人类颜色视觉的计算理论

该文有机地结合了计算视觉理论和生态学视觉理论,指出颜色信息处理的根本任务是检测环境中的光不变量。在此基础上,作者提出了颜色视觉的计算理论以及计算理论本身的生物学标准。初级视觉计算是典型的不适定问题,动物的视觉系统则利用视环境中存在的条件将该不适定问题转化为定解问题。本文引入颜色视觉计算的免要条件,客观性约束,以及颜色认知的神经表象,证明了上述约束下颜色算法的存在性。本文给出了构造颜色知觉的基本假设。同时,该文还讨论了与上述问题密切相关的几个基本问题:神经表象的完备性,主观色觉的客观性,明度知觉和颜色知觉的统一,人类主观色觉的实现方式。     

Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

Mental imagery: in search of a theory

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons--for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the "null hypothesis"; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.     

Rhythmic entrainment: Why humans want to,fireflies can’t help it,pet birds try,and sea lions have to be bribed

Until recently, the literature on rhythmic ability took for granted that only humans are able to synchronize body movements to an external beat—to entrain. This assumption has been undercut by findings of beat-matching in various species of parrots and, more recently, in a sea lion, several species of primates, and possibly horses. This throws open the question of how widespread beat-matching ability is in the animal kingdom. Here we reassess the arguments and evidence for an absence of beat-matching in animals, and conclude that in fact no convincing case against beat-matching in animals has been made. Instead, such evidence as there is suggests that this capacity could be quite widespread. Furthermore, mutual entrainment of oscillations is a general principle of physical systems, both biological and nonbiological, suggesting that entrainment of motor systems by sensory systems may be a default rather than an oddity. The question then becomes, not why a few privileged species are able to beat-match, but why species do not always do so—why they vary in both spontaneous and learned beat-matching. We propose that when entrainment is not driven by fixed, mandatory connections between input and output (as in the case of, e.g., fireflies entraining to each others’ flashes), it depends on voluntary control over, and voluntary or learned coupling of, sensory and motor systems, which can paradoxically lead to apparent failures of entrainment. Among the factors that affect whether an animal will entrain are sufficient control over the motor behavior to be entrained, sufficient perceptual sophistication to extract the entraining beat from the overall sensory environment, and the current cognitive state of the animal, including attention and motivation. The extent of entrainment in the animal kingdom potentially has widespread implications, not only for understanding the roots of human dance, but also for understanding the neural and cognitive architectures of animals.     

Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision

This paper examines the relationship between cognitive impenetrability and perceptual nonconceptualism. I argue against the view, recently defended by Raftopoulos, that the (alleged) cognitive impenetrability of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for states of early vision and their content to be nonconceptual. I show that that view, here dubbed ‘the mutually entailing thesis’, admits two different standard interpretations depending on how we understand the property of being nonconceptual—corresponding to the distinction between the state and the content views of perceptual nonconceptualism. I first argue for the falsity of the state-nonconceptualist reading of the mutually entailing thesis, on the grounds that it mistakenly takes being nonconceptual to be a causal instead of a constitutive relationship. The content-nonconceptualist understanding of the thesis, I then argue, is disproved by plausible views regarding the content of experience. The mutually entailing thesis could only be true, I conclude, on a non-standard, causal interpretation of the notion of nonconceptual content. Yet, on that reading, the thesis would either be trivially true or would entirely fail to engage with the contemporary literature on perceptual nonconceptualism. Some potential relationships between the causal reading of the mutually entailing thesis and psychological research in this area are also briefly discussed.     

Materials for an analysis of a just universe

There is one assumption that is shared by practically all popular religious and philosophic systems, ancient and modern, Eastern and Western. In truth it may well be that it is this single assumption which makes such ‘systems’ possible. That shared assumption is the belief in a ‘just universe’, i.e. ‘just’ in the sense of morally ordered, morally predictable and morally explainable. This assumption rests, as most assumptions must, on pragmatic grounds; that is to say, the assumption is retained or used because it gets the users where they want to go, i.e. the assumption works. But if it could be shown that this assumption, aside from being useful, leads to insuperable logical or empirical problems, then this might be prima facie grounds for rejecting the assumption. Part I examines the historical roots of the assumption of a just universe. Part II, examines three implications that would seem to follow from the assumption that the universe, the world, is a just place in which to live. Part III explores the unacceptable consequences that are found in and that follow from these three implications and that necessitate the rejection of the assumption of the just universe of Part I.     

On specification and the senses

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.     

Kierkegaard and Camus: either/or?

The philosophies of Søren Kierkegaard and Albert Camus have typically been considered as inverted images of each other. Kierkegaard turns to faith in God as a path of redemption from meaninglessness while Camus rejects faith as a form of intellectual suicide and cowardice. I argue that an analysis of key terms of contest—faith and lucidity, revolt and suicide, Abraham and Sisyphus, despair and its overcoming—serves to blur the lines of contrast, making Kierkegaard and Camus much closer in their views of what sort of life we should live in face of the forsakenness of our condition than they seem at first glance.     

A Note from the Editor

In this article I detail the conceptual trajectory of a classroom of 2nd- and 3rd-grade students as they reinvent topographical lines to represent height in a map within the constraints of an overhead perspective. In my analysis I pay special attention to the role of social interaction—and in particular the role of the teacher—in the process of knowledge production. First, I demonstrate how the invention of representational forms by individuals occur as part of a larger social process of creating cultural conventions and negotiating a taken-as-shared understanding of these new tools. Second, I show how gesture, as a part of the larger semiotic ecology for meaning making around representations, contributes to creation of understanding. Third, I make some preliminary proposals regarding the process of transforming personal inventions into cultural conventions. The analyses are intended to contribute to our field's growing understanding of young children's activity when inventing representations (i.e., metarepresentational competence), the mechanisms for learning within instructional activities based on the iterative refinement of these representations (i.e., progressive symbolization), and a rejection of the dichotomy between an individual's cognition and her participation within a cultural community.     

The relationship between consciousness,understanding, and rationality

The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from (1) the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (2) the fact that conscious access appears to involve the selective routing/broadcasting of representational content to neural systems that integrate information in order to select cognitive/behavioral intentions in conjunction with goals. Based on these premises I illustrate how a disruption to the rationality of a representation’s influence on intention formation (when it becomes consciously accessible) would also remove any evidence that a person was conscious of the content of that representation. I therefore suggest that conscious content (and associated phenomenology) may be determined by the rational, content-appropriate influences an accessed representation has on intention formation (i.e., the influences associated with understanding). I conclude by offering replies to several potential objections to this thesis.     

What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How

In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a “collective afterlife” (i.e., the assumption that the human race and humanity lives on after our own individual deaths) plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions (“The Recognition Thesis”) and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us (“The Valuers Like Us Thesis”)—but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife (“The Human Form Thesis”).     

Myths,metaphors, and mentors

This article begins with a discussion of myths as visions that transform life. The primary myth is that of death and rebirth. Metaphors are images which illumine our myths. Therapists are thus both scientists and poets. The process of being a mentor occurs in a variety of relationships. Our search is for an understanding of this process which then transcends the positions of master and disciple. Mentors need to have a sufficient degree of self-transcendence to enable the focus to be on the person's own unique vision. Mentors light sparks which ignite our myths and metaphors and thereby expand our understanding of ourselves. Mentors become catalysts for our growth and thereby facilitate the process of transformation.The author would like to express his gratitude to Anne Nelson, who helped with editing this article.     

‘Aloneness’ and the problem of realism in classical Sākhya and yoga

The concept of kaivalya (literally, ‘aloneness’) is of crucial importance to the systems of classical Indian philosophy known as Sākhya and Yoga. Indeed, kaivalya is the supreme soteriological goal to which these systems are directed. Various statements concerning this final goal appear in the classical texts—namely, the Sākhyakārikā and Yogasūtra—and yet there is no consensus within modern scholarship about how the concept is to be interpreted. More specifically, there appears to be a great deal of confusion over the implications of kaivalya for the existence of the empirical world. In this article I discuss the principal difficulties encountered by existing interpretations of kaivalya, and propose that these difficulties result from an unwarranted assumption that Sākhya and Yoga take a realist view with regard to the empirical world. I further propose that these difficulties can, in large part, be overcome when the assumption of realism is set aside.     

Evolutionary Theory and Neighborhood Quality: A Multilevel Selection-inspired Approach to Studying Urban Property Conditions

Actions that increase individual quality of life (QoL) can often undermine QoL at some higher level of aggregation. In cities, this “fundamental problem of social life” is regularly played out in the form of physical disorder. When an urban actor allows his or her property to fall into disrepair, perhaps to allocate resources to more essential uses, this decision reduces the relative quality of that actor’s neighborhood by contributing to local disorder. Researchers and policymakers therefore devote significant attention to understanding and controlling patterns of such behaviors. The central thesis of this paper is that evolutionary theory has much to offer this discourse. First, through synthesizing existing arguments from the urban disorder/decline literature, I develop a framework for studying intra-city disorder that is inspired by evolutionary multilevel selection (MLS) theory. Next, to empirically demonstrate the utility of this framework, I draw on longitudinal data and space-time analysis to find that population-level patterns of substandard property conditions in a given study area—i.e., measurable manifestations of physical disorder—are generated by a combination of individual and group “selective” pressures on property maintenance behavior. The results suggest that adopting an MLS perspective might aid policymakers in managing the processes that produce patterns of urban disorder, which can ultimately help to improve urban QoL.     

Health behavior change in transactive systems

Relationship members are frequently concordant on health outcomes; health behavior change is also concordant in close relationships. Despite clear evidence of this influence, relatively little is known about the possible mechanisms by which individuals in densely transactive systems (i.e., relationships with high goal‐related interdependence) influence each other's health. I draw on transactive goal dynamics (TGD) theory to highlight potential processes involved in health behavior change in interdependent systems. I introduce and discuss relevant literature about two related constructs—partner‐directed goal pursuit and partner‐directed goal qualities. I then highlight two areas where drawing on TGD principles may be useful, including unpacking recursive patterns of influence and health behavior change in concordant systems. I conclude with recommendations for future research.     

Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception be Unconscious?

Recently, a new movement has arisen in the philosophy of perception: one that views perception as a natural kind. Strangely, this movement has neglected the extensive work in philosophy of science on natural kinds. The present paper remedies this. I start by isolating a widespread and influential assumption, which is that we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for perception. I show that this assumption is radically at odds with current philosophy of science work on natural kinds. I then develop an alternative, new view of perception. This new view takes as its starting point the dominant position on kinds in the life sciences: the homeostatic property cluster account. I show that, if you accept this view, then all of the putative cases of unconscious perception are more plausibly seen as cases where it is indeterminate whether the mental episode in question is an instance of perception.     

Adoption is Not Abortion‐Lite

It is standardly taken for granted in the literature on the morality of abortion that adoption is almost always an available and morally preferable alternative to abortion — one that does the same thing so far as parenthood is concerned. This assumption pushes proponents of a woman's right to choose into giving arguments that are based almost exclusively around the physicality of pregnancy and childbirth. On the other side of the debate, the assumption that adoption is a real alternative seems to strengthen the contention that a woman who wishes to abort is morally deficient, whatever the status of the foetus: that she is selfish or short‐sighted in her refusal to bear the temporary physical burden of pregnancy. In this article, I will argue that adoption is not a genuine alternative to abortion. It does not ‘do the same thing’, even setting aside the physicality of pregnancy. I will show that on the most successful model of parental obligation — a causal account that formalises the distinction between parent: progenitor, and parent: carer — birth mothers and fathers remain obliged, life‐long, to their birth children even when the child is adopted out.     

Physicalism,Qualia Inversion,And Affective States

I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is nota possibility we should take seriously. The principlereason is that if someone's qualia were inverted inthe specified manner there is reason to believe thephenomenal difference would manifest itself inbehaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, Isuggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, arepartly constituted by an affective component whichwould be inverted along with the connected qualia. Theresulting affective inversions will, given theintimate connections that exist between emotions andbehaviour, likely manifest themselves in behaviour, inwhich case the underlying phenomenal differences canbe functionally captured. Second, I argue that othersense modalities lack the structural featuresnecessary for undetectable inversion which, because oftheir analogy with colour qualia, weakens theplausibility of such an inversion in the original caseof vision.     

Where brain,body, and world collide

The brain fascinates because it is the biological organ of mindfulness itself. It is the inner engine that drives intelligent behavior. Such a depiction provides a worthy antidote to the once-popular vision of the mind as somehow lying outside the natural order. However, it is a vision with a price. For it has concentrated much theoretical attention on an uncomfortably restricted space; the space of the inner neural machine, divorced from the wider world which then enters the story only via the hygienic gateways of perception and action. Recent work in neuroscience, robotics and psychology casts doubt on the effectiveness of such a shrunken perspective. Instead, it stresses the unexpected intimacy of brain, body and world and invites us to attend to the structure and dynamics of extended adaptive systems — ones involving a much wider variety of factors and forces. Whilst it needs to be handled with some caution, I believe there is much to be learnt from this broader vision. The mind itself, if such a vision is correct, is best understood as the activity of an essentially situated brain: a brain at home in its proper bodily, cultural and environmental niche.