Knowledge and cognitive integration

Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature of our intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy of mind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of subjective justification: so long as the agent’s belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any doubts there was something wrong in the way he arrived at them. Moreover, since both externalist philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology treat the process of cognitive integration in the same way, we can claim that epistemic cognitive characters may extend beyond our organismic cognitive capacities to the artifacts we employ or even to other agents we interact with. This move is not only necessary for accounting for advanced cases of knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts or the interactive activity of research teams, but it can further lead to interesting ramifications both for social epistemology and philosophy of science.     

Cognitive externalism meets bounded rationality

When proponents of cognitive externalism (CE) turn to empirical studies in cognitive science to put the framework to use and to assess its explanatory success, they typically refer to perception, memory, or motor coordination. In contrast, not much has been said about reasoning. One promising avenue to explore in this respect is the theory of bounded rationality (BR). To clarify the relationship between CE and BR, we criticize Andy Clark's understanding of BR, as well as his claim that BR does not fit his version of CE. We then propose and defend a version of CE—“scaffolded cognition”—that is not committed to constitutive claims about the mind, but still differs from mainstream internalism. Finally, we analyze BR from our own CE perspective, thereby clarifying its vague appeals to the environment, and argue that cognitive internalism cannot explain important aspects of the BR program.     

A Practical Guide to Building an Integral World

We stand at the start of a new millennium with a growing awareness of what is wrong with our civilization but little agreement as to what to do. From environmental crises to democratic systems dominated by moneyed interests, the list of dangers is long and growing. Each issue has a band of defenders who struggle to right that particular wrong but, because these bands are disjointed, the broad movement they serve remains incoherent and weak. The broad movement is usually described as toward "sustainable civilization," but its precise designation is "integral society." The challenge for the emerging "new science" is to provide a framework for understanding that unifies and gives direction to the disparate efforts that comprise the integral movement. This framework must address three needs. First, it must provide a sound understanding of why, despite our sophistication, things seem to be going badly in so many spheres. Secondly, it must present a believable vision of where our civilization should be headed. Finally, it must provide a sense that there are concrete steps we can take to achieve the deep dreams that most of us actually share. What we need, in short, is not more disparate insights, but rather a collective intellectual unity that integrates existing insights into a logically coherent and emotionally compelling whole. Such integration, however, cannot be constructed artificially, by committee or consensus. Rather, true integration can only come from a unified scientific understanding of why various ideas connect. Today, a scientific story capable of such unifying understanding is found in the expanded theory of evolution that is emerging from the union of a broad range of scientific efforts. This theory also serves as a unifying thread for an integrated new science. This article outlines the "dynamic" view of evolution and how it unites integral efforts.     

Knowledge embedded in process: the self-organization of skilled noun learning

Young children's skilled generalization of newly learned nouns to new instances has become the battleground for two very different approaches to cognition. This debate is a proxy for a larger dispute in cognitive science and cognitive development: cognition as rule-like amodal propositions, on the one hand, or as embodied, modal, and dynamic processes on the other. After a brief consideration of this theoretical backdrop, we turn to the specific task set before us: an overview of the Attentional Learning Account (ALA) of children's novel noun generalizations, the constrained set of experimental results to be explained, and our explanation of them. We conclude with a consideration of what all of this implies for a theory of cognitive development.     

从数量表征到数表征：具身认知视角下的人类数能力获得

数能力是数学认知的基本成分。与动物所具有的基本数能力不同,人类不仅具备数量表征能力,更重要的是还拥有对数概念进行表征的数表征能力。虽然具身认知与离身认知都对数概念的表征问题进行了解释,但二者却存在明显理论分歧。具身认知观点主要从具身数量表征和数能力发展的具身认知机制两方面为人类独特数能力的获得提供了理论支撑及实证证据。这启示人们需要重视具身学习在数能力形成实践中的关键作用,重视具身数量表征在数学教学中的作用,仍需进一步揭示其内在的心理和神经基础。     

A Regression Framework for Causal Mediation Analysis with Applications to Behavioral Science

We introduce and extend the classical regression framework for conducting mediation analysis from the fit of only one model. Using the essential mediation components (EMCs) allows us to estimate causal mediation effects and their analytical variance. This single-equation approach reduces computation time and permits the use of a rich suite of regression tools that are not easily implemented on a system of three equations. Additionally, we extend this framework to non-nested mediation systems, provide a joint measure of mediation for complex mediation hypotheses, propose new visualizations for mediation effects, and explain why estimates of the total effect may differ depending on the approach used. Using data from social science studies, we also provide extensive illustrations of the usefulness of this framework and its advantages over traditional approaches to mediation analysis. The example data are freely available for download online and we include the R code necessary to reproduce our results.     

The psychodynamics of forensic mental health nursing

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to clarify some important interpersonal dynamics that underpin forensic patients’ presentations within the clinical environment, in a way that is accessible to nurses. The world of forensic mental health nursing is often difficult to describe to those who have not experienced first hand prolonged clinical contact with patients at the therapeutic interface of secure services. Even then, the characteristic, intense emotional phenomena that tend to arise out of interpersonal relationships with patients and colleagues is not easy to articulate. Yet, for those of us who consider our professional identity to be one of “forensic mental health nurse,” it seems important to find a way to put words to what appears to occupy a large component of our working lives. More importantly, if we can develop a way to make sense of the way our work makes us feel and the way we can find ourselves relating to others within our professional roles, we will be in a better position to harness our energy and enthusiasm in the service of supporting forensic patients towards effective care and treatment pathways. Of course, forensic patients are supported through services with or without a framework for articulating emotional and interpersonal experiences. However, this frequently occurs in the context of significant struggle. For patients, this struggle is often characterized by difficulty communicating what their needs are, and for nurses this struggle is often characterized by feeling emotionally overwhelmed by their task of providing containing, therapeutic relationships for patients whose interpersonal needs are not clear to them. This article will use case examples to describe some of the complex interpersonal and emotional challenges faced by forensic nurses, and explain how a psychodynamic framework could support nursing practice in each of the case examples.     

The functional‐cognitive meta‐theoretical framework: Reflections,possible clarifications and how to move forward

The functional‐cognitive meta‐theoretical framework has been offered as a conceptual basis for facilitating greater communication and cooperation between the functional/behavioural and cognitive traditions within psychology, thus leading to benefits for both scientific communities. The current article is written from the perspective of two functional researchers, who are also proponents of the functional‐cognitive framework, and attended the “Building Bridges between the Functional and Cognitive Traditions” meeting at Ghent University in the summer of 2014. The article commences with a brief summary of the functional approach to theory, followed by our reflections upon the functional‐cognitive framework in light of that meeting. In doing so, we offer three ways in which the framework could be clarified: (a) effective communication between the two traditions is likely to be found at the level of behavioural observations rather than effects or theory, (b) not all behavioural observations will be deemed to be of mutual interest to both traditions, and (c) observations of mutual interest will be those that serve to elaborate and extend existing theorising in the functional and/or cognitive traditions. The article concludes with a summary of what we perceive to be the strengths and weaknesses of the framework, and a suggestion that there is a need to determine if the framework is meta‐theoretical or is in fact a third theoretical approach to doing psychological science.     

THE HEART OF MY CONCERN

Abstract. This brief piece summarizes the author's lifelong personal credo, particularly his attempt to translate traditional religious wisdom into modern scientific concepts. Contemporary science reveals to us the vast system of natural processes that has brought the universe, our planet, and our species into existence. This natural system is in fact a "more-than-human 'Lord of History,'" corresponding to traditional ideas of God. This Lord of History not only has created us but also sustains us—not just externally but also our interior psychic and spiritual nature. We are challenged to discern the requirements that this system of natural processes places upon us; if we conform to these requirements, we shall be blessed, and we will be enabled as co-creators of our future evolution.     

Reconsidering P-Prims Theory From the Viewpoint of Situated Cognition

Andrea diSessa's work appears to be representative of the 1980s research on the preconceptions and epistemology of physics. His theoretical framework also seems to be representative of 1980s cognitive science theory such as mental models. Although my theoretical perspective, based on a Gibsonian and situated cognition viewpoint, is different from diSessa's, I agree with him on many points. At the same time, however, I also feel that we have to reinterpret his contributions from a different perspective. In this commentary, therefore, I summarize how the situated cognition view can reinterpret diSessa's work as representative of 1980s research on the epistemology of physics.     

A computational cognitive framework of spatial memory in brains and robots

Computational cognitive models of spatial memory often neglect difficulties posed by the real world, such as sensory noise, uncertainty, and high spatial complexity. On the other hand, robotics is unconcerned with understanding biological cognition. Here, we describe a computational framework for robotic architectures aiming to function in realistic environments, as well as to be cognitively plausible.We motivate and describe several mechanisms towards achieving this despite the sensory noise and spatial complexity inherent in the physical world. We tackle error accumulation during path integration by means of Bayesian localization, and loop closing with sequential gradient descent. Finally, we outline a method for structuring spatial representations using metric learning and clustering. Crucially, unlike the algorithms of traditional robotics, we show that these mechanisms can be implemented in neuronal or cognitive models.We briefly outline a concrete implementation of the proposed framework as part of the LIDA cognitive architecture, and argue that this kind of probabilistic framework is well-suited for use in cognitive robotic architectures aiming to combine spatial functionality and psychological plausibility.     

A Bivariate Generalized Linear Item Response Theory Modeling Framework to the Analysis of Responses and Response Times

A generalized linear modeling framework to the analysis of responses and response times is outlined. In this framework, referred to as bivariate generalized linear item response theory (B-GLIRT), separate generalized linear measurement models are specified for the responses and the response times that are subsequently linked by cross-relations. The cross-relations can take various forms. Here, we focus on cross-relations with a linear or interaction term for ability tests, and cross-relations with a curvilinear term for personality tests. In addition, we discuss how popular existing models from the psychometric literature are special cases in the B-GLIRT framework depending on restrictions in the cross-relation. This allows us to compare existing models conceptually and empirically. We discuss various extensions of the traditional models motivated by practical problems. We also illustrate the applicability of our approach using various real data examples, including data on personality and cognitive ability.     

“认知科学”与“第二代认知科学”刍议

以计算隐喻为核心假设的传统认知心理学以及联结主义心理学均不能克服离身心智（disembodied mind）的根本缺陷,当代认知心理学正面临着新的范型转换。以具身性和情境性为重要特征的第二代认知科学将日受重视,并促使认知神经科学进入新的发展阶段。作者认为在身心关系上应该坚持生理只是心理的必要条件,而非充分条件的立场,克服生理还原论的危险;应该重新审视基于二元论的生理机制这种说法;心理学传统中的科学主义和人文主义有可能在第二代认知科学强调认知情境性的基础上达成某种融合;第一代认知科学对意识的研究是不成功的,因为对知觉、注意、记忆、思维等心理过程的研究不能代替意识的研究,同时还应避免以意识内容的研究取代心理学研究的倾向。第二代认知科学中的动力系统理论关于变量（因素）之间的偶合（coupling）关系完全不同于变差分析中的变量之间的交互作用关系”,其动力系统模式可能更有助于破解意识的产生（涌现）之谜,并引发心理学研究的方法论的变革新潮。第二代认知科学的兴起将启发人们对身心关系、生理还原论、意识研究在心理学中的地位、人工智能对心智完全模拟的可能性等重大问题重新思考     

Darwin and the Fully Human Theory of Evolution

Among scientists today a matter that many had assumed was long laid to rest is moving from the background to the foreground in the minds of the broad-gauged and the discerning. It is that what we call evolution theory requires a massive updating, integrating, and streamlining if it is to meet the needs of the 21st century. On one hand here is a planet with threats to the survival of ourselves and all species everywhere on the rise. On the other hand are the sciences, to which we look for answers on how to meet the threats, in disarray. Evolution theory, for example, supposedly provides the grounding for all science. Yet behind an outdated and dangerously constricted assumption of unity, instead of any useful cohesion it offers a bewilderingly disparate and unfocused sprawl. How then are we to move toward the evolutionary gestalt or framework needed to pull together science into some new intelligibility? But of more immediate urgency, how are we to build an evolution theory that can provide the practical guidance-or road map to the future-to our species at a time of exponentially escalating confusion and need?     

Thinking about others and the future: Neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting.     

Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates

Abstract argumentation has been shown to be a powerful tool within many fields such as artificial intelligence, logic and legal reasoning. In this paper we enhance Dung’s well-known abstract argumentation framework with explanatory capabilities. We show that an explanatory argumentation framework (EAF) obtained in this way is a useful tool for the modeling of scientific debates. On the one hand, EAFs allow for the representation of explanatory and justificatory arguments constituting rivaling scientific views. On the other hand, different procedures for selecting arguments, corresponding to different methodological and epistemic requirements of theory evaluation, can be formulated in view of our framework.     

The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

Towards a postconscious processes model of mental control: A conceptual analysis

A new perspective on mental control is proposed that conceptually links conscious and automatic processes through a complementary postconscious activity that is rooted in the cognitive mechanism of priming. It is argued that the alterable structure of underlying mental representations connects these processes to produce a level of intentional regulation that would normally prove beneficial but in a few rare cases could prove detrimental. This hypothetical process is reflected in our empirical knowledge of mental control and related phenomena such as prospective memory. The new perspective maintains the traditional models' structure of conscious and automatic processing but, in an effort to expand our knowledge in the field, it redefines the relationship between these two processes so that it fits into a more accountable theoretical framework.