Representation and theory of mind development

This longitudinal study investigated the relation between children's early use of symbols and their later understanding of representation and metarepresentation. The performance of 64 children on DeLoache's (1987) scale model task was measured at 30, 36, and 42 months, and their false belief understanding was measured at 42 and 48 months. Language and executive function measures were taken at each time point. Scale model performance was related to concurrent and subsequent false belief understanding, and scale model performance both predicted and was predicted by language across time. Language predicted false belief within and across time, and with increasing age it mediated the relation between success on the scale model task and false belief understanding. Although executive function was related to performance on scale model and theory of mind tasks, it did not mediate the relation between these. This study provides evidence suggesting that symbolic functioning, language, and theory of mind may form part of a single skill set underlying symbolic representation.     

Neural correlates of three cognitive processes involved in theory of mind and discourse comprehension

Neuroimaging studies have found that theory of mind (ToM) and discourse comprehension involve similar brain regions. These brain regions may be associated with three cognitive components that are necessarily or frequently involved in ToM and discourse comprehension, including social concept representation and retrieval, domain-general semantic integration, and domain-specific integration of social semantic contents. Using fMRI, we investigated the neural correlates of these three cognitive components by exploring how discourse topic (social/nonsocial) and discourse processing period (ending/beginning) modulate brain activation in a discourse comprehension (and also ToM) task. Different sets of brain areas showed sensitivity to discourse topic, discourse processing period, and the interaction between them, respectively. The most novel finding was that the right temporoparietal junction and middle temporal gyrus showed sensitivity to discourse processing period only during social discourse comprehension, indicating that they selectively contribute to domain-specific semantic integration. Our finding indicates how different domains of semantic information are processed and integrated in the brain and provides new insights into the neural correlates of ToM and discourse comprehension.     

Children's understanding of idioms and theory of mind development

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis according to which theory of mind competence was a prerequisite to ambiguous idioms understanding. We hypothesized that the child needs to understand that the literal interpretation could be a false world representation, a false belief, and that the speaker's intention is to mean something else, to correctly process idiomatic expressions. Two kinds of ambiguous idioms were of interest: decomposable and nondecomposable expressions (Titone & Connine, 1999). An experiment was designed to assess the figurative developmental changes that occur with theory of mind competence. Five-, 6- and 7-year-old children performed five theory of mind tasks (an appearance-reality task, three false-belief tasks and a second-order false-belief task) and listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions inserted in context, before performing a multiple choice task. Results indicated that only nondecomposable idiomatic expression was predicted from the theory of mind scores, and particularly from the second-order competences. Results are discussed with respect to theory of mind and verbal competences.     

Observant, nonaggressive temperament predicts theory of mind development

Temperament dimensions influence children's approach to and participation in social interactive experiences which reflect and impact children's social understandings. Therefore, temperament differences might substantially impact theory of mind development in early childhood. Using longitudinal data, we report that certain early temperament characteristics (at age 3)--lack of aggressiveness, a shy-withdrawn stance to social interaction, and social-perceptual sensitivity--predict children's more advanced theory-of-mind understanding two years later. The findings contribute to our understanding of how theory of mind develops in the formative preschool period; they may also inform debates as to the evolutionary origins of theory of mind.     

Culture and the sequence of steps in theory of mind development

To examine cultural contrasts in the ordered sequence of conceptual developments leading to theory of mind (ToM), we compared 135 3- to 6-year-olds (77 Australians; 58 Iranians) on an established 5-step ToM scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004). There was a cross-cultural difference in the sequencing of ToM steps but not in overall rates of ToM mastery. In line with our predictions, the children from Iran conformed to a distinctive sequence previously observed only in children in China. In contrast to the case with children from Australia (and the United States), knowledge access was understood earlier than opinion diversity in children from Iran, consistent with this collectivist culture's emphasis on filial respect, dispute avoidance, and acquiring knowledge. Having a sibling was linked with faster overall ToM progress in Australia only and was not related to scale sequences in either culture.     

A longitudinal study of child siblings and theory of mind development

This study tested a sample of 63 children twice in a longitudinal design over 14 months to examine their theory-of-mind (ToM) understanding in relation to their number of child-aged siblings (1–12 years). Age-appropriate batteries of ToM tests emphasising false belief were given at the start of the study, when children had a mean age of 4–2 (range: 3–3 to 5–6), and at the end, when mean age was 5–4 (range: 4–3 to 6–9). Irrespective of chronological age, children with 2 or more child siblings scored significantly higher on both the earlier and the later battery than those with no child-aged siblings. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that, over and above chronological age and verbal intelligence, having more child siblings predicted higher ToM scores at Times 1 and 2. Furthermore, at Time 2, the participant's number of child-aged siblings continued to predict higher ToM scores even after controlling for age, verbal intelligence, and Time 1 ToM scores. Results were considered in relation to the kinds of family-based social and conversational experiences that might foster ToM growth throughout the period from toddlerhood to the threshold of primary school.     

Narrative rationality and the logic of scientific discourse

This essay argues that scientific discourse is amenable to interpretation and assessment from the perspective of the narrative paradigm and its attendant logic, narrative rationality. It also contends that this logic entails a revised conception of knowledge, one that permits the possibility of wisdom. The text analyzed is James D. Watson and Francis H. Crick's proposal of the double helix model of DNA.     

A microgenetic investigation of stability and continuity in theory of mind development

The processes behind the transition from consistently failing tests of false belief understanding to consistently passing the tests was investigated by tracking changes in children's mental state understanding. Participants were 42 children (aged 3;1 to 4;3). There were two conditions; an experimental condition in which children were tested on a battery of eight theory of mind tests every four weeks for six phases of testing, and a control condition in which children only completed the battery of tests at the first and last testing phases. The profiles of performance showed that an understanding of false beliefs develops gradually and the development is relatively stable. An examination of the types of explanation children give on tests of false belief understanding showed that initially they rely on reality, then they progress through a period of confusion, where they do not provide an explanation, to a final stage in which they are able to explain behaviour by referring to an individual's false belief. Further analyses examined practice effects, construct validity, and the role of verbal ability on the development of mental state understanding.     

Hermeneutics and theory of mind

In contemporary philosophy and psychology there is an ongoing debate around the concept of theory of mind. Theory of mind concerns our ability to understand another person. The two approaches that dominate the debate are “Theory Theory” (TT) and “Simulation Theory” (ST). This paper explores the connection between theory of mind and hermeneutics. Although both speak of the nature of understanding, and the way we gain and organize our knowledge of others, certain aspects of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics reflect a theory approach, long before TT itself was developed. In contrast, Dilthey’s hermeneutics reflects a simulation approach. In contrast to both of these approaches, I propose a contextual theory, as a parallel to Gadamer’s work in hermeneutics, and as a view that offers the basis for an important critique of both TT and ST.

Sibling conflict and theory of mind

This study examined conflicts between siblings in an attempt to identify variables that are related to false‐belief understanding. The variables investigated were children's use of mental state terms and specific types of arguments (Slomkowski & Dunn, 1992) that occurred during conflict episodes. Twenty‐two children between 3 and 5 years of age were administered eight false‐belief tasks and were also videotaped while playing with an older sibling. Use of other‐oriented arguments by the target child was significantly associated with success on false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. No use of argument was negatively related to performance on the false‐belief tasks after controlling for age and general language ability. Neither the use of self‐oriented arguments nor use of mental state terms was found to be associated with false‐belief performance. The findings indicate that specific features of sibling conflicts are related to children's developing false‐belief understanding.     

错误信念理解后儿童心理理论的发展

错误信念理解后儿童心理理论的进一步发展是近年来发展心理学研究中比较活跃的一个课题。该文在简要介绍儿童心理理论获得的主要标志--错误信念理解的基础上,概括阐述了该领域研究的现状和存在的争议。     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Husserl and the representational theory of mind

Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.My thanks to David Woodruff Smith and Frank McGuinness for their invaluable help with the issues addressed in this paper.     

Bergson and the holographic theory of mind

Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity.     

Belief in discourse representation theory

Conclusion I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel way, thus combining the semantics developed here with one of the theory's original motivations (Kamp, 1981a). However, these are unfortunately topics that I must reserve for another time.I am grateful to Dan Bonevac, Irene Heim, Richard Larson, Stan Peters, Rich Thomason and especially Hans Kamp and an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Philosophical Logic for comments on previous drafts of this paper, as well as to The Center for Cognitive Science for research support.     

Task instructions and implicit theory of mind

It has been hypothesized that humans are able to track other’s mental states efficiently and without being conscious of doing so using their implicit theory of mind (iToM) system. However, while iToM appears to operate unconsciously recent work suggests it does draw on executive attentional resources ( Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, & Dux, 2012) bringing into question whether iToM is engaged efficiently. Here, we examined other aspects relating to automatic processing: The extent to which the operation of iToM is controllable and how it is influenced by behavioral intentions. This was implemented by assessing how task instructions affect eye-movement patterns in a Sally–Anne false-belief task. One group of subjects was given no task instructions (No Instructions), another overtly judged the location of a ball a protagonist interacted with (Ball Tracking) and a third indicated the location consistent with the actor’s belief about the ball’s location (Belief Tracking). Despite different task goals, all groups’ eye-movement patterns were consistent with belief analysis, and the No Instructions and Ball Tracking groups reported no explicit mentalizing when debriefed. These findings represent definitive evidence that humans implicitly track the belief states of others in an uncontrollable and unintentional manner.     

A child-centred exploration of the relevance of family and friends to theory of mind development

Theory of Mind (ToM) is said to develop at around 4 years old. But some studies suggest it develops considerably earlier than this, with others suggesting it develops much later. Although several recent studies have found that social factors (like gender, family size, number of siblings, and number of friends) can impact on ToM, other studies contradict those findings. We wondered whether addressing several procedural issues and ensuring the task concerns real protagonists in real time, would bear on the above issues. Here, 114 children of 3-6 years completed four ToM tasks incorporating controls from experimental psychology, including randomly varying the order of ToM and non-ToM questions across participants. Now, children passed ToM tasks from around 5 years old, rather than 4 years or earlier. Girls did not develop ToM any earlier than boys. There was clear correlational evidence for the older-sibling effect and effects of friends but no reliable effects of nuclear or extended family. However, when these factors were set in the context of one another, the sibling effect was driven by a negative influence from younger siblings (as opposed to older siblings) and the friends effect was driven by friends at school (as opposed to friends at home). Finally, "friends" was a stronger predictor than siblings but memory (a cognitive factor) and age (a maturational factor) were the strongest predictors of all.