Creative Cognition in Social Innovation

The present article considers the debate between Darwinian and non-Darwinian accounts of creativity from the perspective of little-c (or everyday) creativity. Specifically, the basic arguments found in both positions are highlighted by juxtaposing Simonton's (this issue) empirical analysis of Picasso's Guernica sketches with Weisberg's and Hass's (this issue) analysis. Unresolved issues in this debate are identified and discussed. The body of the article is focused on developing an argument for how these lingering issues might be addressed by expanding empirical studies of Big C (eminent) creative processes to include little c (or everyday) levels of creative magnitude.     

Exploring the Creation of Picasso's Guernica: Composition Studies,Chance, Metaphors,and Expertise

Simonton (2007 Simonton , D. K. ( 2007 ). The creative process in Picasso's Guernica sketches: Monotonic improvements versus nonmonotonic variants . Creativity Research Journal , 19 , 329 – 344 .[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) offered evidence for his Darwinian theory of creativity—blind nonmonotonic variation and selection—based on ratings of Picasso's preliminary sketches of the components for Guernica. This comment reexamines the sketches, adding two major sources of information: (a) consideration of the changing conceptions of the composition, as well as the components, and (b) inclusion of sketches from Picasso's first vision for his mural, the Studio sketches. Such analysis supports the notion of nonmonotonic variation including backtracking. It also suggests that the final mural, although radically different in its components from the Studio sketches, drew on the composition and theme of that initial vision for the mural, but in a completely reimagined form when a chance event pulled Picasso's thinking in a new direction. This comment also describes how Picasso drew on his expertise throughout his explorations, that lack of knowledge of outcome does not diminish the role of expertise in the artist at work. The terms Darwinian and blind mask this and other features of the creative process, and an alternate vocabulary is suggested.     

Response to Alcoff,Ferguson, and Bergoffen

This paper responds to comments, queries, and criticisms offered by Alcoff, Bergoffen, and Ferguson at a scholar's session on my work held at the annual meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in October 2001. Responding to Alcoff, I highlight my understanding of liberation in the context of a Nietzschean and a Latin American feminism and the politics of conceptualizing “resistance” in postcolonial theory. Responding to Ferguson, I address, among other issues, the often misunderstood distinction between postcolonialism and postmodernism, as well as related implications regarding some postcolonial feminists' qualified appeals to universals and women's rights. Responding to Bergoffen, I advocate on behalf of cultural formations supportive of the feminist affirmation of life and of radical subjectivities that challenge gender orthodoxies.     

Contesting (Simonton's) Blind Variation,Selective Retention Theory of Creativity

Over the 50 years since Donald Campbell advanced his Darwinian theory of creative thought, now better known as the blind variation, selective retention (BVSR) theory of creativity, a considerable literature has evolved, involving both support and opposition to the theory. The most prolific support of BVSR theory is due to Dean Keith Simonton. In response to a detailed exposition by Simonton of BVSR theory, a set of cognitive-historical case studies to refute it was presented by Dasgupta; this, in turn, had elicited a response from Simonton. Very recently, Simonton presented an updated version of the theory, which will be called here Simonton's BVSR theory. This article offers two detailed cognitive-historical case studies of actual episodes of technological creativity to challenge and contest BVSR theory as a general theory of creativity.     

A CHRISTIAN NATURALISM: DEVELOPING THE THINKING OF GORDON KAUFMAN

This essay develops a theological naturalism using Gordon Kaufman's nonpersonal idea of God as serendipitous creativity in contrast to the personal metaphorical theology of Sallie McFague. It then develops a Christian theological naturalism by using Kaufman's idea of historical trajectories, specifically Jesus trajectory₁ and Jesus trajectory₂. The first is the trajectory in the early Christian church assuming a personal God in the framework of Greek philosophy that results in the Trinity. The second is the naturalistic‐humanistic trajectory of creativity (God) that evolves from nonpersonal interactions in the universe and life to creativity in persons and is manifested in Jesus as love. This is elaborated further with Dean Keith Simonton's Darwinian understanding of genius and Marcus Borg's analysis of Jesus as Jewish mystic, teacher of alternative wisdom, and nonviolent resister to the domination system of the Roman Empire. What makes Jesus a religious genius is his exemplifying unconditional, universal love—a new mode of creativity (God) that has evolved from nonhuman to a human form.     

THE QUESTION OF NATURE AND GRACE IN KARL BARTH: HUMANITY AS CREATURE AND AS COVENANT‐PARTNER1

This article describes and responds to criticisms of Karl Barth recently offered by John R. Betz and John Milbank concerning this set of issues in Barth's theology: nature and grace, analogy, and a natural desire for the supernatural. It attempts to defuse these complaints by giving attention to Barth's twofold determination of humanity as both creature and covenant‐partner. Within this material, it is argued, Barth employs doctrines such as election, Christology and analogy in order to orient nature towards grace in such a way that something like a natural desire for the supernatural is present in his theology.     

Donald Campbell's Model of the Creative Process: Creativity as Blind Variation and Selective Retention

This special issue honors Donald Campbell, who died on May 6, 1996. Although Campbell became best known for his methodological contributions, he also published a classic 1960 paper in which he developed a blind-variation and selective-retention model of the creative process. Not only does this Darwinian model accurately describe Campbell's own creative modus operandi, but in addition it may provide the basis for a comprehensive theory of creativity. The articles collected for this special issue are devoted to evaluating Campbell's theoretical proposal from the hindsight of nearly 40 years of research and thinking on the creative process.     

Passing‐over: The Death of the Author in Hegel's Philosophy

Criticism of Hegel has been a central preoccupation of “postmodern” philosophy, from critical theory and deconstruction to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory and Foucauldian “archaeology.” One of the most frequent criticisms is that Hegel's invocation of “absolute knowledge” installs him in a position of authorial arrogance, of God‐like authority, leaving the reader in a position of subservience to the Sage's perfect wisdom. The argument of this article is that this sort of criticism is profoundly ironic, since Hegel's construction of the role of the Sage possessing absolute knowledge is in fact an elaborate mask covering over a radical project of disappearance of the author by which it becomes the reader who is left to author the text. The article explores Hegel's commitment to his own death as an author in his invention of a new method of demonstration, his epistemology, his philosophy of language, his theory of desire, and even in the seemingly least likely place of all, his portrait of “absolute knowledge.”     

Is creativity a Darwinian process?

In 1960, the psychologist Donald Campbell advanced a Darwinian model of how new knowledge comes into being. This would later come to be known as “evolutionary epistemology”;. For some psychologists and historians of science interested in creativity in science and technology, the Darwinian perspective was irresistible. Thus, in 1988, the psychologist Dean Keith Simonton proposed a Darwinian model of the psychology of scientific discovery by refining Campbell's model. Recently, in 1999, Simonton has devoted an entire book to “Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity.”; In this article, I challenge the Darwinian perspective by examining three episodes taken from the histories of natural science, technology and art, respectively.     

THE POWER OF RELIGIOUS NATURALISM IN KARL PETERS'S DANCING WITH THE SACRED

Abstract. This essay is an appreciative engagement with Karl Peters's Dancing with the Sacred (2002). Peters achieves a naturalistic theology of great power. Two themes are covered here. The first is how Peters gives ontological footing for a naturalistic conception of God conceived as the process of creativity in nature. Peters achieves this by conceiving creativity in terms of Darwinian random variation and natural selection combined with the notion of nonequilibrium thermodynamics. He gives ontological reference for a conception of God similar to Henry Nelson Wieman's idea of creative transformation. The second theme is how Peters succeeds in translating this nonpersonal conception of God into a powerful view of naturalistic religion that can shape a religious form of life. The key is that Peters's God can be understood as present in experience. Peters provides naturalistic interpretations of grace and the cruciform structure of creativity; the latter addresses the problem of evil in a nuanced fashion. I conclude with three critical comments about Peters's environmental ethics, his use of the notion of mystery, and his failure to have a robust conception of human fault or sin.     

Exploring the Effects of Creativity Training on Creative Performance and Creative Self‐Efficacy: Evidence from a Longitudinal Study

In organizations and educational institutions, creativity trainings are the preferred approach to enhancing individual creative abilities. However, three issues regarding these trainings still remain largely unsolved. First, the question of how long‐lasting creativity training effects are has not been sufficiently answered so far. Second, the question arises whether all participants benefit from such trainings equally in terms of their creative performance (CP). Third, an increasing number of studies have shown that creativity trainings may also be able to increase participants' creative self‐efficacy (CSE), that is, the confidence in one's own creativity. Other studies, however, did not find evidence for this effect. Therefore, this article aims to address these issues by analyzing data from three measurement waves. Results reveal that participants' CP increased during the training and decreased only slightly 4 weeks after the training. Additionally, we found an effect of diminishing training returns in that the higher a participant's CP before the training the lower the training effect was. In contrast to most prior literature, we found no support for an effect of creativity training on participants' CSE. We discuss these findings and offer implications for both theory and practice. Finally, we state this study's limitations and derive avenues for further research.     

Kant's Theory of Judgment,and Judgments of Taste: On Henry Allison's Kant's Theory of Taste

An examination of the currently fashionable thesis that scientists, and especially biologists in the wake of the Darwinian Revolution, can now solve the problems that traditional philosophers have only talked about. Past philosophers, for example during the Enlightenment, have themselves made use of contemporary, scientific techniques and theories. The present claim may only be another such move, to be welcomed by philosophers who would distinguish themselves from rhetoricians. Others may prefer to stake out the merely human or subjective world as their field, identifying 'truth' with 'what it's better to believe'. Both moderns and postmoderns must abandon the rational realism that actually sustained Enlightenment endeavours, and Darwinian explanation, on its own, must erode traditional ethical values and the meta-ethical assumptions that sustain them. Universal humanism is only one possible project among many - and Darwinian reasonings suggest that it is hypocritical. In this crisis there may after all be a rôle for traditional, Platonizing philosophers, believing that there is a truth, and that we can find it out. Such a theory is actually better able to explain our scientific successes, and our evolutionary past.     

Of words,tools, and actions

The author rejects Leon Galis's claim (Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 2) that in ‘Of Words and Tools’ (Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2) he attacks a form of the ‘use’ theory of meaning that no one has held. Galis's other claim, that the author criticizes a needlessly weak form of the theory, is found to be justified, but the author argues that his procedure was adequate, and parallel to that oi Galis's own reconstruction of the ‘use’ theory in terms of ‘goal‐directed action’. Difficulties in this reconstruction are pointed out, and some meta‐semantic issues about theories of meaning raised.     

Is Society “Sick”? Comment on Zerbe Enns's Article

The author responds critically to the argument (Zerbe Enns, 1988) that an integration of “feminist perspectives” within a “family systems” epistemology will advance the latter's treatment of “power” and “equality” issues.     

Beyond transference,countertransference, the silences and the opinion1

The author examines several works of an intersubjectivist trend, as well as writings by Hanly, Cavell and Bion, defending many of the named psychoanalysts' viewpoints. These viewpoints are expressed in the search and the struggle for truth, recognizing, like Popper, that truth exists but that we cannot know with certainty whether and when we touch upon it, only that this endless effort merits a lifetime's work because it is the attempt at an encounter with ourselves‐the true encounter. The author explains the criticisms by Green of Jacobs, and defends the maintenance of ‘a certain possible neutrality’ (Eizirik). He poses some questions with regard to Ogden's ‘third subject’, considering it, among other aspects, from the supervisory point of view, which may demonstrate the existence of ‘a certain possible objectivity’ of the emotional confl ict. He develops some criticisms concerning silence as an interpretative action by Ogden, and summarizes two case histories. Both were unconsciously attempting to manipulate the analyst intensely‐one of them to get the analyst to intervene in his love life, and the other to interrupt acting out.     

The Paradox of Beginning: Hegel,Kierkegaard and Philosophical Inquiry

This paper reconsiders certain of Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel's theoretical philosophy in the light of recent interpretations of the latter. The paper seeks to show how these criticisms, far from being merely parochial or rhetorical, turn on central issues concerning the nature of thought and what it is to think. I begin by introducing Hegel's conception of “pure thought” as this is distinguished by his commitment to certain general requirements on a properly philosophical form of inquiry. I then outline Hegel's strategy for resolving a crucial problem he takes himself to face. For his account of the nature of thought depends upon the idea of a form of inquiry in which nothing whatsoever is presupposed; but this idea appears basically paradoxical inasmuch as the mere act of beginning to inquire in a certain way embodies an assumption about how it is appropriate to begin. Turning to Kierkegaard, I consider a key objection to the effect that Hegel's strategy for resolving this paradox depends on the incoherent idea of a purely reflexive act of thinking. Finally, I draw out some central features of the alternative account of “situated” thought and inquiry which Kierkegaard presents as distinctively Socratic.     

The Structure of Evolutionary Theory : on Stephen Jay Gould's Monumental Masterpiece

Stephen Jay Gould's monumental The Structure of Evolutionary Theory “attempts to expand and alter the premises of Darwinism, in order to build an enlarged and distinctive evolutionary theory … while remaining within the tradition, and under the logic, of Darwinian argument.” The three branches or “fundamental principles of Darwinian logic” are, according to Gould: agency (natural selection acting on individual organisms), efficacy (producing new species adapted to their environments), and scope (accumulation of changes that through geological time yield the living world's panoply of diversity and morphological complexity). Gould's efforts to contribute something important to each of these three fundamental components of Darwinian Theory are far from successful.     

Teaching Disobedience: Jung,Montuori, and the Pedagogical Significance of Conflict

Alternative education often seeks to promote creativity. In so far as this tendency might come to suggest something ideological, then the intent thus indicated is liable to become self-defeating. This article considers C.G. Jung's conservative ideas about education, and explores how these notions might relate to his wider psychology. Contrasting Jung's position with Alfonso Montuori's notion of Creative Inquiry, the author argues for the importance of a more conscious relationship to the role of conflict in the development of a relationally focused pedagogy.     

The ad hominem argument of Berkeley’s Analyst

This paper responds to two issues in interpreting George Berkeley’s Analyst. First, it explains why the text contains no discussion of religious mysteries or points of faith, despite the claims of the text's subtitle; I argue that the subtitle must be understood, and its success assessed, in conjunction with material external to the text. Second, it’s unclear how naturally the arguments of the Analyst sit with Berkeley’s broader views. He criticizes the methodology of calculus and conceptually problematic entities, and the extent to which they require one to bend the rules of classical mathematics. Yet, elsewhere, Berkeley’s opinion of classical mathematics and its intelligibility is low, and he defends a pragmatic approach to word meaning that should not find fault with so functionally successful a theory. The ad hominem intention of the text makes it difficult to discern to what extent Berkeley is committed to the sincerity of these criticisms. This component of the text is rarely discussed, but I argue that when trying to decide what Berkeley’s true position is in the Analyst, we should treat its ad hominem component as its primary intention.