized as occupying a locus in an information space consisting of inertial variables that constrain perception of length by dynamic or effortful touch. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that feedback about length led to predictable movements across the information space from less optimal to more optimal loci. Such results provide additional support for the theory of direct learning and suggest that convergence information may be modality independent.     

Discovering your inner Gibson: Reconciling action-specific and ecological approaches to perception–action

Both the action-specific perception account and the ecological approach to perception–action emphasize the role of action in perception. However, the action-specific perception account demonstrates that different percepts are possible depending on the perceiver’s ability to act, even when the same optical information is available. These findings challenge one of the fundamental claims of the ecological approach—that perception is direct—by suggesting that perception is mediated by internal processes. Here, we sought to resolve this apparent discrepancy. We contend that perception is based on the controlled detection of the information available in a global array that includes higher-order patterns defined across interoceptive and exteroceptive stimulus arrays. These higher-order patterns specify the environment in relation to the perceiver, so direct sensitivity to them would be consistent with the ecological claims that perception of the environment is direct and animal-specific. In addition, the action-specific approach provides further evidence for the theory of affordances, by demonstrating that even seemingly abstract properties of the environment, such as distance and size, are ultimately perceived in terms of an agent’s action capabilities.     

An ecological analysis of knowing by wielding.

The ecological approach to perception, as developed by James Gibson, is described and applied to how one knows, by means of the haptic perceptual system, various properties of hand-held objects. Four sets of experiments are reviewed in which subjects reported on the extent, orientation, shape, and fractional components of unseen objects wielded freely. For each task, an invariant specific to the object property in question is identified in the structured arrays of rotational moments and strains produced by the act of wielding. Results are discussed in relation to the concepts of attention and stimulation, as reformulated by the ecological approach, and the general theory of perception as information pickup.     

Learning as change of coordination dynamics: theory and experiment

Learning of coordination patterns was investigated theoretically from the point of view of a dynamic theory of biological coordination and with reference to recent experiments on the learning of relative timing patterns. The theory is based on theoretical and experimental work showing that coordinated movement is characterized not only by the actually performed pattern of coordination but by an entire dynamics of coordination. Theoretically, such dynamics are captured as equations of motion of relevant collective variables. Experimentally, signatures of these underlying dynamics can be found in the temporal stability of coordination patterns, which can be assessed through various stability measures as well as through processes of pattern change. We argue that not only intrinsic coordination tendencies, but also specific behavioral requirements, be they perceived, memorized, or intended, must be expressed in terms of such dynamics. The concept of behavioral information captures such requirements as part of the coordination dynamics. We expound two hypotheses on the nature of learning in this framework. First, we assume that at each point during the learning process the system is governed by a well-defined coordination dynamics. This equation of motion evolves with learning so as to acquire an attractor solution near the to-be-learned pattern. Second, we hypothesize that this change of the coordination dynamics, captured by the time course of memorized behavioral information, can itself be ascribed to an additional layer of dynamics, the slower learning dynamics. Testable consequences of these views are discussed in the light of recent experimental findings on the learning of a relative phase in rhythmic movement: (a) Learning affects dynamic properties of performed coordination patterns, in particular, their stability; (b) the change of the coordination dynamics due to learning leads to specific changes of behavior also under conditions other than the learned condition, namely, to systematic deviation toward the learned patterns; (c) learning may lead to instabilities in the coordination behavior if initial and learned performance differ sufficiently; and (d) the dynamic properties of the performed coordination patterns are distinct on the two time scales of learning and of performance.     

Squinting with the mind’s eye: Effects of stimulus resolution on imaginal and perceptual comparisons

Subjects either viewed or visualized arrays that were divided into four quadrants, with each quadrant containing a set of stripes. In two experiments, one array contained only relatively narrow (high-resolution) stripes, and one contained only relatively thick (low-resolution) stripes. The subjects compared sets of stripes in different quadrants according to their length, spacing, orientation, or width. When the subjects visualized the arrays, they required much more time to compare high-resolution patterns than low-resolution patterns; when the subjects saw the arrays, they evaluated both types of arrays equally easily. In addition, the results from the third experiment provide strong evidence that people use imagery in this task; in one condition, the subjects evaluated oblique sets of stripes, and in another condition, they evaluated vertical and horizontal stripes. In both imagery and perception, the subjects made more errors when evaluating oblique stimuli; in imagery, they also required more time to evaluate oblique stimuli. The results suggest that additional effort is required in imagery to represent visual patterns with high resolution. This finding demonstrates that, although imagery and perception may activate common brain regions, it is more difficult to represent high-resolution information in imagery than in perception.     

The Senses Considered as One Perceptual System

ABSTRACT

J. J. Gibson (1966) rejected many classical assumptions about perception but retained 1 that dates back to classical antiquity: the assumption of separate senses. We suggest that Gibson's retention of this assumption compromised his novel concept of perceptual systems. We argue that lawful, 1:1 specification of the animal–environment interaction, which is necessary for perception to be direct, cannot exist in individual forms of ambient energy, such as light, or sound. We argue that specification exists exclusively in emergent, higher order patterns that extend across different forms of ambient energy. These emergent, higher order patterns constitute the global array. If specification exists exclusively in the global array, then direct perception cannot be based upon detection of patterns that are confined to individual forms of ambient energy and, therefore, Gibson's argument for the existence of several distinct perceptual systems cannot be correct. We argue that the senses function as a single, irreducible perceptual system that is sensitive exclusively to patterns in the global array. That is, rather than distinct perceptual systems there exists only 1 perceptual system.     

Physical imagery: kinematic versus dynamic models.

Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e. g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery.     

Geometric specification of dynamics: learning to visually perceive kinetic quantities from static images

In a single experiment, perceivers viewed computer-generated hammer-like objects and estimated a kinetic property. Each hammer comprised a cylinder of some diameter and height, attached to a handle-a second cylinder of fixed diameter and variable length. On 5 blocks of trials, three groups of perceivers reported a property reflecting mass, torque, or moment of inertia. Blocks 2-4 were training blocks on which numerical feedback was given. On blocks 6 and 7, perceivers were asked to report the kinetic properties not reported on blocks 1-5. We were interested in how geometrical object properties affected the perception of kinetic properties, and how that perception changed with experience. To determine how geometrical object properties informed reports of kinetics, a continuous information space of head diameter and height, and handle length was created, and perceivers' loci within that space were determined. Perceivers began at various distances from the optimum for the to-be-reported property and were closer to the optimum after training. On blocks 6 and 7, performance did not reflect transfer from training on another property. The results were interpreted in the context of the theory of direct learning.     

ESTIMATING MODULATOR INDICES AND STATE LIABILITIES

An extension of the familiar factor analytic model which deals with traits has been proposed to enable it t o fit the psychological theory of modulation of behavior by ambient situations which change individuals' state levels and role involvements (Cattell, 1963). The present paper gives more substance to this development, defining more precisely the basic assumptions in the new concepts and setting out the procedures for calculating the main new parameters. Most important among the latter are (1) the modulator values for each ambient situation, (2) the characteristic individual state liabilities, and (3) the change in the group state level as related to the individual state changes. This model is also part of a development for integrating the traditional interests of psychometrists, centered on individual differences, with the tradi- tion interests of experimentalists (researchers on processes, such as learning and perception) centered on changes in group means. It is suggested that this model brings to practical experimental work with concepts of mood, role, and the measurement of ambient-situations the precision t o which we have been accustomed in individual difference psychometry in a way not previously pos- sible in this domain.     

Meta-Invariant Structure in Stimulus Arrays: A Response to Mace's Zetetic Challenge to Ecological Perceptual Researchers

ABSTRACT

Ecological perception, per James Gibson's theory, avows that perception depends on informative structure in stimulus arrays, where information is defined as stimulus array invariants. Gibson, however, was somewhat vague about the nature of such structure. Consequently, ecological perceptual research—even acknowledging some remarkable successes—has generally been ad hoc: Lacking principled heuristics, researchers examine array structure, which, by some means, they have come to discover as (or believe to be) informative. Here, I propose a series of heuristic principles potentially useful for the discovery of informative structure in stimulus arrays, with examples to suggest how those principles might apply. The major benefit of principled search for stimulus array invariants is more efficient elaboration of their function in perception. While admittedly preliminary, the principles outlined may both guide perceptual investigations and prompt additional consideration of how to approach the search for stimulus array invariants.     

Subliminal processes,dissociation and the 'I'

The study of unconscious processes leads to the hypothesis of the limit of consciousness, which involves two main kinds of psychic activity. The first represents psychic contents which are subliminal for their low energy, the second subliminal contents which are inaccessible to consciousness because they are dissociated in the subliminal region. Dissociation is a concept introduced by Pierre Janet for splitting consciousness due to traumatic events or during hypnosis. It takes a more general form in Hilgard's neo-dissociation theory of hypnotic phenomena and also in Jung's theory of the collective unconscious. Further generalization links it to the modern findings of explicit and implicit perception, leading to a shift in dissociation from hypothesis to clinical, experimental and theoretical reality. Studies in hypnosis also point to the existence of an integrative psychic entity, that comprises the conscious 'I'. Hilgard called this the hidden observer, and his findings represent empirical confirmation of Jung's term for the Self as mirror 'I', which leads to many important consequences for self-discovery and the meaning of life.     

A computational model of perception and action for cognitive robotics

Robots are increasingly expected to perform tasks in complex environments. To this end, engineers provide them with processing architectures that are based on models of human information processing. In contrast to traditional models, where information processing is typically set up in stages (i.e., from perception to cognition to action), it is increasingly acknowledged by psychologists and robot engineers that perception and action are parts of an interactive and integrated process. In this paper, we present HiTEC, a novel computational (cognitive) model that allows for direct interaction between perception and action as well as for cognitive control, demonstrated by task-related attentional influences. Simulation results show that key behavioral studies can be readily replicated. Three processing aspects of HiTEC are stressed for their importance for cognitive robotics: (1) ideomotor learning of action control, (2) the influence of task context and attention on perception, action planning, and learning, and (3) the interaction between perception and action planning. Implications for the design of cognitive robotics are discussed.     

Form discrimination: features or invariants?

Does form discrimination rely on feature analysis, as the indirect theory of perception supposes, or on affordances (behavioural meanings specified by invariant patterns), as direct theory states. Subjects were to indicate the position of a target in a perspective rendering of a plane, displayed for 100 msec. in a large screen projection. In one of the conditions the target disrupted the plane, in the other it did not. Although targets of the two conditions shared the same features, the disruptive targets were discriminated more often than the nondisruptive targets. This result supports the direct approach to perception which states that a perceiver discriminates behaviourally relevant patterns rather than geometrical properties.     

Understanding intentions from actions: Direct perception,inference, and the roles of mirror and mentalizing systems

This review asks whether observers can obtain information about others’ intentions from observation of their actions; and if so, whether this process is performed using direct perceptual or inferential processes (prominent examples of each being the intention understanding theory of mirror neuron function, and mentalizing accounts of intention understanding, respectively). I propose four conditions that should be fulfilled in order to support a direct perception account, and suggest that only two of these conditions are supported by the existing data. I then propose and review three further sources of evidence which have the potential to inform this debate, concluding that the data do not support the direct perception account. In particular, mirror neurons may be involved in lower-level processes of action perception, but there is no evidence to support their involvement in the type of higher-level intention understanding that is proposed by the direct perception account.     

The topological approach to perceptual organization

To address the fundamental question of “what are the primitives of visual perception”, a theory of topological structure and functional hierarchy in visual perception has been proposed. This holds that the global nature of perceptual organization can be described in terms of topological invariants, global topological perception is prior to the perception of other featural properties, and the primitives of visual form perception are geometric invariants at different levels of structural stability. In Part I of this paper, I will illustrate why and how the topological approach to perceptual organization has been advanced. In Part II, I will provide empirical evidence supporting the early topological perception, while answering some commonly considered counteraccounts. In Part III, to complete the theory, I will apply the mathematics of tolerance spaces to describe global properties in discrete sets. In Part IV, I will further present experimental data to demonstrate the global-to-local functional hierarchy in form perception, which is stratified with respect to structural stability defined by Klein's Erlangen Program. Finally, in Part V, I will discuss relations of the global-to-local topological model to other theories: The topological approach reformulates both classical Gestalt holism and Gibson's direct perception of invariance, while providing a challenge to computational approaches to vision based on the local-to-global assumption.     

The Impact and Status of Carol Fowler's Supramodal Theory of Multisensory Speech Perception

ABSTRACT

One important contribution of Carol Fowler's direct approach to speech perception is its account of multisensory perception. This supramodal account proposes a speech function that detects supramodal information available across audition, vision, and touch. This detection allows for the recovery of articulatory primitives that provide the basis of a common currency shared between modalities as well as between perception and production. Common currency allows for perceptual experience to be shared between modalities and supports perceptually guided speaking as well as production-guided perception. In this report, we discuss the contribution and status of the supramodal approach relative to recent research in multisensory speech perception. We argue that the approach has helped motivate a multisensory revolution in perceptual psychology. We then review the new behavioral and neurophysiological research on (a) supramodal information, (b) cross-sensory sharing of experience, and (c) perceptually guided speaking as well as production guided speech perception. We conclude that Fowler's supramodal theory has fared quite well in light of this research.     

On the perception of speech from time-varying acoustic information: contributions of amplitude variation

The cyclic variation in the energy envelope of the speech signal results from the production of speech in syllables. This acoustic property is often identified as a source of information in the perception of syllable attributes, though spectral variation can also provide this information reliably. In the present study of the relative contributions of the energy and spectral envelopes in speech perception, we employed sinusoidal replicas of utterances, which permitted us to examine the roles of these acoustic properties in establishing or maintaining time-varying perceptual coherence. Three experiments were carried out to assess the independent perceptual effects of variation in sinusoidal amplitude and frequency, using sentence-length signals. In Experiment 1, we found that the fine grain of amplitude variation was not necessary for the perception of segmental and suprasegmental linguistic attributes; in Experiment 2, we found that amplitude was nonetheless effective in influencing syllable perception, and that in some circumstances it was crucial to segmental perception; in Experiment 3, we observed that coarse-grain amplitude variation, above all, proved to be extremely important in phonetic perception. We conclude that in perceiving sinusoidal replicas, the perceiver derives much from following the coherent pattern of frequency variation and gross signal energy, but probably derives rather little from tracking the precise details of the energy envelope. These findings encourage the view that the perceiver uses time-varying acoustic properties selectively in understanding speech.     

The Psychophysiology Of Intuition: A Quantum-Holographic Theory Of Nonlocal Communication

This work seeks to explain intuitive perception—those perceptions that are not based on reason or logic or on memories or extrapolations from the past, but are based, instead, on accurate foreknowledge of the future. Often such intuitive foreknowledge involves perception of implicit information about nonlocal objects and/or events by the body's psychophysiological systems. Recent experiments have shown that intuitive perception of a future event is related to the degree of emotional significance of that event, and a new study shows that both the brain and the heart are involved in processing a pre-stimulus emotional response to the future event. Drawing on this research and on the principles of quantum holography, I develop a theory of intuition that views the perception of things remote in space or ahead in time (nonlocal communication) as involving processes of energetic resonance connecting the body's psychophysiological systems to the quantum level. The theory explains how focused emotional attention directed to the nonlocal object of interest attunes the bio-emotional energy generated by the body's psychophysiological systems to a domain of quantum-holographical information, which contains implicit information about the object. The body's perception of such implicit information about things distant in space/time is experienced as an intuition.     

Reference frame effects on shape perception in two versus three dimensions

Three experiments are reported in which it is tested whether the Gestalt effect of configural orientation on shape perception operates on two-dimensional (2-D) or three-dimensional (3-D) representations of space. It is known that gravitationally defined squares and diamonds take longer to discriminate in diagonal arrays than in horizontal or vertical arrays. In the first experiment it is shown that this interference effect decreases dramatically in magnitude when pictorial depth information is added so that subjects perceive the target shapes in different depth planes. In the second experiment this difference is shown not to be due to relative size of the target shapes or to occlusion of a background plane. It is also shown, in the final experiment, that this difference is not due to linear perspective information or merely to perception of the target figures in a 3-D scene. The overall pattern of results supports the position that this configural reference frame effect arises primarily when the elements of the configuration are coplanar, and that the principal organization underlying it is the structure of the perceived 3-D environment rather than that of the 2-D image. In all three experiments, however, there is also a small interference effect in the noncoplanar 3-D conditions. This might be due either to some aspect of reference frame selection operating on the 2-D image representation or to the failure of subjects to see depth in the 3-D stimuli on some proportion of the trials.