Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of Answers as Cues to Deception

Purpose  The purpose of this study was to test a new cognitive lie detection method, time restricted integrity confirmation (Tri-Con), which uses response time and inconsistencies across answers as cues to deception. Design/methodology/approach   Data were obtained from two samples of students enrolled in psychology classes (n = 96 for Experiment 1, n = 99 for Experiment 2). The experimental task required students to lie or tell the truth to questions probing biodata under time restriction. The foci of questions (such as Academics or Employment History) were chosen because of their relevance to participants’ lives. Findings  Tri-Con was able to distinguish between truth tellers and liars after controlling for individual differences. In one experiment, liar-truth teller classification accuracies reached 89%. Mean response times and answer consistency can be used to distinguish those who lie from those who tell the truth. Implications  Research on cognitive-based lie detectors, such as Tri-Con, hold the potential for developing reliable and valid methods of screening out employees likely to engage in misconduct and providing deceptive answers to screening questions. A cognitive lie detector would constitute a paradigm shift away from the polygraph, and could be used in tandem with integrity tests. Originality/value   This study was a preliminary test of a cognitive lie detection method based on a model of cognitive events (the Activation-Decision-Construction model) when people answer questions deceptively. It constitutes a step in translating laboratory-based cognitive research into applied technologies for the real world detection of lying, including lying that occurs during pre-employment screening. Received and reviewed by former editor, George Neuman.     

Different answers to different audiences: effects of social context on the accuracy-informativeness trade-off

Research on conversational exchanges shows that people attempt to optimise their responses’ relevance when they definitely know the correct answer (e.g., “What time is it?”). However, such certainty is often unavailable while speakers may still be under social pressure to provide an answer. We investigated how social context influences the informativeness level when answering questions under uncertainty. In three experiments, participants answered difficult general-knowledge questions placed in different social contexts (formal vs. informal). Participants generated their answers, then they were presented with a given context, and decided on the number of alternative responses they wanted to provide (single, with one alternative vs. plural, with several alternatives) and whether the answer should be reported or withheld (report option). Participants reported more answers in the informal context. In the formal context, single answers were preferred, and they were more frequently reported. We conclude that social context influences the level of informativeness in a conversation, affecting achievable accuracy. Our results also show the joint influence of the confidence and the social context on willingness to share information.     

Subjective confidence in one's answers: the consensuality principle

In answering general-information questions, a within-person confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlation is typically observed, suggesting that people can monitor the correctness of their knowledge. However, because the correct answer is generally the consensual answer--the one endorsed by most participants--confidence judgment may actually monitor the consensuality of the answer rather than its correctness. Indeed, the C-A correlation was positive for items with a consensually correct answer but negative for items with a consensually wrong answer. Results suggest that the consensuality-confidence correlation may be mediated by 2 internal mnemonic cues that are correlated with consensuality: Consensual answers are reached faster and are selected more consistently by the same person on different occasions than nonconsensual answers. The results argue against a direct-access view of confidence judgments and suggest that such judgments will be accurate only as long as people's responses are by and large correct across the sampled items, thus stressing the criticality of a representative design.     

Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: cognitive misers are no happy fools

Influential work on human thinking suggests that our judgment is often biased because we minimize cognitive effort and intuitively substitute hard questions by easier ones. A key question is whether or not people realize that they are doing this and notice their mistake. Here, we test this claim with one of the most publicized examples of the substitution bias, the bat-and-ball problem. We designed an isomorphic control version in which reasoners experience no intuitive pull to substitute. Results show that people are less confident in their substituted, erroneous bat-and-ball answer than in their answer on the control version that does not give rise to the substitution. Contrary to popular belief, this basic finding indicates that biased reasoners are not completely oblivious to the substitution and sense that their answer is questionable. This calls into question the characterization of the human reasoner as a happy fool who blindly answers erroneous questions without realizing it.     

Two methods of reducing overconfidence

Prior research has suggested that most people are seriously overconfident in their answers to general knowledge questions. We attempted to reduce over-confidence in each of two separate experiments. In Experiment 1 half of the subjects answered five practice questions which appeared to be difficult. The remaining subjects answered practice problems which appeared to be easy but were actually just as difficult as the other group's practice questions. Within each of these two groups, half of the subjects received feedback on the accuracy of their answers to the practice questions, while the other half received no feedback. All four groups then answered 30 additional questions and indicated their confidence in these answers. The group which had received five apparently “easy” practice questions and then had been given feedback on the accuracy of their answers was underconfident on the final 30 questions. In Experiment 2 subjects who anticipated a group discussion of their answers to general knowledge questions took longer to answer the questions and expressed less overconfidence in their answers than did a control group.     

Answering Questions and Explaining Answers: A Study of Finnish-Speaking Children

This research explores, within the framework of Relevance Theory, how children’s ability to answer questions and explain their answers develops between the ages of 3 and 9 years. Two hundred and ten normally developing Finnish-speaking children participated in this study. The children were asked questions requiring processing of inferential meanings and routines, and were asked to explain their correct answers to elicit understanding about their awareness of how they had derived the answers from the context. The results indicated that the number of correct answers increased rapidly between the ages of 3 years and 4–5 years. Familiarity of context had a significant effect on young children’s ability to answer questions. Becoming aware of the information used in inferencing developed gradually over time between the ages of 3 and 9. Analysis of the children’s incorrect answers and explanations showed that, as children develop, their unsophisticated answer strategies diminish and they increasingly utilize context even in incorrect answers and explanations.     

Confidence in own and others' knowledge

A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration.     

Clever hands: uncontrolled intelligence in facilitated communication

Five studies examined how people who are answering questions on behalf of another person may use their own knowledge to answer correctly while attributing authorship of their answers to the other. Experiments 1 and 2 found that participants instructed to answer yes/no questions randomly were unable to do so. They were more often correct on easy than hard questions, and extended opportunity and incentive did not reduce this effect. Experiments 3-5 found similar correctness for participants who were asked to answer yes/no questions by sensing either the ostensible keyboard finger movements or unvoiced inclinations of another person who had been admonished not to answer, and who was infact a confederate and was not even given the questions. In this paradigm, the answers were often attributed to the other.     

Automatic grading and hinting in open-ended text questions

Open-ended text questions provide better assessment of learner’s knowledge, but analysing answers for this kind of questions, checking their correctness, and generating of detailed formative feedback about errors for the learner are more difficult and complex tasks than for closed-ended questions like multiple-choice.The analysis of answers for open-ended questions can be performed on different levels. Analysis on character level allows to find errors in characters’ placement inside a word or a token; it is typically used to detect and correct typos, allowing to differ typos from actual errors in the learner’s answer. The word-level or token-level analysis allows finding misplaced, extraneous, or missing words in the sentence. The semantic-level analysis is used to capture formally the meaning of the learner’s answer and compare it with the meaning of the correct answer that can be provided in a natural or formal language. Some systems and approaches use analysis on several levels.The variability of the answers for open-ended questions significantly increases the complexity of the error search and formative feedback generation tasks. Different types of patterns including regular expressions and their use in questions with patterned answers are discussed. The types of formative feedback and modern approaches and their capabilities to generate feedback on different levels are discussed too.Statistical approaches or loosely defined template rules are inclined to false-positive grading. They are generally lowering the workload of creating questions, but provide low feedback. Approaches based on strictly-defined sets of correct answers perform better in providing hinting and answer-until-correct feedback. They are characterised by a higher workload of creating questions because of the need to account for every possible correct answer by the teacher and fewer types of detected errors.The optimal choice for creating automatised e-learning courses are template-based open-ended question systems like OntoPeFeGe, Preg, METEOR, and CorrectWriting which allows answer-until-correct feedback and are able to find and report various types of errors. This approach requires more time to create questions, but less time to manage the learning process in the courses once they are run.     

Effects of interviewer behavior on accuracy of children's responses

Previous research has shown that certain interviewer behaviors can evoke inaccurate answers by children. In the current study, we examined the effects of approving and disapproving statements on the accuracy of 3 children's answers to questions in an interview (Experiment 1). We then evaluated 3 questioning techniques that may be used by interviewers during a forensic interview in which a child provides eyewitness testimony (Experiment 2). All participants responded with more inaccurate answers when approving statements followed inaccurate information and disapproving statements followed accurate information in Experiment 1. During Experiment 2, 1 participant responded most inaccurately when she was requestioned after providing an initial answer, whereas the remaining 2 participants responded most inaccurately when the interviewer provided cowitness information and suggestive questions.     

Does mentioning "some people" and "other people" in a survey question increase the accuracy of adolescents' self-reports?

A great deal of developmental research has relied on self-reports solicited using the "some/other" question format ("Some students think that… but other students think that…"). This article reports tests of the assumptions underlying its use: that it conveys to adolescents that socially undesirable attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors are not uncommon and legitimizes reporting them, yielding more valid self-reports than would be obtained by "direct" questions, which do not mention what other people think or do. A meta-analysis of 11 experiments embedded in four surveys of diverse samples of adolescents did not support the assumption that the some/other form increases validity. Although the some/other form led adolescents to think that undesirable attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were more common and resulted in more reports of those attitudes and behaviors, answers to some/other questions were lower in criterion validity than were answers to direct questions. Because some/other questions take longer to ask and answer and require greater cognitive effort from participants (because they involve more words), and because they decrease measurement accuracy, the some/other question format seems best avoided.     

I Knew It All Along,Unless I Had to Work to Learn What I Know

After receiving knowledge regarding some topic, people usually overestimate their prior topic knowledge. Two experiments investigated whether people would claim less prior knowledge if they worked to earn their present knowledge. In Study 1, students finishing a psychology course claimed less precourse psychology knowledge if they reported devoting more effort toward the course. In Study 2, the knew-it-all-along effect was stronger for participants who were simply given the answers to questions than for participants who studied for 20 minutes to learn the answers. Both cognitive and motivational factors can account for the observed effects of effort investment on retrospective knowledge judgments.     

Can Money Buy Happiness? Evidence for European Countries

This research comes to empirical investigate the influence of income on the level of happiness. Can money buy happiness? It’s one of the most frequently disputed and researched questions of all time. At first sight, it seems easy to assign a simple answer: yes or no, but the correct answer is more difficult than these. We start from the assumption that people need to be happy but also need financial resources to feel safe. We used a panel analysis on a sample of 26 European countries over the period 2008–2016. We found that happiness increases with individual income until a threshold of 27,913 Euro per year (rounded to 35,000 USD) in European countries. Also, we found that culture plays an essential role in the perception of happiness. Moreover, our results indicate that a lower power distance, a high individualism, a low level of uncertainty avoidance and a high indulgence statistically increase the level of happiness.

     

中国特色心理学问题的思考

摘 要 中国特色社会心理学应当对在中国社会转型的独特过程中所产生的有别于欧美的社会问题进行回应,对从改革发展过程中所产生的种种具体社会问题进行解决,以此建立中国特色心理学研究。应当从中国社会转型过程中的现实、具体问题出发,提出具有现实关怀、解决社会发展中具体困难的学术问题;应当具有更深层的人文关怀、精神关怀,从心理学的角度回应中国社会转型与社会变迁形成的当代中国人精神层面的巨大变化所产生的社会问题。中国特色心理学研究应当在借鉴西方心理学研究方法的基础上,根据问题的特征选择适合的研究方法。研究中国特色心理学对中国心理学发展与中国社会发展均有巨大的积极意义。     

The Effects of Accuracy Motivation on Children's and Adults' Event Recall,Suggestibility, and Their Answers to Unanswerable Questions

This study investigated children's and adults' event recall accuracy and suggestibility effects when participants' accuracy motivation was manipulated. A total of 240 participants (6-, 7-, and 8-year-olds, and adults) were shown a video and later asked 4 types of questions: answerable questions, both open-ended and strongly misleading, and unanswerable questions, both open-ended and strongly misleading. Participants were either (a) rewarded with a token for every correct answer (high accuracy motivation, Free Report Plus Incentive condition), (b) explicitly given the option of answering with "don't know" when unsure (medium accuracy motivation, Free Report condition), or (c) asked to provide an answer to every question, even when they were not sure or had to guess or both (low accuracy motivation, Forced Report condition). The condition with the high accuracy motivation yielded the highest recall accuracy scores for answerable open-ended and misleading questions. For unanswerable questions, even the youngest age group was able to increase the number of appropriate "don't know" answers when highly motivated to be accurate, but a misleading question format undermined these abilities. The results highlight important interactions between social (accuracy motivation) and cognitive factors (metacognitive monitoring processes) in children's formal interviewing.     

States of curiosity and interest enhance memory differently in adolescents and in children

Curiosity – broadly defined as the desire to acquire new information – enhances learning and memory in adults. In addition, interest in the information (i.e., when the information is processed) can also facilitate later memory. To date, it is not known how states of pre‐information curiosity and post‐information interest enhance memory in childhood and adolescence. We used a trivia paradigm in which children and adolescents (N = 60, 10–14 years) encoded trivia questions and answers associated with high or low curiosity. States of high pre‐answer curiosity enhanced later memory for trivia answers in both children and adolescents. However, higher positive post‐answer interest enhanced memory for trivia answers beyond the effects of curiosity more strongly in adolescents than in children. These results suggest that curiosity and interest have positive effects on learning and memory in childhood and adolescence, but might need to be harnessed in differential ways across child development to optimize learning.     

儿童在回答无意义问题时的反应倾向与年龄特征

研究设计了无意义问题来考察5、6、81、0岁共128名儿童在回答问题时的反应倾向。研究结果发现:(1)5~10岁儿童在回答无意义问题时,存在猜测答案的倾向,且受问题形式的影响。较开放问题,儿童在面对封闭问题时猜测答案的倾向更强烈。(2)在无意义的非比较问题上,随年龄的增长,儿童猜测答案的倾向更强烈。(3)5~10岁儿童回答封闭的非比较问题时存在否定反应倾向,但在封闭的比较问题上则不存在这种倾向。     

What affects strategy selection in arithmetic? The example of parity and five effects on product verification

The parity effect in arithmetic problem verification tasks refers to faster and more accurate judgments for false equations when the odd/even status of the proposed answer mismatches that of the correct answer. In two experiments, we examined whether the proportion of incorrect answers that violated parity or the number of even operands in the problem affected the magnitude of these effects. Experiment 1 showed larger parity effects for problems with two even operands and larger parity effects during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and varied the proportion of problems violating parity. Larger parity effects were obtained when more of the false problems violated parity. Moreover, all three effects combined to show the greatest parity effects in conditions with a high proportion of parity violations in problems containing two even operands that were solved during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 3 generalized the findings to the case of five rule (i.e., checking whether a false product ends in 5 or 0), another procedure for solving and verifying multiplication problems quickly. These results (1) delineate further constraints for inclusion in models of arithmetic processing when thinking about how people select among verification strategies, (2) show combined effects of variables that traditionally have been shown to have separate effects on people's strategy selection, and (3) are consistent with a view of strategy selection that suggests a bias either in the allocation of cognitive resources in the execution of strategies or in the order of execution of these strategies; they argue against a simple, unbiased competition among strategies.     

Effects of meaningfulness and organization on problem solving and computability judgments

When subjects were required to calculate answers for computable problems and answer questions, an interaction was found corresponding to that obtained by Kieras and Greeno (1975) from judgments of computability. With nonsense formulas, much longer times were required to identify noncomputable problems than to compute answers, with a much smaller difference when formulas consisted of meaningful concepts. The better performance on noncomputable problems and questions with meaningful formulas corroborates an interpretation that those items test the connection of algorithms with general conceptual knowledge. Finally, it was found that for relatively complex problems, solution times and time to judge computability were longer if nonsense formulas were learned in separate sets than if they were learned in a single set; however, no such effect was found with meaningful formulas. It was concluded that learning conditions influenced the integration of cognitive structure in the case of nonsense formulas, while subjects were able to adjust organization of the meaningful formulas.