Reasoning with quantifiers

In the semantics of natural language, quantification may have received more attention than any other subject, and one of the main topics in psychological studies on deductive reasoning is syllogistic inference, which is just a restricted form of reasoning with quantifiers. But thus far the semantical and psychological enterprises have remained disconnected. This paper aims to show how our understanding of syllogistic reasoning may benefit from semantical research on quantification. I present a very simple logic that pivots on the monotonicity properties of quantified statements--properties that are known to be crucial not only to quantification but to a much wider range of semantical phenomena. This logic is shown to account for the experimental evidence available in the literature as well as for the data from a new experiment with cardinal quantifiers ("at least n" and "at most n"), which cannot be explained by any other theory of syllogistic reasoning.     

The case for a dual-process theory of transitive reasoning

Ever since its popularisation by Piaget around 60 years ago, transitive reasoning (deductively-inferring A > C from premises A > B and B > C) has been of psychological interest both as a mental phenomenon and as a tool in areas of psychological discourse. However, the focus of interest in it has shifted periodically first from child development, to learning disability, to non-humans and currently to cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Crucially, such shifts have always been plagued by one core question – the question of which of two competing paradigms (extensive-training paradigm versus non-training paradigm) is valid for assessing transitive reasoning as originally conceived in Piagetian research. The continued avoidance of this question potentially undermines several important findings recently reported: Such as about exactly what is involved in deducing transitive inferences, which brain regions are critical for reaching transitive inference, and what links exist between weakened deductive transitivity and mental illnesses like schizophrenia. Here, we offer the view that both of the competing paradigms are indexing transitivity, but each one tends to tap a different aspect of it. Then, we summarise studies from child and adult cognitive psychology, disabilities research, and from cognitive neuroscience. These, together with studies of non-human reasoning, seem to afford a theory of transitive reasoning that has two major components; one deductive but the other associative. It is proposed that only a dual-process theory of transitivity (having analytic versus intuitive routes approximate to deductive versus associative processing respectively) can account both for the variety of findings and the apparently-disparate paradigms. However, fuzzy-trace theory (“Gist” processes and representations), if not already embodying such a dual-process theory, will need to be incorporated into any complete theory.     

儿童类比推理的影响因素及干预促进

类比推理这一重要认知能力能够帮助儿童在未经历过的复杂情况下进行推断和学习。近年来研究者主要从行为研究、计算机模型和眼动技术的角度探究了儿童抑制控制和工作记忆在类比推理中的交互作用模式及类比推理策略对类比推理的影响。在此基础上,研究者围绕语言标签和物理表征两方面对儿童类比推理进行了干预研究。儿童类比推理的未来研究应着眼于改进研究方法、关注类比推理各加工阶段影响因素及加强儿童类比推理策略的干预应用研究。     

利/害条件下归纳推理的心理效应分离

研究设计了两类包含内容的归纳推理任务, 一类是对获得收益的可能性的推理; 另一类是避免伤害的推理。实验显示, 不同内容的归纳推理结果有显著差异。其中, 避免伤害的归纳推理表现出将伤害可能过度推延的特点; 而获得收益的归纳推理则表现出对收益可能推延不足。此外, 不同的自我卷入水平——自我卷入式推理或者非自我卷入式推理——也会对推理产生显著影响。在避害条件下, 自我卷入式推理比非自我卷入式推理表现出更强烈的过度推延的特点; 在获利条件下, 自我卷入式推理比非自我卷入式推理表现出更严重的推延不足。研究经过分析提出, 这种差异可能暗示了归纳推理的领域特殊性特征。     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

统计认知理论及应用研究

长期以来大家认为人类认知尽管可以看成是非确定的推理计算过程,但它的知识表达、模型结构、及计算方法和概率统计理论在本质上是不同的,因此认知科学和概率统计方法存在巨大的鸿沟,过去两者基本上独立发展。近年来随着Bayesian概率统计模型研究的一系列突破性工作和认知过程本质的不断被发现和挖掘,两者的相关性和互补性逐渐突显出来。许多研究者认为认知是近似遵循概率统计推理原则的,一些研究工作显示两者的结合有可能对人工智能发展产生深远的影响。本文对当前统计认知理论及应用研究的现状进行系统的梳理,并结合自身的研究对它今后的发展提出自己的看法。     

That’s what task sets are for: shielding against irrelevant information

Goal-directed behavior requires the cognitive system to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. The authors show that task sets help to shield the system from irrelevant information. Participants had to respond to eight different colored word stimuli under different instruction conditions. They either had to learn the stimulus-response mappings (SR condition), to use one task set (1 TS condition) or to use two different task sets (2 TS condition). In the 2 TS and the SR conditions, participants showed response repetition effects (interaction of color repetition x response repetition), indicating that participants processed the color of the words. Importantly, the 1 TS condition did not show such an interaction. Overall, the results provide evidence for the shielding function of task sets. This benefit turns into costs in classical task switching paradigms. From this perspective, switch costs can be interpreted as the consequence of successful shielding on the previous task.     

Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgments of scientific reasoning

Brain images are believed to have a particularly persuasive influence on the public perception of research on cognition. Three experiments are reported showing that presenting brain images with articles summarizing cognitive neuroscience research resulted in higher ratings of scientific reasoning for arguments made in those articles, as compared to articles accompanied by bar graphs, a topographical map of brain activation, or no image. These data lend support to the notion that part of the fascination, and the credibility, of brain imaging research lies in the persuasive power of the actual brain images themselves. We argue that brain images are influential because they provide a physical basis for abstract cognitive processes, appealing to people's affinity for reductionistic explanations of cognitive phenomena.     

The Relevance of Social Theory in the Practice of Environmental Management

In this paper I argue that the dominance of certain paradigms and theories on policies can have an influence on the value added by impact assessments. A link exists between paradigms and theories and policies and consequently the practices humans develop to tackle real world problems. I also argue that different types of thinking (contained in paradigms and theories) need to be integrated, at least at the scientific level, to enhance our understanding of social phenomena. This in turn can have a positive influence on policy processes that follow impact assessment recommendations. I am not arguing for the adoption of theoretical positions by practitioners, Instead, I contend that if impact assessments are informed by a variety of paradigms and theories, the policy practitioner might have a better understanding of the issue and the moral choices he or she needs to make. I will highlight the connection between theory and policies with practical examples from the social impact assessment of the De Hoop Dam, which was constructed on the Steelpoort River. I also argue for an integration of different theories to give a deeper understanding of real world problems.     

Relational integration in older adults

Reasoning requires making inferences based on information gleaned from a set of relations. The relational complexity of a problem increases with the number of relations that must be considered simultaneously to make a correct inference. Previous work (Viskontas, Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, & Knowlton, ) has shown that older adults have difficulty integrating multiple relations during analogical reasoning, especially when required to inhibit irrelevant information. We report two experiments that examined the ability to integrate multiple relations in younger, middle-aged, and older adults performing two other reasoning tasks. These tasks systematically varied relational complexity, and required either inductive reasoning (a version of the Raven's Matrices Task) or transitive inference. Our results show that as people age they have increasing difficulty in solving problems that require them to integrate multiple relations. This difficulty may stem from a decrease in working memory capacity.     

Dual-process theories of reasoning: The test of development

Dual-process theories have become increasingly influential in the psychology of reasoning. Though the distinction they introduced between intuitive and reflective thinking should have strong developmental implications, the developmental approach has rarely been used to refine or test these theories. In this article, I review several contemporary dual-process accounts of conditional reasoning that theorize the distinction between the two systems of reasoning as a contrast between heuristic and analytic processes, probabilistic and mental model reasoning, or emphasize the role of metacognitive processes in reflective reasoning. These theories are evaluated in the light of the main developmental findings. It is argued that a proper account of developmental phenomena requires the integration of the main strengths of these three approaches. I propose such an integrative theory of conditional understanding and argue that the modern dual-process framework could benefit from earlier contributions that made the same distinction between intuition and reflective thinking, such as Piaget’s theory.     

Biases and their impact on opinions of transgender bathroom usage

The relationship between personality traits and biased assimilation, evaluating arguments, and persuasive messages more favorably if supporting pre-existing attitudes, lacks adequate research. Research suggests that higher narcissistic traits are associated with biased reactions. Additionally, research suggests that people with greater scientific reasoning abilities have more biased reactions to information that challenges their attitude, as they more easily locate flaws on topics that oppose their beliefs. Participants (N = 260) completed measures to identify their views on trans bathroom use, as well as other personality and attitude measures. They were randomly assigned to read one of the two articles using fake scientific data that either supported trans people using a bathroom reflecting their gender identity or that they should use a bathroom matching their sex-assigned at birth. Participants rated the quality of the article significantly higher when their opinion on bathroom use was congruent with the article than when it was incongruent. We used regression analyses with participants' perceptions of the quality of the article as the outcome variable and scientific reasoning scores, narcissism personality index scores, open-mindedness scores as predictor variables. In the mismatch group, the higher the scores on scientific reasoning, the lower the ratings of the quality of the opinion incongruent article. In the match group, the higher the scores on open-mindedness, the lower the ratings of the quality of the opinion congruent article. This research suggests that bias reduction is necessary to function in a world where scientific facts are called into question on a consistent basis.     

The link between deductive reasoning and mathematics

ABSTRACT

Recent studies have shown that deductive reasoning skills (including transitive and conditional inferences) are related to mathematical abilities. Nevertheless, so far the links between mathematical abilities and these two forms of deductive inference have not been investigated in a single study. It is also unclear whether these inference forms are related to both basic maths skills and mathematical reasoning, and whether these relationships still hold if the effects of fluid intelligence are controlled. We conducted a study with 87 adult participants. The results showed that transitive reasoning skills were related to performance on a number line task, and conditional inferences were related to arithmetic skills. Additionally, both types of deductive inference were related to mathematical reasoning skills, although transitive and conditional reasoning ability were unrelated. Our results also highlighted the important role that ordering abilities play in mathematical reasoning, extending findings regarding the role of ordering abilities in basic maths skills. These results have implications for the theories of mathematical and deductive reasoning, and they could inspire the development of novel educational interventions.     

Comparisons in research and reasoning: Toward an integrative theory of social induction

Strong scientific theories give coherence to a body of research findings, make precise predictions about key phenomena, and guide the search for new discoveries. In social psychology, some contemporary theories fall short of this ideal. Mini-theories are prevalent (cf. Van Lange, Higgins, & Kruglanski, 2011), many predictions are merely directional (like this one!) and theorizing post-hoc. Guided by experimental reasoning, many researchers emphasize—and reify—empirical differences. Taking the experimental method as an epistemological gold standard, they regard comparative thinking as a criterion of rational thinking. Using examples from social judgment and decision making, we show how comparative reasoning can constrain theoretical development and bias assessments of human rationality. To encourage movement toward stronger theory, we describe a model of inductive reasoning in social contexts.     

情绪状态对大学生条件推理的影响

采用不同情绪效价的电影片断诱发大学生不同的情绪,并运用眼动仪器记录条件推理的过程和结果,探讨了不同情绪状态对条件推理的影响状况。实验采用3（情绪组别：积极情绪、消极情绪、中性情绪）×4（推理形式：MP、DA、AC、MT）的混合实验设计。研究结果发现,中性情绪状态下的条件推理成绩显著地高于积极和消极情绪状态,结果支持抑制假说。     

Types of abduction in tool behavior

Tool-use behavior is currently one of the most intriguing and widely debated topics in cognitive neuroscience. Different accounts of our ability to use tools have been proposed. In the first part of the paper we review the most prominent interpretations and suggest that none of these accounts, considered in itself, is sufficient to explain tool use. In the second part of the paper we disentangle three different types of reasoning on tools, characterized by a different distribution of motor and cognitive ingredients. At the conceptual level, these types of reasoning reflect the distinction between three types of abductive inference as they are described in semiotic studies. At the functional level, we suggest that these types of reasoning on tools may correspond to different mental processes, possibly implemented in different regions of the left inferior parietal lobe. This proposal can account for the different interpretations commonly associated with the role of the left parietal cortex in tool use.     

Encouraging children to think counterfactually enhances blocking in a causal learning task

According to a higher order reasoning account, inferential reasoning processes underpin the widely observed cue competition effect of blocking in causal learning. The inference required for blocking has been described as modus tollens (if p then q, not q therefore not p). Young children are known to have difficulties with this type of inference, but research with adults suggests that this inference is easier if participants think counterfactually. In this study, 100 children (51 five-year-olds and 49 six- to seven-year-olds) were assigned to two types of pretraining groups. The counterfactual group observed demonstrations of cues paired with outcomes and answered questions about what the outcome would have been if the causal status of cues had been different, whereas the factual group answered factual questions about the same demonstrations. Children then completed a causal learning task. Counterfactual pretraining enhanced levels of blocking as well as modus tollens reasoning but only for the younger children. These findings provide new evidence for an important role for inferential reasoning in causal learning.     

归纳推理和演绎推理的关系理论及其模型

推理是人类高级认知过程的一种,相关的心理学研究一般将其分为归纳推理和演绎推理两个方面。归纳推理是从特殊到一般的推理过程,与之相对的演绎推理则是从一般到特殊的过程。归纳推理和演绎推理的关系问题是当前心理推理研究领域的一个重点问题。这一问题主要有两种理论解释：一种是单过程理论,该理论认为归纳推理和演绎推理本质上是同一个认知过程,以单过程理论为基础构建的推理模型称为单维模型;另一种是双过程理论,认为归纳推理和演绎推理是两个不同的认知过程,并不同程度地受到启发和分析过程的影响。未来研究可多关注推理的时间进程,以及采用不同的研究方法对各自理论提供数据支持。     

Reasoning counterfactually: Combining and rending

Counterfactual reasoning occurs when people are asked to assume for the sake of argument that a fact they previously thought was true is now false and to draw a conclusion on that basis. To accomplish this sort of reasoning requires a revising of one's beliefs, which was simulated in the present study. Students were shown a set of statements that they were to assure themselves was consistent. They were then asked to accept a counterfactual assumption as true and reconcile resulting inconsistencies among the set of statements. In these problems, one statement is a generality (e.g., All trees on the plaza are elms), another is a particular (e.g., This tree is a pine), and one is a counterfactual (e.g., Assume this tree is on the plaza). Students preferred to reconcile the inconsistency by identifying the generality as "true" and the particular as "false." They did this more often when the assumption combined categories than when it dislodged categories and when real beliefs were at stake rather than arbitrary generalities. This study tested current models of inference for their ability to account for counterfactual reasoning and found the results to be consistent with natural deduction system, mental models, and conceptual-integration network approaches to everyday reasoning.