The indispensability of precollision kinematics in the visual perception of relative mass

The visible kinematic pattern that occurs when objects collide contains information about the relative mass of the objects. Recently, Gilden and Proffitt (1989) have claimed that perceivers are limited to the use of simultaneous elemental cues and that therefore mass discrimination judgments are independent of whether the precollision epoch is visible or not. The present paper argues that their experimental results are irrelevant because crucial parameters were held constant, and that false conclusions were drawn because their data were not treated for what they are: threshold measurements obtained with the method of constant stimuli. Three experiments are reported, showingthat a high level of performance is attainable only when the whole event is visible, and thus that the effective information is extended over time. In addition, modified PROBIT analysis was used to determine what information observers use when the precollision epoch is occluded. Analytically complex invariants, based on vector components in the abstract collision-axis system, proved to have the best fit to the data. Thus the elementaristic premises in Gilden and Proffitt’s cue-heuristic model for relative mass perception are defeated.     

Support for the cue-heuristic model is based on suboptimal observer performance: Response to Gilden and Proffitt (1994)

Gilden and Proffitt (1994) have derived support for their updated cue-heuristic model of mass discrimination in observed collisions from two experiments reported by Runeson and Vedeler (1993). However, these experiments are inadequate for theory testing because of confounding and lack of representative variation in parameters. Instead, extended analyses of the third of Runeson and Vedeler’s experiments are presented. It is shown that observers exclusively use collision-axis velocity components in conditions where the heuristic model asserts that only trajectory speeds are available. Moreover, the patterns of error predicted by the heuristic model do not occur. Overall, performance is closer to the ideal than to the predictions from any conceivable model based on elementaristic cues; hence an explanation in terms of advanced informative invariants is the more viable approach. The final discussion concerns the distortion of theory development that might be engendered by empirical data that represent suboptimal observer performance due to unfavorable testing conditions.     

Learning to perceive the relative mass of colliding balls: the effects of ratio scaling and feedback

The theory of direct perception holds that competent observers are able to detect optical patterns that specify the relative mass of colliding balls. Heuristic theorists, on the other hand, claim that judgments of relative mass are based on variables that do not specify relative mass. We contrasted these views with an experiment in which participants were given feedback on their ratio-scaled estimates of the relative mass of simulated colliding balls. Correlations between judged relative mass and various kinetic and kinematic measures of the collisions revealed that (1) judgments of relative mass become more accurate with feedback, (2) different observers use different variables, (3) during training, many observers change which variables they use, (4) before training, observers tend to use nonspecifying variables or combinations thereof, (5) after a minimal amount of training, at least some observers seem to detect mass-specifying information, and (6) the judgments do not support a generalization of the heuristic model of Gilden and Proffitt (1989, 1994). These findings suggest that direct perception of relative mass is a skill that can be developed through appropriate training.     

Action goals influence action-specific perception

We examined the processes that mediate the emergence of action-specific influences on perception that have recently been reported for baseball batting and golf putting (Witt, Linkenauger, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2008; Witt & Proffitt, 2005). To this end, we used a Schokokusswurfmaschine: Children threw a ball at a target, which, if hit successfully, launched a ball that the children then had to catch. In two experiments, children performed either a throwing-and-catching task or a throwing-only task, in which no ball was launched. After each task, the size of the target or of the ball was estimated. Results indicate that action-specific influences on perceived size occur for objects that are related to the end goal of the action, but not for objects that are related to intermediate action goals. These results suggest that action-specific influences on perception are contingent upon the primary action goals to be achieved.     

An effect of mood on the perception of geographical slant

Previous research has shown that hills appear steeper to those who are fatigued, encumbered, of low physical fitness, elderly, or in declining health (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). The prevailing interpretation of this research is that observers' perceptions of the environment are influenced by their capacity to navigate that environment. The current studies extend this programme by investigating more subtle embodied effects on perception of slant; namely those of mood. In two studies, with two different mood manipulations, and two estimates of slant in each, observers in a sad mood reported hills to be steeper. These results support the role of mood and motivational factors in influencing spatial perception, adding to the previous work showing that energetic potential can influence perception.     

Perception of Sex From Complex Body Movement in Young Children

This article reports on a study of the perception of sex from complex body movement. Studies by Cutting and his associates (Barclay, Cutting, & Kozlowski, 1978; Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977) and by Runeson and Frykholm (1983) have shown that adult observers of both adult and child actors (11-12 years old) can reliably recognize the sex of the actor. In this study, prepubescent actors (4-5 years old) were employed, and the role of familiarity of observers with children of this age was also examined. Ten children (4-5 years old), 5 boys and 5 girls, performed 7 actions similar to those employed in Runeson and Frykholm's study: walking in a circle, running in a circle, throwing a ball, lifting a box, sitting on the floor, sitting on a chair, and climbing onto a chair and jumping down. Point-light displays were made of each child performing each action. Each actor was recorded performing each action once. An experimental tape was prepared in which all 70 acts from the source tape appeared in a counterbalanced order such that each child appeared once in each block of 10 trials and each action appeared once in each block of 7 trials. The effect of familiarity was explored by employing 3 different groups of observers: the parents of the child actors, a group of adults familiar with children of this age, and a student group of young adults not familiar with children of this age. The overall detection rate was only just above chance and none of the observer groups performed better than chance. Sex was reliably perceived, however, for particular actors and for particular actions. The implications of these findings for Runeson and Frykholm's kinematics specifies dynamics principle are noted.     

An effect of mood on the perception of geographical slant

Previous research has shown that hills appear steeper to those who are fatigued, encumbered, of low physical fitness, elderly, or in declining health (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). The prevailing interpretation of this research is that observers’ perceptions of the environment are influenced by their capacity to navigate that environment. The current studies extend this programme by investigating more subtle embodied effects on perception of slant; namely those of mood. In two studies, with two different mood manipulations, and two estimates of slant in each, observers in a sad mood reported hills to be steeper. These results support the role of mood and motivational factors in influencing spatial perception, adding to the previous work showing that energetic potential can influence perception.     

What hands know about objects; taking perception of hills out of context: A response to Durgin (2013)

In a recent paper, we provided independent evidence on the accuracy of ‘haptically’ measured geographical slant perception (Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2013). Durgin (2013) argues that the devices used in our work, namely the palm-board, and palm-controlled inclinometer (PCI), are not measures of perception. In response, we outline four failures of replication in the laboratory work of Durgin and colleagues on which they base their model of slant perception. We also highlight fundamental differences between the perceptual tasks Durgin and colleagues ask of participants relative to those of Proffitt and colleagues' traditional measures. These subtle differences might help explain how the two groups have arrived at discrepant conclusions.     

Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense.     

Mode Transition and Change in Variable Use in Perceptual Learning

Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000) proposed (a) that perceptual learning entails a transition from an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension, and (b) that relative confidence—the difference between estimated and actual performance—indicates whether apprehension is inferential or direct. In 3 experiments participants received feedback on judgments of force; the results replicated Runeson et al.'s observed decrease in overconfidence but showed more overconfidence. Relative confidence depended on how performance was defined. An attempt to manipulate confidence failed, but trait confidence affected relative confidence. It was concluded that overconfidence does not necessarily signal inferential functioning and that a decrease in overconfidence might occur in a direct-perceptual mode. A theory of learning within the direct-perceptual mode, in addition to learning through a mode transition, appears necessary.     

When faces and voices come together: Face width-to-height ratio and voice pitch contribute independently to social perception

Prior research has shown that the face's width-to-height ratio (fWHR) and the voice's pitch influence social perception. Yet, the relative contribution of either cue has been largely unexplored. We examined the simultaneous effects of fWHR and pitch on social evaluations. Experiment 1 (N = 102) tested how such cues shaped global impressions. Experiment 2 (N = 121) tested fWHR and pitch's effect on behavioural affiliative intentions, framing social interaction as a physical or an intellectual competition. Experiment 3 (N = 57) assessed whether variations in fWHR and pitch could influence trait attribution (i.e., physical formidability and intelligence). Individuals with large faces or low-pitched voices elicited negative impressions, positive behavioural intentions in a physical competition, and the attribution of stronger formidability but lower intelligence. Across the studies, cues exerted independent effects. The implications of these findings for research on cross-modal social perception are discussed.     

The physical self-concept across childhood: Measurement development and meaning for physical activity

The physical self-concept is considered a significant predictor of physical activity and persistence in childhood and youth. Based on Shavelson, Stanton, and Hubner's (1976) hierarchical structure of self-concept, several approaches have been developed to measure physical self-perception. A multi-dimensional fitness-based approach by Marsh (1990) shows a valid method for measuring physical self-concept in all age groups from 8 years old to adulthood. Furthermore, following standard childhood fitness test dimensions, instruments have been developed for middle to late childhood (Dreiskämper, Tietjens, Honemann, Naul, & Freund, 2015a) and early childhood (Tietjens et al., 2018). However, based on Harter's (1980) approach of a more global and general skills-summarizing self-perception profile, other studies – preliminary coming from a motor development perspective – focused on measuring children's self-perception based on fundamental movement skills such as object control, locomotion, and stability. In this line, Estevan and Barnett (2018) proposed an adaption of Fox and Corbin's (1989) model. However, several research questions have remained unanswered because these different research directions have not been integrated yet: 1) How is the physical self-concept in childhood constructed, and how can it be measured? 2) How does the physical self-concept develop across childhood (and is this consistent with the assumptions about the self-concept as defined by Shavelson et al., 1976)? And 3) What is the role of physical self-concept in behavior (i.e., PA) and its antecedents in childhood (and how)? The purpose of this discussion paper is to address these three more or less open questions from a self-concept research perspective. To this end, the models of Shavelson et al. (1976) and Marsh (1990) will be drawn upon to integrate the recent research developments into a new classification of the physical self-concept and its development throughout childhood.     

Heuristic judgment of mass ratio in two-body collisions

The logic of judging relative mass from a two-body collision is developed from data presented by Runeson and Vedeler (1993). Data from two experiments are analyzed on a point-by-point basis, and strong support for the theory that mass-ratio judgments are mediated by separate speed and angle heuristics is shown. This analysis is accomplished by reducing the collision event to two elementary features: the presence of ricochet and the ratio of exit speeds. The heuristics that both ricochet and greater exit speed specify relative lightness are shown to explain the basic patterns of data presented by Runeson and Vedeler.     

LOCKE AND THE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION

Abstract: It is common to assume that if Locke is to be regarded as a consistant epistemologist he must be read as holding that either ideas are the objects of perception or that [physical] objects are. He must either be a direct realist or a representationalist. But perhaps, paradoxical as it at first sounds, there is no reason to suppose that he could not hold both to be true. We see physical objects and when we do so we have ideas. We see or hear birds and bells but we also have visual and auditory ideas of birds and bells. This suggestion is explored through examination of what Locke says about perception in his Elements of Natural Philosophy and the accounts offered both by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and by some of Locke's successors.     

Potentiation of action by undetected affordant objects

The physical attributes of objects that are relevant to motor behaviour, or action, are referred to as affordances (Gibson, 1979). Recent evidence has shown that an object's affordance can potentiate an unrelated motor response even when there is no intention to respond to it (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998). In the five experiments, we examined whether conscious perception of an affordance is necessary to produce motor priming by presenting images of affordant objects (e.g., hammer) under conditions which cause them to be undetectable: Brief masked exposure (BME) and attentional blink (AB). We successfully demonstrated that conscious perception is not necessary for an object's affordance to produce motor priming. Since these findings are consistent with the abilities/disabilities of patients with blindsight and visual form agnosia, it is possible that processing accomplished by the dorsal stream produced this effect, though more research is needed to confirm this assertion.     

Applied sport psychology: A view from britain

Abstract

Based on the findings of a field study with youth sport coaches, contextual factors in youth sport arc considered. Youth sport is discussed as a “developmental intervention” (Birkel, Lerner, &; Smyer, 1989). Although past research has examined a variety of issues in youth sport (e.g., coaching behavior, participation motivation), the dynamics of the context have been largely ignored. It is argued that situational factors may have important implications for the quality of children's youth sport experiences. Data arc presented to show the significance of contextual factors in coaches' experiences. Examples of previous interventions aimed at manipulating contexts arc offered and suggestions for future interventions, based on the present study, arc discussed. The roles of parents. spectator location. rules, and time are discussed in detail.     

The Emerging Concept of Information

Rapid progress in the understanding of the perception of spatial layout is credited to J. J. Gibson's (1979) concept of information. Ecological research has focused on the wealth of information based in the continuous change and invariant structures of optic flow, information that can specify events and the stable properties of objects. Recent demonstrations that have shown that instantaneous optic flow not only contains informative structure but also controls perception suggest that previous claims that static displays are necessarily impoverished and ambiguous were exaggerated. Future research efforts should consider the potential of both instantaneous and ongoing optic flow to provide information about the world and even about the dynamics of events.     

Affordances matter in geographical slant perception

We argue that the experimental conditions in the Durgin et al. (2009) study were so different from those in Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) that the results of the former study cannot be generalized to the latter. The participants in the Durgin et al. study viewed a 2-m-long ramp; those in Bhalla and Proffitt viewed expansive hills. When drawing generalizations from one study to another, equating experimental conditions is always important; moreover, from an embodied perspective on perception, equating the opportunities for action also matters.     

Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?

The controversy over the interpretative issue—is Thomas Reid a perceptual direct realist?—has recently had channelled into it a host of imaginative ideas about what direct perception truly means. Paradoxically enough, it is the apparent contradiction at the heart of his view of perception which keeps teasing us to review our concepts: time and again, Reid stresses that the very idea of any mental intermediaries implies scepticism, yet, nevertheless insists that sensations are signs of objects. But if sensory signs are not mental intermediaries, what are they? Hasn't Reid merely swapped the common ‘sensation’ for the notorious ‘idea’, ending up with indirect realism? ^{1 1}This view is attributed to Reid by Hamilton (1865) and Mill (1877) , as well as Duggan 1960, Immerwahr 1978 , Chappell 1989 , Putnam 1994 , and Wolterstorff 2001 . Madden 1986 refuses to assign sensations any cognitive role. Others think that sensations are compatible with direct realism: See Cummins 1974, Daniels 1974, DeRose 1989, Pappas 1989, Haldane 1989, Copenhaver 2000 , and Van Cleve 2004 .
Current imaginative strategies answer negatively: Reid's sensory sign does not contradict direct perception, and those who think otherwise merely fail to understand what it means.     

Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions

In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and that when rightly understood they compare favourably in many respects with leading contemporary accounts.