Metastable attunement and real-life skilled behavior

In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inherently unpredictable and uncertain environment. All sorts of unpredictable and unexpected things happen but typically people are able to skillfully adapt. In this paper, we address two key questions in cognitive science. First, how is an agent able to bring its previously learned skill to bear on a novel situation? Second, how can an agent be both sensitive to the particularity of a given situation, while remaining flexibly poised for many other possibilities for action? We will argue that both the sensitivity to novel situations and the sensitivity to a multiplicity of action possibilities are enabled by the property of skilled agency that we will call metastable attunement. We characterize a skilled agent’s flexible interactions with a dynamically changing environment in terms of metastable dynamics in agent-environment systems. What we find in metastability is the realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the agent to express their intrinsic dynamics and the tendency to search for new possibilities. Metastably attuned agents are ready to engage with a multiplicity of affordances, allowing for a balance between stability and flexibility. On the one hand, agents are able to exploit affordances they are attuned to, while at the same time being ready to flexibly explore for other affordances. Metastable attunement allows agents to smoothly transition between these possible configurations so as to adapt their behaviour to what the particular situation requires. We go on to describe the role metastability plays in learning of new skills, and in skilful behaviour more generally. Finally, drawing upon work in art, architecture and sports science, we develop a number of perspectives on how to investigate metastable attunement in real life situations.

     

Imagining Experiences

It is often held that in imagining experiences we exploit a special imagistic way of representing mentality—one that enables us to think about mental states in terms of what it is like to have them. According to some, when this way of thinking about the mind is paired with more objective means, an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical features of mental states arises. This paper advances a view along those lines, but with a twist. What many take for a special imagistic way of thinking about experiences is instead a special way of misconstruing them. It is this tendency to misrepresent experiences through the use of imagery that gives rise to the appearance of an explanatory gap. The pervasiveness and tenacity of this misrepresentational reflex can be traced to its roots in a particular heuristic for monitoring and remembering the mental states of others. The arguments together amount to a new path for defending the transparency of perceptual experience.     

Can the Mind Command the Body?

People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal—as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2–5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind–body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental- (e.g., “thinking”) but not to physical states (“activation”). Together, these results suggest that mind–body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.     

Predicting future affective states: How ease of retrieval and faith in intuition moderate the impact of activated content

Prior research suggests that duration bias—the tendency to overestimate the duration of affective states—is due to individuals' inordinate focus on event‐related information. We propose that the impact of focusing on event‐related (vs. unrelated) content is moderated by the ease with which the information is brought to mind. In the present experiment, participants thought about a possible future negative event and made affective forecasts after retrieving either few or many aspects in their life that would be affected (or unaffected) by the event. Participants estimated longer duration of affective consequences when they retrieved event‐related rather than event‐unrelated information. However, this effect was restricted to conditions where the respective information was brought to mind easily. Importantly, results also revealed that individual differences in faith in intuition moderated the effect of manipulated ease of retrieval. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The pressure toward enactment and the hatred of reality.

The pressure toward enactment is investigated in terms of the threats that primitive, pre-thinking states of mind exert on attempts to know and understand. Clinical material and a review of the literature suggest that when the analyst confronts (by thinking) rather than complies (by action) with the hidden demands of omnipotence, he or she triggers and is then subject to the pre-thinking mental realm of concrete sensory bombardment, which can penetrate and obliterate his or her separately thinking mind. One important pressure driving the analyst toward enactment derives from a defensive response aimed at avoiding the threat of such concrete projections.     

On Musical Cognition and Archaic Meaning Schemata

In clinical psychoanalytic work, one often encounters psychical material that is devoid of form or shape. This kind of material is often manifest as concrete somatic sensations on the border of the body and mind. At the same time, it is a primitive body-related self-experience that functions as a background, an essential requirement for more developed, differentiated self-experiences. Bi-logic is a theoretical method by which one can outline these early, partially formless processes and states of mind. This paper includes an overview of the main hypotheses of Matte Blanco's bi-logical vertex, which focuses on the extreme symmetrization of mental phenomena that emanate from the body. Clinical vignettes illustrate ways in which analysis can gradually bring forth such form from the previously formless, dissociated traumatic material into the range of the conscious mind. In this way, the capacity for thinking and reflection increases and the early elements of self-experience are enlivened.     

Transcending the caesura: Reverie,dreaming and counter‐dreaming

The author reflects about our capacity to get in touch with primitive, irrepresentable, seemingly unreachable parts of the Self and with the unrepressed unconscious. It is suggested that when the patient's dreaming comes to a halt, or encounters a caesura, the analyst dreams that which the patient cannot. Getting in touch with such primitive mental states and with the origin of the Self is aspired to, not so much for discovering historical truth or recovering unconscious content, as for generating motion between different parts of the psyche. The movement itself is what expands the mind and facilitates psychic growth. Bion's brave and daring notion of ‘caesura’, suggesting a link between mature emotions and thinking and intra‐uterine life, serves as a model for bridging seemingly unbridgeable states of mind. Bion inspires us to ‘dream’ creatively, to let our minds roam freely, stressing the analyst's speculative imagination and intuition often bordering on hallucination. However, being on the seam between conscious and unconscious, dreaming subverts the psychic equilibrium and poses a threat of catastrophe as a result of the confusion it affords between the psychotic and the non‐psychotic parts of the personality. Hence there is a tendency to try and evade it through a more saturated mode of thinking, often relying on external reality. The analyst's dreaming and intuition, perhaps a remnant of intra‐uterine life, is elaborated as means of penetrating and transcending the caesura, thus facilitating patient and analyst to bear unbearable states of mind and the painful awareness of the unknowability of the emotional experience. This is illustrated clinically.     

Triangulation or strangulation: managing the suicidal patient

The suicidal person is tortured by an internal dilemma to do with unbearable feelings of separation and loss which seem to be insoluble. The suicidal act is an attempt to resolve this by creating a phantasy in which the intolerable pain associated with a grievance is projected and obliterated by murdering the body that has become identified with it. This type of assault on the self reveals a major confusion between mind and body, affecting the capacity to think and resulting in two-dimensional, rather than three-dimensional, thinking, which can permeate therapeutic efforts, at both individual and systemic levels, in the way these patients are managed by their carers. It is suggested that a safety-net made up of mindful carers, based on a triangular principle, can provide a symbolic or mental space, and a containment for the patient's intolerable states of mind, which can be analogous to an ego-function that is lacking internally, and works well if the net can manage to function as a healthy parental couple. Two case studies are presented as an attempt to illuminate some of the dynamics and difficulties in maintaining the safety-net.     

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION OF THE BILATERAL BRAIN

Abstract. A "transcendent function," which integrates conscious and unconscious elements, can be characterized for the human mind. From Carl Jung's model of four basic functions of the psyche—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition—a modified compass of the psyche is constructed to conform to the neurobio-logical structure of the bilateral brain. The transcendent function can be correlated with the principal states of consciousness existent between waking and sleep. Dreams, myth, and the experience of deity, of related unconscious content, are manifest in hybrid states of consciousness. The exercise of the transcendent function is of creative value in the arts and sciences and paramount to human survival.     

Segmenting the stream of consciousness: the psychological correlates of temporal structures in the time series data of a continuous performance task

Using principal component analysis, we examined whether structural properties in the time series of response time would identify different mental states during a continuous performance task. We examined whether it was possible to identify regular patterns which were present in blocks classified as lacking controlled processing, either behaviourally (as a failure to withhold a response to a target) or subjectively (as an off task report at a thought probe). Principal component analysis identified three components present in response times accounting for 58.8% of the variance in the data. Of these components, the second largest factor showed two features that implied it was a marker for mind wandering. First, it was stronger under slow relative to fast stimulus presentation conditions, and so paralleled the distribution of mind wandering reports. Second, it was more powerful prior to behaviour markers of mind wandering (failures in response inhibition) and less powerful prior to reports of task focused thinking (on task reports). Taken together, the use of principal components analysis on response times seem a viable tool for differentiating different mental states and so could help identify the neural substrates which underpin mind wandering and other subjective states.     

A Wandering Mind is Not Always a Creative Mind: How Thought Dynamics Explain the Relationship between Mind Wandering and Creativity

A wandering mind is not always a creative mind. Anecdotes about ideas spontaneously entering awareness during walks, showers, and other off-task activities are plenty. The science behind it, however, is still inconclusive. Creativity might result from how thought context—whether thoughts are on-task or off-task—relates to thought dynamics—how thoughts unfold. To explore this, study 1 (n = 85) surveyed creative professionals about a single idea they had earlier in the day. The spontaneity of thoughts positively correlated with self-reported creativity, whereas off-task thoughts or doing something else did not. Study 2 (n = 180) replicated these findings in a student sample during an idea generation task and added that free movement of thoughts also correlates with self-reported originality during idea generation. As indicated by expert ratings, no relationship of thought dynamics and thought context was found with population-level creativity. Herewith, this study suggests that thought dynamics, rather than thought context, explain the often suggested relationship between mind wandering and creativity.     

Subjectivism,instrumentalism, and prudentialism about reasons: On the normativity of instrumental transmission

According to a subjectivist theory, normative reasons are grounded in facts about our desires. According to an instrumentalist theory, reasons are grounded also in facts about the relevant means to desired objects. These are distinct theories. The widespread tendency to conflate the normativity of subjective and instrumentalist precepts obscures two facts. First, instrumentalist precepts incorporate a subjective element with an objective one. Second, combining these elements into a single theory of normative reasons requires explaining how and why they are to be combined. I argue that the most plausible justification for combining the two elements—which appeals to a theory of well‐being—exposes the inadequacy of the instrumentalist theory: The grounds required to justify the instrumentalist combination are also grounds for the normativity of prudential precepts and with them practical reasons that may have no internal connection to an agent's conative, motivational states.     

The Pervasiveness of 1/f Scaling in Speech Reflects the Metastable Basis of Cognition

Human neural and behavioral activities have been reported to exhibit fractal dynamics known as 1/f noise , which is more aptly named 1/f scaling . Some argue that 1/f scaling is a general and pervasive property of the dynamical substrate from which cognitive functions are formed. Others argue that it is an idiosyncratic property of domain-specific processes. An experiment was conducted to investigate whether 1/f scaling pervades the intrinsic fluctuations of a spoken word. Ten participants each repeated the word bucket over 1,000 times, and fluctuations in acoustic measurements across repetitions generally followed the 1/f scaling relation, including numerous parallel yet distinct series of 1/f fluctuations. On the basis of work showing that 1/f scaling is a universal earmark of metastability, it is proposed that the observed pervasiveness of 1/f fluctuations in speech reflects the fact that cognitive functions are formed as metastable patterns of activity in brain, body, and environment.     

Über Mentalisierung, Affektregulierung und die Entwicklung des Selbst

The author presents an overview of the work by the London research group around Peter Fonagy. This work combines two currently prominent research areas within developmental psychology—the theory of mind research and the attachment research—with psychoanalysis, and it outlines the stepwise acquisitation of the mentalization ability within a comprehensively planned design. The ability to understand oneself and others as entities with mental-emotional states and to deal meaningfully with one’s own inner life and that of others is seen as dependent on attachment experiences. The architecture of the theory is being reconstructed in six steps: After elucidating the mentalization concept (I), the affect-mirroring model (II) and the playing-with-reality-theory (III) are presented. Both segments of the theory constitute the central theoretical core and lead to a particular understanding of the features of the interactive and symbolic affect regulation which is presented in part IV. Particular aspects of the development of the self are then considered (V), and finally the implications of the presented issues with respect to the conceptualisation of such clinical phenomena as the projective identification. The author sees the original aspects of this approach in the fact that Fonagy et al. choose to write an interaction history as opposed to a maturation history favored by many cognitive psychologists in the era of the human genome project. The red thread pervading the discussion of divergent topics is the importance of interpersonal interaction to the development of thinking and emotional processes. The structure of (early) interpersonal relationships is considered as constitutive for normal and pathological variations of the ability to perceive oneself and others as thinking and feeling beings.     

Workers,groups and gangs: consultation to residential adolescent teams

This paper discusses how the internal worlds of adolescents who are looked after in residential care homes impact upon workers and generate complex dynamics within teams. This is especially so regarding internal parental objects and couplings, which inevitably include those of abandoning, abusive and ambivalent parental figures. Versions of these are projected and enacted between adolescents and workers, workers and managers, team and consultant. Conceptual thinking about groups and gangs is drawn upon to help illuminate the emotional phenomena encountered in team consultation meetings as described in the paper. Clinical material is given of working in the transference as consultant to the team, in order to illustrate processes of containment and the opportunity for thinking to take place. In this, there is movement between different states of mind within the team. The paper seeks to demonstrate a way of consulting to residential teams working with looked after adolescents and to show how this can mediate some of the enactments by workers and teams of projected states and transferential phenomena. Associated with this, there can be a deepening of the team's understanding of the emotional experience of the adolescents in their care.     

Validating a visual version of the metronome response task

The metronome response task (MRT)—a sustained-attention task that requires participants to produce a response in synchrony with an audible metronome—was recently developed to index response variability in the context of studies on mind wandering. In the present studies, we report on the development and validation of a visual version of the MRT (the visual metronome response task; vMRT), which uses the rhythmic presentation of visual, rather than auditory, stimuli. Participants completed the vMRT (Studies 1 and 2) and the original (auditory-based) MRT (Study 2) while also responding to intermittent thought probes asking them to report the depth of their mind wandering. The results showed that (1) individual differences in response variability during the vMRT are highly reliable; (2) prior to thought probes, response variability increases with increasing depth of mind wandering; (3) response variability is highly consistent between the vMRT and the original MRT; and (4) both response variability and depth of mind wandering increase with increasing time on task. Our results indicate that the original MRT findings are consistent across the visual and auditory modalities, and that the response variability measured in both tasks indexes a non-modality-specific tendency toward behavioral variability. The vMRT will be useful in the place of the MRT in experimental contexts in which researchers’ designs require a visual-based primary task.     

Mothers' representations of caregiving and their adult children's representations of attachment: intergenerational concordance and relations to beliefs about mothering

Mothers (N= 35) and their adult children completed questionnaires and were interviewed in order to examine relationships between mothers' caregiving representations and their adult children's attachment representations, and relationships between attachment/caregiving representations and beliefs about mothering. Mothers' and their children's accounts of and present thinking about their past relationship were highly similar, indicating that the two parts develop concordant states of mind regarding their relationship. In contrast, there was no relationship between mothers' and their adult children's beliefs about mothering, suggesting that such beliefs are not simply passed on from generation to generation within families. Attachment/caregiving classification interacted with generation in influencing a belief that biological facts determine maternal behavior, young adults with preoccupied attachment being particularly prone to reject this idea. Attachment/caregiving classification also had a significant effect on participants' tendency to adhere to an idealized conception of mothering, this tendency being associated with a dismissive attachment/caregiving representation.     

Neural correlates of theory-of-mind reasoning: an event-related potential study

Everyday understanding of human behavior rests on having a theory of mind—the ability to relate people's actions to underlying mental states such as beliefs and desires. It has been suggested that an impaired theory of mind may lie at the heart of psychological disorders that are characterized by deficits in social understanding, such as autism. In this study, we employed the event-related potential methodology to index the activity of neural systems that are engaged during theory-of-mind reasoning in adults. Specifically, neural activity elicited by tasks that required thinking about mental as compared with nonmental representations (i.e., beliefs vs. photographs) was characterized by a focally enhanced positivity over left frontal areas, which was diminished over left parietal areas. These findings provide an important perspective on both children's theory-of-mind development and the neurobiology of disorders in which theory of mind seems to be impaired.     

What It's Like To Have a Cognitive Home

Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one's being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic access. In Williamson's words, we are cognitively homeless. In this paper I will argue that Williamson's argument for the conclusion that we are cognitively homeless fails. Then I will show that there is a class of phenomenal states that constitutes a substantial cognitive refuge. When all is said and done, I will have both defended and shed light on our cognitive home.     

Bringing deadness to life: An appreciation of Rosenfeld's contribution to thinking about narcissism

SUMMARY

In this paper I have described some of Rosenfeld's ideas about narcissism, and in particular the distinction he makes between libidinal and destructive narcissism. Using a clinical example to illustrate the struggle between dependency and the power of excitement and destruction, I have attempted to show some narcissistic defences in action. I have argued that while Rosenfeld's differentiation may not hold, in that both constructive and destructive elements are always present, he has identified vividly important elements. The degree of the destructiveness, the extent to which it is split-off, hidden and unavailable, the extent to which it is maintained by excitement and eroticisation, and the rigidity of the organisation that has been set up (that is, where or not much is allowed in from outside) are all crucial. What needs to be distinguished are states of mind, and which state of mind is in the ascendancy at any one time. I have reviewed briefly some of the theories advanced to explain why these defences come into existence, and I have mentioned some of the consequent implications for technique.