Bernard Shaw and the doctors: The art and science of medicine inThe Doctor's Dilemma

What did Bernard Shaw really think about doctors? Although any reader with a sketchy understanding of Shaw's work is inclined to think that he condened the entire profession, a careful reading of his most well-known play featuring medical practitioners reveals a mixed attitude. InThe Doctor's Dilemma, one finds a position that may be representative of Shaw's attitude. In this play, he places the entire Edwardian medical establishment—consultants and general practitioners — on stage, and he focuses the attention of this diverse group on the problem of a patient. In doing so, Shaw is able to separate the play's characters into representatives of (1) the newscientific medicine and (2) the venerableart of medicine. He satirizes the arrogance of the former, and he presents the humane attitude of the latter in a favorable light.     

The perception of preschool social dominance

Children's and teachers' perception of social dominance was examined using a behavioral criterion for determining accuracy of verbal judgments. Video records of agonistic interactions were obtained during approximately 60 hours of free-play at two preschool centers. Analyses of social conflict episodes ending in submission revealed linear dominance structures for both groups. Dominance perception was assessed in two ways. Both teachers and children were asked to rank-order a subgroup of children according to dominance. They were also asked to select the more dominant children in a number of predetermined pairs. Results indicated that teachers could accurately judge dyadic dominance relations, and that accuracy among children varied as a function of their status within the group hierarchy. Findings have implications for social dominance assessment methodology, and for the issue of consensual versus ecological validity in developmental studies of social perception.     

Visual illusions and direct perception: Elaborating on Gibson's insights

Gibson argued that illusory pictorial displays contain “inadequate” information (1966, p. 288) but also that a “very special kind of selective attention” (p. 313) can dispel the illusion–suggesting that adequate perceptual information could in fact be potentially available to observers. The present paper describes Gibson's treatment of geometrical illusions and reviews pertinent empirical evidence. Interestingly, Gibson's insights have been corroborated by recent findings of inter- and intra-observer variability in susceptibility to visual illusions as a function of culture, learning and task. It is argued that these findings require a modification of the general Gibsonian principle of perception as the detection of specifying information. Withagen and Chemero's (2009) evolutionary motivated reconceptualization of perception predicts observers' use of both specifying and non-specifying information and inter- and intra-observer variability therein. Based on this reconceptualization we develop an ecological approach to visual illusions that explains differential illusion effects in terms of the optical variable(s) detected.     

Situated Behavior and the Place of Measurement in Psychological Theory

Measured values of human behavior may entail contradictory attributes of wave and particle by analogy with the wave/particle attributes of the electron. 1/f scaling is the wave attribute in this analogy and punctate data points are the particle attribute. One consequence of the wave/particle duality in physics was to elevate measurement to a primary place in physical theory, and one purpose of the present analogy is to likewise elevate measurement to a primary place in psychological theory. Another purpose is to emulate Robert Shaw's creative use of analogies, consistent with the brief quotation that begins this article.     

The Essential Elements of an Evolutionary Theory of Perception

ABSTRACT

Traditional theories of perception developed for centuries before Darwin conceived his theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Although many areas of psychological theory and research now have mainstream approaches strongly influenced by evolutionary thinking, mainstream perceptual theory remains close to its pre-Darwinian roots. This paper draws on insights from ecological psychology, especially as represented in J. J. Gibson's The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), to identify 4 elements that any future evolutionary approach to perception should be expected to include: (a) an ecological analysis of ambient energy, (b) a comparative understanding of the perceptual abilities of different species, (c) a dynamic understanding of organism–environment interaction as essential for perception, and (d) an understanding of perceptual attunement based on the concept of affordances. Each of these elements serves an essential theoretical role while also pointing toward lines of research where much work remains to be done. The presence of these elements explains, in part, the affinity between ecological psychology and other evolutionarily grounded approaches to psychology, including the emerging fields of enactivism and embodied cognition.     

Is parenthood a desirable adult role? An assessment of attitudes held by contemporary women

The purpose of this study was to explore contemporary women's perception of parenthood. The attitudes toward parenthood of 213 undergraduate females enrolled in family or women's studies courses were measured by an 11-item Likert-type scale. Major findings include (a) the expectation that parenthood will be among the subjects' adult roles, but will be delayed; (2) a rejection of the idea that motherhood is a prerequisite to women's happiness and fullfillment; (3) a confused perception of the effect of parenthood on the male; and (4) a suggestion that although these young women intend to parent, they assess their preparation to do so as limited.     

Monocular Egocentric Distance Information Generated by Head Movement

The complex systems approach to cognition has been challenged by the need to redescribe cognition in a way that avoids traditional commitments to the notion of efficient-cause relationships between perception, isolated computational components, and action. Guy Van Orden met this challenge head-on. Instead of decomposing consecutive reaction times into means and comparing differences in means across conditions to the variability surrounding those means (which was assumed to constitute white noise), he examined the multiscale dynamics entailed in consecutive reaction times. This led him to develop the notion of interaction-dominant versus component-dominant dynamics. Although Guy's empirical and theoretical work clearly addresses ecological psychology's long-standing concern with indirect, mediated perception, it nonetheless begs the question of just how interactive we are willing to go. This article proposes that Guy's work was leading us toward a metaphysics of interaction, all the way down. In such an interaction-dominant, process ontology, “context” becomes metaphysically fundamental (i.e., vs. “things”); stability comes to be seen as a scale-relative, contextually emergent phenomenon; and the notion of “intrinsic” properties becomes meaningless, as all “properties” find themselves contextually grounded. The article examines the implications of these assertions for ecological psychology specifically and cognitive science in general.     

Invariants and Information Pickup in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems: Implications for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior

ABSTRACT

Although Gibson focused his agenda on the study of perception and Skinner on learning as contingencies of reinforcement, they shared a nonrepresentational approach. We propose that the ecological concept of invariants developed in Gibson's book The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966) could underlie Skinner's notion of contingencies of reinforcement as environmental opportunities for behaving. The proposal is divided in 3 parts: the concept of stimulus for perception, the role of the notion of invariants in the operant contingency, and the information for perception and behavior. We conclude that approximating contingencies of reinforcement as instances of environmental invariants can be fruitful for studying a number of phenomena within the context of operant conditioning.     

1966 and All That: James Gibson and Bottom-Down Theory

ABSTRACT

The “later” James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus–response theorist. In fact, Gibson's 1966 book presents a radical alternative to stimulus–response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and receptive but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers “reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the implications of Gibson's systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, including the relations between the senses; the concept of “sensationless” perception; and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in terms.     

Perceiving Multiple Affordances for Objects

Researchers (Gilden &; Proffitt, 1989; Runeson &; Vedeler, 1993; Todd &; Warren, 1982) have tested Runeson's (1977) claim that the relation between a collision . . event's dynamics and kinematics might support perception of the relative mass of colliding objects. Results have been inconsistent; however, these studies employed computer-generated collisions as stimuli. The present research assessed observer's ability to report relative mass in the context of physical objects involved in physical collisions. The results indicate greater sensitivity to relative mass than had been found with animations-based studies. Implications of these data for the kinematic specification of dynamics (KSD) principle of dynamics perception (Runeson &; Frykholm, 1983) and a cue-heuristics theory of dynamics perception (Gilden &; Proffitt, 1989) are discussed.     

Experiencing Gendered Seeing

This paper explores the concept of “gendered seeing”: the capacity to visually perceive another person's gender and the role that one's own gender plays in that perception. Assuming that gendered properties are actually perceptible, my goal is to provide some support from the philosophy of perception on how gendered visual experiences are possible. I begin by exploring the ways in which sociologists and psychologists study how we perceive one's sex and the implications of these studies for the sex/gender distinction. I then discuss feminist philosopher Linda Alcoff's concept of “interpretative horizons,” which highlights the role that one's social and political identities play in how we understand the world around us. I also discuss Elizabeth Grosz's notion (borrowed from Merleau‐Ponty) of double sensation. I then apply some work in the philosophy of perception on perceptual learning and the cognitive penetration of perception to gendered seeing. My hypothesis is that we can explain how one's interpretative horizons are acquired through some notion of perceptual learning. I conclude by suggesting some of the epistemic and ethical implications of gendered seeing.     

Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense.     

Shadworth Hodgson and William James's formulation of space perception: Phenomenology and perceptual realism

This paper has two related goals. First, it seeks to show that the theory of perception found in William James's Principles of Psychology is thoroughly consistent if it is approached through the framework of perceptual realism versus constructionism rather than the nativism versus empiricism debate. As such, this paper offers an alternative to Nicholas Pastore's claim that there are two contradictory theories of perception in the Principles. James's commitment to perceptual realism is articulated within the contexts of his (1) critique of constructionist perception theories, (2) notion of the spatial quale, and (3) formulation of the role of knowledge in adult perception. The second goal of this paper deals with the historical development of James's perceptual realism. Here it is argued that Shadworth Hodgson's method of reflection–an anticipation of Husserl's phenomenological reduction–served as the basis of James's commitment to perceptual realism.     

Cognition as the Cooperative Appropriation of Affordances

Michaels (2000) expressed concerns about the implications of the notion of 2 visual systems (Milner &; Goodale, 1995) for ecological psychology. This leads her to suggest a decoupling of perception and action, by which action is separate from perception. It is suggested that although Michaels noted, on the one hand, that Milner and Goodale's approach to perception is a constructivist one, she mistakenly adopts their view that separates vision for perception from vision for action. An alternative position is presented, based on a recent article (Norman, in press), in which the parallels between the 2 visual systems, dorsal and ventral, and the 2 theoretical approaches, ecological and constructivist, are elucidated. According to this dual-process approach to perception, both systems are perceptual systems. The ecological-dorsal system is the system that picks up information about the ambient environment allowing the organism to negotiate it. It is suggested that this type of perception always processes the relevant information for action and that there is no need to sever the perception-action coupling. Ecological psychology and the 2 visual systems are quite compatible, and there is no need for concern.     

Encouraging children to mentalise about a perceived outgroup increases prosocial behaviour towards outgroup members

We investigated whether encouraging young children to discuss the mental states of an immigrant group would elicit more prosocial behaviour towards them and impact on their perception of a group member's emotional experience. Five‐ and 6‐year‐old children were either prompted to talk about the thoughts and feelings of this social group or to talk about their actions. Across two studies, we found that this manipulation increased the extent to which children shared with a novel member of the immigrant group who was the victim of a minor transgression. The manipulation did not lead to greater sharing towards a victim from the children's own culture and did not influence their perception of a victim's negative emotions. These results may ultimately have implications for interventions aimed at fostering positive intergroup relations within the context of immigration.     

The relationship of early adolescent functioning to parent-reported and adolescent-perceived interparental conflict

Is an adolescent's perception of interparental conflict important or is the parents' report of such conflict sufficient to predict adolescent functioning? To examine this question, a study was undertaken with 178 young adolescents and their mothers, fathers, and social studies teachers. Adolescents completed a measure of their perceptions of interparental conflict while mothers and fathers completed a self-report measure of their conflict. Teachers provided an assessment of each adolescent's cognitive and social functioning at two separate times, 1 year apart. Results indicated that both parental report, particularly maternal, and adolescent perception of interparental conflict were significantly related to adolescent cognitive and social functioning, and the magnitude of the correlations did not differ significantly. Hierarchical regression analyses were performed in which mother and father report of conflict was forced into the equation initially and adolescent perception of such conflict was allowed to enter freely. These analyses indicated that adolescents' perceptions accounted for unique variance in their functioning, beyond that accounted for by parental report. The results are discussed in terms of the specific roles that parental conflict and adolescent perceptions of such conflict play and the possible mechanisms by which each operates.     

Perceiving Whether or Not the World Affords Stepping Onto and Over: A Developmental Study

Abstract

Children's perception of the critical (upper) limit of their stepping affordances, was tested at 6, 8, and 10 years of age for stepping onto (SON_max in Experiment I) and over (SOV_max in Experiment II) obstacles. Warren's (1984) proposition (similarity hypothesis) that adults perceive SON_max to be .88 of leg length (L) because the geometry of adults' legs is invariant over varying height was extended to varying height due to growth. Because the geometry of children's legs is both invariant over growth between 6 and 10 years and identical to adults, we predicted that children should both accurately perceive their critical limit and perceive it to be .88L. Experiment I confirmed these predictions and Experiment II demonstrated that children differentiate between the two stepping affordances. The similarity hypothesis is further supported by the fact that age does not interact with either observers' mean accuracy over conditions or variability within observers. This stable performance is interpreted to mean that children are continually adapted to these affordances and not continually retuning them in response to growth. The need for “action” studies to complement “perception” studies of affordances is discussed in terms of the possibility that the biodynamic effects of growth variations, such as the distribution of body mass, may affect perception only or principally when perception and action are dynamically linked in goal-directed behavior.     

Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception

This paper focuses on the contents of perception in Kant's first Critique and Husserl's later writings. Both Kant and Husserl are known for their appeal to synthesis in their transcendental accounts of perceptual experience and objective judgment. Especially regarding Kant, the precise nature of perceptual synthesis has recently been the cause of much debate. Whereas some argue that for Kant perception must have nonconceptual content, others believe he is a conceptualist. After offering an alternative solution to this interpretative problem in Kant's philosophy, I turn to Husserl's later theory of perception. My main claims here are that Husserl departs from Kant specifically regarding (i) the sort of synthetic contents that govern affective perception and (ii) the role of conceptual capacities in the contents of attentive perception.     

Taxing behavioral control diminishes sharing and costly punishment in childhood

Instances of altruism in children are well documented. However, the underlying mechanisms of such altruistic behavior are still under considerable debate. While some claim that altruistic acts occur automatically and spontaneously, others argue that they require behavioral control. This study focuses on the mechanisms that give rise to prosocial decisions such as sharing and costly punishment. In two studies it is shown in 124 children aged 6–9 years that behavioral control plays a critical role for both prosocial decisions and costly punishment. Specifically, the studies assess the influence of taxing aspects of self‐regulation, such as behavioral control (Study 1) and emotion regulation (Study 2) on subsequent decisions in a Dictator and an Ultimatum Game. Further, children's perception of fairness norms and emotional experience were measured. Taxing children's behavioral control prior to making their decisions reduced sharing and costly punishment of unfair offers, without changing perception of fairness norms or the emotional experience. Conversely, taxing children's emotion regulation prior to making their decisions only led to increased experience of anger at seeing unfair offers, but left sharing, costly punishment and the perception of fairness norms unchanged. These findings stress the critical role of behavioral control in prosocial giving and costly punishment in childhood.     

Individual differences in women's perceptions of other women's dominance

Recent research on men's dominance perception suggests that the extent to which men perceive masculine men to be more dominant than relatively feminine men is negatively correlated with measures of their own dominance. In the current studies, we investigated the relationship between indices of women's own dominance and their perceptions of other women's facial dominance. Women's own height and scores on a dominance questionnaire were negatively correlated with the extent to which they perceived masculine women to be more dominant than relatively feminine women. In follow‐up studies, we observed similar individual differences when (i) women separately judged other women's social and physical dominance, suggesting that individual differences in women's dominance perceptions generalize across two different types of dominance judgment and (ii) we assessed the perceivers' dominance indirectly by using a questionnaire that measures the extent to which women view interactions with other women in competitive terms. These findings present new evidence that the extent to which people perceive masculine individuals to be more dominant than relatively feminine individuals is negatively correlated with measures of their own dominance and suggest that competition and conflict among women may have shaped individual differences in women's dominance perception. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.