Utilitarians Are Not Always Fair and the Fair Are Not Always Utilitarian: Distinct Motives for Cooperation1

This paper investigates the effect of utilitarianism and fairness motives on cooperative behavior in a real‐life, large‐scale social dilemma while also looking at the moderating effect of various situational factors on this relationship. Perceived criticality of the situation and high‐efficacy beliefs are shown to increase cooperation of utilitarians more than they increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive. Ownership of the problem and the expected cooperation of others on the other hand are shown to increase cooperation of those with a fairness motive more so than they increase cooperation of utilitarians. Implications of these findings for increasing cooperation in social dilemmas are discussed.     

Why Gamers Are Not Performers

I argue that even if video games are interactive artworks, typical video games are not works for performance and players of video games do not perform these games in the sense in which a musician performs a musical composition (or actors a play, dancers a ballet, and so on). Even expert playings of video games for an audience fail to qualify as performances of those works. Some exemplary playings may qualify as independent “performance‐works,” but this tells us nothing about the ontology of video games or playings of them. The argument proceeds by clarifying the concepts of interactivity and work‐performance, drawing particularly on recent work by Dominic Lopes, Berys Gaut, and David Davies.     

Not All Worlds Are Stages

The stage theory is a four-dimensional account of persistence motivatedby the worm theory's inability to account for our intuitions in thecases involving coinciding objects. Like the worm theory, it claimsthat there are objects spread out in time, but unlike the worm theory,it argues that these spacetime worms are not familiar particulars liketables and chairs. Rather, familiar particulars are the instantaneoustemporal slices of worms. In order to explain our intuitions that particulars persist for more than an instant, the stage theory drawson the counterpart theory of modal possibilism, which it is supposedto parallel. In this paper I show how the stage theory presupposes thattime can be divided into instants, which I call the atomistic view oftime. I do this by laying out an alternative theory of the nature oftime, the gunky view, and show that if time is gunky the stage theorycollapses into the worm theory. The deeper problem is that the merepossibility of gunky time would cause the stage theory's parallels topossibilism to break down. I therefore conclude that the stage theoryis committed to the view that time is necessarily atomistic. Finally,in the last section I argue that the fact that the stage theory rulesout a priori the possibility of time being gunky gives us reason toreject it as an account of persistence.     

Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

Ranks Are Not Bypassed,Rituals Are Not Negated: The Dionysian Corpus on Return

Modern readings of the Dionysian corpus often subordinate its hierarchical treatises to its theological treatises. Two unfortunate consequences follow: one, the thetic positions and aphairetic removals of the Divine Names and Mystical Theology bypass or transcend the hierarchical ranks and hierurgical rituals of the Celestial Hierarchy and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. Second, the return to God occurs through apophatic abstraction rather than sacramental performance. This article interprets the Dionysian corpus differently, offering four arguments why Dionysian negative theology is not the means by which ranks and rituals are negated or abandoned but rather a means by which they are affirmed and accomplished.     

Masked Reviews Are Not Fairer Reviews

ABSTRACT— Many people believe that reviewers are less likely to produce unfair and biased reviews when they do not know the identity of the authors. However, there is surprisingly little evidence of such bias, there is little evidence that masked review is effective in addressing bias, and masked review has potential costs and drawbacks to the research community. More empirical work on the existence and nature of bias is needed.     

Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects

Philosophical Studies -     

My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive

An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost.