Quine: Peter HyltonReference, Ontological Relativity, and Realism

Section I of this essay discusses Quine's views about reference,, contrasting them with those of Russell. For the latter, our language and thought succeed in being about the world because of our acquaintance with objects; the relation of reference—roughly, the relation between a name and its bearer—is thus fundamental. For Quine, by contrast, the fundamental relation by which our language comes to be about the world, and to have empirical content, is that between a sentence and stimulations of our sensory surfaces; reference, while important, is a derivative notion. Section II shows how this view of reference as derivative makes possible the notorious Quinean doctrine of ontological relativity. Section III raises the issue of realism. It argues that somewhat different notions of realism are in play for Quine and for Russell—for Russell, objects, and our knowledge of objects, play the fundamental role, while for quine objectivity and truth are fundamental, with ontology being derivative.     

Contra Cartwright: Structural Realism, Ontological Pluralism and Fundamentalism About Laws

In this paper I argue against Nancy Cartwright’s claim that we ought to abandon what she calls “fundamentalism” about the laws of nature and adopt instead her “dappled world” hypothesis. According to Cartwright we ought to abandon the notion that fundamental laws (even potentially) apply universally, instead we should consider the law-like statements of science to apply in highly qualified ways within narrow, non-overlapping and ontologically diverse domains, including the laws of fundamental physics. For Cartwright, “laws” are just locally applicable refinements of a more open-ended concept of capacities. By providing a critique of the dappled world approach’s central notion of open ended capacities and substituting this concept with an account of properties drawn from recent writing on the subject of structural realism I show that a form of fundamentalism is viable. I proceed from this conclusion to show that this form of fundamentalism provides a superior reading of case studies, such as the effective field theory program (EFT) in quantum field theory, than the “dappled world” view. The case study of the EFT program demonstrates that ontological variability between theoretical domains can be accounted for without altogether abandoning fundamentalism or adopting Cartwright’s more implausible theses.     

The Higgs Boson: An Adventure in Critical Realism

Abstract

The search for the Higgs boson has been like the search of a pirate for buried gold. Like the pirate, the physicist has a map, a conceptual map—the Standard Model (SM) made up of mathematical formulas. Without the Higgs boson in the SM, fundamental particles would be massless. Where could the mass mechanism be? The conceptual map pointed in the right direction. On July 4, 2012 the pirates found their treasure with the help of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. In this article a physicist and theologian ask: could this be critical realism (CR) at work? Could CR constitute a set of presuppositions shared by both physicists and theologians who cannot see the object of their inquiry but employ conceptual models that presuppose the reality of its referent? What role could shared CR play in the creative mutual interaction between science and theology?     

The Taxonomy of a Japanese Stroll Garden: An Ontological Investigation Using Formal Concept Analysis

This paper introduces current acoustic theories relating to the phenomenology of sound as a framework for interrogating concepts relating to the ecologies of acoustic and landscape phenomena in a Japanese stroll garden. By applying the technique of Formal Concept Analysis, a partially ordered lattice of garden objects and attributes is visualized as a means to investigate the relationship between elements of the taxonomy.     

An Argument For Metaphysical Realism

This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve. But the interpretation of its premises introduces subtleties: whether, for example, these premises are to be understood as assertions about the world or about our evidence, internally or externally, via assertibility conditions or truth conditions – and what sorts of beings are included in the `we' upon whose cognitions the antirealist supposes the structure of the world to depend. I argue that antirealism can provide no defensible, fully articulated interpretation of the premises that either shows them not to be true or defeats the reasoning. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Causes and Means of Healing: An Islamic Ontological Perspective

Journal of Religion and Health - Healthcare practitioners are increasingly aware that patients may utilize faith-based healing practices in place of conventional medicine based on their spiritual...     

An Ontological Sketch for Robust Non-Reductive Realists

The aim of this article is to draw a sketch of an ontology for Realist Non-Naturalist Cognitivists. A distinction is made between moral property-universals and moral property-particulars. It is argued, first, that moral property-universals have the same ontological status as non-moral property-universals; second, that moral property-universals have many instances in the spatio-temporal world; third that these moral property-instances or -particulars have the same ontological status as non-moral property-particulars.     

马克思自然范畴的本体论解读与生态审美观

知识论路向下自然范畴的偏误,为马克思所突破与变革:其一展现人与自然的本真存存及其原初关联;其二揭示人与自然互为生成之过程;其三更注重自然存在的本质显现及与人道主义相吻合的审美境界;三者于本体论意义上构成对自然范畴的形上界说.马克思此种自然观彰显着生态审美睿智.     

Dreamless Sleep and the Whole of Human Life: An Ontological Exposition

This paper explores the meaning of dreamless sleep. First, I consider four reasons why we commonly pass over sleep’s ontological significance. Second, I compare and contrast death and sleep to show how each is oriented to questions regarding the possibilities of “being-a-whole.” In the third and final part, I explore the meaning and implications of “being-toward-sleep,” arguing that human existence emerges atop naturally anonymous corporeality (i.e. living being). In sum, I try to show that we can recover an authentic – if somewhat ambiguous – sense of “being-a-whole” only by recognizing the ontological significance of dreamless sleep.     

从本体伦理世界观到生态伦理世界观--当代道德哲学范式的转换

在<法哲学原理>中,黑格尔揭示了关于"伦理"的两种考察方式:实体的观点;原子的观点."在考察伦理时永远只有两种观点可能:或者从实体出发,或者原子式地进行探讨,即以单个的人为基础而逐渐提高."他的看法是:"后一种观点是没有精神的,因为它只能做到集合并列,但精神不是单一东西,而是单一物和普遍物的统一."[1]实体的观点、原子的观点,都基于一个依据经验确立的至今难以动摇的理智的直觉:伦理是关系的,道德也是关系的."道德的观点是关系的观点、应然的观点或要求的观点."[2]无论伦理、道德,还是伦理世界观、道德世界观,都应当以"关系的观点"、"应然的观点",这两大人文元素为基础和前提.     

Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons

In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine‐grainedly, normative reasons should be classified as coarse‐grained entities, e.g. as states of affairs, in order to explain certain necessary truths about them and to make sense of how we count and weigh them. As I briefly sketch, acting for normative reasons is nonetheless possible if the connection between normative reasons and motivating considerations is a competence‐based correspondence.     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

Realism and Realism: Rejoinder to Gare and Smith

This is a response to comments by Gare and Smith (1984) on my critique of humanistic psychology (McMullen, 1982).     

The (Old) New Realism: What Holt Has to Offer for Ecological Psychology

As Ecological Psychology pushes into new areas, success will be made easier by a rediscovery its theoretical history, in particular the “New Realism”, lead in part by E. B. Holt. Three New Realists tenants seem particularly relevant: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Though the two groups differ in terms of their conception of perception, and what can be perceived, their conceptions are related in very insightful ways. Further, the comparison reemphasizes the extent of unique empirical claims ecological psychologists make, and grounds those claims within a larger framework for psychology as a whole. This makes obvious the need for further work on the mathematics of invariants, the physiological mechanisms of information extraction, and the behaviors of perception.

马克思的实践首先是一个价值本体概念

如何理解马克思的实践概念 ?这个问题近来又重新引起人们的关注。跟以往不同的是 :有关探讨正在向着更深的学术史层面掘进。马克思的实践概念包含许多不同的维度 ,对之不存在一种本质主义的标准解释 ,从不同维度可以看到不同的内容 ,得到不同的理解。这些都是正常的。需要探讨的是 :对各个维度的界定和理解是否确切 ?每个维度是否还有发挥的余地 ?现有维度之外是否还存在新的维度 ?不同维度之间究竟是什么关系 ?等等。在本文中 ,我想集中揭示的是马克思的实践概念的价值维度。在我看来 ,马克思所说的实践 (praxis)首先是一个价值概念 ,并且…     

Assessing Students' Misclassifications of Physics Concepts: An Ontological Basis for Conceptual Change

Physics novices and experts solved conceptual physics problems involving light, heat, and electric current and then explained their answers. Novices were ninth-grade students with no background in physics; experts were two postgraduates in physics and two advanced physics graduate students. Problems were multiple choice, with one correct response and three alternative responses representing possible misconceptions. For each conceptual physics problem, an isomorphic material-substance problem was constructed by imagining a materialistic conception of the physics topic and creating the resulting version of the problem. In each physics problem, one of the incorrect choices corresponded to the correct choice in the isomorphic material-substance problem. The empirical question was whether novices would reason about the physics problem as if it were conceptually similar to the substance isomorph. This question was addressed by comparing subjects' responses in the problem pairs, as well as by examining their explanations concerning all problems. A content analysis of subjects' explanations revealed that physics novices were strongly inclined to conceptualize physics concepts as material substances, whereas expert protocols revealed distinctly nonmaterialistic representations. A theory of conceptual change involving ontologically distinct categories is substantiated by these findings.     

An Ontological Critique of the Trans-Ontology of Enrique Dussel

Enrique Dussel has developed a sweeping philosophical critique of the eurocentricity of Western habits of thought and action, with the aim of articulating an ‘ethics of liberation’ that takes the part distinctively of ‘the victims’ of the world system. The heart of Dussel’s effort is an ostensibly new method, ‘analectic’ or ‘anadialectic,’ which comes about through the ‘revelation’ of the other, and goes beyond the self-enclosure that, Dussel asserts, typifies dialectic in Western ontology. Thus, he takes his position to have gone beyond ontology: it is a trans-ontology, a genuine meta-physics. I question whether analectic does go beyond Western thinking of being, and propose an ontological critique that is classically Western or, as I would prefer to say, historically Western yet (along with its analogues in other philosophical traditions) classically relevant even in our ‘age of globalization and exclusion.’     

简析病人的存在性孤独

对于很多久病不愈或濒死的病人来说,存在性孤独是侵扰他们的主要精神痛苦.从生存论哲学的角度看,这种孤独根源于人的“共生”和“终有一死”的生存论特征,它的核心是病人因死亡的逼近而产生的与他人的深刻疏离感.存在性孤独具有很多不同于一般性孤独的特征,应当引起医生和病人家属的重视.